Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004306
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58377/2024 LP/03677/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 20th April 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WALSH

Between

LPM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms. S Panagiotopoulou, Counsel, instructed by Sentinel Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms. S McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellantis granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. This is the re-making under Section 12 (2) (b) (ii) of the Tribunals, Courts, and Enforcement Act 2007 of a First-tier decision dated 16 July 2025 which I set aside with preserved findings in my decision promulgated on 18 January 2026.

Anonymity Order

2. The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order in this appeal, which I maintained at the error of law hearing, because the appellant has made a claim for international protection. No party asked for this to be set aside and I consider it appropriate for that order to continue because the public interest in the UK’s compliance with its international obligations and in the confidentiality of the asylum system outweigh the public interest in open justice in this case.

Background Facts

3. For convenience, I repeat here the summary contained in my decision of 18 January 2026 appended below.

4. The appellant is a national of the Democratic Republic of Congo. She arrived in the United Kingdom on 6 September 2019 and claimed asylum the same day. The essence of her claim is that she was a member of the UDPS and had been detained on four occasions between 2016-2019. Her last period of detention occurred after the election of President Tshisekedi. She said she was taken from her house where she had convened a meeting of UDPS members dissatisfied with President Tshisekedi and the lack of development since his election. She was held in a camp for four months where she was subjected to forced labour and rape. Her escape was facilitated by one of the security officers who had raped her but came to feel sorry for her. The security officer warned that the appellant needed to leave the country as her life was in danger.

5. The account given by the appellant in her asylum interview led to a referral to the National Referral Mechanism. The NRM determined there were Conclusive Grounds to accept that the appellant had been a victim of modern slavery.

6. I preserved the following findings from the facts accepted by the FtT:

a. The appellant was arrested at her home, detained and ill-treated as a result of her political activities.
b. The appellant’s political activities included a political meeting for the UDPS in her own home.
c. The appellant was subjected to detention, mistreatment and sexual abuse after the UDPS meeting in her home.

7. Additionally, I determined in my decision of 18 January 2026, that as there was no challenge or adverse credibility finding in relation to the appellant’s claim that the meeting at the appellant’s home was for UDPS members opposed to President Tshisekedi, this was a material fact the FtT ought to have taken into account.

8. For the avoidance of doubt the respondent accepted that the appellant’s claim, based on her actual or imputed political opinion, engaged the Refugee Convention.

Legal Framework

9. The appellant claimed asylum prior to the commencement of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022. Therefore the lower standard of proof is applicable. That is, it is for the appellant to show that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that for a Convention reason, she has a well-founded fear of persecution and owing to that fear she is unwilling to avail herself of state protection.

10. The appellant has made a claim for international protection. Accordingly, the I have applied the most anxious scrutiny to the appellant’s claim R (on the application of YH) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 116 at [22-24].

11. I had regard to PO (DRC – Post 2018 elections) DRC CG [2023] UKUT 00117 (IAC), the relevant country guidance in this appeal.

12. I also take into account paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules, that is, that past persecution is to be regarded as a serious indication of the appellant’s well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm unless there are good reasons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated.

Issues for Determination

13. The two questions for me to determine in this remaking are:

a. Whether the appellant falls within a category of persons identified in PO as potentially being at risk.

b. If so, having carried out a fact-sensitive analysis as required by Headnote 2 of PO, whether there is a real risk to the appellant on return of persecution/ill-treatment.

The Hearing

14. The composite bundle before me consisted of 245 pages, including the appellant’s updating supplementary bundle, the admission of which I allowed at the error of law hearing.

15. Additionally I considered the Country Information Policy Notes (“CPIN”) on the Democratic Republic of Congo: Opposition to the Government, Version 4.0 (November 2023) which is the most recent.

16. The appellant did not give evidence. As the credibility of the appellant’s account was not in issue, her account having been accepted at First-tier and preserved, in my judgment it was not necessary to hear from the appellant nor did Ms. McKenzie indicate that the appellant was required for cross-examination.

17. Ms. McKenzie noted at the outset that the appellant has permission to remain until 11 September 2026 under the family private law rules as the mother of dependent children whose father has been granted permission to remain. The appellant, nevertheless, pursues her appeal.

