Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004290

First-tier Tribunal No: EU/54658/2024
IA/00046/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 9th December 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PAUL LEWIS

Between

MARIOS THEODOSIOU
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: In person
For the Respondent: Mrs. Nolan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 20th November 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a national of Cyprus. On 16th February 2024 he applied for settled status under the provisions of Appendix EU to the Immigration Rules. His claim was refused. His appeal against that decision was dismissed by a First-tier Tribunal Judge (the ‘Judge’) in a decision promulgated on 26th August 2025.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal
2. The issues to be determined by the Judge were whether the appellant had acquired settled status in the UK; and if so, whether there had been a ‘supervening event’ to a continuous qualifying period [‘CQP’] of residence which had the effect of terminating the appellant’s right to settled status in the UK.
3. In determining those issues, at [12], the judge found ‘the Appellant has visited the UK on a reasonably regular basis since September 1999 to see friends and from time to check on his property which is rented out through an agent.’
4. No findings were made by the judge as to the number of occasions the appellant was in the UK, for how long, or in any other detail.
5. Turning to the second issue, at [15] of the decision, the Judge found: ‘the concept of supervening event is intended to apply where a person who has settled status is absent in the sense of having to reside in the UK….I reject the appellant’s suggestion that a right to settled status can be maintained by occasional physical presence during brief visits to the UK whilst clearly living permanently elsewhere….’
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
6. Permission to appeal the Judge’s decision was granted by FT Judge Gumsley in September 2025 on two grounds:
(i) The absence of findings by the judge as to when the appellant returned to the UK post 1999, and
(ii) Whether the Judge erred in incorporating a requirement to reside in the UK into the meaning of not being absent from the UK.
Discussion
7. The respondent initially submitted that the Judge made adequately reasonable findings when rejecting the appellant’s assertion that a right to settled status can be maintained by occasional physical presence during brief visits to the UK whilst still clearly living permanently outside of the UK and despite not having resided in the UK for over 20 years.
8. At the hearing, and with reference to ground one, Mrs. Nolan now conceded that in light of the brevity of the judge’s findings at [12], the judge did not make any, or any clear findings as to when the appellant had returned to the UK, for how long and on what basis since 1999 as a starting point for assessing what, if any, supervening events had occurred.
9. As to ground two Mrs. Nolan conceded that:
(i) Annex 1 to Appendix EU defined supervening event by reference to a person’s absence from the UK;
(ii) The term ‘Absent’ was not defined further in Annex 1;
(iii) That Annex 1 did not expressly require a person’s residence in the UK.
For those reasons, Mrs. Nolan conceded the Judge made a material error or law.
10. The Upper Tribunal is not bound by the respondent’s concession that the decision involved a material error of law. However, the fact that there is no dispute between the parties necessarily functions as an important factor in the assessment of whether the judge’s decision contained a material error of law. I am satisfied that the concession was properly made and indicated at the hearing that I would allow the appeal and would remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal to be decided de novo without preserving any findings of fact.
Disposal
11. The parties agreed that appropriate course was to remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal to decide the appeal afresh because a full fact-finding process was necessary upon setting aside the entirety of the judge’s decision. As ground one relates to the absence of findings, it is not appropriate to preserve any.
12. The appellant had sought leave of this Tribunal to introduce further evidence in support of his claim. Although this had reached the Tribunal, Mrs. Nolan has not assessed the evidence. I indicated that appellant should serve his evidence on the respondent and separately to the first-tier Tribunal once the matter is remitted.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the judge involved a material error of law. I allow the appeal and set aside the decision. The appeal is to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be decided de novo by a judge other than Judge Loughridge

Paul Lewis

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3rd December 2025