Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004421
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/51616/2024
LP/03734/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 18th February 2026
Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ANZANI

Between

AM
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Adetoye, Assured Legal Services
For the Respondent: Mr Simpson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 28 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant is a national of Botswana, born on 12 July 1972. She appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, dated 4 August 2025, dismissing her appeal on asylum, humanitarian protection and human rights grounds.
Background
2. The appellant entered the United Kingdom on 24 December 2021 with her dependent son, MLM (born 3 August 2009), holding a visitor visa. She claimed asylum on 11 January 2022. The respondent refused her application by decision dated 7 December 2023, and she appealed that refusal to the First-tier Tribunal.
3. The appellant’s claim is founded on her experiences of prolonged domestic violence at the hands of her former partner, DL, in Botswana. She asserts that the abuse began after she was diagnosed as HIV positive in 2005 and continued over a number of years. She maintains that DL blamed her for her HIV diagnosis and threatened to expose her condition to the community, causing her significant fear, stigma and isolation. The appellant reported DL to the police on two occasions, in 2020 and 2021, following incidents of serious violence. However, she did not pursue criminal charges, explaining that she feared retaliation from DL, lacked confidence in the police and criminal justice system, and believed that reporting him would place her at greater risk.
4. In her appeal before the First-tier Tribunal, the appellant contended that, as a woman who has suffered domestic violence in Botswana, she is a member of a particular social group for the purposes of the Refugee Convention. She maintained that she would face a real risk of further harm from DL on return and that the authorities would be unable or unwilling to provide effective protection, relying on background evidence showing low reporting rates, societal stigma, and lack of confidence in the criminal justice system. She further argued that internal relocation would not be reasonable or safe given DL’s alleged ability to locate her, the small population of Botswana, and her personal circumstances, including her health and responsibility for her son.
5. The respondent accepted that the appellant had been abused by DL as claimed but did not accept that she faced a real risk of persecution or serious harm on return. It was contended that there is, in principle, sufficient state protection available in Botswana, including police protection, legal aid, and support services, and that the appellant had not demonstrated that such protection would be ineffective in her individual circumstances. The respondent further maintained that internal relocation was available and reasonable, that appropriate medical treatment was accessible in Botswana, and that removal would not breach the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention, the Immigration Rules, or Articles 2, 3 or 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights (‘ECHR’).
Decision of the First-tier Tribunal
6. The appeal was heard by First-tier Tribunal Judge Henderson at Taylor House on 25 July 2025, with the decision promulgated on 4 August 2025.
7. The Judge accepted the appellant’s identity and nationality and accepted that she had been subjected to domestic violence by her former partner, DL, in Botswana. The Judge further accepted that women who suffer domestic violence in Botswana are capable of forming a particular social group.
8. However, the Judge concluded that the appellant had not established a real risk of persecution or serious harm on return. In summary, the Judge found that:
(a) there was, in principle, state protection available in Botswana;
(b) in the appellant’s particular circumstances, including her family situation, she could access such protection;
(c) there was a viable internal relocation alternative available to her; and
(d) removal would not breach Articles 2, 3 or 8 of the ECHR.
9. The appeal was accordingly dismissed on all grounds.
Grounds of appeal
10. The grounds of appeal contend, in essence, that the Judge:
(i) made inconsistent or irrational findings in relation to the availability of state protection, particularly in light of background evidence showing low levels of reporting of gender-based violence;
(ii) erred in placing reliance on the presence of a police officer within the appellant’s family when assessing sufficiency of protection; and
(iii) erred in concluding that internal relocation was reasonable and available.
11. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Iqbal on 23 September 2025. Although Judge Iqbal observed that Ground 1 was the only ground with some arguable merit, permission was not restricted.
Error of law hearing
12. The appellant was represented by Mr Adetoye, who relied on the grounds of appeal. He submitted in particular that the Judge’s findings at paragraphs [50]–[53] of the decision were inconsistent with the ultimate conclusion that the appellant could access effective state protection.
13. On behalf of the respondent, Mr Simpson opposed the appeal and submitted that the grounds disclosed no error of law. He argued that the Judge was entitled to draw a distinction between general background evidence concerning societal attitudes and reporting levels, and the specific question whether there was, in law, a sufficiency of protection available to this appellant. He further submitted that the Judge’s conclusions on internal relocation were fully open on the evidence.
Decision and reasons
14. I have considered the First-tier Tribunal decision, the documentation that was before the First-tier Tribunal, the grounds of appeal, and the submissions made at the hearing, before coming to a decision in this appeal.
15. The Supreme Court in HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 reiterated that judicial caution and restraint is required when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. In particular, judges of the specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 49. When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v FTT (SEC) [2013] UKSC 19. I have kept these considerations in mind when coming to my decision.
Ground 1
16. In Ground 1, the appellant submits that the First-tier Tribunal Judge reached perverse or irrational conclusions in her assessment of risk on return and internal relocation. It is argued that the Judge’s findings that the appellant could access effective state protection and safely relocate internally are inconsistent with earlier findings at paragraphs [50]–[51] of the decision, which accepted background evidence demonstrating high levels of gender-based violence in Botswana, extremely low reporting rates to the police, a lack of confidence in the criminal justice system, and a high incidence of gender-based killings. The appellant further submits that her failure to pursue criminal proceedings against her former partner was entirely consistent with that background evidence, and that the Judge’s acknowledgment of limited shelter provision undermines the conclusion that adequate protection or a viable internal relocation alternative exists. The appellant maintains that the Judge therefore erred in concluding that she would not face a real risk of persecution or serious harm on return.
17. I do not accept that this ground discloses an error of law. It proceeds on the flawed premise that the Judge’s recognition of serious societal problems surrounding violence against women and girls and low reporting rates necessarily precluded a lawful finding that state protection was available or that internal relocation was feasible.
18. The Judge correctly directed herself as to the legal test for sufficiency of protection. The relevant question is not whether all victims of domestic violence have confidence in the police or whether the protection system operates effectively in every case, but whether there exists, in principle, a system of state protection which the authorities are willing and able to operate. The Judge was entitled to conclude that under-reporting, fear of reprisals, and societal stigma do not, without more, establish a systemic failure of protection for the purposes of the Refugee Convention.
19. The findings at paragraphs [50]–[51] were directed primarily to the question whether women who suffer domestic violence in Botswana are capable of forming a particular social group, and to explaining the appellant’s reluctance to engage with the authorities. Those findings do not compel the conclusion that protection is unavailable in law. There is no inconsistency in recognising both that many women are reluctant to report abuse and that state protection exists in principle.
20. The appellant’s reliance on the Judge’s observation at paragraph [53] concerning the limited availability of shelters likewise fails to establish any legal inconsistency. The Judge was entitled to note that shelter provision is limited, while nonetheless concluding that protection is not confined to shelters alone and that other forms of assistance and protection were available to this appellant. The Judge did not treat shelters as the sole means by which protection could be accessed.
21. The Judge conducted an individualised assessment of the appellant’s circumstances. In doing so, she took into account the appellant’s prior contact with the police, the absence of any evidence that her former partner exercised influence over the authorities, and the appellant’s family circumstances, including the presence of close relatives able to provide support. The reference to a family member employed as a police officer was not treated as determinative, but as one relevant factor in assessing the appellant’s practical ability to seek assistance.
22. In relation to internal relocation, the Judge provided clear and sustainable reasons for concluding that the appellant could reasonably relocate to another urban area in Botswana. These included the appellant’s level of education, work history, previous experience of living away from her home area, and the lack of evidence that her former partner had either the reach or motivation claimed. The Judge was entitled to reach that conclusion on the evidence before her.
23. When read as a whole, the decision discloses no internal inconsistency, irrationality or misdirection in law. The Judge’s findings were coherent, legally sound, and properly open to her on the evidence. The appellant’s submissions amount to no more than a disagreement with the Judge’s evaluative conclusions and the weight she attached to the evidence, which does not establish an error of law.
24. Ground 1 is therefore dismissed.
Ground 2
25. In Ground 2, the appellant submits that the First-tier Tribunal Judge misdirected herself by placing reliance on the fact that one of the appellant’s nephews had recently qualified as a police officer. It is argued that, at paragraph [55] of the decision, the Judge improperly treated this as indicative of the availability of state protection, and that this was inconsistent with her earlier findings at paragraphs [50]–[51] concerning low reporting rates of domestic violence and a general lack of confidence in the police and criminal justice system.
26. I do not accept that this ground discloses an error of law. The Judge neither found nor suggested that the appellant’s nephew could guarantee protection, exert improper influence, or act as a substitute for the state’s protection obligations. On the contrary, the Judge expressly acknowledged at paragraph [55] that the nephew would not be in a position to control any prosecution. His employment was treated as one contextual factor in assessing the appellant’s practical ability to seek assistance, rather than as determinative of the availability of protection.
27. There is no inconsistency between the Judge’s acceptance of general background evidence demonstrating societal distrust of the police and her conclusion that, in the appellant’s particular circumstances, she would nonetheless have access to practical support in engaging with the authorities. In that context, the Judge was entitled to have regard to the appellant’s family network, including her nephew’s role, as part of a holistic and individualised assessment of risk and protection. The Judge’s approach was legally sound and properly open to her on the evidence.
28. Ground 2 is accordingly dismissed.
Ground 3
29. In Ground 3, the appellant contends that, as a consequence of the alleged errors identified in the preceding grounds, the decision of the First-tier Tribunal was not in accordance with the law. It is submitted that the Judge’s findings resulted in an unlawful dismissal of the appeal, contrary to Article 33 of the 1951 Refugee Convention, paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules, and the United Kingdom’s obligations under the ECHR as incorporated by the Human Rights Act 1998.
30. This ground is entirely parasitic upon the preceding grounds. For the reasons already given, I am satisfied that the Judge made no material error of law in her assessment of the evidence or application of the relevant legal principles. It follows that the Judge’s conclusions were lawfully reached and that the dismissal of the appeal was consistent with Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, paragraph 339C of the Immigration Rules, and Articles 2, 3 and 8 of the ECHR. This ground discloses no freestanding error of law and is accordingly dismissed.
31. For the reasons given above, I conclude that the First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
32. The decision shall stand.

Notice of Decision
The First-tier Tribunal decision did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The decision shall stand.

S. Anzani
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

10 February 2026