18. In her submissions, Ms. Panagiotopoulou argued that the appellant had a high profile for the purposes of Headnotes 1 (ii) and 2 (a) of PO. The appellant, Ms. Panagiotopoulou submitted, is likely to have come to the attention of the authorities by virtue of the circumstances prompting her flight from the DRC, namely her extended detention, rape and forced labour together with the warning to flee the country. Given that it was her opposition to President Tshisekedi whilst still a member of the UDPS that brought about her detention and ill-treatment, she could not be properly characterised as a member or activist of the UDPS for whom there was considered to be no risk in PO at [142]. Further, the ill-treatment of the appellant occurred under the current regime.

19. Ms. Panagiotopoulou drew my attention to Section 10 of the CPIN and in particular paragraphs 10.2.12 and 10.13 citing the US State Department (USSD) Human Rights Report from 2022 referring government restrictions on freedom of expression including the intimidation, threat and arrest of those who publicly criticised the government. Ms. Panagiotopoulou also relied on paragraph 10.2.15 of the CPIN citing the Human Rights Watch World Report from 2022 referring to “an atmosphere of growing intolerance for dissenting voices, repression against journalists, activists, government critics, and peaceful protestors.”

20. In the supplementary bundle, Ms. Panagiotopoulou highlighted the opening line of the Executive Summary of the 2024 USSD report which states that there had been no significant changes in the human rights situation in the past year. Section C of the same report was relied on by Ms. Panagiotopoulou; that section refers to enforced disappearances by or on behalf of the government and reports that the whereabouts of some human rights defenders, civil society activists and civilians arrested by the SSF remained unknown for long periods with no effort by the government to prevent, investigate, or punish these acts.

21. Ms Panagiotopoulou submitted that given the past persecution suffered by the appellant perpetrated under the current regime and the country evidence indicating that the situation has not changed for opponents to President Tshikedi, the appellant remains at risk of persecution or ill-treatment if she is returned to the DRC. She therefore urged me to allow the appellant’s appeal.

22. Ms McKenzie invited me to dismiss the appellant’s appeal. She relied on the reasons for refusal letter and respondent’s review. Whilst the past persecution suffered by the appellant was accepted and should be given some weight, Ms. McKenzie argued that the appellant’s past ill-treatment needs to be put into the context of the current risk matrix and submitted that the appellant had not demonstrated a current real risk of persecution.

23. Emphasis was placed by Ms. McKenzie on Headnote 1 and 1 (ii) of PO (set out in full below) establishing that the election of President Tshisekedi led to a durable change to the risk of persecution to actual and perceived opponents of both former President Kabila and current President Tshisekedi such that save for those with a high profile, opponents of President Tshisekedi are not reasonably likely to be at real risk.

24. Ms. McKenzie did not accept that the appellant fell within the categories of people referred to in the country evidence as experiencing current ill-treatment by the Tshisekedi regime. In any event, Ms McKenzie argued that more weight should be attached to PO than to the USSD report as PO is based on country expert evidence. Ms. McKenzie submitted boldly that according to PO there is no risk to those expressing opposition to the government. However, Ms. McKenzie went on to argue that to fall within a risk category in PO, the appellant would have to demonstrate that she had a profile of significant and active opposition to the regime referring to PO at [136].

Discussion and Findings

25. As this appeal turns on whether the appellant falls within a category of persons identified in PO as potentially being at risk of ill‑treatment, the relevant parts of the headnote are set out below.

1. The change in Presidency, following the elections held on 30 December 2018 and the announcement on 10 January 2019 that Felix Tshisekedi was the winner of the elections, has led to a durable change to the risk of persecution to actual and perceived opponents of former President Kabila and current President Tshisekedi, such that the following general guidance applies:

(i) Actual or perceived opponents of former President Kabila are not at real risk of persecution upon return to the Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”).

(ii) Generally speaking, rank-and-file members of opposition political parties or political opponents of President Tshisekedi and/or the Sacred Union are not reasonably likely to be at real risk. That must be distinguished from high-profile opponents who may be at risk in some circumstances.

