Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004380

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51277/2024
LP/04838/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 9th December 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PAUL LEWIS

Between

A
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: No attendance
For the Respondent: Mrs. Nolan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 20 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Anonymity was ordered by the First-tier Tribunal. No application to discharge was made. It remains in force.

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Background
1. The appellant, a citizen of Sri Lanka, appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge (the ‘judge’) promulgated on 6th August 2025.
Grounds of appeal
2. Permission to appeal was granted on three grounds. The judge materially erred in:
(i) Making unreasonable and erroneous conclusions in relation to the appellant’s previous non-disclosure of his sexuality;
(ii) Failing to give adequate consideration to the appellant’s status as a vulnerable adult when assessing the medical evidence;
(iii) Reaching speculative or unreasonable conclusions when assessing the medical evidence and/or erroneously supplanting the views of the medical experts with his own views.
3. The Respondent opposed the appeal and filed a written response on 30th September 2025, summarising the grounds as no more than a disagreement with the ‘well-reasoned’ findings of the judge.

The hearing
4. The appellant was represented by solicitors and counsel before the judge in the First-tier Tribunal. After permission to appeal was granted, on 18th October 2025, the appellant instructed new solicitors.
5. The newly instructed solicitors wrote to the Tribunal under cover of a letter dated 12th November 2025 in which they indicated that on 31st October 2025 they were made aware of the Appellant’s Error of Law hearing listed on 20th November 2025.
6. The appellant’s solicitors made several written applications to adjourn the hearing: all were refused. Thereafter, they sent an email to the Tribunal informing that they would not be attending nor instructing counsel to attend. They asked that if the hearing were to proceed, I should consider ‘the previously submitted grounds and documents.’
7. Neither the appellant nor a representative on his behalf attended the hearing. In accordance with Rule 38 of the Tribunal Procedure Rules, I was satisfied the appellant was notified of the hearing and that it was in the interest of justice to proceed.
8. At the hearing I heard submissions from Mrs. Nolan and asked her to address specific aspects of the grounds of appeal. I reserved my decision.

Discussion
9. The Judge’s finding and reasons are set out in a detailed 44-page decision. In assessing the judge’s reasoning, I apply Volpi v Vopli [2022] EWCA Civ 464. At [2(i)]
‘Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract’.
Ground 1: Unreasonable conclusions on sexuality
10. The particulars of this ground are contained at [8] to [10] of the appellant’s skeleton argument. The judge is specifically criticised for ‘presuming’ that the appellant ought to have disclosed his previous same-sex relationship to medical professionals or others and that the delay in disclosing such relationship damaged the appellant’s credibility. At [9], it is submitted that it was unreasonable and or illogical for the judge to conclude that the non-disclosure of the appellant’s sexuality prior to making his claim for asylum damaged the appellant’s credibility.
11. At [83] the judge makes plain that he rejected the appellant’s explanation for failing to disclose his sexuality after having looked ‘at the evidence as a whole’. In reaching his decision, the judge was entitled to consider how, when and why the appellant disclosed his sexuality and to give appropriate weight to any developments in the appellant’s account.
12. The judge specifically considered the appellant’s given reasons for non-disclosure and rejected them. The judge was entitled to consider the disclosures made by the appellant prior to his asylum interview. He did so and gave them weight. Ultimately, this ground discloses no more than a disagreement with the findings of the judge.
Ground 2: The appellant’s status as a vulnerable witness
13. The second ground criticises the judge for ‘failing to give adequate consideration to the relevance of the appellant’s psychiatric illness and his status as a vulnerable adult, when considering purported delays, omissions and inconsistencies…’ and ‘that judge should have expressly considered whether and to what extent and purported delays, omissions or inconsistencies….could have been attributed to the appellant’s psychiatric illness’.
14. At [60] the judge determined that the appellant was to be treated as a vulnerable witness for the purpose of the hearing. At [63] the Judge referred to expert evidence and noted appellant’s mental health would affect his ability to concentrate and recall events. The judge directed himself to be ‘cautious’ about making adverse credibility findings solely based on inconsistencies in the appellant’s account.
15. The judge records and analyses the accounts given by the appellant, and the opinions of the experts in detail. At [132], the judge finds the ‘appellant does have ongoing mental health problems…..however, I find he has grossly exaggerated and embellished his symptoms and has not shown to the lower standard of proof that any symptoms he is experiencing are as severe or debilitating as he claims. It is difficult to assess the true extent of his mental health difficulties because he is not being honest about his symptoms.’
16. The judge reached such findings as he was able to do on the material before him. The judge could not find a sufficient nexus between the appellant’s mental health and the delays or inconsistencies in the appellant’s account. The judge adequately considered the material before him. Again, this ground is a disagreement with the judge’s findings and has no merit.

Ground three: Speculative or unreasonable conclusions
17. This ground refers to the judge’s conclusions when considering the medical evidence. The judge’s reasoning at [78], [79] and [84] is criticised for supplanting the judge’s own views for that of the experts and engaging in unnecessary speculation. I note that there are two paragraphs [78] and [79] in the judge’s decision.
18. It is trite that a judge is not bound to accept the evidence of an expert. In assessing the weight to be given to the expert’s findings, the judge found [75], that ‘the first report does not adequately engage with the issue.’ This is a clear finding relevant to the weight to be attached to the expert evidence.
19. At [84](2)(a), the judge is criticised for reaching his own conclusions and straying into the realm of the medical expert. In reaching his conclusion, the judge referred to specific paragraphs of the expert report and gave such weight to the report as he saw fit.
20. At [79] the judge finds it ‘inconceivable’ that matters raised by the appellant in consultation with his doctor would not have been referred to in the discharge letter from therapy. Having considered the judge’s reasoning as a whole, this comment, placed in proper context is not a definitive finding as to how the author of the letter must have acted. It is tolerably clear the judge is simply finding that the document is question did not support the account given by the appellant. Having considered all the evidence, the judge concluded [128] that the ‘appellant’s account has all the hallmarks of a story that has developed and been significantly embellished over time’.
21. The judge’s finding at [79] might have been better expressed: it is an error of expression, not an error of law.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve a material error of law. Judge Davisons’s decision of 6th October 2024 stands. The appeal is dismissed.

Paul Lewis

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

3rd December 2025