Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004391

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64302/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 14th January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE Ó CEALLAIGH KC

Between

MA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Rutherford, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Hulme, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 17 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The appellant is a citizen of Iraq. On the appellant’s case he fears persecution by the Kurdish Democratic Party (“KDP”) and/or the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (“PUK”). The appellant’s protection claim was refused on 1 May 2024. He appealed.

2. The appellant’s appeal was dismissed by FTTJ Plowright in a determination promulgated on 6 August 2025. By these proceedings the appellant appeals with permission the dismissal of his appeal.

Grounds of appeal
3. The appellant appealed on two grounds, though for clarity I have divided the first ground into Ground 1(a) and Ground 1(b). The grounds provide as follows:

a. Ground 1 (a): The FTTJ failed to provide adequate reasons for his conclusions in respect of the appellant’s failure to mention in his Asylum Claims Questionnaire (“ACQ”) two events, namely a meeting with a Brigadier General and a meeting with members of the KDP in a coffee shop. The appellant was not legally represented at the time he completed the ACQ. The FTTJ failed in the circumstances to give adequate reasons why the appellant’s account of why the ACQ left out these details was not credible.

b. Ground 1(b): The FTTJ erred in failing to give reasons for concluding that the appellant’s explanation as to why he asked for his belongings to be destroyed was inadequate.

c. Ground 2: The FTTJ erred in concluding that there was an inconsistency in the appellant’s account of how frequently he was in contact with his family. While he said in oral evidence that he only had contact with his family once, that is not inconsistent with his account of being in contact with his family in his interview and witness statement, because he only refers to one incident of contact and made no statement about the frequency of contact.

4. Permission to appeal was granted by FTTJ Hollings-Tennant on all grounds.

5. FTTJ Hollings-Tennant considered in particular that it was arguable that the reasoning in respect of the rejection of the appellant’s reasons for the omissions in the ACQ were deficient. She was also concerned with the adequacy of the findings in respect of ongoing contact with the appellant’s family.

6. The respondent filed and served a Rule 24 response dated 13 October 2025 seeking to uphold the findings of the FTT.

The hearing
7. Ms Rutherford represented the appellant as she had below, and Mr Hulme represented the respondent. I am grateful to them both.

8. Ms Rutherford relied on her grounds of appeal.

9. In respect of her Ground 1(a), she accepted that the FTTJ dealt with the discrepancies that concerned him and was entitled to do so. She also accepted when I put it to her that the FTTJ had been entitled to simply not believe the appellant, if that was his conclusion. However she maintained that the FTTJ was required to at least engage with the fact that the appellant was not legally represented when he completed the ACQ, and that there was no information as to the qualifications of the interpreter.

10. Ms Rutherford submitted that when a person is legally represented a court can have confidence that a document signed will have been produced using a suitably qualified interpreter. That applies in particular to screening interviews and asylum interviews. The same cannot be said for ACQs which were specifically produced without such protections, and which were sent out to unrepresented individuals who then had a short time to complete them in another language and return them.

11. The FTTJ had failed to engage with this reality and failed to address the question of whether a document produced in such circumstances could be considered to be reliable. The FTTJ needed to give reasons as to why inconsistencies arising from a document produced in such circumstances could be relied on, notwithstanding the appellant’s explanation.

12. In respect of her Ground 1(b), Ms Rutherford submitted that the FTTJ was required to give reasons as to why he considered that the appellant’s explanation for destroying his belongings was inadequate. The FTTJ accepted that acting irrationally as a result of anxiety might be a possible explanation but did not accept that reason as adequate. He was required to give reasons for that conclusion.

13. In respect of Ground 2, I put to Ms Rutherford that the FTTJ had not in fact relied on a discrepancy as to the frequency of contact but had actually concluded [26] that the proposition that the appellant had only been in contact with his family once was implausible. There was no challenge to that conclusion in the grounds. Ms Rutherford accepted that was the case.

14. On Ground 1(a), Mr Hulme submitted that there was no requirement for legally trained persons to assist in the production of the ACQ. There was no suggestion that a complaint had been made about the interpreter and no detailed account as to how the interpreter had been identified. It was wrong to assume that the interpreter was not appropriately qualified. The FTTJ was entitled in the circumstances to consider what was a clear inconsistency.

15. On Ground 1(b) Mr Hulme submitted that the conclusion in respect of the appellant’s reasons for destroying his belongings at [27] of the determination had to be read with the reasoning in [26]. Read together, there was clearly adequate reasoning on that issue.

16. I indicated to Mr Hulme that I did not need to hear from him on Ground 2.

Decision and reasons
17. Ground 2 may be dealt with shortly. As set out above the FTTJ did not rely on an inconsistency in respect of the appellant’s level of contact with his family; he considered that the appellant’s account of the frequency of that contact was implausible. There was no error in that conclusion and indeed it was not challenged in the grounds.