2. The assessment of those at real risk of persecution for reasons relating to [1(ii)] requires a fact-sensitive analysis of the individual’s profile, wherein the following (non-exhaustive) factors will be relevant:

a. Whether an individual is a sufficiently high-profile opponent of President Tshisekedi having regard to their role and profile, including involvement in activity that is likely to have brought them to the adverse attention of the Tshisekedi regime.

b. The political party of which the individual is an officer or member, or to which the views of the individual are aligned.

c. The position of the political party or the views of the individual towards President Tshisekedi and the Sacred Union.

d. The nature and frequency of the individual’s activities in opposition to Tshisekedi’s Sacred Union and to what extent the authorities know about him/her.

e. It is unlikely that a rank-and-file member of any opposition party or group will have a sufficient profile such that they will be at real risk upon return without more.

3. In particular:

…

(ii) Members or supporters and activists of the UDPS are no longer at risk upon return to the DRC. The country guidance set out in AB and DM Democratic Republic of Congo CG [2005] UKAIT 00118, endorsed in MK DRC CG [2006] UKAIT 00001 and re-affirmed in MM (UDPS members – Risk on return) Democratic Republic of Congo CG [2007] UKAIT 00023, as far as it relates to the risk of persecution of UDPS members and activists, should no longer be followed.
…

(iii) Failed asylum seekers are not at risk on return simply because they are failed asylum seekers and there is no basis in the evidence before us to depart from the guidance set out in BM and Others (returnees – criminal and non-criminal) DRC CG [2015] UKUT 00293.

(iv) There is no credible evidence that the current authorities in the DRC are interested in monitoring the diaspora community in the UK; nor is there is any credible evidence that the intelligence capability exists, even if there were the appetite.

26. I turn first to the question of whether the appellant falls with Headnote 1 (ii), that is high-profile opponents of President Tshisekedi who may be at risk. There is no specific definition of “high-profile” in PO. Rather, Headnote 2 sets out the factors to take into account in the assessment of those at real risk of persecution.

27. It is clear that the appellant does not have the profile some UDPS members who have been detained and arrested, such as the former head of the UDPS and President Tshisekedi’s former security advisor [see CPIN 10.2.10].

28. However, it is equally clear to me that the appellant cannot be considered a rank-and-file member of an opposition party or a “mere” political opponent of President Tshisekedi given the appellant’s arrest, prolonged detention and ill-treatment. In my judgment this accepted factual matrix is sufficient to bring the appellant within Headnote 1 (ii) requiring the fact sensitive analysis of the appellant’s risk profile with reference to the factors in PO Headnote 2.

29. It was accepted that the appellant was arrested and detained at her own home whilst hosting a meeting of UDPS members opposed to President Tshisekedi.

30. As the authorities attended her home to arrest her, it is reasonable to infer that she must have been “on the radar” as an active opponent of the President. Accordingly, I find that the appellant engaged in activities which had brought her to the adverse attention of the authorities PO Headnote 2(a), 2(d).

31. Given the length of her detention, the extent of ill-treatment, and the warning to flee the country; it is also reasonable to infer that the appellant’s activism must have been perceived as significant, PO Headnote 2 (a), 2(d).

32. I have considered the fact that the ill-treatment suffered by the appellant occurred nearly seven years ago. In the appellant’s asylum on 10 February 2020, the appellant said the last time she had spoken to her family was a month and a half prior to the interview [Q/R 48]. She didn’t know whether the authorities had approached her family after she left as they had spoken only superficially and the phone number she had for them no longer worked [Q/R 279]. There is therefore no evidence whether or not authorities have made enquiries about her in her absence and this is not a matter raised by the respondent in the hearing. Accordingly it is not a matter I can take into account when assessing the current risk to the appellant.

33. The CPIN and country evidence in the appellant’s bundle and supplemental bundle do not suggest that the situation has improved in the past seven years for opponents of President Tshisekedi with a high risk profile. It is clear from the country evidence that whilst the situation generally is worse in conflict-affected areas of the DRC, ill-treatment of government opponents is not isolated to those areas. For example, the USSD 2024 report does not suggest that the disappearance and/or prolonged detention of human rights defenders, civil society activists or civilians arrested by security personnel is geographically restricted (also cited in the CPIN at 10.2.13).

34. Ms. Panagiotopoulou, did not seek to persuade me that I should depart from the country guidance in PO. Contrary to the submission of Ms. McKenzie therefore, there is no conflict between PO and the country evidence as PO clearly acknowledges in Headnotes 1 (ii) and 2 an ongoing risk to government opponents, albeit those with a high profile. The country evidence is relevant to the assessment of the current situation for those who fall within the categories of persons defined by PO as those who may be at risk.

