Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004441
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56685/2024
LP/14301/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 16th April 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOFFMAN

Between

HY
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr E Raw of Counsel, instructed by Howe & Co
For the Respondent: Mr J Nappey, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 31 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant, who is a national of Turkey, appeals the decision of the respondent dated 27 February 2024 to refuse his asylum and human rights claim.

2. The appellant’s appeal was initially dismissed by the First‑tier Tribunal in a decision promulgated on 11 August 2025. However, on 29 January 2026, that decision was set aside by the Upper Tribunal (Deputy Judge Hoshi), with certain findings preserved. The appeal was retained by the Upper Tribunal for remaking on limited grounds. A copy of the error of law decision is appended to this determination.

Anonymity

3. The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order in respect of the appellant. There has been no application to set aside that order. While I recognise the strong factors in favour of open justice, in the present case I am satisfied that it is appropriate to continue the anonymity order given that the appellant seeks international protection.

Background

4. The background to the case is set out at [3]-[6] of the error of law decision. I do not therefore repeat it here.

The hearing

Issues in dispute

5. In the error of law decision, DUTJ Hoshi preserved the following findings of the First‑tier Tribunal:

a. While the respondent accepted that the appellant had been a member of the HDP in Turkey, the appellant’s claim that he had twice been arrested, detained, and coerced into being an informant by the Turkish authorities, and that his family had also been subject to harassment, was not found to be credible.

b. Neither the appellant nor his family had come to the adverse attention of the Turkish authorities as a result of any political activities.

c. While the appellant is a member of the Kurdish People's Democratic Assembly (KPDA) in the UK, his involvement is limited to attendance at social events rather than participation in political activities.

6. The respondent accepts that the appellant is Kurdish, that he was a member of the HDP in Turkey, and that he departed Turkey illegally. The sole remaining issue in dispute, as identified by DUTJ Hoshi, is therefore whether, irrespective of the preserved findings, the appellant nonetheless has a profile such that, on return to Turkey, he would face a real risk of persecution or serious harm at the hands of the authorities.

Evidence

7. I had before me the following documents:

a. The 244-page composite bundle, including both parties’ evidence before the First-tier Tribunal (“CB”);

b. The appellant’s skeleton argument dated 16 March 2026;

c. The respondent’s skeleton argument dated 30 March 2026;

d. The Country Policy and Information Note Turkey: Kurds (Version 5.0; July 2025) (“the Kurds CPIN”);

e. The Country Policy and Information Note Turkey: Peoples’ Democratic Party/Green Left Party (HDP/YSP) (Version 5.0; October 2023) (“the HDP CPIN”); and

f. Two country guidance cases:
i. IA (Risk-Guidelines-Separatist) Turkey CG [2003] UKIAT 00034; and
ii. IK (Returnees, Records, IFA) Turkey CG [2004] UKIAT 00312.

8. Mr Nappey confirmed that he did not intend to cross-examine the appellant and, consequently, the hearing proceeded on a submissions-only basis. I heard from both advocates, whose submissions are recorded in the record of proceedings, following which I reserved my decision.

Legal framework

9. To succeed in an appeal on asylum grounds, the appellant must show a well-founded fear of persecution for a Convention reason (race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, political opinion). The burden of proof rests on the appellant. As the asylum claim was made on or after 28 June 2022, pursuant to s.32 of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (NABA), in considering whether the appellant qualifies as a refugee, I must apply a two-stage test. As per the guidance from JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) Botswana [2024] UKUT 00100 I must first determine the following matters on the balance of probabilities:

a. Taking the appellant’s claim at its highest, is there a Convention reason?
b. Does the appellant fear persecution for that Convention reason?

10. If so, I must go on to determine whether it is reasonably likely that:

a. The appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason;
b. There would not be sufficient protection available; and
c. The appellant could not internally relocate.

11. To succeed on an appeal on humanitarian protection grounds the appellant must not be a refugee; they must show substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm in their country of origin. The burden of proof rests on the appellant.

Findings

12. In light of the preserved findings of the First‑tier Tribunal, I am satisfied that my task is confined to an assessment under the second stage of the test set out in s.32 of NABA. Given that any risk to the appellant would arise from the actions of the state at the border, the options of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation are not applicable.

