Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case Nos: UI-2025-004323 & UI-2025-004324

First-tier Tribunal Nos: EA/11098/2022
& HU/00173/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 27th March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LANE
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE COLE

Between

ABDUL BASIT ALI
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr I Ricca Richardson, Counsel instructed by Turpin Miller
For the Respondent: Mr A Tan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 23 March 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a citizen of Austria. He was granted settled status under Appendix EU on 3 February 2020. He committed criminal offences. On 26 October 2022 the respondent made a decision to deport the appellant. The appellant had a Human Rights claim which was refused by decision dated 29 September 2024. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. His appeal was dismissed in a decision promulgated on 26 June 2025. The appellant now appeals to the Upper Tribunal.
Background
2. The appellant came to the UK with his parents in 2005. He was granted settled status under Appendix EU on 3 February 2020.
3. The appellant had been involved in criminality for some time. Whilst a child, he was found to have been a victim of forced criminality between 2018 and 2020.
4. On 17 January 2022 the appellant was sentenced to 26 months youth detention for offences relating to the possession and class A and B drugs with intent to supply. The offences relating to the class A drugs took place on 13 September 2021; the offence relating to the class B drug took place on 19 April 2020.
5. On 26 October 2022 the respondent made a decision to deport the appellant. The appellant appealed against this decision under regulation 6 of the Immigration (Citizen’s Rights appeals) (EU exit) Regulations 2020.
6. The appellant was convicted of further offences of affray, dangerous driving and possessing a bladed article following incidents on 4 July 2023. On 13 October 2023 the appellant was sentenced to a total of 18 months’ detention at a young offender’s institution.
7. The appellant’s representations against deportation were treated as a Human Rights claim, which was refused by decision dated 29 September 2024. The appellant appealed against this decision under section 82(1)(b) of the Nationality, Immigration & Asylum Act 2002.
8. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. The appeal was heard by Judge Row on 16 June 2025.
9. Judge Row dismissed the appeal.
10. The appellant appealed and Judge Grimes granted permission on the following terms:
1. The application is in time.
2. It is arguable, as contended in ground 1, that the judge erred in his approach to the medical evidence at paragraph 65 in criticising the medical evidence as to mental illness on the basis that it came from a psychologist or psychotherapist rather than a medical doctor or a psychiatrist. It is further arguable, as contended in ground 2, that the judge erred in failing to assess the medical evidence as to possible neurodivergence. Ground 3 is interlinked with grounds 1 and 2 in terms of the judge’s consideration of the medical evidence.
3. It is arguable, as contented in ground 4, that the judge failed to give adequate reasons for finding that there is no continuity in terms of the offending post 31 December 2020 and that the judge’s finding that Austria ‘has the highest standards of everything’ [76] is unreasoned and unevidenced.
4. It is arguable, as contended in ground 5, that the judge erred in rejecting the appellant's argument that EU proportionality has to be considered in the context of the pending appeal to the Court of Appeal against the decision in Vargova v SSHD [2024] UKUT 00336 (IAC)
5. The grounds are arguable.
11. Thus, the matter came before us to determine whether Judge Row’s decision involved the making of an error on a point of law.
The Hearing
12. Mr Ricca Richardson relied upon the grounds and the skeleton argument.
13. In relation to Ground 5, the appellant maintained that this ground of appeal is well-founded and that Vargova v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 31 was wrongly decided. The appellant also understands that Vargova may be appealed to the Supreme Court. However, it was confirmed that, at this stage, the appellant does not actively pursue this ground of appeal and instead simply reserves his position should the Court of Appeal’s decision be overturned.
14. Mr Ricca Richardson made detailed additional submissions on Grounds 1 to 4. He submitted that each of the grounds were made out and provided a clear basis for the appeal to be allowed. It was submitted that the case should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for rehearing as there would be significant updating evidence required.
15. Mr Tan relied on the Rule 24 provided. He submitted that the judge’s decision was sustainable and that there were no material errors demonstrated by the appellant’s grounds.