35. In sum, applying the guidance in PO, I have found that the appellant falls within the category of the opponents to the Tshisekedi regime who may be at risk of ill-treatment. Having considered the totality of the evidence and applying paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules, I find there is nothing in the evidence providing a good reason to consider that the past persecution suffered by the appellant would not be repeated.

36. Accordingly, I find that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that the appellant will suffer persecution on account of her actual or perceived political opinion. As the risk emanates from the state, there is no question of sufficiency of protection or internal relocation.

37. I therefore allow the appeal on Refugee Convention and article 3 ECHR grounds.

Notice of Decision

38. The appeal is allowed on Refugee Convention and article 3 ECHR grounds.

M Walsh

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

13 April 2026

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No:UI-2025-004306
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58377/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WALSH

Between

LPM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Ms. S. Panagiotopoulou, Counsel instructed by Sentinel Solicitors

For the Respondent: Mr. M. Parvar, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 8 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Anonymity Order
1. The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order in this appeal because the appellant has made a claim for international protection. No party asked for this to be set aside and I consider it appropriate for that order to continue because the public interest in the UK’s compliance with its international obligations and in the confidentiality of the asylum system outweigh any identifiable public interest in the precise details of this appellant’s identity.
Background
2. The appellant appeals with permission the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 16 July 2025 dismissing her appeal against the Respondent’s decision dated 14 March 2024 refusing her protection claim. The appellant was granted permission to stay until 11 September 2026 as the parent of her three dependent children, but sought to pursue her protection claim.
3. The appellant is a national of the Democratic Republic of Congo. She arrived in the United Kingdom on 6 September 2019 and claimed asylum the same day. The essence of her claim is that she was a member of the UDPS and had been detained on four occasions between 2016-2019. Her last period of detention occurred after the election of President Tshisekedi. She said she was taken from her house where she had convened a meeting of UDPS members dissatisfied with Tshisekedi and the lack of development since his election. She was held in a camp for four months where she was subjected to forced labour and rape. Her escape was facilitated by one of the security officers who had raped her but came to feel sorry for her. The security officer warned that the appellant needed to leave the country as her life was in danger.
4. The account given by the appellant in her asylum interview led to a referral to the National Referral Mechanism. The NRM determined there were Conclusive Grounds to accept that the appellant had been a victim of modern slavery.
First-tier Decision
5. The FtT identified the two issue in dispute as follows at [8]:
a. The credibility of the appellant’s claimed political activities for the UDPS and her claimed political profile there, including whether that profile was the reason for her accepted detention and mistreatment in the DRC;
b. If credible, whether the appellant faces a real risk of persecution or other serious harm as a result.
6. At [17] the FtT records the respondent’s “byzantine” approach to credibility in not seeking to resile from the NRM minute whilst simultaneously maintaining that the appellant’s claimed political activities were not credible and could not have resulted in her detention and mistreatment.
7. The FtT set out the conclusion of the NRM minute at [19], finding at [20] that the respondent’s position could not be reconciled with the NRM position which clearly stated that the appellant had been engaged in political activities and this was the reason she was detained for four months.
8. Consequently at [21] the FtT stated:
In my judgement, the respondent clearly stating that the NRM decision is not disputed or retracted in any way, the conclusions in that decision mean that there is at least a reasonable likelihood the appellant was detained and mistreated as a result of her political activities, including a political meeting for the UDPS in her own home, as set out clearly in the NRM minute. She was then subjected to four months of detention, mistreatment and sexual abuse.
9. Having taken account of the appellant’s oral evidence and applying the lower standard of proof, the FtT concluded that there is a reasonable degree of likelihood that the appellant’s claims are true [22].
10. The FtT then went on to consider whether a person with the appellant’s profile was at risk of serious harm or persecution with reference to the country guidance in PO (DRC – Post 2018 elections) DRC CG [2023] UKUT 00117 (IAC). Finding that none of the country information provided by the appellant persuaded him to depart from PO, he found that the appellant was not at risk stating:
25. The key conclusions at paragraphs 142 and 143 of the country guidance case are that members and supporters of the UDPS are no longer at risk of harm and that previous country guidance to the opposite effect should no longer be followed.
26. The appellant's case is that as a result of her UDPS activism she was previously detained and persecuted and that aspect of the claim is accepted. Given the country guidance case, however, and despite the fact she is a victim of past persecution, the current background country information suggests she would not be at risk a upon return as a UDPS activist now.
Grounds of Appeal
11. The grounds of appeal are two fold:
a. that the FTTJ failed to assess the individual circumstances of the appellant’s claim and;
b. that the FTTJ misapplied paragraphs 142 and 143 which state rather than being eradicated, the risk to UDPS activists is “considerably diminished”.
12. The First-tier tribunal’s refusal of permission to appeal found an arguable error of law arising from both grounds but determined that neither error was material. Granting permission, Upper Tribunal Judge Blundell found an error in the failure of the FtT to assess the appellant’s individual circumstances and referred to the guidance on permission to appeal that disputes on materiality should be left to the appeal process and not form the basis of the refusal of permission to appeal.
Discussion
13. In reaching my decision, I have taken into consideration the contents of the bundle and the submissions of Ms. Panagiotopoulou and Mr. Parvar which will not be rehearsed here but I will refer to the aspects I considered to be material in the discussion below.
14. The appellant submitted an application under rule 15 (2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 to adduce updated country information. Ms. Panagiotopoulou confirmed that she did not seek to rely on the material for the error of law hearing but in the event the appeal was allowed, sought permission for that material to be adduced in a remaking/remitted hearing.
15. With respect to the two grounds of appeal, Ms. Panagiotopoulou accepted that they in fact are merged. The principle challenge is that the FtT erred in assessing the risk to the appellant as simply that of a member, supporter or activist of the UDPS without taking into account the particular facts of her claim. I consider therefore it has not been necessary for me to consider ground 2 separately.
16. I reminded myself of the country guidance in PO and in particular to Headnotes 1 (ii), 2 and 3 (ii) together with paragraphs 133, 142 and 143 which are most relevant to this appeal.
17. An issue arose, in the course of submissions, as to whether Ms. Panagiotopoulou sought to persuade me to depart from PO. Ms. Panagiotopoulou clarified however that she was not submitting that the country guidance should be departed from but rather that the appellant fell to be considered within the categories of persons considered in PO to still potentially be at risk [para 133 of PO].
18. As the principal ground of appeal turns on the question of the fact-sensitive analysis referred to in Headnote 2 , it is worth setting that Headnote out in full:
2. We find that the durable change that we refer to following the elections held on 30 December 2018 is such that generally speaking, rank-and-file members of opposition political parties or political opponents of President Tshisekedi and/or the Sacred Union are not reasonably likely to be at real risk. That must be distinguished from high-profile opponents who may be at risk in some circumstances. The assessment of those at real risk of persecution as actual or perceived opponents of President Tshisekedi requires a fact-sensitive analysis of the individual’s profile, wherein the following (non-exhaustive) factors will be relevant:
a. Whether an individual is a sufficiently high-profile opponent of President Tshisekedi having regard to their role and profile, including involvement in activity that is likely to have brought them to the adverse attention of the Tshisekedi regime.
b. The political party of which the individual is an officer or member, or to which the views of the individual are aligned.
c. The position of the political party or the views of the individual towards President Tshisekedi and the Sacred Union.
d. The nature and frequency of the individual’s activities in opposition to Tshisekedi’s Sacred Union and to what extent the authorities know about him/her.
e. It is unlikely that a rank-and-file member of any opposition party or group will have a sufficient profile such that they will be at real risk upon return without more.
19. It was common ground that the FtT did not undertake the ‘fact-sensitive’ analysis of the appellant.
20. Ms. Panagiotopoulou submitted that the particular facts which should have been considered were the circumstances of her last period of detention and escape, notably her opposition to President Tshisekedi and her escape. Under that factual matrix, Ms. Panagiotopoulou argued, the appellant would fall to be considered as an opponent to President Tshisekedi with a significant profile.
21. Mr. Parvar argued that at no time had the appellant put herself forward as having a “high profile”, referring me to that appellant’s activities as a member of the UDPS which included recruiting UDPS members and distributing information [AIR Questions 147-155 CB 182-183]. On that basis, Mr. Parvar submitted it was not necessary for the FtT to undertake further assessment as the appellant did not fall within Headnote 1 (ii) of PO, ie high profile opponents who may be at risk in some circumstances.
