Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Cases Nos: UI-2025-004341
(PA/64172/2023)

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 15th of October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BRUCE
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PAUL LEWIS

Between

YI
(anonymity order made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr J. Dingley, Counsel instructed by Broudie Jackdon Canter Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr. A. Tan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on the 24 August 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant or any other member of his family likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant is a national of the Islamic Republic of Iran born in 1996. He appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal to dismiss his appeal on protection and human rights grounds.

Case Background and Matters in Issue before the First-tier Tribunal
2. The Appellant arrived in the UK on 28 December 2021 and claimed asylum the same day. He told the officer conducting his ‘screening interview’ that he is a Kurdish farmer from a village near Piranshahr. He had problems in his country. These arose because during a private conversation with friends he had insulted the Supreme Leader of Iran. One or more of that group subsequently reported the Appellant to the secret police who now wish to arrest or kill him. The Appellant understands that the government now believe him to have set up a group and that they “intend to retaliate for what happened in my village. The people were displaced by the government”.
3. Nothing appears to have happened in respect of the Appellant’s case until 6 July 2023, when the Appellant completed a document entitled “Continue Asylum Claim”. Therein the Appellant repeats the evidence he gave in his SEF, and provided the following additional detail. He explained that during the conversation he mentioned he had been saying that Kurds are oppressed and that there is no freedom of speech; he had cursed the leaders of Iran. The Appellant’s brother knows some people who work for the government and they subsequently informed him that the Appellant’s name was now on a wanted list. The information provided to the Appellant’s brother was that the Appellant was now accused of setting up a group with a view to destroying a dam that had been built, displacing the people of their village. In his substantive asylum interview on 22 September 2023 the Appellant again repeated this account. In answer to questions put to him he said that the local river was called the Lawen, and this was what had been “changed into the Kanisew Dam” (sic – subsequently amended to read Kani Sib dam). This had happened approximately 2 years before the Appellant left Iran. The Appellant and his brothers had left their village of Kasakaran and relocated to Piranshahr. The conversation had taken place in October 2021. After his brother had warned him he had left Piranshahr. He was told that his home had been raided after he left.
4. During 2023 the Appellant submitted to the Home Office evidence concerning a second plank of his claim. That was that he had been engaged in political activity in the UK contrary to the Iranian government, including attending protests and posting online.
5. The Respondent refused to grant asylum. In her letter of 13 November 2023 she explained that it was not considered plausible that friends whom the Appellant had known all his life would inform on him; he had failed to identify a reason why they would do that. There was nothing to substantiate his claim that his home had been raided. His sur place activity would not be known to anyone in his village since on his own evidence they did not have internet there. He had said that he had no education so it is “not believable” that he had compiled the posts himself.
6. That, in summary, was the case for each party when the matter came before the First-tier Tribunal on 26 August 2025.
7. By its decision dated 29 August 2025 the First-tier Tribunal (Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede, sitting as a First-tier Tribunal judge) dismissed the appeal. The Appellant had not mentioned his home being raided at his screening interview; he had been inconsistent about when his brother told him that it had occurred. There was a lack of any credible explanation as to why people who had known the Appellant his whole life would inform on him, and in doing so greatly exaggerate the extent of his opposition to the authorities. In his evidence before the Tribunal the Appellant had mentioned attending protests against the building of the dam, but this had not been mentioned in his interviews. The Tribunal found that if there was any ongoing interest in the Appellant from the Iranian authorities, he would know about it. The conclusion on the historical claim is encapsulated at the Tribunal’s paragraph 27:
27. For all these reasons I do not accept that the appellant ever came to the adverse attention of the authorities in Iran. Whilst it may be the case that he was outspoken about the construction of a dam in his village which had caused the villagers to have to leave their homes, I do not accept that that went beyond a conversation with friends. I do not accept that he was actively involved in attending protests. I do not accept that he was reported to the Iranian authorities and I do not accept that the Iranian authorities raided his home or threatened him or pursued him owing to that or to any other incident. I do not accept that the appellant left Iran for the reasons claimed and do not accept that he has shown that he would be at risk on return to Iran as a result of any pre-flight activities. Even if he exited illegally, I do not consider that there would be any adverse interest in him on return to Iran such that he would be at risk of persecution.
8. Turning to the alleged risk arising sur place, the Tribunal noted the Appellant’s claims to have been interviewed by a Youtuber and to have been interviewed on Akar TV, but since none of this content had been translated into English, it was unable to attach any weight to it. The numerous Facebook posts by the Appellant appear to be re-posts or shared links. It was not believable that the posts were compiled by the Appellant himself, given his own admitted level of education. They would not have come to the attention of the Iranian authorities and in any event the Appellant could delete them prior to returning to Iran. In relation to the demonstrations the Appellant claimed to have attended, there was no evidence that he played a significant role. There is no evidence that he had burned photographs of the Ayatollah, or that he was observed doing so. The decision concludes on this matter: “I do not accept that he attended the demonstrations for any reason other than to enhance his asylum claim and I do not accept that his attendance is a reflection of any genuine political interest or opinion which he would wish to continue to express in Iran”. That being the case:
“It may be the case that the appellant would be subjected to initial questioning on arrival in Iran as a failed asylum seeker of Kurdish origin who had exited Iran illegally. However there is no reason for there to be any further questioning which could give rise to ill-treatment. The guidance in HB makes it clear that the mere fact of being a returnee of Kurdish ethnicity with or without a valid passport, and even if combined with illegal exit, does not create a risk of persecution or Article 3 ill treatment”.
9. The Appellant now appeals on the following grounds:
i) In finding it inherently improbable that the Appellant’s friends would report him to the IRGC the Tribunal placed reliance on immaterial considerations, viz its own subjective view on how Kurdish villagers might behave. It is further submitted that in reaching this finding the Tribunal failed to have regard to country background material regarding the use and prevalence of informers in the Kurdish population;
ii) The Tribunal was prepared to accept that the Appellant was critical of the dam construction near his home in the context of private conversations with other Kurds, but then found that he has no political opinion. It is submitted that this is inconsistent reasoning;
iii) In reaching the finding that the Appellant could not have compiled his own social media posts given his stated level of education the Tribunal failed to have regard to the evidence, which was that the Appellant studied at madrasa in Iran and has been attending English literacy classes in the UK;
iv) The Appellant relied on the decision in IK (Returnees - Records – IFA) Turkey CG [2004] UKIAT 00312 to submit that he cannot be expected to lie when questioned on arrival in Iran. The Tribunal failed to address this submission.
10. In his oral submissions Mr Dingley pointed out that when the appeal had come before the First-tier Tribunal, there was only one real issue: whether the Appellant genuinely held political views contrary to the Iranian government. It was accepted that the Appellant was Kurdish, and that he had held conversations with fellow villagers in which he had been critical of the construction of the dam and the forced evacuation of their homes. There was objective country background material which indicated that the Etelaat run a wide network of spies and informers, and that Kurdish people participate in that activity for a variety of reasons, including fear that if they don’t, someone else will inform on them. There was also evidence (relating to Kurdistan more generally) of “assimilationist programs” being pursued by the four nation states (including Iran) that administer Kurdish territory, which result in marginalised minorities such as the Kurds attempting to “fit in” and in doing so “internalising oppression”. Mr Dingley placed considerable reliance on the Tribunal’s acceptance that the Appellant may have been opposed to the dam construction, and pointed to country background evidence about such projects.
11. In reply Mr Tan submitted that the Tribunal’s analysis about possible informers was entirely rational. It was the Appellant’s evidence that the people he was talking to were also villagers who had been displaced by dam construction and in those circumstances it was inherently improbable that there would be people amongst their number who would turn informer. Mr Tan further pointed out that the Tribunal had identified inconsistencies in the evidence which the grounds fail to address, specifically at FTT §22-23:
“22. It was Ms Taylor’s submission that there had been some elaboration of the appellant’s case since his screening interview and that that undermined his credibility. It is indeed the case that the appellant made no mention, at his screening interview, of the IRGC having raided his house, a matter he raised only a year and a half later at the ‘continue asylum claim’ and only mentioned at his substantive interview when it was specifically put to him at question 47. His evidence at his screening interview was that the secret police had told his brother to bring him to their office because they needed him and wanted to arrest or kill him, but he made no mention of them going to his house. Whilst I accept entirely, in accordance with the guidance in YL (Rely on SEF) China [2004] UKIAT 00145, that the screening interview is not intended as a means by which to elicit a full account of a claim and that its purpose is limited, it does seem to me to be of some significance that such an important part of the appellant’s claim would not have been mentioned at the earliest possible opportunity. The fact that it was not raises some doubts as to whether that actually occurred.
23. That is particularly so because the appellant’s explanation as to how he knew about the raid on his home was not consistent. In response to the respondent’s concerns about his evidence of a lack of ongoing contact with his family owing to no internet connection in the village in Iran, the appellant’s explanation in his statement at [58] was that his brother gave him the information in person as he was in Iran with him at the time, and as such the lack of internet access was irrelevant. However when asked at the hearing to clarify and to explain how he received the information from his brother about the raid on his home, the appellant said that his brother telephoned him. His evidence then varied between his brother telling him directly when he was transporting him to the city of Shinou, and his brother telling him by telephone after he had arrived in that city. The inconsistent evidence in that regard raises further concerns about the credibility of the appellant’s account”.
12. In respect of Ground (ii) Mr Tan cautioned us against subjecting the decision of the First-tier Tribunal to narrow textual analysis. It is perfectly possible that the Appellant might have complained about losing his home without that coalescing into a political opinion. Regarding the Facebook material Mr Tan submitted that it was for the Appellant to show that he had posted this content, and that it reflected his genuinely held political views. He had failed to do so. As to the issue of what would occur on arrival in Iran, Mr Tan submitted that the argument made by Mr Dingley about returnees’ behaviour at ‘pinchpoints’ had been expressly rejected by the Court of Appeal in OM (Iran) v SSHD [2025] EWCA Civ 1585.

