Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004293
UI-2025-004294
First-tier Tribunal No:
HU/00205/2025
EA/01839/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

21st September 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MAHMOOD

Between

BRUNO RICARDO MAZZO
(no Anonymity ORDER)
Appellant
and

Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Pipi, Rehoboth Law Ltd
For the Respondent: Mr Simpson, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 21 July 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The previous anonymity order made in this case is lifted. I had canvassed this with the parties at the hearing. There was no proper basis for anonymity in this case, especially since all matters had been in the public via the proceedings at the Crown Court.
2. It is the Secretary of State who brings this appeal. To ease following the decision, I have referred to the parties as they were before the First-tier Tribunal.
3. The Secretary of State appeals against the decision of a First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the Judge”) allowing the Appellant’s appeal on human rights grounds.
4. The hearing before me is to consider whether or not there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision. If I find that there is a material error of law in the decision, then it will have to remade. If I find that there is no material error of law in the Judge’ decision then the Judge’s decision which had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal will stand.
The Grant of Permission to Appeal
5. Permission to appeal was refused by the First-tier Tribunal.
6. On a renewed application, permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins in a decision sealed on 20 October 2026. The Learned Judge said as follows when granting the Secretary of State permission to appeal:
“1. The Secretary of State wishes to appeal a decision of the First-tier Tribunal allowing the appeal of the appellant against a decision refusing him leave to remain on human rights grounds.
2. The has been sentenced to 30 months imprisonment for causing death by careless driving. He was acquitted of causing death by dangerous driving. He is subject to deportation.
3. The Judge gave clear self directions and noted the particular needs of the appellant’s children, then aged 17½ and 7½, before allowing the appeal. The findings are reasoned and detailed and the Secretary of State may struggle to show that the decision is unlawful.
4. However, at paragraphs 19 and 42 of the Decision and Reasons the Judge noted that the respondent had conceded that the effect on the qualifying children of leaving the United Kingdom would be unduly harsh. The Secretary of State says that no such concession was made. It would be an unlikely mistake for the Judge to have made but it also an unlikely denial on the part of the Secretary of State if, in fact, the point was conceded.
5. I give permission to appeal on all grounds.
6. I direct the Appellant to notify the Tribunal and the Secretary of State, no more than 10 days after receiving this order, if it is the Appellant's case that the Secretary of State did make the concession identified above. If that is the Appellant’s case it will probably be necessary to ask the Judge to comment and to listen to any electronic record of proceedings.”
The Hearing Before Me
7. Mr Simpson relied on the grounds of appeal. Those grounds had said in summary as follows:
“Stay Scenario.
It is uncontroversial that the children will be impacted to some degree if the appellant is deported, however judge has treated the appellant’s absence as determinative and in so doing has failed to properly consider whether the children’s needs could be met by others in his absence….

It is submitted that the reasons put forward… with regard to the unduly harsh test, are pure conjecture and largely speculative in stating that the impact of the appellant’s absence on his eldest son ‘will significantly harm his future education and work chances, and a continuation of this disrespect for authority and boundaries, could well bring him onto the wrong side of the law.’ There is no evidence to corroborate such a finding and whilst it is acknowledged that the appellant’s absence might be a contributing factor, it cannot be said to be determinative.

