Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004400
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/50936/2023
LH/04570/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 2 March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HIRST

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

CAE
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Tufan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr Toal, counsel instructed by Wilson Solicitors LLP

Heard at Field House on 20 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Respondent and his daughter are granted anonymity. A departure from the principles of open justice is necessary in this case to prevent jigsaw identification of the Respondent's daughter, who is a minor with significant mental and physical health needs. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Respondent or his family members, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Respondent or his family members. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction and summary
1. The Secretary of State appeals, with permission granted by the First-tier Tribunal, from the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 11 August 2025 allowing the Respondent’s appeal on human rights grounds.
2. The only issue which I am required to determine in this appeal is whether the First-tier Tribunal’s decision allowing the Respondent's appeal contained a material error or errors of law. For the reasons set out below, I have decided that it did not. The decision to allow the Respondent's appeal was one which was open to the Tribunal, which correctly applied the relevant statutory provisions and caselaw to the facts and evidence before it. I therefore decline to set aside the First-tier Tribunal’s decision and dismiss the Secretary of State’s appeal.
3. The effect of this decision is that the First-tier Tribunal’s determination allowing the Respondent’s appeal stands. For the avoidance of doubt, the effect of my decision is not to grant the Respondent leave to remain or otherwise determine his immigration status in the UK. Those decisions are and remain solely the responsibility of the Secretary of State.
4. I apologise to the parties for the lengthy delay in producing this decision, which has been due to my prolonged and continuing absence on sick leave, and for any inconvenience caused. Applying the principles in R (SS (Sri Lanka)) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 1391, however, I consider that it remains appropriate for me to determine the appeal on the basis of the parties’ written and oral submissions.
Background
5. The Respondent is a citizen of Nigeria. He entered the UK lawfully in 1983, then aged 3, and has since resided in the UK. On 11th February 2021, he was convicted of offences of violence and escape from custody and was sentenced to two years and two months’ imprisonment.
6. On 12 January 2023, the Secretary of State made a decision to deport the Respondent. The Respondent appealed on human rights grounds. On 11th August 2025 the First-tier Tribunal allowed the appeal. The First-tier Tribunal judge noted that the Secretary of State conceded that the Respondent had been lawfully in the UK for most of his life and that it would be unduly harsh for the Respondent's daughter S to go to Nigeria. The First-tier Tribunal found that both the exceptions in s117C(4) and (5) Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 were met and that the public interest did not therefore require the Respondent's deportation.
7. The Secretary of State appealed the decision. Permission to appeal was granted by the First-tier Tribunal on 18 September 2025.
The grounds of appeal
8. The Appellant's grounds of appeal contended that the First-tier Tribunal had erred in law in the following ways:
a. Ground 1: The First-tier Tribunal had not provided adequate reasons or correctly applied relevant caselaw when finding that the Respondent was culturally and socially integrated in the UK;
b. Ground 2: The First-tier Tribunal similarly failed to provide adequate reasons or to apply relevant caselaw when deciding that there were very significant obstacles to the Respondent's reintegration in Nigeria;
c. Ground 3: The First-tier Tribunal did not provide adequate reasons for finding that the Respondent had a subsisting parental relationship with S, nor correctly apply the relevant ‘unduly harsh’ threshold in finding that s117C(5) NIAA 2002 was met.
Discussion and decision
9. It is a well-established principle that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of the First Tier Tribunal as a specialist fact-finding tribunal: HA(Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22, [2022] 1 WLR 3784 at [72]. This is an appeal on an error of law; the Upper Tribunal should not interfere with the conclusions of a First-tier Tribunal judge on primary facts unless satisfied that those conclusions were “plainly wrong” or “rationally insupportable” on the evidence before her: Volpi & Anor v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, [2022] 4 WLR 48 at [2].
10. Similarly, when it comes to the reasons given by the First-tier Tribunal for its decision, some judicial caution is required, and the Upper Tribunal should not assume that the judge misdirected herself or gave inadequate reasons just because not every step in her reasoning is fully set out: HA (Iraq) at §72 citing R (Jones) v First-tier Tribunal (Social Entitlement Chamber) [2013] UKSC 19; [2013] 2 AC 48 at §25. What is required is reasons which are sufficiently detailed that the parties understand the principles on which the First-tier Tribunal has acted and the factors which led it to its decision: Haleemudeen v SSHD [2014] EWCA Civ 558 at §35.
Legal framework: Article 8 ECHR and s117C Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002
11. Article 8 ECHR provides:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
