Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004319
First-tier Tribunal No : EA005792024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 27th of March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANE

Between

ZAHEER MIRZA
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

Entry Clearance Officer
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Not present or represented
For the Respondent: Dr Ibisi, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 24 March 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan born on 6 September 1982. He appealed to the First-tier Tribunal against a decision of the Secretary of State dated 10 March 2021 refusing him leave to enter as a family member under the EU Settlement Scheme. The First-tier Tribunal dismissed his appeal by a decision promulgated on 11 June 2025 and the appellant now appeals to the Upper Tribunal.
2. Granting permission, Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor wrote:
2. The appellant is not legally represented. He seeks permission to appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Mensah, sent out on 11 June 2025. The judge decided the appellant’s appeal without a hearing in line with the appellant’s request and the absence of an objection by the respondent. The judge dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision of 10 March 2021, refusing his application under the EUSS. The core question for the judge was whether the appellant was dependent on his brother (the sponsor). Having considered the evidence as a whole, the judge concluded that the appellant had not demonstrated that he was in fact dependent on his brother.
3. I have carefully considered the judge’s decision, the decision of the First-tier Tribunal refusing permission, and the grounds of appeal.
4. By a narrow margin, I am persuaded that first aspect of the appellant’s grounds is arguable. It is clear enough that the judge had before her the appellant’s two-part bundle and the sponsor’s witness statement. However, it appears as though the appellant had previously submitted what is described as an “explanation of case”, which arguably constituted a witness statement. The judge does not refer to this at [4] and a subsequent reference to there being no details of the appellant’s personal circumstances may have arisen out of an oversight of the “explanation of case” document. Whether the point would have made any material difference to the outcome is debatable, but I am persuaded that permission should be granted.
5. The other aspects of the grounds are weaker, but I do not limit the grant of permission.
3. At the initial hearing at Manchester on 24 March 2026, the United Kingdom sponsor did not attend nor was the appellant represented. I am satisfied from examining the Tribunal file that the notice of hearing was sent to the appellant on 19 February 2026. There is no evidence that it failed to reach him. I was satisfied that it was in the interests of justice to proceed in the absence of any representative for the appellant.
4. I heard the oral submissions of Dr Ibisi, Senior Presenting Officer, who appeared for the Secretary of State and then reserved my decision.
5. The main issue identified by Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor is whether the First-tier Tribunal judge took account of the appellant’s ‘Explanation of Case’ dated 3 February 2025. At [7] the judge wrote:
7. In his witness statement filed for the appeal the Sponsor says his brother had to stop working in factory in 2018 because he developed asthma due to the conditions. He claims that as a result of this his brother has not worked and has been reliant upon the Sponsor for his entire income. In other words, he has no source of income. The statement has been confirmed as true but as this is a paper appeal it has not been tested and so this reduces the weight I can attach to it. I therefore have considered what has been said in the light of the documentary evidence. I note the Appellant has not filed a statement setting out his personal circumstances.
I find that the judge has erred in law by not considering the appellant’s ‘Explanation’. I am aware that the judge is not obliged to refer to each and every document before her but it is obvious from her decision that she has overlooked the ‘Explanation’. As noted above, at [7] the judge recorded that the appellant ‘has not filed a statement setting out his personal circumstances.’ The ‘Explanation’ is plainly such a document; it sets out the personal circumstances of the appellant is detail. Secondly, at [12] the judge states:
12. I have very little information or evidence as to the living circumstances of the Appellant. I do not know if he is married, living with other family members or has other family in Pakistan. I do not know if their parents are alive or if they have siblings. I therefore cannot ascertain if the money sent by way of the money transfer receipts is in fact the only source of income in the Appellant’s household or that the money is being sent solely for the purpose of supporting the Appellant and not, as is common in Pakistan, for the purpose of supplementing a joint family unit. On the basis of the limited evidence around those matters I find the evidence that has been filed does not prove the Appellant’s dependency is as claimed.
The great majority of the matters which concerned the judge and which evidently led her to conclude that the appellant had failed to discharge the burden of proof (including the appellant’s marital/family status) are addressed in the ‘Explanation’ at [12]:
12. As to circumstances of my family, I am single. We are only two siblings. My parents lived in sponsor’ house at the time of application and were supported by sponsor, however, they have passed away subsequently and I live alone in sponsor house now. Sponsor was married in Pakistan but divorced his wife in 2017 and since then he is living alone.
I find that the judge has not read or has ignored this passage and, since what she says at [12] goes to the ratio of her decision to dismiss the appellant’s appeal, her decision is flawed by legal error. Had the judge taken the ‘Explanation’ into account, there is real possibly that she may have reached a different decision.
6. I set aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision. None of the findings of fact shall stand. Since there has been a failure by the judge to provide the appellant with a fair consideration of his appeal, the appeal is returned to the First-tier Tribunal for that Tribunal to remake the decision.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside. None of the findings of fact shall stand. The decision is returned to the First-tier Tribunal for that Tribunal to remake the decision.

C. N. Lane

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 24 March 2025