Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004265

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/02839/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 17th of December 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DAYKIN

Between

NF
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Appellant in person, unrepresented
For the Respondent: Ms Lecointe (Senior Home Office Presenting Officer)

Heard at Field House on 10 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal brought with permission, by the Appellant against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 7 July 2025 in which the Appellant’s protection and human rights appeal was dismissed.
2. In summary the Appellant’s case is that she is from Pakistan and identifies as bisexual. She entered the United Kingdom to study in 2022. Her parents started putting pressure upon her to marry and around July or August 2023 she revealed her sexual identity to them. They threatened to kill her and put pressure on her to return home. The Appellant fears if she returned to Pakistan she would be killed by her family due to her sexual identity.
3. The Respondent did not accept the Appellant’s claimed sexual identity or that she was threatened by her family on the basis of her assessment of the Appellant’s credibility. One of the issues was that the Appellant had attempted to send supporting evidence to the Respondent by email but failed to attach the files and a corrected email attaching the files was not sent.
4. The Appellant represented herself at the hearing before First-tier Tribunal Judge S J Clarke (“the Judge”). The Judge concluded that the Appellant was not a witness of truth and did not believe her claim as to her sexual identity or threats from her family because her account contained inconsistencies, lacked detail, lacked supporting evidence which would be readily available, and no plausible explanation had been provided for its absence. The Appellant appeared to advance the fact that she was unrepresented to the Judge as some explanation for her situation, but the Judge was satisfied that the Appellant had been sent the Guide for unrepresented appellants by the Tribunal which sets out how to present her case [§12].
5. The Judge recorded that it was put to the Appellant that she had failed to provide any supporting evidence and the Appellant replied that “she did send them to the Respondent” [25]. Part of the Appellant’s claim is that she received threatening messages from her parents but had been unable to produce them because she had lost her phone. The Respondent had raised in the refusal decision that the Appellant could have produced evidence of her parents withdrawing financial support or threats made on social media or instant messaging services like WhatsApp or Messenger from a new phone. The Judge considered the Appellant was on notice of this issue through the refusal decision [§25].
6. In response, the Judge recorded the Appellant’s explanation was that she had not read the decision letter correctly, “and she could provide the evidence and I ruled that no evidence could be submitted now at the hearing or afterwards considering this in the round.” [§27].
7. The Judge also noted that the Appellant did not provide evidence of her studies and certificates despite saying she would at the end of her asylum interview [§29]. Furthermore, there was no evidence that her parents have stopped financially supporting her and that contact has ceased. The Judge considered all this evidence was readily available.
Summary of grounds and submissions
8. The Appellant drafted her own grounds of appeal. There are five points raised in respect of the Judge’s findings:
(1) The Appellant did not advertise to the world that she is bisexual, but she is living openly in the UK, in contrast to how she lives in Pakistan [§13].
(2) The Appellant did not have anyone to tell about her sexual identity. She had a friend called Lilly who took her to a club in Newcastle, which was unfamiliar to her, towards the beginning of her arrival in the UK [§14].
(3) The Appellant used to live with a roommate, it was not a relationship, which is why there is no evidence [§19].
(4) The Appellant called the Home Office several times in August 2023 to claim asylum, she provided her name and date of birth but did not hear back. Rather than the Home Office verifying their records she was accused of failing to provide evidence [§21].
(5) The Appellant had tried to log into WhatsApp but the verification code goes to the sim card of the lost phone which is registered in father’s name [§25].
9. In granting permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal, the decision found it was arguable that the Judge had misunderstood aspects of the Appellant’s account, for example the assumption that at interview that the Appellant had claimed to be in a romantic relationship with her roommate, which was inconsistent with other evidence and what the Appellant meant when asked about living openly. It was arguable that overall, the assessment of credibility was not fairly balanced.
10. The Appellant was representing herself at the hearing before me. She handed up two documents at the hearing, the first was a skeleton argument prepared by Christina Nicholas BL, dated 7 November 2025. The second was a Rule 25 reply prepared by the same person of the same date. The Appellant informed me that the person who prepared these documents was a barrister. I confirmed that the Appellant was not expecting to be represented at this hearing by that person or any other legal representative. It was confirmed during the course of the hearing that these documents had been uploaded to CE-file but in any event my clerk sent copies to Ms Lecointe and she confirmed she was in a position to deal with them. In the event, both the skeleton argument and the Rule 25 reply said no more than was contained within the grant of permission decision and I did not derive any further assistance from them.