13. It is not in dispute that the appellant would be returning to Turkey as a Kurdish man who left the country illegally, using an emergency travel document, and that there is a real risk he would be identified by the border police as a failed asylum seeker: see IK, at [79] and [82]. What is in dispute is what would happen thereafter.

14. In IK at [78], the AIT explained that the starting point is

“not with the airport on return, but whether the claimant would be at any real risk of persecution or a breach of Article 3 in his home area as a consequence of his material history there. If the answer to that is “no”, then the claim cannot normally succeed, unless of course the risk arises from or is aggravated by other factors, such as his material activities abroad or in other parts of Turkey. Any real risk would arise only from a person’s material history…and this history will in most normal circumstances be at its most extensive in the individual’s home area….”

15. In the present case, the preserved findings of the First‑tier Tribunal are that, although the appellant was a member of the HDP, he had not come to the adverse attention of the Turkish authorities in his home area and, accordingly, he does not face a risk of persecution or harm there.

16. Nevertheless, the appellant contends that he would be likely to be sent to the airport police station for further questioning: see IK, at [82]. This, in itself, would not give rise to a real risk of harm: see IK, at [79]. However, the appellant submits that he would be asked about his political activities and that he cannot be expected to lie about either his past membership of the HDP in Turkey or his activities in the United Kingdom. He argues that such disclosure would then be reasonably likely to result in his being referred for further questioning by the anti‑terrorist unit of the police or even by the national intelligence organisation, the MIT, where he could be at risk of torture or other ill‑treatment.

17. Applying the lower standard of proof, I am satisfied that, as the appellant will be returning to Turkey as a Kurdish failed asylum seeker who left the country illegally, there is a real risk that he could be sent to the airport police station for further questioning. I accept that he is likely to be asked about his identity, the reasons for and duration of his departure from Turkey, the basis of his asylum claim, any criminal history, and any possible contact with illegal organisations: see IK, at [84]. In light of the preserved findings of the First‑tier Tribunal, the appellant will have no adverse record with the authorities, nor would he need to admit that he fled Turkey due to political persecution, as he did not face any. He would, however, have to state that he sought asylum on a basis found to be fabricated. Even applying the lower standard, on their own, I find that these matters are unlikely to lead to the appellant being referred onwards for further examination.

18. However, again applying the lower standard, I accept that there is a real risk that the appellant would be asked about any political party membership and that, as he contends, he cannot be expected to lie in this regard. He would therefore have to inform the police that he was previously a member of the HDP. He would also need to disclose his membership of the KPDA in the UK, although he can be expected to explain that his involvement was limited to attendance at social events. There is insufficient evidence before me to establish that membership of the KPDA is likely to be viewed with suspicion by the Turkish authorities. The question, therefore, is whether admission of his past membership of the HDP would lead to his being referred to the anti‑terrorist unit or to the MIT.

19. The appellant relies, among other passages, on paragraph 10.2.2 of the Kurds CPIN, which records that sources informed the Home Office fact‑finding mission that the Turkish government “consider Kurds as HDP supporters” and that “Kurds are assumed to be PKK members/supporters.” He also relies on paragraph 9.4.1 of the HDP CPIN, which notes that the fact‑finding team “met several sources who believed the government perceived there to be a link between the HDP and the PKK” and that an “HDP MP perceived that the government consider HDP supporters as terrorists and consider Kurds as HDP supporters.” However, these statements cannot be taken to mean that all Kurds face persecution as perceived enemies of the Turkish state. That is neither the position of the country guidance authorities nor the CPINs themselves. Paragraph 3.1.1 of the HDP CPIN makes clear that “in general, simply being a member or supporter of HDP/YSP is not likely to result in a person facing persecution,” and that “the risk faced will depend on the person’s profile and activities.” Likewise, paragraph 3.1.1 of the Kurds CPIN states that “in general, any discrimination faced by Kurds does not, by its nature or repetition, even taken cumulatively, amount to a real risk of persecution and/or serious harm.”