16. It was put to Mr Tan that it appeared that the respondent was relying on the cannabis conviction which related to offending in April 2020 and so this indicated that the European regime should have applied. Mr Tan had worked on the assumption that it was agreed that the Domestic regime applied. Mr Ricca Richardson clarified that it had been accepted that the respondent was not relying on the April 2020 offending (substitute decisions had been issued) and the reference to the cannabis conviction was merely part of the background. However, he did highlight the appellant’s continued reliance on the continuum of offending issue.
17. Mr Ricca Richardson then briefly responded to Mr Tan’s submissions. He submitted that the respondent was trying to reargue the case whereas the appellant had identified clear errors of law.
18. After hearing the submissions, we reserved our decision.
Discussion and Analysis
19. When considering whether the judge made a material error in law in dismissing the appellant’s appeal, we have reminded ourselves of the following principles.
20. It is not permissible for the Upper Tribunal to simply disagree with the result or the way in which it was reached (see paragraph 36 of South Bucks County Council v Porter [2004] UKHL 33).
21. We take note of the narrow circumstances in which an appellate Tribunal may interfere with findings of fact and credibility by the fact-finding Tribunal. In Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, the Court of Appeal confirmed that unless the First-tier Judge's decision is “rationally insupportable”, the Upper Tribunal should not interfere with findings of fact by the First-tier Judge who had seen and heard the oral evidence.
22. We also remind ourselves that the Upper Tribunal is required to exercise judicial restraint in its oversight of the First-tier Tribunal's reasoning, as detailed by the Court of Appeal in paragraph 26 of Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201.
a. Ground 1
23. The appellant asserts that the Judge failed to deal lawfully with the medical evidence presented in support of the case.
24. The appellant seeks to distil the Judge’s consideration of the medical evidence into separate sections rather than looking at the decision as a whole.
25. The Judge notes that the medical experts are psychologists and a psychotherapist and not medically qualified doctors, such as a psychiatrist. This is factually correct. The Judge does not reject the medical evidence on this basis. He does not state that the experts are not suitably qualified to provide the opinions within the reports. The Judge details that one of the reservations he has about the reports is that the experts are not medically qualified. It is not unlawful for the Judge to consider this matter as a factor in the weight he gives to the reports.
26. The Judge then highlights that the medical experts were not provided with the appellant’s GP records. Again, this is factually correct. Certainly, since the decision in HA (expert evidence; mental health) Sri Lanka [2022] UKUT 00111 (IAC), it has been clear that medical experts should routinely be provided with the comprehensive medical records of the person they are preparing a report for. This is a legitimate factor for the Judge to consider when assessing the weight to be given to the expert reports (we will return to this issue under Ground 3).
27. The Judge then records his assessment of the vulnerability of the appellant as detailed by the experts compared to the facts of the appellant’s criminality. He clearly notes the consensus of the experts regarding the appellant's vulnerabilities. The Judge then details the appellant’s significant role in dealing class A drugs and the appellant’s later involvement in an armed confrontation with a rival gang before driving a car at high speeds to try to outrun the police.
28. The Judge is not bound to simply accept the conclusions of experts. His role is to make his own assessment considering all relevant factors. Regarding the appellant’s vulnerability, this is what the Judge has done. He has considered the findings of the experts and then highlighted his own concerns about facts that do not sit easily with the experts’ conclusions. There is nothing unlawful in the Judge’s approach.
29. Ultimately the Judge concludes that he will give “little weight” to the expert reports. The weight to be given to evidence is a matter for the judge hearing the case. Here, the Judge gives several reasons from paragraphs 65 to 73 for his conclusion that the expert reports should be given “little weight”. His conclusions and reasoning do not demonstrate any error of law.
30. A different judge may have viewed the expert reports differently and chosen to give them greater weight. However, that is not the issue for us. We must decide whether the Judge dealt with the expert evidence in a lawful manner and we conclude that he did so.