11. The Appellant had no further oral submissions at that stage and relied upon the written arguments.
12. Ms Lecointe on behalf of the Respondent relied upon the Rule 24 response to the grounds, which concisely stated that the Judge had directed himself appropriately, weight was a matter for the Judge, and the Judge was entitled to make those findings on the extremely limited oral and written evidence provided by the Appellant.
13. Ms Lecointe further submitted that the Appellant had not submitted any further evidence after the interview. The credibility findings, which included the timing of the claim, go to the core of the Appellant’s account. The Appellant was on notice of the issues and failed to address them. The Judge was entitled to make the conclusions about inconsistencies in the Appellant’s evidence. I was referred to Volpi and another v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464; [2022] 4 WLR 48, §2 and that the Respondent’s position is that the Appellant’s appeal amounts to a disagreement with the Judge’s findings rather than an identification of a material error of law.
14. I explained to the Appellant that she could reply to the Respondent’s submissions, she took that opportunity.
15. The Appellant said that she did email her educational certificates to the Home Office and that she has proof to demonstrate that. I asked the Appellant if she had shown the Judge that evidence and she said no, no-one had asked for it, she was unrepresented and did not know what to do.
16. The Appellant explained that she simply had a roommate and there was no sexual relationship, any suggestion otherwise was a misunderstanding [§19].
17. At this point I raised my concern about what the Judge had recorded at paragraph 27 and that it appeared to me that the Appellant had told the Judge she had further evidence in support of her appeal, but the Judge had ruled not to admit it without providing any context for the decision or reasons beyond “considering this in the round”. The Judge then proceeded to find the failure to provide evidence that should be readily available to the Appellant, as weighing against the credibility of her account (§§17, 18, 20, 22, 25, 26, 29 and 30). It seemed to me there was a ‘Robinson obvious’ (R v SSHD, Ex parte Robinson [1997] 3 W.L.R. 1162) point of potential procedural unfairness. I explained what this meant to the Appellant and invited any submissions from the parties.
18. Ms Lecointe stated that issues were raised in the refusal decision and there was ample opportunity for the Appellant to address them. Although noting that the Appellant was representing herself, timeliness was relevant to the consideration of the Appellant’s account. Ms Lecointe stated that the Judge should have accepted the Appellant’s offer to advance further evidence but the refusal to allow her to do so was not a material error. The Appellant has sought some legal representation in these proceedings but there has been no application to submit further evidence pursuant to Rule 15 (2A).
19. I explained the Rule 15 (2A) procedure to the Appellant. She informed me that the barrister that prepared the written documents did not tell her about this procedure and the appellant had understood from the letter sent to her by the Home Office (the Appellant maybe referring to correspondence from the Tribunal) that she could not submit any further evidence at this stage.
20. I reserved my decision.
Decision
21. I will deal with the procedural unfairness issue first. Presumably the Judge treated the Appellant as having made an application to rely on further evidence since she ‘ruled’ against the admission of any further evidence. However, the Judge’s decision is entirely unclear as to what was the substance of the application, any submissions of the parties and the applicable principles by reference to the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum) Procedure Rules 2014, the Senior President of Tribunals' Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal dated 1 November 2024 ('the 2024 PD') and the Equal Treatment Bench book (specifically Chapter 1: Litigants in person and lay representatives).
22. Paragraph 2 of the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum) Procedure Rules 2014 sets out the overriding objective of the Rules is to enable the Tribunal to deal with cases fairly and justly. That includes dealing with the case in ways which are proportionate to the importance of the case, the complexity of the issues, anticipated costs and the resources of the parties (2(2)(a)) and the Tribunal and avoiding unnecessary formality and seeking flexibility in the proceedings (2(2)(b)).
23. The 2024 PD says this at paragraph 1.5:
“This Practice Direction applies to appellants without representatives in the same way as it does to parties represented by lawyers. However, the Tribunal recognises the difficulties faced by appellants who are preparing and presenting their own appeal. The Tribunal will ensure that they are treated fairly and enabled to explain their case. Judges should take account of the Equal Treatment Bench Book. The Bench Book provides guidance on the Tribunal's duty to litigants in person who are referred to in this Practice Direction as appellants in person. Account will be taken of the particular needs of appellants in person when dealing with the management of the appeal and at the hearing.”
24. The 2024 PD further provides with respect to evidence at paragraph 7.14 (underlining added):
“7.14. Where any evidence is provided later than 5 working days prior to the hearing, including on the day of the hearing, the judge must decide as a preliminary matter whether to admit that evidence at the hearing. If an application is made to admit evidence which is ruled inadmissible, the judge must give specific reasons for the exclusion of that evidence in any written decision.”