20. Mr Nappey argued that the mere membership of the HDP is unlikely to put the appellant at real risk of persecution or harm. In doing so, he sought to rely on the HDP CPIN. I note that paragraphs 3.1.5 and 3.1.6 say as follows:

“3.1.5 It should be noted that attracting the adverse attention of the authorities and being arrested and detained is not the same as, and does not automatically equate to, a well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of serious harm. Similarly, being detained can encompass various types of treatment, not all of which would breach Article 3 ECHR or create a future well-founded fear of persecution or real risk of serious harm.

3.1.6 Sources stated that it is difficult to keep track of the exact numbers of HDP members in prison because people get arrested and released, additionally stating that HDP members are not being systematically prosecuted and rather arrests may be a tactic of discouraging people from actively working for the HDP (see Detention of individuals associated with the HDP).”

21. Mr Nappey also directed the Tribunal’s attention to the following passages of the HDP CPIN:

a. 2.4.2 highlights that HDP members who work on human rights causes may attract attention.

b. 12.4.3: “‘Being ethnically Kurdish and outspoken politically’, could cause the authorities to suspect an HDP member/supporter of supporting the PKK.” The same source highlighted “that any of the following may attract the attention of the authorities:

• Elected HDP officials or persons on a regional board
• Management committee members
• Election organisers
• Canvassers (knocking on doors, leafletting)
• Being a Mayor or a Councillor; local officials can be more influential than
elected officials and many Mayors are in prison…”

c. 12.4.7-12.4.9 detail that members of Parliament who belong to the HDP have been suspended and the involvement of the Ombudsman in the progress.

d. 12.4.10: whilst providing an inexhaustive list of risk groups, the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs found:

“Interviews with confidential sources brought to light a range of circumstances and activities that in practice could lead to arrests, detentions, criminal investigations and convictions. This does not mean that these circumstances and activities led to personal problems with the Turkish authorities for all HDP members, employees, activists and/or
sympathisers.”

22. Mr Nappey submitted that, on the evidence, the appellant does not fall within any of the risk categories identified in the passages cited and, as such, is unlikely to attract the interest of the airport police on return so as to prompt referral to either the anti‑terrorist unit or the MIT. Taking into account the risk factors identified at [46] of IA, and in circumstances where neither the appellant nor his family members have previously come to the adverse attention of the authorities, the appellant did not have any political profile of note, and it is accordingly unlikely that his details appear on any law enforcement databases, I am satisfied that this submission is correct.

23. I therefore conclude that, while it is reasonably likely that the appellant will be referred to the airport police for further questioning on arrival in Turkey because he would be returning to the country as a Kurdish failed asylum seeker who had left illegally, he has not established, even to the lower standard, that there is a real risk he would be referred onwards to the anti‑terrorist unit or the MIT, where he might face ill‑treatment, because of his past membership of the HDP.

Notice of Decision

The appeal is dismissed.

M R Hoffman

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

9th April 2026

Annex: The error of law decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004441
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/56685/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOSHI

Between

HY
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Nnamani, counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Ojo, senior presenting officer

Heard at Field House on 7 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information that is likely to lead members of the public to identify him, including his name or address. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. On 11 August 2025, the First-tier Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s 27 February 2024 decision to refuse his 21 September 2022 protection and human rights claim.

2. Thereafter, the Appellant applied for permission to appeal. Permission was granted by the Upper Tribunal on 3 November 2025. The appeal came before me for an error of law hearing on 7 January 2026.

Background

3. The Appellant is a male national of Turkey aged 28. He entered the UK unlawfully on 21 September 2022 and claimed asylum on the same day. The basis of his claim was that he was at risk on return to Turkey from the authorities there as a person of Kurdish ethnicity who was a member of Halkların Demokratik Partisi (the ‘HDP’ – in English, the People’s Democratic Party) and had twice been arrested, detained and ill-treated on suspicion of being a member of Partiya Karkeren Kurdistane (the ‘PKK’ – in English, the Kurdistan Workers’ Party).

4. On 27 February 2024, the Respondent refused the Appellant’s claim. The Respondent accepted the credibility of his claimed identity and nationality, that he was of Kurdish ethnicity, and that he was a member of the HDP. However, she did not accept the credibility of his claim to have twice been arrested, detained and ill-treated on suspicion of being a member of the PKK. She refused his claim on Refugee Convention, Humanitarian Protection and human rights grounds. The Appellant duly appealed.

