Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004402
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51692/2024
LP/08571/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

19th June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

MQ
(ANONYMITY ORDERED)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Ahmed, counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Abdul-Karim, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 1 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction and Background
1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal (‘FtT’) because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Iran. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.
2. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 21 July 2025, of a judge of the FtT (‘the judge’) to dismiss the appeal on international protection and human rights grounds.
3. The appeal arose in the context of the appellant’s claim that he had been transporting political leaflets into Iran when his party was ambushed by Iranian security forces. His claim to have therefore been identified as assisting Kurdish political causes in this way was the centrepiece of his claim for asylum. He further claimed that his family home was raided soon after the ambush and, after he fled to the UK, he engaged in sur place political activity which further put him at risk of persecution on return.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
4. The appellant was granted permission to argue six grounds of appeal. For reasons which will become clear, it is unnecessary to summarise these grounds of appeal.
5. At the error of law hearing, I heard oral submissions from both parties. After I raised what I considered to be a ‘Robinson-obvious’ point, the respondent conceded that the decision involved a material error of law. It was agreed that the appropriate disposal was to remit the matter to the FtT to be decided de novo. I indicated at the hearing that I would be allowing the appeal and remitting the matter. These are my reasons.
Discussion
6. At [7] of his decision, the judge noted:
[7] I asked the advocates to identify what the issues were in this appeal. The HOPO said that credibility is the issue. If the Appellant's account were accepted then the Home Office would concede that he would be at risk upon return. The Appellant's counsel agreed.
7. There was no dispute between the parties at the error of law hearing that the centrepiece of the appellant’s asylum claim was his narrative of being ambushed while in the process of smuggling into Iran political literature critical of the Iranian regime and supportive of Kurdish civil rights. It was accepted that the asylum appeal ought to succeed if the appellant’s factual claims were found to be credible. The judge rejected the appellant’s overall credibility for various reasons touching on inconsistencies about his knowledge of Iranian politics, his inability to recall the dates of relevant events and confusion about the claimed raid on his family home after the ambush. The judge also expressed doubts about the appellant’s true motivation for pursuing political activity in the UK, his failure to contact his family in Iran and his failure to seek protection on his journey from Iran to the UK. At no point in the analysis does the judge address whether it is credible that the appellant was engaged in smuggling political literature when his party was said to have been raided by the Iranian security forces. This omission is all the more surprising when seen against the backdrop of the respondent’s acceptance that he had worked as a kolbar and the centrality of his credibility about this key event.
8. This omission to grapple with the core of the factual element of a protection claim resonates with [26]-[31] of the judgment of May LJ in AM & Anor v SSHD [2026] EWCA Civ 159 where the court stressed the need for finders of fact to engage with the “key indicia of risk”. The central basis for allowing the appeal in that appeal was expressed by the court in this way at [31]:
[31] Reading the Determination as a whole, it appears that the judge may have directed his focus to reaching an overall credibility finding at the expense of sufficiently addressing and explaining his conclusions regarding the core elements of the claim going to risk. […]
9. I am satisfied that we are in the very same territory here because the judge has not addressed his mind explicitly to the “key indicia of risk” which was undoubtedly the claimed ambush by dint of which the appellant claimed to have been identified as a political actor by the Iranian forces. It was manifestly insufficient to rely on a broad assessment of peripheral matters going to credibility without the judge turning his mind to the credibility of the fundamental factual claim at the heart of the case. Without deciding this critical factual question, I am satisfied that the decision involved a material error of law which, if left undisturbed, would run the risk of putting the UK in breach of its obligations under the Refugee Convention. Notwithstanding the fact that the point was not raised in the grounds of appeal, I am more than satisfied that it is so obvious that I should raise it of my own motion, grant permission and allow the appeal on the strength of the point. The respondent agreed with this approach at the hearing and conceded the appeal. For all of these reasons, I allow the appeal on the strength of the ’Robinson-obvious’ point I have identified.
Disposal
10. The parties were agreed that the appropriate disposal was to remit the matter to the FtT to be decided de novo. I agree. The appellant has not had a judicial resolution of the factual centrepiece of his asylum claim. All of the other findings reached by the judge necessarily fall away and cannot be preserved. The appellant is entitled to a full and lawful judicial assessment of his protection claim at first instance preserving the two-tier appeals process.
Notice of Decision
The appeal involved a material and ‘Robinson-obvious’ error of law. I set aside the decision and do not preserve any findings of fact. The appeal is to be remitted to the FtT to be decided de novo by a different judge.

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 June 2026