12. When a court or tribunal is required to determine whether a decision made under the Immigration Acts breaches a person’s right to respect for his private or family life under Article 8 ECHR, it must apply the provisions of s117A-D Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. When assessing whether an interference with a person’s Article 8 rights is justified under Article 8(2), the court or tribunal must in particular have regard to the considerations in s117B, and in cases concerning deportation of foreign criminals, to the considerations in s117C.
13. Section 117C(3) provides that, where a foreign criminal has not been sentenced to a period of imprisonment of four years or more, the public interest requires his deportation unless either or both of the exceptions in s117C(4) or (5) applies.
14. Exception 1 in s117C(4) applies where (a) the foreign criminal has been lawfully resident in the UK for most of his life, (b) he is socially and culturally integrated in the UK, and (c) there would be very significant obstacles to his integration into the country to which it is proposed to deport him.
15. Exception 2 in s117C(5) applies (as relevant to this appeal) where the foreign criminal has a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child and the effect of his deportation on the child would be unduly harsh.
16. That was the legal framework which the First-tier Tribunal had to apply in this appeal. The question for the Upper Tribunal is whether, in determining that Exceptions 1 and 2 were met on the facts of the Respondent's case, the First-tier Tribunal made a material error of law in any of the ways identified in the Appellant's grounds of appeal.
Ground 1: s117C(4)(b)
17. On behalf of the Appellant, Mr Tufan relied on the grounds of appeal. He submitted that the First-tier Tribunal had failed to take into account the Respondent's offending history when considering whether he was ‘culturally and socially integrated’ as required by s117C(4)(b).
18. The First-tier Tribunal judge expressly and correctly directed herself (§66-67) by reference to CI (Nigeria) v SSHD [2019] EWCA Civ 2027 and the subsequent judgment in SC (Jamaica) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 15. As she noted, the Court of Appeal in CI (Nigeria) clearly stated (at §79) that although the nature and extent of an individual’s criminal offending were relevant to the strength of the public interest in his deportation, they were not relevant when answering the separate question of whether the individual was integrated in the UK.
19. The judge correctly noted that it was for the Respondent to demonstrate his integration, noted the relevance of the Respondent's history of criminal offending, and expressly recorded that he had been previously convicted on multiple occasions (§68). However, the judge also identified (§68-69) a number of factors which pointed towards the Respondent being socially and culturally integrated as at the time of the hearing, not least his length of residence, his social ties, his work with youths and knife crime, and his lack of any knowledge or ties to any other country or society than the UK. The Appellant does not suggest that those factors were irrelevant, and Mr Tufan expressly disavowed any submission that the First-tier Tribunal reached an irrational conclusion.
20. The essence of the Appellant's case, as put forward in the grounds of appeal and oral submissions, is that previous criminal offending is always a factor which the Tribunal should treat as weighing against the social and cultural integration of the individual. That approach is however inconsistent with the clear reasoning of the Court of Appeal in CI (Nigeria) and with the warning in that case as to “double counting” the public interest in deportation when considering whether Exception 1 is met.
21. In this case the First-tier Tribunal judge’s approach, which concerned itself with the Respondent's social and cultural links and his identity, was entirely consistent with the guidance in CI (Nigeria) which was subsequently affirmed in SC (Jamaica). I consider that it was entirely open to the First-tier Tribunal judge, applying the relevant authorities, to conclude that on the evidence before her the Respondent was socially and culturally integrated in the UK at the time of the hearing. Her reasoning was clear and succinct and entirely adequate to explain her conclusion. There was no error of law in her approach.
Ground 2: s117C(4)(c)
22. The judge considered s117C(4)(c) at §70-82 of the decision. At §71 she directed herself by reference to Kamara v SSHD [2016] EWCA Civ 813 at §14 and the requirement for a “broad evaluative judgment” as to whether the threshold was met. At §76 she expressly noted that “The test is elevated and requires there to be very significant obstacles” (original emphasis) and noted that did not equate to merely finding life difficult or challenging on return.
23. The judge set out at §72-75 and §77-81 a number of factors which she considered relevant. Those included the Respondent's lack of any meaningful contacts or any support network in Nigeria; the fact that English was spoken in Nigeria; his lack of practical skills; the medical evidence demonstrating a deterioration in the Respondent's mental and physical health and severe symptoms; the evidence from the relevant CPIN and from the International Displacement Monitoring Centre demonstrating that the Respondent was likely to be unable to access medical care or employment in Nigeria, leading to a likely further deterioration in his health; the effects of separation from his daughter S; and the fact that the Respondent had not been in Nigeria since he was 3. The judge concluded (§82) that “by a small margin” the Respondent had established that there were very significant obstacles to integration on return.
24. Mr Tufan submitted that although the First-tier Tribunal judge had correctly directed herself that ‘very significant obstacles to integration’ imposed an elevated threshold, she had not in practice applied that threshold. In particular, he criticised the judge’s findings at §72-74 and 78 and submitted that her reasoning in relation to s117(4)(c) was not balanced.