Go Scenario
At [42] judge has found that whilst the appellant’s wife will gain immigration status from the appellant’s Italian nationality, ‘there is nothing to suggest that she speaks Italian, can work in Italy or could do so within a reasonable timeframe’. Furthermore, judge has also stated that the SSHD having conceded the point that it would be unduly harsh for the children to leave the UK, it therefore follows that as the children cannot be left on their own in the UK without a father or mother and is ‘clearly untenable,’ it was concluded ‘that logically it must follow that it would be unduly harsh on the qualifying partner to leave for Italy.’
12. However, it is respectfully submitted that this is incorrect. There was no such concession made. In fact, what the decision letter had stated at [28-30]; ‘It is accepted that relocating to Italy may cause disruption to your children’s education. Alternatively, your children could remain in the UK with their mother until the end of the school year and join you in Italy during the summer holidays in order to minimise disruption. You may also decide as a family that your wife and children join you in Italy, after Jorge has completed his education in the UK, in order to continue with your family life. Your younger child would be able to continue his education in Italy. Although there may be a language barrier if they relocated to Italy, English is widely spoken in Italy and taught in schools. Your children can also maintain contact with friends and family in the UK via modern methods of communication and with visits after they have travelled to Italy’ [28]. ‘Information provided by the Italian Consulate in London under their ‘Services for Foreign Citizens’ states that: 204 “Children under the age of 18 are automatically Italian if one of the parents is an Italian citizen, and their birth certificate is registered with the Italian authorities’ [29]. ‘A further source confirms that dual citizenship is permitted’ [30]”
8. In his submissions before me, Mr Simpson said that in fact the Secretary of State’s grounds were not arguing that no concession was made, He said the Secretary of State’s grounds had been wrongly made or misread. He said he could not argue that the Secretary of State did not make a concession in respect of the children. He said that although the Judge concluded it would not be unduly harsh, that it would become unduly harsh in the long term. He said that materiality was the issue.
9. Mr Simpson said that the Secretary of State was also arguing that the Judge’s findings were speculative. There was a failure to consider factors such as there would be 2 strong male persons. He said it was difficult to see how the Judge had come to the conclusions reached.
10. Mr Pipi in reply said that because it has been accepted that the ‘go scenario’ was unduly harsh then it meant the ‘stay scenario’ would also mean it would be unduly harsh for the Appellant’s wife and the parents if there was deportation.
11. Mr Pipi referred to the Judge’s decision at paragraphs 20 to 24 which referred to the evidence, He said the Judge then assessed that evidence.
12. Importantly, Mr Pipi highlighted to me that the Secretary of State’s grounds had failed to refer to the full part of the Respondent’s Refusal Letter. He said that had made the concession referred to by the Judge in the decision. The Respondent’s Refusal Letter states as follows:
“26. It is accepted that it would be unduly harsh for your son, [J] to live in Italy, the country to which you are a national. This is because he has been living in the UK since aged 9 months and is currently aged 17 years. It is considered that he is the middle of his education and may have already made plans to continue to study in the UK after the age of 18 years. Likewise, it is accepted that it would be unduly harsh to expect [B] to live in Italy as this would entail a separation from his brother. In addition, [B] would be able to continue to access treatment for his condition in the UK. “
13. Mr Simpson in reply said that there was “no father in the picture” and so the proper factual position had not been considered by the Judge.
14. I had reserved my decision.
The Correct Approach to Appeals from the First-tier Tribunal
15. I remind myself that the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal has been impressed upon the Upper Tribunal for very many years, including more recently in the decision of the Court of Appeal in MH (Bangladesh) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 688. In particular the judgment of Arnold LJ, with whom Singh and King LJJ agreed. Paragraph 29 makes clear:
“There have been many recent authorities in both the Supreme Court and this Court on the need for appellate courts and tribunals to be cautious before interfering with findings of fact and evaluative assessments by lower courts and tribunals, and in particular specialist tribunals such as the FTT. For present purposes it is sufficient to cite Lord Hamblen’s summary in HA (Iraq) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]:

‘It is well established that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist fact finding tribunal. In particular:

(i) They alone are the judges of the facts. Their decisions should be respected unless it is quite clear that they have misdirected themselves in law. It is probable that in understanding and applying the law in their specialised field the tribunal will have got it right. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49; [2008] AC 678 per Baroness Hale of Richmond at para 30.

(ii) Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49; [2011] 2 All ER 65 at para 45 per Sir John Dyson.

