The decision



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004355
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/500003/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

5th November 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DEAKIN

Between

MR SOYAB YAKTUB YUSUF MUNSHI
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr K Pullinger, counsel (directly instructed)
For the Respondent: Mr K Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 October 2026


DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The Appellant appeals with permission against the 1 July 2025 decision of FTJ Carey to dismiss his appeal on human rights grounds.
Material Background
2. The Appellant is an Indian citizen.
3. In July 2007 he entered the United Kingdom as a working holidaymaker with leave until 23 July 2009. It appears returned to India before his visa expired. The Appellant was subsequently granted leave as a Tier 4 (General) Student until 17 September 2012. He entered the United Kingdom and overstayed. He made an asylum application in August 2013 but he failed to report as required and his application was treated as withdrawn in February 2015.
4. The Appellant met Ms Sajeda Tapas (a British citizen) in late 2020. They entered into a relationship, culminating in a civil ceremony on 27 January 2023. On 23 June 2023 the Appellant applied to remain in the United Kingdom on the basis of his relationship with Ms Tapas. This application was refused on 27 December 2023. The Appellant lodged an appeal against that decision on 1 January 2024.
5. That appeal was heard by the First-tier Tribunal on 19 June 2025 and dismissed in a decision promulgated on 1 July 2025.
6. The Appellant applied for permission to appeal on two grounds. First, he argued that the Judge had failed “…to make any proper conclusions in respect of GEN.3.2 of the Rules”. Secondly, he argued that Judge erred in not approaching this case on the basis that the Appellant was bound to succeed should he make an application for entry clearance from India and, as such, the Judge failed to carry out a proper Article 8 ECHR proportionality assessment.
7. In a decision dated 6 November 2025, UTJ Khan granted permission to appeal on both grounds.
Ground 1: Gen 3.2(2) of Appendix FM to the Immigration Rules
8. Gen 3.2(2) provides as follows:

(2) Where sub-paragraph (1) above applies, the decision-maker must consider, on the basis of the information provided by the applicant, whether there are exceptional circumstances which would render refusal of entry clearance, or leave to enter or remain, a breach of Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, because such refusal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the applicant, their partner, a relevant child or another family member whose Article 8 rights it is evident from that information would be affected by a decision to refuse the application.
9. The Appellant argues that, while the Judge made reference to Gen 3.2 of the Immigration Rules, “there is no assessment whatsoever on whether there would be any unjustifiably harsh consequences to the Appellant, his wife, or any of her family members (including her father).” (Grounds para. 6).
10. The Secretary of State maintains the Judge had, on the contrary, “considered the circumstances of the Appellant, wife and father at [31] to [34]. Then at [46] to [51] the FTTJ conducts a balancing exercise considering factors for and against the Appellant” before reaching “a clear conclusion at [52] that being there were no “exceptional circumstances” and “He will have the option of applying for entry clearance if that is what he wishes to do”. A clear finding on consequence resulting from the decision.” (Rule 24 para. 4).
11. I do not accept the Appellant’s submissions on this point.
12. In the context of considering para. EX.1 of the Immigration Rules:
a. The Judge considered Ms Tapas’ circumstances in detail. He noted her long standing connection to the United Kingdon, that she would not wish to relocate to India with the Appellant were he required to return, her employment and business interests, how return to India would likely impact her employment and business interests, her ability to find employment in India, her health needs, and her ability to speak the local language in India (paras. 31 and 33).
b. The Judge also addressed Ms Tapas’ father’s medical conditions, need for care, and the Appellant’s and Ms Tapas’ involvement in that care (paras. 31 and 32).
c. The Judge considered the assistance that may be available to the Appellant from his three sisters should he return to India, the Appellant’s own health needs, his resilience and ability to find employment should he be returned to India.
d. The Judge concluded that, while “…it will not be easy for the Appellant and his wife to establish themselves in India…” there were no insurmountable obstacles to their doing so. He noted that modern means of communication would afford Ms Tapas a limited substitute for face-to-face contact with her family, and noted that, as a British citizen it was open to Ms Tapas to return to see her family as frequently as she wished (para. 35).
13. The Judge then went on to address Gen 3.2(2) and, in my judgment, plainly considered whether returning the Appellant to India would give rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences:
a. The Judge addressed the law at paras. 36-41. He accepted that Article 8 ECHR was “clearly engaged” and that he had to decide if the Secretary of State’s decision was necessary and proportionate (para. 42).
b. The Judge noted that the Appellant and his partner had no children (para. 47).
c. The Judge recorded that the Appellant was involved in the care of his father-in-law but noted (expressly cross-referring to his consideration of this issue when addressing para. EX.1) that Mr Tapas’ care needs were not “…particularly extensive or demanding…” (para. 51).
d. The Judge took into account Ms Tapas’ interests and her wish not to be separated from the Appellant but noted (again with reference to his consideration of these issues in relation to para. EX.1) that she could accompany the Appellant to India if she so wished (para. 52).
e. The Judge expressly found that the Appellant would not face very significant obstacles to re-integration into Indian society (para, 52) and noted that it would be open to the Appellant to apply for entry clearance if that is what he wished to do.
14. In my judgment, reading the decision as a whole, it is clear that the Judge considered the matter and that he was not of the view that returning the Appellant to India would give rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences for the Appellant, his wife and/or his father-in-law.
15. I accordingly dismiss the Appellant’s appeal on Ground 1.
Ground 2: Error in Proportionality Balance
16. At his second ground of appeal, the Appellant argued as follows:
a. If the Appellant were to make an application for entry clearance from India, such an application would be “…bound to succeed…” (Grounds para. 12) / “…almost certain to succeed…” (oral submissions). The Judge erred in proceeding on basis that such an application may succeed (para. 45). This error infected the Judge’s Article 8 ECHR proportionality assessment.
b. Further, on proper analysis, the sole basis for refusing the Appellant’s application was the “narrow procedural ground” that he was required to return to India in order to make an application for entry clearance. As such, in refusing the appeal, the Judge failed to properly apply the principles set out in the cases of R (Chikwamba) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] UKHL 40; [2008] 1 WLR 1420; Alam v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 30; [2023] 4 WLR 17; and Butt v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2025] EWCA Civ 189.
17. I do not accept the Appellant’s submissions on this point.
18. First were the Appellant to make an application for entry clearance from India, such an application is (and was at the date of decision) not bound to succeed. The Appellant submits that the Appellant “can have a legitimate expectation” that, as the Secretary of State invited him to make an application for entry clearance and had not refused the Appellant’s application on the basis of suitability, such an application would be granted (see Grounds para. 14). In my judgment no such legitimate expectation arises. I accept that the Appellant’s 2023 application was not refused on general suitability grounds and that when considering exceptional circumstances in the Reasons for Refusal letter the Secretary of State stated that Ms Tapas “…is under no obligation to leave the UK and can remain close to her father in the UK until you obtain the correct Entry Clearance back into the UK”. I accept further that it was noted in the Review that it was not “unreasonable or disproportionate to expect [the Appellant] to return to India temporarily to seek the appropriate entry clearance” (para. 18 of the Review). However, these passing observations are in no way clear and unambiguous representations capable of binding the Secretary of State. Should the Appellant choose to make an application for entry clearance at some point in the future, his application will fall to be determined on its merits in the ordinary way. The outcome of any such application will be a matter for the Secretary of State.
19. I do not accept that the Judge erred in proceeding on the basis that, if the Appellant makes an application for entry clearance in future, such application may be refused or may succeed.
20. Second the Appellant proceeds on the basis that, properly analysed, the sole basis for refusal of his application was that he was required to return to India to make an entry clearance application. As such, he argues, the principle articulated in Chikwamba applies in his case.
21. It is, however, clear from the reasons for refusal letter that the Appellant’s application was not refused on the basis that he was required to return to India and make an application for entry clearance:
a. In relation to family life, the Secretary of State determined that the Appellant failed to satisfy E-LTRP 2.2(b), decided that EX.1 did not apply and so concluded the Appellant failed to satisfy R-LTRP.1.1.(d)(iii) of Appendix FM to the Immigration Rules.
b. In relation to Private Life, the Secretary of State determined that the Appellant failed to satisfy PL 5.1(b) of the Immigration Rules.
22. The Judge therefore correctly recoded that the Appellant’s application had not, in fact, been refused on the narrow procedural ground that he was required to leave the United Kingdom to apply for entry clearance at all (para. 44) and, following Butt, that the Chikwamba principle did not apply in the Appellant’s case
23. In my view the Judge’s reasoning here was correct and there in no error in the Judge’s approach to the Chikwamba, Alam, Butt line of cases.
24. In any event, the Judge did take into account the fact that the Appellant could make an application for entry clearance from India when considering Article 8 ECHR and, as set out above, his approach to this issue was appropriate.
Conclusion
25. For the reasons set out above I dismiss the appeal.

Notice of Decision
26. Appeal dismissed.


ANDREW DEAKIN

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


1 November 2026