5. On 11 August 2025, the First-tier Tribunal dismissed the Appellant’s appeal. The Judge did not accept the credibility of the Appellant’s claim to have twice been arrested, detained and ill-treated on suspicion of being a member of the PKK. Therefore, the Judge found that he would not have a well-founded fear of persecution and dismissed his appeal on Refugee Convention grounds. The Judge also dismissed his appeal on Humanitarian Protection and human rights grounds on the same basis (the Appellant having confirmed that all such claims would stand or fall with his Refugee Convention claim).

6. The Appellant applied for permission to appeal. The First-tier Tribunal refused permission on 10 September 2025. The Appellant renewed the application. The Upper Tribunal granted permission on 3 November 2025, on all grounds.

Hearing

7. Before me, the documentation was contained in a consolidated bundle of 244 pages and a rule 24 response from the Respondent.

8. Ms Nnamani applied for anonymity for the Appellant. Mr Ojo did not oppose the application. I acknowledge the importance of the principle of open justice. However, I have decided to make an anonymity order because the Appellant is a political asylum claimant and I consider that disclosing his identity could give rise to risk to him in the event that he is returned to Turkey.

9. Ms Nnamani adopted the Appellant’s grounds of appeal and made further submissions which may be summarised as follows:

a. Ground 1. The Judge’s risk assessment was flawed because it erroneously treated the Appellant’s failure to establish the credibility of his claim to have twice been arrested, detained and ill-treated on suspicion of being a member of the PKK as being dispositive of the issue of risk on return. The Judge failed to consider the elements of the Appellant’s account that were not disputed or were accepted by the Judge by reference to the extant country guidance caselaw IK (Returnees – Records – IFA) Turkey CG [2004] UKIAT 312. Specifically, his Kurdish ethnicity, his membership of the HDP, his illegal exit from Turkey and his sur place activities were IK risk factors and ought to have been the subject of a bespoke risk assessment.

b. Ground 2. The Judge’s adverse credibility finding was flawed because it was based on only two minor inconsistencies.

10. Mr Ojo adopted the Respondent’s rule 24 response and made further oral submissions which may be summarised as follows.

a. Ground 1. It could be inferred that the Judge did not consider that the risk factors relied on by the Appellant would put him at a real risk of serious harm / persecution. Alternatively, if there was an error of law here, it was immaterial because those risk factors could not possibly be said to put the Appellant at a real risk of serious harm / persecution.

b. Ground 2. This ground was nothing more than a disagreement with the Judge’s reasoning.

11. In terms of disposal, both representatives agreed that if I were to find material errors of law in respect of both of the Appellant’s grounds of appeal, then the decision of the First-tier Tribunal should be set aside in its entirety and remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for re-making at a de novo hearing. However, if I were to find a material error in respect of ground 1 only, then elements of the First-tier Tribunal’s decision should be preserved and the appeal should be retained in the Upper Tribunal for re-making.

12. At the conclusion of the hearing, I reserved my decision.

Decision and reasons

Ground 1

13. I am satisfied that it was an error of law to fail to consider the elements of the Appellant’s account that were not disputed or were accepted by the Judge by reference to the extant country guidance caselaw when assessing risk on return. This was a failure to resolve a material matter in dispute between the parties.

14. Mr Ojo accepted that it was not in dispute that the Appellant had left Turkey illegally and that this would give rise to a real risk that he would be identifiable as a failed asylum-seeker and sent to the airport police station for further investigation (see IK at §§82, 133(6)).

15. In IK, the Tribunal held that there was no real risk of serious harm / persecution during such a further investigation. However, if as a result of information derived from questioning or enquiries undertaken during such a further investigation the police were to decide to transfer the returnee for yet further investigation by the anti-terror or intelligence services, that would give rise to a real risk of serious harm / persecution (§§79-80, 110).

16. That being so, the Judge in each case must assess what questions are likely to be asked during such further investigation and how the returnee would respond without being required to lie, with the ambit of the likely questioning depending on the circumstances of each case (see IK at §§85-6, 133(7)).