Discussion and Findings
13. The Secretary of State argued in her refusal letter that it was unlikely that fellow Kurds, particularly people the Appellant describes as friends, would act as covert informants for the Iranian authorities. We agree with Mr Dingley that this is not a particularly sound argument, given the country background evidence to the effect that many Kurds are complicit in supplying information to the Iranian authorities, who actively leverage the threat that the security services pose to the population at large in order to ensure compliance. Had that been the reason that the First-tier Tribunal gave for disbelieving the Appellant about the core of his account, we would have agreed that this was an error, for a failure to have regard to that material.
14. That was not however the reason that the Tribunal gives. The reasons it gives are the reasons set out in its §22-23 and cited to us by Mr Tan (above). Those were that the Appellant had been inconsistent in his evidence about how it had come to his attention that the IRGC were interested in him, and how and when that matter was communicated to him. It is true that its §24 the Tribunal goes on to adopt the Respondent’s reasoning, but in doing so significantly elaborates on it by questioning why the alleged informant would actively make additional accusations up:
“24. In addition to such concerns about the appellant’s evidence, there was a lack of any credible explanation from the appellant as to why people he had known his entire life, who came from his own village and faced the same issues as him, and whom he called his friends, would have reported him to the IRGC. More significantly, why the friend or friends told the IRGC false information, namely that he had formed a group which was against the government and that he intended to retaliate for what happened in the village with the construction of the dam. The appellant sought to provide some explanation at question 45 of his interview, that some Kurdish people were secret members of the Iranian government but otherwise led normal lives, and would report on fellow Kurds. He also provided an explanation at [33] to [35] and [38] of his witness statement, referring to the existence of Kurdish collaborators. In addition he sought to distance himself from the evidence that the incident involved a friend, asserting simply that the person was someone he knew well from his village. I do not consider any of those explanations to provide a credible reason as to why his own friend, or close acquaintance, would have reported him to the authorities and in particular would have made up an accusation about him forming an opposition group when that was not true. As the respondent pointed out in the refusal letter, there appears to be no benefit to anyone in making such an allegation”.
15. In the context of the evidence as a whole, and in particular its foregoing paragraphs, we are satisfied that this was rational reasoning and it is not for us to go behind it.
16. At its §27 the First-tier Tribunal said this:
“Whilst it may be the case that he was outspoken about the construction of a dam in his village which had caused the villagers to have to leave their homes, I do not accept that went beyond a conversation with friends.”
17. Ground (ii) is that this amounted to an acceptance that the Appellant held, or had expressed, political views contrary to the Iranian government, and that this is reasoning inconsistent with the final conclusion reached in dismissing the appeal.
