Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004364

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60854/2024
(LP/02858/2025)

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 28th of January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ALIS

Between

T P
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: Mr Janjua, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Walker, Senior Home Officer Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 22 January 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant, a Vietnamese national aged 47 years of age entered the United Kingdom on 28 June 2022 and claimed asylum. Her claim was refused by the Respondent on 8 April 2024, and her appeal was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the FTT) on 23 August 2025.

2. The Appellant lodged grounds of appeal against this decision and on 17 September 2025 permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Judge Dainty on grounds 2 and 3 of the grounds of appeal. In granting permission, she found:

“Grounds 2 and 3 are arguable errors of law – by putting front and centre the fact of arrests and also failing to consider this by reference to country evidence there is an arguable error in the legal analysis and the giving of reasons”

SUBMISSIONS

3. Mr Janjua adopted the remaining grounds of appeal and submitted the FTT’s rejection of the Appellant’s account of six arrests/detentions was flawed. The FTT assumed it was implausible the Appellant could have obtained a UK visa if she was of interest to the Vietnamese authorities, but failed to consider objective evidence—including the 2019 Home Office Fact‑Finding Mission report—showing that Hoa Hao followers were often briefly detained, questioned, or issued “letters of invitation” without being formally charged or registered as criminal offenders. She had provided full details of her six arrests in her screening interview and whereas the FTT questioned her actual arrests the CPIN (page 139 of consolidated bundle) made clear that “the term arrested was used liberally.” Mr Janjua made further submissions on what was ground three of the grounds of appeal but for the reasons set out later I have not addressed them in this decision.

4. Mr Walker relied on the Rule 24 response and submitted the FTT was entitled to rely on the Appellant’s ability to exit Vietnam, particularly as the CPIN indicated that activists of real interest were normally prevented from travelling abroad. The Appellant’s submissions did not address this point before the FTT. He submitted the FTT considered the CPIN carefully and made clear at paragraph [47] that all the evidence had been considered when considering the Appellant’s credibility

DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS

5. In deciding whether there had been an error in law I have taken note of the narrow circumstances in which an appellate Tribunal may interfere with findings of fact and credibility by the fact-finding Tribunal.

6. In Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, the Court of Appeal stated:

a. An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.

b. The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.

c. An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.

d. The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.

e. An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.

f. Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.

7. I also reminded myself that the Upper Tribunal is required to exercise judicial restraint in its oversight of the First-tier Tribunal's reasoning, as detailed by the Court of Appeal in Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 20.

8. Having heard submissions on what was ground two in the grounds of appeal I raised with Mr Walker whether, on further reflection, he accepted the FTT had failed to demonstrate any engagement with either the CPIN or the 2019 Home Office Fact‑Finding Mission report.

9. I indicated to Mr Walker that whilst the FTT had stated regard had been had to all the documents (see paragraph [7] of the FTT decision) the FTT had failed to demonstrate engagement with country evidence which identified both discrimination and arrest of supporters of Hoa Hao.

10. Mr Walker, having considered my observations, accepted that the FTT had not demonstrated any consideration of the country evidence, and he accepted that this must impact on the credibility assessment and this failure amounted to a material error. In the circumstances I found a material error on ground 2 of the grounds of appeal. Having found a material error on what was ground 2 I found it unnecessary to deal with Mr Janua’s remaining submissions.

11. Both parties agreed the case should be remitted back to the FTT for a full consideration of the Appellant’s appeal before a Judge other than Judge Khan as the Tribunal would have to consider the totality of the evidence and make fresh findings on credibility. In remitting the same I took into account the Senior President’s Practice Statement on where appeals should be heard.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained a material error of law, and I set the decision aside.

The decision shall be remade in the First-tier Tribunal before a Judge other than Judge Khan.

SP ALIS

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22 January 2026