17. In making this assessment, the Judge must take into account the risk factors in A (Turkey) CG [2003] UKIAT 34 at §46 (see IK at §§14, 110):

“46. The following are the factors which inexhaustively we consider to be material in giving rise to potential suspicion in the minds of the authorities concerning a particular claimant.
a) The level if any of the appellant’s known or suspected involvement with a separatist organisation. Together with this must be assessed the basis upon which it is contended that the authorities knew of or might suspect such involvement.
b) Whether the appellant has ever been arrested or detained and if so in what circumstances. In this context it may be relevant to note how long ago such arrests or detentions took place, if it is the case that there appears to be no causal connection between them and the claimant’s departure from Turkey, but otherwise it may be a factor of no particular significance.
c) Whether the circumstances of the appellant’s past arrest(s) and detention(s) (if any) indicate that the authorities did in fact view him or her as a suspected separatist.
d) Whether the appellant was charged or placed on reporting conditions or now faces charges.
e) The degree of ill treatment to which the appellant was subjected in the past.
f) Whether the appellant has family connections with a separatist organisation such as KADEK or HADEP or DEHAP.
g) How long a period elapsed between the appellant’s last arrest and detention and his or her departure from Turkey. In this regard it may of course be relevant to consider the evidence if any concerning what the appellant was in fact doing between the time of the last arrest and detention and departure from Turkey. It is a factor that is only likely to be of any particular relevance if there is a reasonably lengthy period between the two events without any ongoing problems being experienced on the part of the appellant from the authorities.
h) Whether in the period after the appellant’s last arrest there is any evidence that he or she was kept under surveillance or monitored by the authorities.
i) Kurdish ethnicity.
j) Alevi faith.
k) Lack of a current up-to-date Turkish passport.
l) Whether there is any evidence that the authorities have been pursuing or otherwise expressing an interest in the appellant since he or she left Turkey.
m) Whether the appellant became an informer or was asked to become one.
n) Actual perceived political activities abroad in connection with a separatist organisation.
o) If the returnee is a military draft evader there will be some logical impact on his profile to those assessing him on his immediate return. Following Sepet of course this alone is not a basis for a refugee or human rights claim.” [The risk factors relied on by the Appellant for the purposes of this ground are emphasised]

18. Applying IK, I am satisfied that the Judge’s failure to give consider and decide upon the following matters amounted to a material error of law:

a. There was a real risk that the Appellant would be subject to further investigation at the airport.

b. Therefore, the Judge needed to consider what questions were likely to be asked during such further investigation and how the Appellant would respond without being required to lie.

c. Further, it was necessary to factor into this assessment those of the A (Turkey) risk factors that were not disputed or were accepted by the Judge, specifically: his Kurdish ethnicity (factor (i)); his membership of the HDP (factors (a) and (f)); his illegal exit from Turkey (factor (k) – illegal exit would appear to be akin to a lack of a current up-to-date passport, see IK at §82); and his sur place activities (factor (n) – albeit that the Judge found that the Appellant was involved in only the social activities of his UK-based Kurdish social and political organisation, the question of how his activities for this organisation might be perceived by the Turkish authorities was not considered).

d. Whether the Appellant would be at real risk of persecution / serious harm on return on this basis (i.e. notwithstanding that he had failed to establish the credibility of his claim to have twice been arrested, detained and ill-treated on suspicion of being a member of the PKK).

19. I remind myself that the First-tier Tribunal is charged with administering a complex area of law in challenging circumstances and it is probable that, in understanding and applying the law in its specialised field, the Tribunal will have got it right (AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49, [2008] 1 AC 678, per Baroness Hale at §30). Nevertheless, I do not accept Mr Ojo’s submission that it can be inferred that the Judge did not consider that the risk factors relied on by the Appellant would put him at a real risk of serious harm / persecution. There is simply no indication whatsoever that the Judge considered there to be any residual issues to consider in respect of risk on return once they had rejected the credibility of the Appellant’s claim to have twice been arrested, detained and ill-treated on suspicion of being a member of the PKK.