31. Ground 1 discloses no error of law in the Judge’s decision.
b. Ground 2
32. The appellant submits that the Judge failed to consider the evidence of neurodivergence and the potential impact on the appellant’s family.
33. The difficulty with the neurodivergence point is that there has been no diagnosis that the appellant suffers from any neurodivergent condition such as ADHD. Ms Kralj, one of the medical experts, acknowledged that she was not qualified to formally assess the appellant for ADHD or autism.
34. There may well have been indicators of neurodivergence, but the fact is that there was no formal diagnosis. The Judge cannot be criticised for not specifically referring to a condition that had not been diagnosed.
35. Furthermore, the Judge references the various medical reports throughout the decision and thus there can be no suggestion that the Judge has not considered them in reaching his conclusions.
36. The Judge does reference the appellant’s family at paragraph 79 of the decision. He highlights that they could move to Austria with the appellant if they thought the relationship important enough.
37. In relation to very compelling circumstances, the Judge confirms at paragraph 81 that “I take into account the points made above.” Thus, the Judge has specifically considered the appellant’s family who are again referenced in paragraph 82, where it is found that “There is a degree of dependency.”
38. Therefore, the Judge has clearly considered the appellant’s family and the circumstances surrounding the appellant's family when reaching his conclusions.
39. Finally, in this ground it is asserted by the appellant that the Judge’s statement in paragraph 89 that “There is a sense in which going to Austria may be the best thing for him” demonstrates an error of law. It is submitted that this statement ignores the fact that the appellant had already moved to Chester, a considerable distance from where the appellant’s offending took place.
40. The Judge referred at paragraphs 32 and 33 to the appellant moving to Chester, living with his sister and being employed in the bar run by his sister and her partner. The Judge accepts this evidence. Therefore, the Judge was clearly aware that the appellant had moved to live a significant distance away from Milton Keynes.
41. However, in relation to the criticisms raised in Mr Ricca Richardson’s skeleton argument, the Judge highlighted that, at the date of the hearing, the appellant had only been out of custody a week and his past history indicated a tendency to reoffend (the appellant had previously committed offences whilst on licence).
42. The Judge’s observations in paragraph 89 refer only to a “sense” that going to Austria may be the best thing for the appellant. The explanation provided in that paragraph is reasonable on the facts of the case. There is nothing to indicate that the Judge has committed any error of law in making these observations.
43. There is no error of law demonstrated by Ground 2.
c. Ground 3
44. This ground relates to claims of procedural unfairness. The skeleton argument refers to two issues regarding the Judge’s consideration of the medical evidence, the lack of GP records and the vulnerability issue. Both matters have been addressed in our consideration of Ground 1. In his oral submissions, Mr Ricca Richardson focussed on the GP records issue.
45. As detailed previously, the Judge was not obliged to accept the conclusions of the experts as regards the appellant’s vulnerability. His observations regarding the appellant’s criminality and vulnerability were reasonable. There is no reason why the Judge should have raised this issue with the appellant. The facts of the appellant’s offending were not disputed, and the Judge was entitled to consider the overall situation when a deciding upon the weight to be given to the expert reports.
46. Since the decision in HA (expert evidence; mental health) Sri Lanka [2022] UKUT 00111 (IAC), it has been clear that medical experts should routinely be provided with the comprehensive medical records of the person they are preparing a report for. The fact that no GP records had been provided to the medical experts was an obvious matter of concern which the appellant’s representatives should have been aware of.
47. Mr Ricca Richardson’s submissions were that the appellant’s evidence was that he had not sought treatment for any mental health issues and so the GP records would disclose nothing to assist the experts. With the greatest respect to Mr Ricca Richardson, this submission is pure speculation as the GP records have still not been obtained; without sight of the GP records, it is impossible to assert whether they contain anything of relevance or not. The appellant may well state that he has not sought support for any mental health difficulties, either in the community or in custody, but without the relevant records is not possible to assess this assertion.
