Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004414
UI-2025-004574

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/61170/2023
LP/01945/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 5 February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GREY

Between

SR
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms S. Alban, Seren Legal Practice
For the Respondent: Ms A. Nolan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 27 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh. He appeals against the decision of First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) of 24 August 2025 dismissing his human rights appeal.

Relevant background

2. Following a hearing on 14 August 2025 in the FTT at Newport IAC, the FTT Judge (“the Judge”) dismissed the appellant’s appeal. The appellant initially claimed asylum on 20 August 2018, on what he now states was a false basis that he was at risk from the Awami League on account of his political activity and opinion. He submitted an appeal to the FTT on 16 November 2023 on protection and human rights grounds. At some point before a Case Management Review Hearing (“CMRH”) in the FTT on 9 September 2024, the appellant instructed new legal representatives in July 2024 and withdrew his protection claim. The appellant pursued his appeal on human rights grounds (Article 3 and 8 ECHR). He now states that his name and date of birth are different to that he had provided in his asylum claim. His account is that he was trafficked to the UK in 2007 when he was just 16 years old and the entry clearance application (visit visa) made on his behalf provided a false date of birth of 10 April 1984 (as opposed to a date in 1991). At the CMRH the respondent was directed to respond to the appellant’s assertion that he was a victim of trafficking by 14 October 2024.

3. In the subsequent directions of Judge Thomas issued on 16 October 2024 it records:

3. The Appellant’s now account is based upon having been trafficked. As already indicated, the Respondent accepts no aspect of that account as such, no referral has been made to the NRM and even if it was now, to delay this appeal to await that decision would neither be reasonable nor proportionate. As such, both representatives agree that the final hearing should not be adjourned on that basis.

4. The directions also record:

By way of background, the original protection claim made by the Appellant is no longer maintained. In short, the protection claim is withdrawn on the basis of the Appellant’s now account. Further, the Appellant's claim to be [SR] with a dob of 10 May 1988 is no longer maintained, he states that he is a [HO] with a date of birth of [1991]. The Respondent rejects all aspects of the Appellant's account in regard to the latter, as such the Appellant’s identity remains in issue

On the basis that the protection claim is withdrawn the issues for determination of the final hearing are, as agreed, the Appellant’s

(i) identity, that is his name and date of birth;
(ii) his claim on Article 3 ECHR medical health grounds; and
(iii) on Article 8 ECHR grounds, both within the Immigration Rules and directly.

5. There were a number of further CMRHs held before the substantive hearing in August 2025. It is noted that on Sunday evening 10 August 2025, three days before the substantive hearing, the respondent uploaded a further review of the appellant’s case. This was the third respondent’s review. At [16] of this document it states:

In addition to the above, it should be noted that the Appellant received a Negative Reasonable Grounds decision in respect of his claimed trafficking on 28th October 2024 – this is further evidence that the Appellant lacks credibility
The FTT decision

6. The decision under challenge records the issues for determination at [7] as follows:

(i) Is the Appellant a credible witness of fact?
(ii) Will the appellant face mistreatment due to his mental health contrary to Article 3?
(iii) Whether the appellant will face very significant obstacles to his integration on return to Bangladesh.
(iv) Are there exceptional compassionate circumstances that justify a grant of leave outside the Immigration Rules.

7. The Judge proceeded to determine the credibility issue, setting out his findings at [25 – 30] of the decision as follows:

25. I have not seen the Appellant or heard him give evidence; I have been told that he is unfit to do so; therefore I have assessed the credibility of his evidence based upon the witness statements and documents provided.

26. Regarding the oral evidence given by Mr Mroz, this relates solely to the level of support given to the Appellant to assist him in the community; it does not assist me in determining his credibility.

27. It is abundantly clear that the Appellant has sought to present a claim for international protection on an entirely false basis, supported by a sustained level of personal dishonesty and bolstered by fraudulent documents obtained from Bangladesh. Having been refused by the Respondent, he then sought to maintain the deception by mounting an appeal. He maintained the false basis of the appeal until 2024, at which time he claimed that he had been trafficked to UK by his family and would be at risk of re-trafficking in Bangladesh. His statement consisted of 29 paragraphs and contained considerable details of his family and the circumstances of his arrival in UK; it also sought to amend his date of birth in order to concur with a birth certificate which he said he had recently obtained from Bangladesh; he said the date he had given in his statement made in March 2024 had been incorrect and the fault was that of his representatives.

28. Background information suggests that the credibility of Bangladeshi documents is generally low; given the Appellant’s own damaged credibility, I am not able to attach weight to those documents supporting his credibility; rather I find that the late production of these documents which wholly undermine his original claim are damaging to his credibility.

29. Regarding his modern slavery claim, I find that the Negative Reasonable Grounds decision further undermines the credibility of the Appellant.

30. Accordingly, I do not find the Appellant to be credible. I find his identity to be as claimed in his asylum claim.

8. The Judge then proceeded to considered the issue of whether the appellant would face mistreatment due to his mental health contrary to Article 3 and/or Article 8 ECHR, and determined that he could find no evidence that the appellant would suffer harm which reaches the very high threshold to engage Article 3 or any “separate or additional factual element to bring the case within Article 8”. The Judge’s reasoning in respect of the appellant’s medical condition and evidence is set out at [31 – 33] of the decision which states:

31. The Appellant’s claimed fears are supported by the medical evidence of Dr Kareem and Dr Griggs. Dr Kareem identified symptoms of PTSD, based upon the Appellant’s history of being the victim of modern slavery, discussion of which caused him distress; however, that claim has been found not to be credible, and that must undermine the credibility of the diagnosis.

32. According to Dr Griggs, the Appellant described other experiences in Bangladesh and fears for the safety of his family due to his activities, which he now claims to have been untrue.

33. According to the relevant CPIN, appropriate treatment is available in Bangladesh, if the Appellant genuinely needs it; however, it appears that the Appellant has been fabricating the causes of his claimed illness, and this must cast doubt upon whether he in fact needs the treatment. His claims have been shown to lack credibility, yet this does not appear to have been considered by the medical witnesses.

9. The Judge found that the appellant had not demonstrated that he had been in the UK for 20 years and noted that he is an overstayer. Further, the appellant had failed to demonstrate that he has any private life in the UK since he is not a credible witness. The decision states that the appellant spent his earlier years in Bangladesh, speaks Bengali Sylheti, has family support in Bangladesh and has no reason to fear for his safety on return. Taking these matters into account the Judge found the appellant would not face very significant obstacles to his integration. In relation to the public interest in the Article 8 proportionality exercise, the Judge found the appellant did not speak English and was financially dependent on the state. The decision states at [39]:

Maintenance of immigration control is in the public interest. I find this to be enhanced in the case of this Appellant, who has used deception to advance a protection claim and has thereby contrived to prolong his presence in UK. The duration and extent of the deception has been egregious.

10. The appellant’s human rights claim was dismissed on all grounds.

The grounds

11. The appellant sought permission to appeal on five grounds. In summary the grounds assert that the Judge erred in the following respects:

1) Failing to engage with the medical evidence and in making “illogical findings”
2) Failing to engage with the evidence regarding the appellant’s “true identity”.
3) Finding that the appellant would have support in Bangladesh despite evidence that most of his family and siblings are settled in the UK or USA.
4) Failing to make his own findings on the appellant’s claim that he was trafficked to the UK and accepting the respondent’s position that there had been a negative reasonable grounds NRM decision in the absence of that decision.
5) Failing to make a finding on whether the appellant arrived in the UK in 2007 or 2018, and failing to take into account his wealth of evidence concerning his private life in the UK.

12. Permission to appeal was granted by the FTT on 21 September 2025. Although the reasoning in the decision indicates that the FTT only found ground 2 to be arguable, the decision was not expressed as a limited grant. In any event, the Upper Tribunal expressly granted permission in respect of all remaining grounds on 16 October 2025. There was a rule 24 response from the respondent dated 30 September 2025.

The error of law hearing

13. I indicated to the representatives at the outset that my provisional view, after careful consideration of the evidence before the FTT, was that the decision under challenge is unsatisfactory in a number of respects, but that I would invite submissions on behalf of both parties before reaching a decision on the grounds.

14. I indicated that my impression from the decision was the Judge had essentially taken a compartmentalised and singular approach to the credibility assessment of the appellant’s account and had determined this issue wholly or substantially on the basis of the fact the appellant had initially brought his asylum claim on an admitted false basis. Whilst the appellant has undoubtedly been untruthful previously and this was unarguably a relevant consideration in the assessment of credibility, there is no indication that the Judge gave himself a Lucas direction or engaged with other evidence which could have informed the Judge on this issue.

15. Subsequent to the Judge’s adverse credibility finding it then appears that the Judge assessed all remaining issues through the lens of that initial adverse credibility finding. It was not apparent from the decision that the Judge had properly considered the extensive body of evidence adduced by the appellant. In particular, I indicated that the Judge’s assessment of the medical evidence appeared to suffer from an error of the nature referred to in Mbanga v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] EWCA Civ 367 (“Mbanga”).

16. I sought confirmation from Ms Nolan that the NRM negative reasonable grounds decision dated 28 October 2024 had not been provided by the respondent in the FTT proceedings and that the existence of this decision had not been raised by the respondent prior to reference in the review dated 10 August 2025. Ms Nolan confirmed this position.

17. Ms Nolan took on board my initial comments and confirmed that the respondent continued to oppose the appeal. I heard submissions from both representatives on all grounds. I am grateful for the submissions made. I do not rehearse those submissions here but have referred, where necessary, to any relevant matters below.

18. At the conclusion of the hearing, I indicated that I found the Judge had materially erred in law. In particular, I found that the decision should be set aside on the basis of ground 1 alone. In light of the errors found I indicated that none of the limited findings of the Judge could be preserved and that the appeal would be remitted to the FTT for a de novo hearing. I provided oral reasons at the hearing and record these below.

Reasons for decision

19. In respect of ground 1, I note the extensive evidence before the FTT in relation to the appellant’s mental health and needs which includes (inter alia): an independent psychiatric report of Dr Oladimeji Kareem dated 9 July 2025; the appellant’s GP medical records which refer to his medication and include letters confirming longstanding mental health issues including depression, anxiety, Complex PTSD, “persistent suicidal ideation” and a history of self-harm; various letters from Dr Griggs, consultant clinical psychologist, describing the trauma work provided to the appellant within secondary mental health services; and, evidence from the appellant’s care providers “Epiphany in Care Limited” funded by the local authority (Bristol City Council Adult Social Care) following an assessment of his needs in accordance with the Care Act 2014.

20. I observe from some of the earlier medical evidence that the cause of the appellant’s mental health conditions was attributed to his experiences in Bangladesh including matters which the appellant now accepts did not occur. This is a matter specifically noted by the Judge at [32] of the decision, and I accept that it was relevant and appropriate for the Judge to do so.

21. More recent medical evidence, however, refers to the appellant’s claim to have been trafficked to the UK. The report of Dr Kareem also specifically notes that he was aware that the appellant had previously brought an asylum claim on a false basis. The report and diagnoses of Dr Kareem, as well as the evidence and diagnoses from medical professionals who have treated the appellant, are dismissed by the Judge on the basis that he had already found the appellant’s claim to have been trafficked/a victim of modern slavery to lack credibility.

22. In my view, in his assessment of the medical evidence, the Judge appears to have “put the cart before the horse” so to speak, and failed to conduct a holistic assessment of all evidence which may inform as to the credibility of the appellant’s account, and potentially the reasons why he initially brought an asylum claim on a false basis. An assessment of the medical evidence, particularly in view of the fact that it pertained to the appellant’s mental health, should have been part of the Judge’s credibility assessment. Instead, it is clear from the decision that the Judge approached the evidence on the basis that the diagnoses in respect of the appellant could not be credible because of his earlier finding that the appellant’s account was not credible.

23. I accept Ms Nolans’s submission based upon MS (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2021] EWCA Civ 941 (case) that the Judge was not obligated to accept the conclusions of the expert witnesses. The Judge was entitled to reach his own conclusion on the evidence and to depart from experts’ reports, provided he explained his reasoning. The reasoning provided was limited to rejecting the medical evidence on the basis of the adverse credibility findings regarding the appellant’s core account. The appellant is entitled to know that the medical evidence had been properly considered. The finding that the evidence is not credible because the appellant’s account is not credible is, in my view, insufficient to demonstrate that the evidence has been properly considered and sufficiently engaged with. The reasoning provided by the Judge leads me to the inescapable conclusion that the Judge disregarded the medical evidence, which may have been capable of supporting his claim, solely on the basis that the Judge found the appellant to be an unreliable, untruthful witness.

24. Applying Mbanga, I find that the Judge erred in not considering the relevant medical evidence as part of a holistic assessment of the appellant’s credibility. I find that this error is material because had the Judge properly engaged with the medical evidence, it is not inevitable that he would have reached the same conclusion regarding the credibility of the appellant’s claim to have been trafficked. Given that the appellant’s medical condition is at the heart of his human rights claim, both in respect of Article 3 and Article 8, I find on this basis alone that the decision is unsafe and must be set aside in its entirety. However, as a record of the reasoning provided at the hearing, I provide the following additional observations on the grounds.

25. In relation to the availability of treatment in Bangladesh the Judge finds that this would be available to the appellant “if [he] genuinely needs it” based on the “relevant CPIN”. However, in making this finding no reference is made to the country expert report of Dr. Ashrad-ul Hoque dated 5 September 2024 adduced by the appellant. This report specifically considers the respondent’s CPIN on Medical and Healthcare issues in Bangladesh. I accept that the Judge is not required to refer to every item of evidence adduced, but without reference to this detailed expert’s report relating to a key disputed issue, the Tribunal and parties cannot be satisfied that it was considered by the Judge in reaching his conclusion that treatment would be available and accessible to this appellant on return to Bangladesh.

26. In respect of ground 2, I find that the Judge’s treatment of the appellant’s evidence in relation to his identity suffers, at least in part, from the same type of Mbanga error as that considered above. The appellant adduced evidence of his birth certificate, his recent passport application and passport (the original of which he took to the FTT hearing), letters from his school in Bangladesh, and documents obtained from the Home Office via a subject access request which, according to the appellant, relate to the appellant’s initial entry to the UK in 2007, with a false birth date provided by those who applied for the visit visa. The Judge fails to engage with any of this documentary evidence but appears to determine the issue of the appellant's identity on this basis of the appellant's damaged credibility and because background information suggests that the credibility of Bangladeshi documents in generally low. This reasoning does not address the documents obtained from the Home Office via the subject access request.

27. In relation to the appellant’s most recent passport, the respondent’s Rule 24 response refers to the fact this was issued in Dhaka (on 21 July 2025). In Ms Alban’s submission, the appellant’s passport application was made to the High Commission in the UK, but the passport was issued from Dhaka. Although this assertion would appear to be supported by information available on the website of the Bangladesh High Commission in London, which indicates that certain passport applications made in the UK are processed and issued in Dhaka, this will be a matter for the appellant to establish with evidence at any new hearing. It was not an issue raised previously by the respondent in the FTT.

28. I accept in respect of ground 3 that the Judge does not demonstrate that he had considered the documentary evidence adduced to support the appellant's assertion that the majority of his direct family, including his parents, were now in the UK and the USA. The Judge was not bound to accept this evidence. However, in my view, if he did not do so, he was required to give reasons. The appellant will need to reconcile the evidence of his parents being settled in the USA, with the DHL evidence (AB/16-17) and the details and address of the appellant’s emergency contact on his recently issued passport.

29. In respect of ground 4, I accept that the Judge did not have sight of the negative reasonable grounds decision at the hearing, as confirmed by Ms Nolan. I accept Ms Alban’s submission that there is no record in the FTT decision as to whether there was any exploration by the Judge of why the NRM decision had not been provided, why this matter had only been raised in the respondent’s third review submitted a few days before the hearing (even though it is said that the decision was made in October 2024), and whether this matter should have been considered by the Judge having only been referred to in the review document provided later than 5 working days prior to the hearing, having regard to [7.14] of the Practice Direction of the Immigration and Asylum Chamber of the First-tier Tribunal, 1 November 2024. It is the appellant’s case that he was not invited to engage in any NRM process, that neither he nor his representatives were served with a copy of the NRM decision or were aware of it, and it is therefore not known on what basis the decision was made. The existence of this decision appears to have been a persuasive factor in the Judge’s credibility findings.

30. I further accept that the Judge erred in not reaching a finding on whether the appellant arrived in the UK in 2007 or 2018, and that this is relevant to the assessment of his Article 8 claim even though he cannot claim to have 20 years continuous residence even if he arrived in 2007 as a 16 year old.

31. For all of these reasons, and in particular in respect of ground 1, the decision shall be set aside with no findings preserved on the basis that the Judge materially erred in law.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of material errors on a point of law and is set aside with no findings preserved. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard afresh by any judge other than Judge Trevaskis.

S. Grey
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 January 2026