Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004403
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53431/2024
LP/04185/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 2nd of July 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BAGRAL

Between

SS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr R Spurling, Counsel instructed by Hunter Stone Law
For the Respondent: Mr J Nappey, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 12 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The Appellant appeals against the decision of First‑tier Tribunal Judge Gibbs (“the judge”), promulgated on 26 June 2025, by which his appeal against the Respondent’s refusal of his protection and human rights claim was dismissed.
2. Permission to appeal was refused by the judge on 8 September 2025. On renewal, permission was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Neville on 4 March 2026. Judge Neville noted that the judge did not appear to have considered the issue of anonymity and made an order to that effect which continues.
3. Judge Neville granted permission to appeal on all grounds, and in doing so observed that it was arguable that the judge failed to make clear findings on the Appellant’s claim to be at risk by association with his foster father.
4. The appeal now comes before me to determine whether the judge made a material error of law.
Background
5. The Appellant is a national of Bangladesh. He states that he was brought up from childhood by a foster family in Bangladesh. He claims that, during his upbringing, he was required to perform domestic work and was subjected to ill treatment by that family. He asserts that his foster father, held a position of influence connected to the Islamic Foundation and government structures in Bangladesh.
6. The Appellant entered the United Kingdom on 20 June 2018 as a visitor in the company of his foster family, who subsequently returned to Bangladesh leaving him in the United Kingdom. He remained in the United Kingdom and claimed asylum on 21 December 2022.
7. The basis of his claim is that, on return to Bangladesh, he would face harm from his foster father and family, including threats of serious violence on account of his previous treatment and his knowledge of alleged wrongdoing. He further asserts that he would be unable to obtain effective protection from the authorities, given the claimed influence of his foster father. In support of his appeal the Appellant relied upon documentary evidence from Bangladesh said to relate to his foster father.
The Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
8. The judge heard oral evidence from the Appellant and considered the documentary evidence.
9. While it was not disputed that the Appellant was a victim of forced labour, the judge found that this aspect of the claim did not engage the Refugee Convention but did accept that his claim as to risk arising from association to his foster father could do so.
10. At [13] – [16], the judge considered the Appellant’s evidence concerning his foster father, including matters such as a two-year delay in claiming asylum, the lack of persuasive evidence as to why his foster father would be interested in the Appellant on return, and the unreliability of his claim to be aware of his foster father’s circumstances particularly in view of the Appellant’s lack of contact with his foster father and his claim not to have had any contacts in Bangladesh.
11. At [11] – [12], the judge dealt with the Appellant’s claim that his foster father is an influential person in the Islamic Foundation and the Ministry of Religion in Bangladesh. The judge expressed concerns as to the reliability of the “numerous documents” said to relate to the Appellant’s foster father, and at [12] said this:
“… The difficultly that I have with these documents is with regards to their origin. For example, (digital page 127-128) appears to be a document issued by the Islamic Foundation but the appellant has not explained how he obtained this document. I also find that the appellant was challenged about the lack of any website address on some of the documents which he was unable to explain. He has also submitted a photograph (digital page 157 of the stitched bundle) which he told Mr Satorius was a photograph that he had taken from a television programme but he was unable to provide any details about the programme, or provide other evidence of the origin of the photograph.”
[my emphasis]
12. The judge concluded that the Appellant had not established a well-founded fear of persecution or entitlement to protection and dismissed the appeal on all grounds
The Grounds of Appeal
13. The Appellant advances four grounds, which may be summarised as follows:
Ground 1: Misdirection in law in concluding that a victim of forced labour could not fall within the Refugee Convention.
Ground 2: Failure to consider background evidence relating to the changed political regime in Bangladesh.
Ground 3: Flawed credibility assessment and failure to apply anxious scrutiny.
Ground 4: Failure properly to assess risk on return.
The Hearing
14. I had before me a composite bundle which included the documents relevant to the appeal, and the Appellant’s and Respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal. I was also provided with a copy of the Appellant’s skeleton argument that was before the judge.
15. Having heard helpful submissions from Mr Spurling and Mr Nappey, I indicated that I would reserve my decision and provide that in writing which I now turn to do.
Consideration
16. Although Mr Spurling represented the Appellant before the judge, the grounds of appeal were drafted by the Appellant’s representatives. Following observations from the bench, Mr Spurling, rightly, conceded Ground 1. This ground fails to explain with any degree of clarity, how the judge misdirected herself in law in concluding that the Appellant’s claim as a victim of forced labour did not engage the Refugee Convention for want of a convention reason.
17. As for the other grounds, I am grateful to both representatives for the pragmatic and fair approach they adopted in respect of them. Mr Spurling’s submissions focussed principally on Ground 3. Grounds 2 and 4 were advanced on the basis that they arise only if Ground 3 is made out, both being contingent upon the challenge to the judge’s assessment and, in particular, its implications for risk on return. Mr Nappey agreed with that assessment.
18. I therefore turn to consider Ground 3. I pause to note here that Mr Spurling in submissions referred to matters from his recollection of what was or was not said at the hearing before the judge, and to matters that are not raised in the grounds either expressly or implicitly. I have no doubt that Mr Spurling was doing his best to assist the Tribunal in light of the fact that he is not the author of the grounds, but he rightly recognised, following further observations from the bench, that he could not give evidence about those matters or indeed raise matters that are not pleaded in grounds. Mr Spurling, again, rightly, did not pursue the matter further and I have there confined my consideration to the grounds as pleaded and the submissions in respect of them.
19. Ground 3 essentially contends that the judge erred in law in the assessment of the evidence relating to the Appellant’s foster father, by failing to properly engage with documentary evidence and by giving inadequate reasons.
20. Mr Spurling submits, that the judge in stating at [12] that, “[t]he difficulty with these documents is with regards to their origin” was questioning the reliability and verifiability of the Appellant’s documents. He submitted not only is that reasoning inadequate, there is a misstep in that reasoning. Mr Spurling emphasised that the Appellant had provided an account in his witness statement as to how those documents were obtained, and he took the Tribunal to several documents which contain apparent identifying features, including website addresses, email contact details, and other indicia of provenance.
21. Mr Spurling submitted that, first, the reasoning at [12] does not engage with those features or with the Appellant’s explanation; and, secondly, that the judge erred in concluding that the Appellant had provided no explanation.
22. Although Mr Nappey relied on the Rule 24 Response (not drafted by him), its treatment of Ground 3 does not directly engage with the present challenge, asserting only that it reflects disagreement with the judge’s findings. In his submissions, however, Mr Nappey adopted a more considered position, properly accepting that the judge erred at [12] in the manner identified by Mr Spurling, but submitted that the error was not material, and that the judge’s findings at [14] and, in particular, at [15] was sufficient to sustain the decision.
23. I am satisfied, as accepted by Mr Nappey, that the judge erred at [12] in considering the documentary evidence. The judge’s conclusions in respect of that evidence contain an error of fact, are unsupported by the evidence, and are inadequately reasoned. However, I do not accept the submission that the errors are not material. Whilst the judge was entitled to take into account the matters identified at [14]–[15], the assessment of the documentary material is central to the evaluation of the foster father’s status and influence.
24. As Mr Spurling submits, the errors at [12] bear directly upon that issue, and in turn, the Appellant’s claim that he is at risk by association to his foster father. I am satisfied that in the absence of an adequate and reasoned assessment of the documents and the Appellant’s explanation for them, it cannot safely be concluded that the later findings - whether concerning lack of contact, passage of time, or political developments - are unaffected.
25. Nor am I persuaded that the judge’s reasoning at [15], described as a “catch-all” assessment, cures the defect at [12]. Neither the conclusions at [15] (or [16]) provide a sufficiently reasoned basis independent of the flawed earlier analysis, particularly where the earlier assessment concerned a central pillar of the claim.
26. Mr Spurling submitted, that the brevity of the reasoning in a case turning on credibility and documentary evidence demonstrated that the judge failed to apply anxious scrutiny to the claim. While brevity is not in itself erroneous, in the present case, in an otherwise careful decision, the lack of engagement with material evidence, coupled with the inadequacy of reasoning, means that the Appellant is left to infer the basis upon which material evidence was rejected.
27. Drawing these matters together, the failure to adequately engage with material evidence, the inadequacy of reasoning at [12], and the centrality of that issue to the assessment of the foster father’s status and influence amount to a material error of law.
28. In light of that conclusion, and as accepted by both representatives, Grounds 2 and 4 follow and do not require separate determination.
Conclusion
29. For the reasons I have given, I am satisfied that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law. That decision is set aside.
30. The error identified goes to the heart of the credibility assessment and, in consequence, to the findings on risk on return. None of the findings of fact can safely be preserved. The appropriate course, as agreed by the representatives, is to remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for a hearing de novo before a judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Gibbs.
Notice of Decision
31. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of a material error of law and is set aside.
32. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing before any judge other than First-tier Tribunal Judge Gibbs.
R. Bagral
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
24 June 2026