18. We accept that a conversation of the type described could amount to evidence of a genuinely held political opinion, or alternatively an indication that it would be viewed as such by the Iranian authorities. Had there been, for instance, country background evidence to the effect that the villagers who opposed the building of the Kani Sib dam were actively organising against the state, or that the state perceived their – understandable – opposition to the flooding of their homes as unreasonable agitation, the First-tier Tribunal may well have accepted that this kind of conversation could have placed the Appellant at risk. There was however no evidence of the sort. The bundle contained some general references1 to the adverse environmental impact of these infrastructure projects, but nothing more specific to give context to the complaints voiced by the Appellant. We accept that political opposition to the Iranian state is very likely to lead to persecution if it becomes known, but not all expressions of dissatisfaction are necessarily going to be viewed in that way. On the spectrum between full throated support for the revolution, and active armed opposition to it, lies a multiplicity of views, not all of which will be classed as political opposition. Most Iranians, for instance, are probably upset about the rate of inflation. They are not all being arrested. Seen in that context, and in the absence of any specific country background evidence, we do not accept that there was any inconsistency in the First-tier Tribunal’s reasoning.
19. Ground (iii) is that the Tribunal erred in its approach to the Appellant’s online activity. The Tribunal found that given the Appellant’s “admitted level of education” it could not be satisfied that he had compiled and posted the Facebook content himself. The grounds read:
“10. At paragraph 29 the First-Tier Tribunal finds that the Appellant could not have compiled his own social media posts because of his own admitted level of education. The Appellant has never stated he was illiterate. He explains he studied the Quran at the mosque, which will provide some level of literacy, and that he has been attending English classes in the UK, which further suggests a level of literacy. The conclusion that he could not have used social media does not follow the evidence”.
20. With respect, we cannot be satisfied that the Tribunal failed to “follow” this evidence because it expressly makes reference to it in its own reasoning:
“…As the respondent observed in the refusal decision, it is not believable that the posts were compiled by the appellant himself, given his own admitted level of education. He claimed to have had no education in Iran other than learning the quran in the mosque and to have attended English language lessons in the UK. I therefore do not accept that the posts are his own and I consider that they have simply been uploaded to his account in order to advance his claim. There is no reason why the appellant’s Facebook posts would have been viewed by the Iranian authorities or would have come to their attention…”
21. Finally we turn to the matter of whether a risk will arise to the Appellant at the “pinchpoint” of Imam Khomeini International Airport. We were not, with respect, particularly assisted by the decision in OM. We do not agree with Mr Tan that this necessarily dispenses with the argument made by Mr Dingley. OM was a Kurd whose sur place activity was found to be disingenuous. The Court of Appeal concluded that the Upper Tribunal had been entitled to dismiss the appeal on the ground that OM could delete any potentially dangerous material since none of it was underpinned by a genuine political belief. If asked on arrival what the basis of his claim had been, he could tell the truth and say that he had lied to the British authorities. As we understood Mr Dingley’s submission, his point was rather that having apparently accepted that the Appellant was a Kurd forcibly displaced by the construction of a dam, that he was opposed to, the Appellant might be compelled to say something else on arrival at that airport. Mr Dingley’s argument on ground (iv) therefore stands and falls with our analysis of ground (ii), which for the reasons we give above, we have not found to be made out.

Decisions
22. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is upheld and the appeal is dismissed.
23. There is an order for anonymity in this ongoing protection claim.

Upper Tribunal Judge Bruce
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
7 October 2026