18. Ground 1(b) may also be dealt with relatively shortly. There are in my view clearly adequate reasons provided by the FTTJ for his rejection of the appellant’s account of his reasons for destroying his belongings when both paragraphs are read together. While another Judge might have accepted those reasons the FTTJ was entitled to disbelieve them.

19. Ground 1(a) is considerably more difficult. It is plainly right that the FTTJ was not required to simply accept the appellant’s explanation that there are parts of his account that the interpreter assisting with the ACQ did not include. However, like FTTJ Hollings-Tennant in granting permission, I am concerned with the lack of reasoning provided, particularly as regards the nature of the ACQ.

20. I am persuaded by Ms Rutherford’s submission that the FTTJ was required to at least engage with the circumstances in which the ACQ was completed.

21. In YL (Rely on SEF) China [2004] UKIAT 00145 the tribunal held as follows [19]:

“When a person seeks asylum in the United Kingdom he is usually made the subject of a 'screening interview'…The purpose of that is to establish the general nature of the claimant's case so that the Home Office official can decide how best to process it. It is concerned with the country of origin, means of travel, circumstances of arrival in the United Kingdom, preferred language and other matters that might help the Secretary of State understand the case. Asylum seekers are still expected to tell the truth and answers given in screening interviews can be compared fairly with answers given later. However, it has to be remembered that a screening interview is not done to establish in detail the reasons a person gives to support her claim for asylum. It would not normally be appropriate for the Secretary of State to ask supplementary questions or to entertain elaborate answers and an inaccurate summary by an interviewing officer at that stage would be excusable. Further the screening interview may well be conducted when the asylum seeker is tired after a long journey. These things have to be considered when any inconsistencies between the screening interview and the later case are evaluated.”

22. Neither party was able to direct me toward any equivalent case law in respect of ACQs. That is perhaps because these documents are relatively new. They appear to have been introduced as part of the Streamlined Asylum Process, the aim of which was to deal with the asylum backlog inter alia by making positive decisions in certain claims without an interview where that was possible and appropriate. They were generally employed in respect of countries with a high grant rate. A relatively short period was provided to respond to the ACQ. Where following receipt of the ACQ the decisionmaker felt it was necessary, a full interview could then be conducted. That appears to be what happened here.

23. Unlike a screening interview or an asylum interview, no interpreter is provided (contrast with the appellant’s screening and asylum interviews in the present case). The recipient of an ACQ, who may not have legal representation, must complete the form however they can, and a failure to do so within time will carry consequences. The questions, at least in the appellant’s ACQ, are somewhat open-ended.

24. The question in the ACQ in response to which the appellant set out his account was “What do you fear will happen if you return?”. There was no indication in that question that the appellant was required to detail any part of his account, still less set out his entire account. There was no indication on the face of the documents made available to me that failing to include an aspect of his factual history in response to that question would result in his account being disbelieved later, though I note that neither side adduced the cover letter.

25. In my judgment, the FTT erred in failing to engage with the circumstances in which the ACQ was conducted, specifically in the absence of legal representation and with an interpreter of unknown qualifications. Moreover, the nature of the ACQ on its face suggests that (as the appellant says his interpreter told him [23]) brief answers are appropriate. There is no indication in the questions that he was required to detail his entire account, or that a failure to do so would be held against him.

26. Mr Hulme’s point that no complaint has been made about the interpreter would have some force if the issue were in respect of an asylum interview or a screening interview. In such circumstances there is a record of the interpreter who must be appropriately registered. However the informal nature of the ACQ means that consideration does not apply, and the lack of equivalent protections inevitably raises the risk of something going awry. Mr Hulme is right to say that it cannot be assumed that the interpreter was inadequately qualified, and I observe that there is a dearth of evidence on this issue. However the fact remains that the FTTJ was required in my view to give full consideration to the circumstances in which the ACQ was produced before placing weight on those omissions.

27. While the position considered in YL (China) in respect of screening interviews is clearly different it is in my view analogous. Although matters might be different where there is an outright contradiction, omissions in ACQs produced in the circumstances above may need to be considered with caution. In this case, the FTT was required in my judgment to at least engage with the circumstances in which the ACQ was produced before placing significant weight on the two omissions.

28. It follows that the decision of the FTT contained an error of law on this issue. As on any view that consideration was critical the FTT’s rejection of the appellant’s credibility it follows that the error was material, and that no part of the determination can stand.

Notice of Decision
The decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Plowright did involve the making of a material error of law. The appellant’s appeal is allowed and the matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a full rehearing with no findings of fact preserved.

Greg Ó Ceallaigh KC

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6 January 2026