UI-2025-004289
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The decision
IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004289
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62506/2023
LP/00214/2025
THE IMMIGRATION ACTS
Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17th November 2025
Before
UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BULPITT
Between
Pineda April Joy Juarez
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and
Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent
DECISION AND REASONS
1. The applicant made protection and human rights claims to remain in the United Kingdom. Those claims were refused by the respondent on 14 November 2023. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal and her appeal hearing took place on 25 April 2025. The appellant did not pursue an appeal against the decision to refuse her protection claim at that hearing, but did pursue an appeal against the decision to refuse her human rights claim on the grounds that the decision was incompatible with her rights under Article 8 ECHR. First-tier Tribunal Judge Farrelly (the Judge) dismissed that appeal in a decision that was promulgated on 21 June 2025.
2. Although the Judge made an anonymity order, I do not maintain that order. The appellant did not pursue the protection claim that she initially made and there is therefore no legitimate basis for interfering with the important principle of open justice.
3. The applicant sought permission to appeal against the Judge’s decision. On 5 September 2025 a Resident Judge of the First-tier Tribunal (the Resident Judge) issued notice of his intention to set aside the Judge’s decision on the grounds that it contained an error of law, inviting any representations to the contrary to be submitted within 14 days.
4. On 12 September 2025, a different Judge of the First-tier Tribunal (the Permitting Judge) granted the appellant permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal against the decision of the Judge on the basis that it contained an arguable error of law. As a result of that grant of permission the appeal was transferred to the Upper Tribunal and directions were issued in anticipation of a hearing of the appeal.
5. On 29 September 2025 the Resident Judge, presumably unaware that permission to appeal had already been granted and having received no response to his earlier notice, purported to issue a decision setting aside the Judge’s decision and directing that the appeal be heard again in the First-tier Tribunal.
6. In my judgment the decision of the permitting Judge to grant permission to appeal is a lawful decision made by virtue of section 11(4)(a) of the Tribunals Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 which must be given effect. That being the case, by the time of the subsequent purported decision by the Resident Judge, the Upper Tribunal was already seized of the matter and the First-tier Tribunal was no longer seized of the matter. This interpretation is consistent with rule 34 of the First-tier Tribunal’s Procedure Rules which states that first a decision must be made on whether to set aside and only where the decision is not set aside should a decision be taken on whether to grant permission to appeal.
7. In summary therefore, the decision of the Resident Judge to set aside the Judge’s decision was a nullity as the appeal was no longer before the First-tier at the time it was taken, the Upper Tribunal already being seized of the appeal.
8. It is significant however that the respondent did not reply to the Resident Judge’s initial indication of his intention to set aside the Judge’s decision.. The explanation given by the Resident Judge for his purported decision are powerful. They were:
“I consider that the First-tier Tribunal’s Decision and Reasons contains a material error of law as follows. The Judge finds the relationship to be genuine but then goes on to consider cohabitation. This is no longer the relevant test as the cohabitation requirement fell away in October 2024. Once the Judge found that the relationship is genuine, he was then required to consider GEN 3.1 and GEN 3.2 and to carefully consider whether family life could continue outside of the UK and whether it would be unduly harsh to remove the Appellant. A careful balancing exercise was required when assessing proportionality and this is missing in this judgment. Further, the Judge further finds that family life cannot be engaged. The findings simply do not sit comfortably with the Judge’s earlier findings. Clearly family life is engaged. The Judge does not consider whether family life can continue outside of the UK. He also arguably falls into error by not properly considering whether the Appellant should return and make an entry clearance application.”
9. For all the reasons given by the Resident Judge I gave notice to the parties of my intention to decide this appeal without a hearing in accordance with rule 34(1) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, to set-aside the decision of the Judge and to remit the appeal for re-hearing in the First-tier Tribunal and invited them to inform the Tribunal if they opposed that course of action. The appellant notified the Tribunal that she agreed with the proposed disposal of the appeal, while the respondent did not make any representations.
10. For the reasons given I am satisfied that it is in the interest of justice that a decision is made in this appeal without a hearing. I am further satisfied that the Judge’s decision contains an error of law such that it must be set aside and a fresh hearing take place in the First-tier Tribunal.
Notice of Decision
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Farrelly contained an error of law and is set aside.
The appeal is remitted for a fresh hearing in the First-tier Tribunal before any Judge other than Judge Farrelly.
Luke Bulpitt
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
11 November 2025