(iii) When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at para 25 per Lord Hope of Craighead.”
16. The legal test to be met by the Appellant to show a material error of law is to be found in the Court of Appeal’s decision in R(Iran) and others v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 982; [2005] Imm. A.R. 535.
Consideration and Analysis
17. In my judgment, the Secretary of State’s grounds of appeal did not fully set out what had been conceded by her in the Refusal Letter. It is disappointing that occurred and it is obviously important that grounds of appeal are properly set out so that the Judge considering them is aware of the surrounding matters. It is clear to me that if the Secretary of State had referred to paragraph 26 of her own Refusal Letter in her grounds of appeal, then the grounds would have been considered in an entirely different way. However, because of the way that the Secretary of State’s grounds were drafted, the Upper Tribunal had made directions in respect of listening appointments of the hearing which had taken place at the First-tier Tribunal. All of that could have been avoided if the Secretary of State’s grounds had referred to paragraph 26 of the Respondent’s Refusal Letter.
18. I am grateful to Mr Simpson for taking the fair approach that he did, albeit the Respondent notes of the hearing at the FTT did not appear to accord with the concession made in the Refusal Letter either.
19. I have reviewed the Judge’s decision and I have reflected on it. As I have stated above, the expertise of the First-tier Tribunal has to be at the forefront of my consideration. I also take into account that the Judge had the benefit of seeing and hearing from the Appellant and his witnesses at the hearing. The Respondent was represented at the hearing and was able to represent the interests of the Respondent, including by challenging the oral and written evidence. It is inappropriate for me to conduct some form of rehearing just because the matter relates to deportation and just because it is the Respondent who brings the appeal.
20. The Judge referred to the correct law at paragraphs 9 to 14 of the decision, including with reference to the correct statutes and Supreme Court decisions.
21. The Judge referred to the issues at paragraphs 14(a) and (b) of the decision.
22. The Judge noted that the immigration history of the family was agreed between the parties. The Judge then set that out evidence out in some detail in the paragraphs which followed. This included that it was accepted that the Appellant was in a genuine and subsisting relationship with his wife and children. It was also accepted by the Secretary of State that the UK family met the decision of “Qualifying Partner” and “Qualifying Children” for the purposes of the law.
23. The Judge referred to section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 at paragraph 27 onwards of the decision. At paragraph 33 the Judge noted that the children had spent virtually their whole lives in the UK. They have other close relatives living nearby and have a circle friends. The Judge referred to the letters from the headteacher. The Judge noted the very serious medical issues which B has to deal with as child. The Judge noted the extreme closeness of the relationship between the child and the father.
24. At paragraph 41 the Judge concluded:
“I find that looking at both these two children, their future is bleak if their father is not physically present in the UK with them - so unduly harsh; sufficient to meet the exacting test clarified in HA(Iraq).”
25. The Judge noted the facts and came to a conclusion that:
“… I find that logically it must follow that it would be unduly harsh on the qualifying partner to leave for Italy; she is the mother and main carer of the children and to argue otherwise would mean that she would either leave the children here alone in the UK, which (as she is the main carer) is clearly untenable in the absence of the Appellant, or depart as a family of three for Italy when (the Respondent has already conceded that) it would be unduly harsh on the children”
26. The Judge unarguably did have all of the facts in mind when coming to that decision, including the limited time that the Appellant had actually lived in Italy and the whole of the family circumstances.
27. I therefore conclude that the Secretary of State’s grounds had failed to refer to paragraph 26 of her own Refusal Letter which had made a clear and unequivocal concession. The rest of the grounds are mere disagreement with the Judge’s decision and an attempt to reargue the case.
28. In my judgment, read as a whole, the Judge’s decision is unimpeachable.
29. Accordingly, I dismiss the Secretary of State’s appeal. The effect is that the Judge’s decision which had allowed the Appellant’s appeal on human rights grounds stands.
NOTICE OF DECISION
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not contain a material error.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal which had allowed the Appellant’s appeal on human rights grounds stands.

11 September 2026
Abid Mahmood
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber