Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004430

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/58173/2023
LP/00710/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 25 November 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE GRAVES

Between

RT
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Isherwood, Senior Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr Gayle, Solicitor/Counsel

Heard at Field House on 19 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals against the decision (“the decision”) of the First-tier Tribunal Judge (“the judge”), dated 3 June 2025, dismissing the appellant’s appeal against the decision of the respondent of 12 September 2023, refusing his asylum and human rights claim.
2. The appellant’s case before the First-tier Tribunal was that he had been a joint administrator of a Facebook site in Kurdistan, on which he publicised demonstrations and posted anti PUK material. He said he was arranging a demonstration with a friend and had posted about that on the site. They were then both writing slogans on the walls in a public place one evening when a high ranking PUK general and his men raided the area, shot and arrested his friend, and the appellant escaped. He went to the house of a friend to hide and in the meantime, his home was raided and the general told his family he was wanted for having an illicit relationship with the general’s daughter. His political Facebook page had been closed down the same day as the raid. The appellant fled the country the next day, using his passport to travel to Turkey and Belarus, before coming to the UK via Poland.
3. When refusing the protection and human rights claims, the respondent had found the claim not to be credible. The appellant’s appeal was dismissed on the same basis by the judge, who gave reasons in the decision.
The appellant’s appeal to the Upper Tribunal and the grant of permission to appeal
4. The appellant appeals against the decision, with permission from the First-tier Tribunal (“the FtT”) granted on 24 September 2025 on grounds 2 to 4, which are briefly summarised below:
Ground 2
5. It was argued that the judge’s analysis of the evidence was materially flawed and based on a misunderstanding of key aspects of the evidence, which gave rise to adverse credibility findings that were not therefore sustainable. These issues included the arrest warrant and what it said, whether the appellant had answered questions at interview about the demonstration he was arrested at and whether the Facebook post he had produced was from the closed account he was an administrator for, or from his own personal account.
6. It was further argued that there was a failure to consider the relevance of compliance with the guidance in XX (PJAK – sur place activities – Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC) and the fact the ‘Download your information’ report had been provided. Further that there was reliance on there being different profile images attached to posts printed at different times, which was explicable by reference to the ‘download’ which showed the appellant had changed his profile picture, which then changed the profile picture for previous as well as new posts. Further that the appellant had provided answers at interview about the account he was an administrator for, which were not considered by the judge. As he asserted the Facebook page had 200,000 followers, a finding this was ‘low level activity’ was not reasonable. The assessment he would not be of adverse interest for that activity was perverse. The appellant had also provided an explanation for how he was identified by the authorities, which met the lower standard.
7. It was argued that these misunderstandings or failures to consider the evidence meant the credibility assessment was flawed.
Ground 3
8. It was argued that the judge’s assessment of the evidence of the appellant’s sur place activity was also materially flawed. The judge found the appellant was a ‘low level supporter only’ of Dakok, but had elsewhere accepted he was a member, and did not take account of the evidence that he was more than an ordinary member and was extensively involved in the organisation of high profile events for the group. He had also posted a speech he gave at a demonstration on his account, which was evidence of his ‘high profile role as an activist in the UK’ and which the judge had not properly considered. This was in part because the judge relied on the link to the appellant’s Facebook site not working, but did not have regard to the download report provided.
Ground 4
9. It was also argued that the judge found the appellant could be returned and redocumentation was possible, but this was on the basis of a flawed credibility assessment. The appellant had no identity documentation in the UK and maintained he had no family members in Iraq who would assist with redocumentation and so redocumentation was not possible.
Permission to Appeal
10. Permission to appeal was refused on ground 1, which related to whether the correct standard of proof had been applied, but was granted on grounds 2, 3 and 4 with the following reasons and observations:
“On the face of the decision, and in light of the criticisms raised in Grounds 2 to 4 regarding the assessment of the Facebook evidence, there appeared to be arguable errors which may have materially affected the outcome of the appeal, when considered cumulatively. Some of these misunderstandings could have been clarified by evidence provided by the appellant or through questions that were not put to the appellant for explanation. While reference is made to XX, it is not apparent that the principles advanced therein were applied to the downloaded information. Given the factual interconnection between grounds 2 to 4, these grounds may be arguable.’
The Hearing
11. I have before me a bundle running to 1033 digital pages containing the documents relevant to the appeal before me, including the appellant’s and respondent’s bundles before the First-tier Tribunal.
12. At the hearing I asked for clarification on the download report and its relevance to some of the grounds and submissions. It was unclear to me whether the grounds were asserting that the judge failed to take into account the download, when assessing the weight to be attached to the post from 2020. The download appeared to relate to a specific date range, starting in 2022, which excluded any Facebook activity before the appellant arrived here. It was not clear to me why this was and it therefore could not be taken into account when assessing the weight to be attached to the 2020 post or what his Facebook account showed before he arrived in the UK. It was also asserted that the appellant relied on that single post before arrival from his personal Facebook account, but I noted that in the bundle, some of the posts appeared to relate to events in 2019 in the UK, when the appellant was not in the UK. Mr Gayle said he could not suggest any expertise in the Facebook download, but it was his understanding that the Facebook translation function can change dates, so this was more of a technical glitch that anything else. As to the period covered by the download, he could not dispute it appeared to relate only to the period after arrival.
13. Further, in relation to the criticism of the judge in not taking into account the download when unable to access anything through the link to the appellant’s speech, I noted the bundle did not appear to contain a screenshot from the page from which the speech was taken, there was only the link and transcript of the speech, so it was unclear to me whether it was from the appellant’s own Facebook account, or some other account or page. I was unable to locate a date for when the video was uploaded or any screenshot in the bundle of where it could be found online. The link itself had not been provided in its original form, it had rather been copied into a translation by the person who translated the speech, and so it may be there was no original ‘hyperlink’ in the bundle that would have worked for the judge. Nor could I locate that post or uploaded video of the speech, which was undated without any additional information, in the download report. Mr Gayle acknowledged there was some information lacking and so could not assist with where the appellant’s speech was actually posted, whether on his own account or elsewhere, and could not direct me to anything in the download that demonstrated it was from the appellant’s own Facebook account.
14. I heard detailed submissions from Mr Gayle and Ms Isherwood, and indicated that I would reserve my decision and now provide this below with reasons.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS
Ground 2
15. I have considered the evidence that was before the judge, which included the interviews, statement and documents. The download document is relied on in a number of respects, and it is argued the judge fell into error for not having regard to it when considering the social media evidence. In the absence of a transcript of proceedings it is not clear to me whether the judge was directed to the relevant sections of the download and addressed on how that impacted the assessment of each key aspect of the social media evidence. It is a lengthy document, and contains data which is not easily accessible. I note too that it does not cover the period before arrival, and so cannot be taken into account in relation to posts made before the appellant’s arrival. Nor does it appear to cover all of the social media evidence provided, such as the speech relied on. The download itself was only provided only after the review, and so had not already been considered by the respondent in any detail, before the hearing in the FtT. This meant it was first considered by the judge and while the appellant argues the judge failed to have regard to the download when considering some of the social media evidence, it is not at all clear to me that it addresses all of that evidence.
16. I do find that the judge also had regard to the correct standard of proof, and considered matters relevant to credibility that were open to them, such as plausibility, consistency of account, credibility issues arising from the appellant’s failure to claim asylum in Poland, the weight to be attached to the evidence of the appellant’s activities, and consistency of the account with medical and country information. The decision contains a detailed review of the evidence and country information.
17. The appellant also does not challenge all of the findings, but argues that in some areas, however, there was a misunderstanding or mischaracterisation of evidence, and reliance on those issues undermined the credibility assessment as a whole.
18. I do accept that the judge commented on the warrant being signed ‘by’ rather than ‘for’ the arrest of the claimed PUK general. I take note of the appellant’s witness statement [at 18 to 25] in which he explains the relevance of the arrest warrant and that he obtained it from social media to demonstrate the general he fears was the subject of an arrest warrant, in 2018, but was not arrested, which demonstrated his existence, role and influence, in that he was able to evade arrest. The judge plainly took the main point, that the warrant was relied on as evidence of the existence of this person, and so while this was a misunderstanding of what the document said, it was not significant or material by itself in its impact on the judge’s findings, but might be cumulatively relevant.
19. It was also argued that in finding the appellant’s account of how he came to be identified by the authorities to be ‘vague’ [at 49], the judge had treated the appellant’s explanations at interview as matters within his knowledge, when in fact he had been asked by the respondent to speculate on something outside of his knowledge. It is asserted that he had given reasonable explanations at interview for how the authorities had likely come to identify him, through seizing his phone and by questioning his friend. In his second statement, he explains that while he does not know for certain how they identified him, it was ‘obvious’ they could do so through his phone or his friend. The judge did not refer to the lengthy explanations in the witness statement [at paragraphs 26 to 35] when finding the appellant had been vague. The judge appeared not to specifically address whether the appellant could be expected to give detailed evidence on something that fell outside of his knowledge. Again, this is not integral to the credibility assessment, but appears to be have been relied on as a matter cumulatively relevant to credibility overall.
20. It was also submitted that the judge failed to make allowances for the way Facebook worked, in commenting [at 45], that there were two different Facebook profile pictures attached to the 2020 post and to its translation. The appellant says that had the download been considered by the judge, this would have established that the profile picture was subsequently changed, which then retrospectively changes the picture for previous posts. The grounds assert this was therefore not a basis for rejecting the reliability of this evidence. As raised by me at hearing, if the download does not cover the period when the post was made, there can be no criticism of the judge in not having regard to it. It is also not clear to me that this issue with the different profile picture was relied on by the judge to undermine the reliability of this evidence. But this issue is again is perhaps cumulatively relevant to the way in which the social media evidence was assessed as a whole, which would need to take into account that subsequent changes to profile information, such as a profile picture, might then retrospectively change the appearance of older posts.
21. It is also argued that the judge relied on the appellant’s ability to produce a single post from Facebook from 2020, despite claiming his account had been closed down before he left Iraq [at 44 to 45], which was an adverse credibility point. I have seen the relevant section of the appellant’s witness statement in which he explains this Facebook post is ‘from my personal Facebook account’, which he differentiates from the public page he claims to have administered, which he asserted had 200,000 followers and was shut down two days before he left the country. I do find there was reliance on this issue by the judge, albeit it is difficult to establish what weight this attracted in the credibility assessment. It did lead the judge to question the consistency of his ability to access his Facebook account in Iraq, when he claimed the account had been shut down by the authorities, which would have potentially been a core credibility point. It further led the judge to question why he could not produce posts from both accounts, if he could produce this one post from an account that had been closed down. This is an error, as it is a misunderstanding of the evidence as it was presented by the appellant. The question is whether it is a material one, and the degree to which it impacted the overall credibility assessment.
22. The judge went on to find that the appellant’s claimed political activities in Iraq were ‘low level’ [at 49] and as such would not have attracted the adverse interest of a high ranking official. When making that assessment, the judge did not have regard to the matters in the appellant’s statement, set out above, about the extent of his activities and reach of the Facebook page, possibly in part because of the credibility concerns surrounding his ability to produce one post, but not others. The appellant says that if accepted, his activism would be characterised as high profile, not low level. The judge also went on to find it was not consistent with the country information that low level political activity would attract adverse interest at all, whereas those actively involved in organising demonstrations or with a higher profile, may be at risk [at 52]. Therefore the findings about the evidence that related to Facebook posts in Iraq, did go on to infect other parts of the credibility assessment, in terms of plausibility and consistency with country information. Because of that, I find it is a material error.
23. I find, therefore, that there was an error that affected the overall credibility assessment, as well as more minor ones that could have had a cumulative impact on the assessment of credibility. Since credibility was at the heart of the appeal, I find this means the credibility findings overall are unsafe and so the decision must be set aside in its entirety.
24. I have not considered the other grounds, as the error infected core issues, which meant no findings could be preserved, and so it was not necessary.
Remaking
25. I have considered whether to retain the matter for remaking in the Upper Tribunal, in line with the general principle set out in statement 7 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement and further considered in AEB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 and Begum (Remaking or remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 00046 (IAC). I am satisfied that because there are no findings preserved, and there may be issues such as up-dating of evidence and the importance of the appellant having access to the two-tier appellate system, it is appropriate for the matter to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. Both parties were also in agreement as to the venue for re-making

Notice of Decision
26. The First-tier Tribunal decision involved the making of errors of law and so is set aside in its entirety with no findings preserved. The appeal is now remitted to the First-tier to be heard afresh by a different judge.

H Graves

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 November 2025