Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025 004308
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/66287/2023
LP/09327/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 1st of May 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BURNETT

Between

R.M.
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr M McCarthy instructed by Lexwin Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Gilmore, senior presenting officer.

Heard at Field House on 4 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. I have maintained the anonymity order as the appellant has made a protection claim.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is the appellant’s appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (FtT) dated 25 July 2025, which was an appeal from the decision of the respondent refusing a protection claim.
Background
2. The appellant is from Nigeria. The appellant claimed a risk of persecution on the basis that her daughter could be subjected to female genital mutilation (FGM) by her husband’s tribe, the Efik. The appellant was from the Isoko tribe. The appellant and her husband were against the practice. The appellant relied upon a number of documents and that the appellant’s niece, CJ, had died in 2017, following FGM. The appellant asserted that there was pressure from the family for her daughter to undergo FGM.
3. The appellant had provided an appeal skeleton argument (ASA) for the appeal which set out the arguments advanced by the appellant. This did not include article 8.
Decision of the FtT.
4. The FtT dismissed the appellant’s appeal finding that the appellant had not established that her daughter is at risk of FGM, that there is sufficiency of protection and the possibility of internal relocation within Nigeria. The FtT gave limited weight to an expert report [13]. The judge rejected the claim that the appellant and her family could be traced in Nigeria [11]. The judge concluded that the influence of the appellant’s husband’s ethnic group was localised [19] and the appellant’s husband’s family had no influence outside their own state [17]. The judge found that the appellant and family would not be found in Abuja [19] and they could work to support the family. The judge found that the decision regarding circumcision rested with the appellant and her husband [17].
Grounds of appeal
5. There are 7 grounds of appeal but the principle focus at the appeal hearing was the lack of specific findings made in respect of the appellant’s niece, CJ, and the documents produced, and this was interwoven across the grounds of appeal.
6. I should state that the ground alleging a failure to consider and make findings in respect of article 8 was not pursued before me.
Permission to appeal.
7. Permission to appeal was refused by a judge of the FtT. The appellant renewed the application to the Upper Tribunal. A judge of the Upper Tribunal granted permission to appeal. The grant of permission was not limited, although there are comments upon the merits of the challenge to the article 8 conclusions.
Hearings and submissions
8. I heard submissions from the parties. I will refer to these as far as is necessary is setting out my decision.
Analysis and conclusions.
9. Relatively recent authority (Ullah v SSHD [2024]EWCA Civ 201, Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, and Chowdhury v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 36) has emphasised that the Upper Tribunal should not rush to find an error of law simply because they would have expressed themselves differently from the First-Tier Tribunal, that the Upper Tribunal should be slow to infer that a point had not been taken into account even if not expressly mentioned, and that judicial restraint should be exercised even though not every step in the reasoning was fully set out, as the issues might be set out by inference. I have borne those principles in mind.
10. I also had in mind the Court of Appeal’s dicta in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 that it is not the role of an appellate court to come to its own conclusions on the evidence before the Judge. It is essential that there is appropriate judicial restraint before interfering with the decision of the expert first instance judge.
11. Mr McCarthy did not seek to rely upon the unreported decision in HNN v SSHD despite the request in the grounds of appeal. I have not further considered the case. Ms McCarthy also did not pursue the claim in respect of a claimed failure to consider article 8. Ms McCarthy acknowledged that she had not appeared before the judge and acknowledged that article 8 was not set out in the ASA drafted by counsel on 6 July 2025. There was also no statement from the advocate who appeared before the judge to state that it had been argued or that reliance was placed upon article 8. I have not considered this ground further. I conclude there is no error of law in this respect.
12. Although there were 7 grounds of appeal, the principle focus was upon the documentary evidence produced regarding the death of the appellant’s niece CJ, and the claims made in this respect. This is interwoven across the grounds of appeal, with reference to background material and the expert report produced. I have considered the grounds holistically.
13. It is stated that CJ died in 2017 following FGM. It is asserted that her father was opposed to FGM but was “unable to resist the pressure from the wider family”. The documents mentioned in the grounds of appeal at paragraph 10 are not further referred to by the judge in the decision. I have read those documents carefully.
14. Particular reference is also made to the background material and the Country information policy note (CPIN) which states:
“9.2.8 […] FGM is a prerequisite for marriage among […] the Efik”
15. This is the only reference in the background material to FGM within the Efik and which was brought to my attention.
16. I note that there is reference to the claim in respect of the niece in the decision at [1] and [18]. The judge stated “The issues relating to the appellant’s husband’s niece did not assist me as they were considered outside the FCT” (Federal Capital Territory).
17. The judge did not state in this condensed reasoning, that the incident had occurred over 8 years ago and that the judge was considering the risk now on the basis of the country information produced. However when read as a whole this is what the judge’s decision implies.
18. The judge did not clearly set out in the decision the parts of the appellant’s evidence which were accepted and which parts were rejected. The judge stated though that all of the evidence had been considered in the round and taken into account [4]. There is reference to the credibility of the account [16], however the judge stated that the evidence was consistent and relatively detailed [15]. I have carefully read the decision. It is implied in decision that the judge rejected the evidence that all women from the Efik are subjected to FGM and that the tribe had power and influence across Nigeria [7]. The judge found that the appellant was educated and was an intelligent woman [14]. The judge rejected the suggestion that the decision as to circumcision was not a question for the parents [14]. The judge rejected that fathers had no say in the practice [14]. The judge stated that the appellant had not been subjected to FGM. Other than this it is not clear whether other aspects are accepted or rejected. However, I have considered that the judge did not reject the evidence that the niece had died following FGM.
19. I should note that the appeal was not helped by the late service of evidence, although it was admitted in the appeal [2].
20. The judge found that the incidents in respect of the Efik are not set out in the table of incidents of FGM across Nigeria, contained within the background material at paragraph 4.5 [7]. This is not disputed in the grounds of appeal. The table of incidents the judge took from the background report (CPIN) dated 2022 which considered statistics from a survey conducted in 2018. This was of note for the judge and implied that the incident of risk was very low. The judge gave the expert report limited weight as it did not focus upon the Efik tribal group. The judge then considered that even if there was a risk from the Efik tribe, that risk would not befall the appellant’s daughter. The judge reasoned that her parents objected, the power of the tribe was localised and the family could move and relocate to another area and seek protection if necessary. All of those factors the judge concluded meant that the appellant’s daughter’s risk was not a real risk. These are all matters which the judge was entitled to take into account.
21. Ms McCarthy submitted that there was still a risk of FGM in the FCT of around 5% (1 in 20) and so the other evidence was important and material in assessing whether the appellant’s daughter would fall within that risk. However this background evidence is not broken down into those who opposed FGM and which tribal group they belonged to. The judge considered this particular background material [18] and drew conclusions from it.
22. I have concluded that the grounds amount to no more than a disagreement to the findings of the judge which were open to the judge on the basis of the information which was before the judge.
23. I conclude that the grounds of appeal do not establish a material error of law in the decision.
24. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law. The appeal is therefore dismissed and the decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.

Notice of Decision
The appeal is dismissed.
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal shall stand.

Iain Burnett

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27 April 2026