48. The Judge was entitled to highlight the lack of medical records and the appellant’s representatives should have known that this was an issue that required explanation.
49. There was no procedural unfairness in the Judge’s reasoning. Ground 3 discloses no error of law.
d. Ground 4
50. The appellant submits that the Judge failed to provide adequate reasons for two material aspects of his decision.
51. The appellant had argued before the Judge that although the index offences relied upon by the respondent post-date the specified date they should be regarded as a continuum of offences which began before that date. The Judge concluded in paragraph 38 that there is no continuity between the earlier offences and the index offences.
52. It may have been preferable for the Judge to provide brief reasons for his conclusion. However, the conclusion reached was the only one available on the facts of the case.
53. The appellant was found to be a victim of forced criminality between approximately 2018 and 2020. Some of this offending was related to drug dealing, including the offence committed on 19 April 2020. This related to the appellant being found in possession of three small bags of herbal cannabis with a value of £120. The appellant was 17 years old at the date of this offence.
54. The first of the index offences occurred on 13 September 2021. This was some 17 months after the cannabis offence. The appellant was 19 years of age at the time of these offences. The appellant was found with two mobile phones, cash, and a substantial number of wraps containing class A drugs (crack and heroin) for the purposes of dealing. The appellant was found to have a significant role in drug dealing that was done for financial gain.
55. Although the September 2021 offending was drug dealing as was the April 2020 offending, the circumstances of the two sets of offending were so disparate in time and circumstances that no judge could have concluded that the appellant’s offending was a continuum. The two sets of offences were clearly separate offences.
56. The appellant’s later offending of affray, dangerous driving and possessing a bladed article following incidents on 4 July 2023 may well have been related to the appellant’s involvement in criminal gangs like his earlier offending. However, there is no rational basis on which these offences can be said to be a continuum of the earlier offending.
57. The Judge was clearly entitled to reach the only possible conclusion that there was no continuity with the earlier offences. His summary dismissal of the appellant’s submissions on this matter was correct.
58. Furthermore, in his skeleton argument that was before the Judge, Mr Ricca Richardson’s submissions on this issue amounted to “His offending is a continuum, in that the later offending cannot be divorced from his trafficking into criminal exploitation.” There are no substantive arguments made by the appellant as to why his offending is a continuum. The appellant made a bare assertion which the Judge rejected. It is not possible to criticise the Judge’s conclusions arguing a lack of reasons when there was nothing of substance for the Judge to engage with.
59. Finally in relation to this ground, the appellant submits that the Judge gave no reasons for his finding in paragraph 76 that Austria “has the highest standards of everything.”
60. The Judge’s phraseology here is perhaps, unfortunate. However, the meaning of the Judge’s findings as regards Austria is clear from the context of his decision. The Judge details that Austria is a Western democracy and a member of the European Union. Austria has a functioning health service, and the appellant will be entitled to all the rights and benefits afforded a citizen of that country.
61. The Judge’s decision must be read as a whole without picking out single sentences to try to demonstrate legal errors. The decision of the Judge makes reasonable and justifiable findings regarding the situation in Austria.
62. There is no error of law identified by this ground.
e. Ground 5
63. As detailed above, the appellant maintained that this ground of appeal is well-founded and that Vargova v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 31 was wrongly decided. The appellant also understands that Vargova may be appealed to the Supreme Court. However, it was confirmed that, at this stage, the appellant does not actively pursue this ground of appeal and instead simply reserves his position should the Court of Appeal’s decision be overturned.
64. We are bound by the decision of the Court of Appeal in Vargova (a decision which we are in full agreement with) and so this ground must be rejected.
f. Conclusion
65. Overall, the Judge has adequately dealt with all the material issues. His decision does not demonstrate any error of law. The grounds raised by the appellant are rejected.
Notice of Decision
The First-tier Tribunal has not been shown to have made an error of law material to the decision to dismiss the appeal. The determination shall stand.

C R Cole
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

25 March 2026