25. Having regard to the overriding objective, the 2024 PD and the guidance in relation to Litigants in Persons in the Equal Treatment Bench book it is insufficient for the Judge to exclude the admission of any further evidence in a protection appeal by an applicant in person with the only reasoning being having considered it “in the round” [§27]. As the 2024 PD makes clear, “specific reasons for exclusion” must be given in any written decision, none have been provided in this case.
26. The Appellant before me has indicated that she has further relevant evidence that has already been sent to the Respondent which appears to have either not been received or not taken into account, either way, she has evidence to support her contention that it was sent. Before the Judge, the Appellant appeared to submit that she had further evidence in relation to the threats from her parents. In light of the criticism by the Judge of the Appellant’s failure to provide relevant evidence that would be available to her, it is in my view procedurally unfair for the Judge to refuse to accept any further evidence from the Appellant in circumstances which were completely unexplored and/or unreasoned.
27. The Appellant has effectively been unrepresented throughout, save for limited scope written submissions prepared by someone the appellant understands to be barrister. As I noted above, those written submissions essentially repeated the grant of permission decision and added nothing further. I accept that the appellant was unaware of Rule 15 (2A) of the Upper Tribunal Procedure Rules 2008 generally but certainly the implication of the failure to make an application pursuant to that rule that I was invited to draw by Ms Lecointe. Since the issue of procedural unfairness was raised by the Bench at the hearing, I do not consider the Appellant’s failure to make a Rule 15 (2A) application material.
28. On this issue alone in my judgment the decision of the First Tier Tribunal contains a material error of law and must be set aside in its entirety.
29. In respect of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal, I accept that the Judge’s approach to the issue of the Appellant living openly in the United Kingdom has unduly focused on attendance at named nightclubs and specific disclosure to others of her sexual identity. The Appellant’s answers at the asylum interview were much more nuanced about the shame and fear she felt in Pakistan in contrast to the United Kingdom where she feels no fear about her sexual identity becoming known, her view being that no one cares about anyone’s sexuality and that everyone can live openly and happy here (Q86, 87, 88, 94). The Judge recorded that the Appellant’s evidence at the hearing referred to her keeping herself to herself, not going out very often and the pressure of her mental health issues (§16). The Appellant is not required to publicly advertise her sexuality in order to establish that she credibly identifies as claimed, just as she is not required to have had relationships in the UK or fit a stereotypical mould of attending LGBTQ+ nightclubs or events. Additionally, I would also note that the Judge was conflating the point at issue – whether the Appellant is bisexual or would be perceived as bisexual upon return to Pakistan, with an issue that would follow on from a positive determination of that first point – how the Appellant would behave upon return and why.
30. I am not satisfied about the merits of the other grounds and conclude that they are a disagreement with the Judge’s findings rather than articulating material errors of law.
Disposal
31. In AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 the Court of Appeal agreed (at §45) with the Upper Tribunal in (MM (unfairness) Sudan v SSHD [2014] UKUT 00105 (IAC)) as to the fundamental constitutional importance of the right to a fair hearing.
32. Section 7 of the Practice Statements of the Immigration and Asylum Chambers of the FTT and the UT, dated 11 June 2018 ('Practice Statement'), concerns the disposal of appeals in the UT, and states:
“7.1. Where under section 12(1) of the 2007 Act (proceedings on appeal to the Upper Tribunal) the Upper Tribunal finds that the making of the decision concerned involved the making of an error on a point of law, the Upper Tribunal may set aside the decision and, if it does so, must either remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal under section 12(2)(b)(i) or proceed (in accordance with relevant Practice Directions) to re-make the decision under section 12(2)(b)(ii).
7.2. The Upper Tribunal is likely on each such occasion to proceed to remake the decision, instead of remitting the case to the First-tier Tribunal, unless the Upper Tribunal is satisfied that:
(a) the effect of the error has been to deprive a party before the First-tier Tribunal of a fair hearing or other opportunity for that party's case to be put to and considered by the First-tier Tribunal; or
(b) the nature or extent of any judicial fact finding which is necessary in order for the decision in the appeal to be re-made is such that, having regard to the overriding objective in rule 2, it is appropriate to remit the case to the First-tier Tribunal.”
33. In my judgment, it is clear that the Appellant has been deprived a fair hearing and the appeal should be remitted to the First Tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
34. The appeal is allowed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of material errors of law and is set aside with no findings preserved.
35. The appeal will be remitted back to the First-tier Tribunal for remaking to be heard by a different judge.

E Daykin

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15 December 2025