22. In her AIR [Questions 123-136 CB 177-180, 222 CB 195] and in her witness statement dated 10 September 2024 [CB 48 at paragraph 5], the appellant stated that she was part of a UDPS faction who felt betrayed by President Tshisekedi and she no longer supported him. The meeting at her home was of those expressing dissatisfaction with President Tshisekedi and was held in her home because they were afraid to hold the meeting in public.
23. Whilst no specific reference is made to the nature of the meeting in the NRM minute set out in the FtT decision at [19], the appellant’s account in the AIR was clearly taken into account as the NRM minutes states: “the information provided is broadly consistent with similar accounts and timeframes across the NRM referral form, Screening and Asylum Interview Record”. The NRM minute goes on to state “There are no significant credibility concerns within your account.”
24. As set out above, the FtT accepted, as per the NRM minute and in her evidence before him that the appellant’s detention flowed from her political activities “including a meeting for the UDPS in her own home.” The FtT states that he has accepted, applying the lower standard of proof, that the appellant’s claims are true. Whilst he is silent as to the nature of that meeting, he does not make an adverse credibility finding as to what the appellant says about it. It must follow, therefore, that the FtT accepted as true what the appellant said about the nature and purpose of the meeting.
25. The meeting at the appellant’s house was therefore, not just a meeting of UDPS activists/members but of UDPS members no longer supportive of President Tshisekedi who felt it was not safe to meet in public. This, in my judgment, is a material fact.
26. In my judgment, therefore, to state as the FtT does at [26] that the appellant’s claim is based on her UDPS activism, is not an accurate reflection of her claim and indicates that the FtT did not take into account the material facts of the appellant’s expressed opposition to President Tshisekedi and nature and circumstances of the meeting at the appellant’s house.
27. In my judgment, failing to take account of the appellant’s opposition to President Tshisekedi led the FtT to take the wrong ‘starting point’ for assessing the appellant’s risk on return in the context of the country guidance in PO which in turn led to the consequent failure to undertake a fact-sensitive analysis of the appellant under Headnote 2. These failures, I find, constitute an error of law.
28. In considering whether the error of law is material, I have considered the appellant’s circumstances together with the country information that was before the FTT, including the CPIN DRC: Opposition to the government dated November 2023. That material contains evidence of repression and intolerance of dissent by the Tshisekedi government, including the arrest and detention of those who were high ranking members of the UDPS for publicly criticising President Tshisekedi [see CPIN 10.2.10 -10.2.11]. It is must be acknowledged that those UDPS members referred to, the former head of the party and the head of the former security, are undoubtedly high profile.
29. However, the factors relevant to risk assessment set out in 2(a) and 2(d) of Headnote 2 in PO focus on the likelihood that a person would have come to the adverse attention of the authorities.
30. Taking into account the circumstances of the appellant’s last period of detention, in particular her prolonged detention, escape from custody and the warning for her to flee the country, I cannot be confident that the FtT would have arrived at the same conclusion if there error had not been made. I thus find the that error of law is material.
31. Accordingly I set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.
Disposal
32. I have considered carefully the principles in Begum and the Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). Given the nature of the error of law found, and specifically that it does not involve adverse credibility findings or procedural unfairness, it is appropriate for the Upper Tribunal to retain jurisdiction and remake the decision.
33. I have considered the principles in AB (preserved FtT findings; Wisniewski principles) Iraq [2020] UKUT 00268 (IAC). I have taken into account that there was no Rule 24 response challenging the FtT credibility findings nor was any attempt at the hearing to challenge these findings. The FtT findings accepting the credibility of the appellant’s claim at [20], [21], and [22] are therefore preserved.
Directions
34. The appellant’s application under Rule 15 2(A) is granted and the parties have permission to rely on evidence that was not before the First-tier Tribunal. Any such evidence must be filed with the Upper Tribunal and served on the other party at least fourteen days before the resumed hearing.
35. No later than 7 days before the hearing, the appellant must provide to the Upper Tribunal and the respondent any skeleton argument upon which they intend to rely.
36. No later than 3 days before the hearing, the respondent must provide to the Upper Tribunal and the appellant any skeleton argument upon which they intend to rely.
37. No later than 14 days before the hearing, any request for the Upper Tribunal to provide an interpreter is to be made in writing, stating clearly the language and any specific dialect required.

Notice of Decision
38. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved a material error of law and is set aside.

Martha Walsh

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

18 January 2026