25. I do not accept those submissions. The assessment of whether there are, in an individual case, very significant obstacles to integration is one which is of its nature fact-sensitive. Although Mr Tufan took issue with the judge’s findings individually, what is required (as emphasised by the Court of Appeal in Kamara) is a “broad evaluative judgment”. The judge directed herself correctly and her assessment that the relevant factors had to be considered together was also undoubtedly correct.
26. In this case, as Mr Toal submitted, the judge identified on the evidence before her the likelihood that the Respondent would on return be subject to a cycle of deterioration in his health exacerbating his inability to obtain employment or support and in turn leading to further deterioration. The judge’s conclusion that the ‘very significant obstacles’ threshold was met was open to her on the facts and evidence before her and was supported by clear reasons. The factors identified in the grounds of appeal are in essence a disagreement with the First-tier Tribunal’s conclusions and do not, even cumulatively, demonstrate a material error of law in the Tribunal’s approach.
27. Even if I had not been of that view, however, any error in relation to s117C(4)(c) was not material in light of the First-tier Tribunal’s conclusion that Exception 2 (s117C(5)) also applied on the facts of the Respondent's case. I address that under Ground 3 below.
Ground 3: s117C(5)
28. In the grounds of appeal, the Appellant contended both that the First-tier Tribunal had failed to provide adequate reasons for finding that the Respondent had a subsisting parental relationship with his daughter S, and that the First-tier Tribunal had misapplied the ‘unduly harsh’ test. In submissions before me, Mr Tufan confirmed that the Appellant did not pursue any challenge in relation to the existence of a genuine parental relationship between the Respondent and S. He was undoubtedly right to do so in light of the First-tier Tribunal’s reasoning at §84-86 of the decision. I concentrate therefore on the Tribunal’s interpretation and application of the ‘unduly harsh’ test.
29. As Mr Tufan recognised, the Secretary of State had conceded that the ‘go’ scenario (S returning to Nigeria with the Respondent) would have unduly harsh effects on S; the issue for the First-tier Tribunal was therefore whether the ‘stay’ scenario (S remaining in the UK without her father) would also have unduly harsh effects. He submitted that in effect the judge had not correctly applied the very high threshold identified in HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22. The Appellant's grounds of appeal asserted that the First-tier Tribunal had not identified any consequences for S which could be categorised as severe or bleak, and took issue in a number of respects with the quality of the evidence before the First-tier Tribunal and the Tribunal’s approach to that evidence.
30. The First-tier Tribunal judge expressly directed herself (§94) by reference to HA (Iraq) and the elevated threshold required, and further set out (§95) the Home Office guidance as to the relevant factors to be considered when assessing whether the ‘unduly harsh’ threshold was met. She noted that the Home Office guidance emphasised the importance of loss of contact, the nature of the relationship between parent and child and the impact on the child of loss of contact. Those were undoubtedly relevant factors.
31. The judge summarised the evidence relating to S at §97-101. She noted that S’s medical conditions, which included long Covid, severe anxiety and panic attacks and mobility issues which meant that she could not be left alone, were accepted by the Appellant at the hearing. The evidence referred to by the judge included a letter from S herself, a report from a Senior Education Mental Health Practitioner, a letter from the local authority family support team, and oral evidence from both the Respondent and his ex-partner and co-parent T. The judge accepted (§103) that on the evidence S could not travel to Nigeria to visit her father, and found that modern means of communication would not be a suitable substitute for face to face contact due to S’s sensory issues; further, her father’s presence had taken on greater significance for S due to her already restricted social circle and social life.
32. Although the Appellant's grounds of appeal took issue with the quality of the evidence before the First-tier Tribunal, and in particular the lack of expert psychiatric evidence, there is no indication that the Appellant addressed this point before the First-tier Tribunal. In any event, there is no requirement for clinical evidence in relation to s117C(6). The evidence before the First-tier Tribunal included evidence from qualified mental health and social work practitioners whose views the Tribunal judge was entitled to accept; the weight to be attached to it was a matter for her.
33. The judge’s conclusion (§103) that S’s particular health and care needs and the consequent significance of her relationship with her father were circumstances which took the case “out of the ordinary commonplaces of family life” was a conclusion which was open to the judge on the evidence before her. That phrase was a reference to the judgment of Jackson LJ in NA (Pakistan) [2016] EWCA Civ 662, [2017] 1 WLR 207 in relation to the more demanding “very compelling circumstances” test imposed by s117C(6) NIAA 2002. The judge’s conclusion that the less stringent threshold for Exception 2 was met was a conclusion which was unarguably open to her on the evidence.
Conclusion
34. The judge’s conclusion that the statutory exceptions in s117C(4) and (5) NIAA 2002 were met, and that the public interest did not therefore require the Respondent's deportation, was a conclusion which was firmly based on the facts and evidence before the First-tier Tribunal. The judge explained her decision clearly and by reference to the evidence. She correctly directed herself as to the relevant law and applied it to the facts and evidence before her. There was no material error of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law. I decline to set the decision aside.
The appeal of the Secretary of State is dismissed.

L Hirst

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27 February 2026