20. I further reject, without hesitation, Mr Ojo’s alternative submission that, if this was an error, it was not a material one. It cannot be said that any rational Tribunal would have come to the same conclusion on risk on return if this error had not been made (see SSHD v AJ (Angola) [2014] EWCA Civ 1636 at §49 per Sales LJ, as he then was).

Ground 2

21. Ground 2 discloses no material error of law.

22. I remind myself that “An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge’s conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong” (see Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, [2022] 4 WLR 48, per by Lewinson LJ at §2(iii)).

23. In rejecting the credibility of the Appellant’s claim to have twice been arrested, detained and ill-treated on suspicion of being a member of the PKK, the Judge relied on two significant inconsistencies in his account. First, the Appellant said in interview that his family were arrested with him when he was first arrested whereas in his witness statement and oral evidence he said that they were not arrested (§21). Second, the Appellant said in interview that he was not required to sign any documents upon being released from detention whereas in his witness statement and oral evidence he said that he was required to sign around three documents (§22). These were not minor inconsistencies, as suggested by Ms Nnamani; rather, the Judge found that they were inconsistencies in “key elements” of the Appellant’s account (§26). I concur with the Judge in this regard.

24. Ms Nnamani accepted the Judge’s reasoning was rational. She did not frame this ground as a reasons challenge – but for the avoidance of doubt I consider that the Judge’s reasoning was clearly intelligible and adequate and enabled the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was (see South Bucks District Council v Porter (No. 2) [2004] UKHL 33, 2004 1 WLR 1953, per Lord Brown at §37). The Judge rejected the credibility of this element of his account because he had been inconsistent in key elements of it.

25. Respectfully, I accept Mr Ojo’s submission that this ground is nothing more than a disagreement with the Judge’s reasoning. In fairness to Ms Nnamani, she did acknowledge that this was not her strongest point.

Conclusion

26. For the reasons set out above, I allow the appeal to the extent that there were material errors of law in the Judge’s decision. I preserve the findings in §§18-23, the first and second sentences of §26, and the first sentence of §28. The remaining findings are set aside.

27. Having found a material error of law in respect of ground 1 only, I concur with both representatives that the appropriate course of action for re-making is for the appeal to be retained in the Upper Tribunal and listed for a resumed hearing in due course. That is because there has been no procedural unfairness to the Appellant and the remaining factual and legal issues are relatively narrow.

28. For the avoidance of doubt, the scope of the resumed hearing will be limited to the whether the Appellant would face a real risk of serious harm / persecution on return to Turkey, including consideration of the risk arising from the elements of his account that were not disputed or were accepted by the Judge.

Notice of Decision

The Judge’s 11 August 2025 decision contains a material error of law. The findings in §§18-23, the first and second sentences of §26, and the first sentence of §28 of the decision are preserved. The remaining findings are set aside.

The appeal is retained in the Upper Tribunal for re-making. The decision on the Appellant’s appeal against the refusal of his protection and human rights claim will be re-made in due course following a resumed hearing.

Directions to the parties

1. No later than 35 days after this error of law decision is sent out, the Appellant shall file and serve a consolidated bundle of all of the material relied on for the purposes of re-making the decision in this appeal. This bundle must comply with the Tribunal’s ‘Guidance note on CE-File and electronic bundles’ (18 September 2023). The contents of the bundle must be relevant to the scope of the resumed hearing, as identified in this error of law decision. If the bundle includes evidence that was not before the First-tier Tribunal, the Appellant should make a rule 15(2A) application at the same time as filing and serving it.

2. If the Appellant is to give oral evidence and requires an interpreter for doing so, he must communicate this to the Upper Tribunal’s administrative staff promptly and no later than 35 days after this error of law decision is sent out.

3. No later than 49 days after this error of law decision is sent out, the Respondent may, if so advised, file and serve any additional evidence relied on.

4. No later than 7 days before the resumed hearing, the Appellant shall file and serve a skeleton argument.

5. No later than 3 days before the resumed hearing, the Respondent shall file and serve a skeleton argument.

6. The parties may apply to vary these directions. They must do so promptly and copy in the other side.

B. Hoshi

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20 January 2026