UI-2025-004446

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 22 Jun 2026
• Promulgation date: 04 Sep 2026
• Publication date: 22 Sep 2026
• Last updated on: 22 Sep 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004446
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54411/2024
LP/02474/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision and Reasons Issued:

On 4th of September 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MALIK KC

Between

CA
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent
Representation
For the Appellant: Mr Nicholas Sadeghi, Counsel, instructed by Simman Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Amrika Nolan, Senior Presenting Officer
Heard at Field House on 22 June 2026
Order Regarding Anonymity
Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify them or any member of their family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.
DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is the re-making of the decision in the Appellant’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision dated 2 February 2024 to refuse his protection and human rights claims.
Factual and procedural background
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Iraq, born in 1991. He travelled through Turkey, Greece, Bulgaria, Italy and France and arrived in the United Kingdom in 2022 in a lorry, and made a protection claim. He stated that he is of Kurdish ethnicity and had been threatened and harassed by the Popular Mobilization Forces (“PMF”) regarding their land. He further claimed that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) had raided his village and caused destruction, and that his father had been kidnapped. He expressed a fear of being killed by the PMF and by ISIS on return to Iraq. The Secretary of State refused his protection claim, together with the associated human rights claim, in 2024.
3. First-tier Tribunal Judge Dowling (“the Judge”) heard the Appellant’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision on 13 June 2025. The Appellant, who was legally represented, gave oral evidence and was cross-examined. By a decision promulgated on 4 August 2025, the Judge dismissed the appeal. The Judge, at [20]–[25], found that it was not reasonably likely that the Appellant would be at risk because of his Kurdish ethnicity. At [26]–[46], the Judge found that it was not reasonably likely that he would be at risk at the hands of the PMF, ISIS, or other militia groups. At [47]–[52], the Judge found that he was not a credible witness. At [53]–[55], the Judge found that his recent Facebook criticism of the Iraqi government was opportunistic rather than reflective of a genuinely held political belief, and that it was not reasonably likely that it would be of interest to the authorities or create a risk for him on return. At [60]–[63], the Judge found that it was not reasonably likely that he would be at risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR on the basis that he would be returning to Iraq without the Civil Status Identity Document (“CSID”). At [64]–[68], the Judge found that his removal from the United Kingdom would not be incompatible with Article 8 ECHR.
4. The Appellant appealed against the Judge’s decision to the Upper Tribunal on two grounds. First, the Judge’s conclusion as to the Article 3 claim relating to return without the CSID was vitiated by a procedural error or a mistake of fact relating to the proposed place of return in Iraq. Second, the Judge’s conclusion as to the risk arising from his Facebook activities was irrational or inadequately reasoned. I heard the Appellant’s appeal on 24 November 2025. Mr Nicholas Sadeghi, who appeared for the Appellant, made submissions developing the grounds of appeal. He invited me to find that the Judge erred in law as to the issues relating to the CSID and the Facebook activities. He invited me to set aside the Judge’s decision, though he made it clear that there was no challenge to the findings at [19]–[52] and [54]. Mr Mahdi Parvar, who appeared for the Secretary of State, resisted the appeal. He submitted that the Judge made no error of law in dismissing the Appellant’s appeal and that his findings were rational and adequate.
5. By a decision dated 28 January 2026, which is attached as an Annex, I concluded that the Judge made a material error of law in dismissing the Appellant’s appeal, as contended by Mr Sadeghi. I set aside the Judge’s decision, but preserved their unchallenged findings, namely, the findings made at [20]–[25] (no risk arising from Kurdish ethnicity), [26]–[46] (no risk at the hands of the PMF, ISIS or other militia groups), [47]–[52] (adverse credibility), and [54] (no genuinely held political belief). The error of law on the part of the Judge had no effect on those findings. I retained the appeal at the Upper Tribunal for the re-making of the decision. I held that the re-making of the decision would concern two discrete matters, namely the Article 3 claim based on return without identity documents and the claim based on the Appellant’s recent Facebook activities. I also stated that it would be necessary to re-make the decision on the Article 8 claim as well in light of the outcome on those matters.
Resumed hearing
6. At the resumed hearing listed before me, Mr Sadeghi appeared for the Appellant, whereas the Secretary of State was represented by Ms Amrika Nolan. I am grateful to both representatives for their assistance.
7. The Upper Tribunal issued country guidance decision in AH, AK and AJ (Identity documentation; returns to the KRI) Iraq CG on 14 April 2026. It was referred to in the skeleton arguments filed by both sides. Following the promulgation of that decision, the Secretary of State informed the Upper Tribunal that paragraph 7 of its headnote should not be relied upon because the evidence put before the Upper Tribunal did not accurately reflect the position. An application for permission to appeal to the Court of Appeal was therefore made in relation to that decision. I asked Mr Sadeghi and Ms Nolan as to how they propose to proceed in the circumstances. In light of the preserved findings and issues, Mr Sadeghi stated that I should proceed with the resumed hearing and re-make the decision. Ms Nolan agreed. It was therefore common ground before me that an adjournment was not needed pending the resolution of the issues relating to AH and others. I agreed, and proceeded with the resumed hearing. I note for completeness that on 29 June 2026, by consent of all parties, the Upper Tribunal granted permission to appeal in AH and others on a single ground of procedural unfairness. On 28 July 2026, by consent, the Court of Appeal set aside the decision and remitted the appeal to the Upper Tribunal for a fresh hearing.
8. The documents before me at the resumed hearing included a composite hearing bundle, a supplementary bundle, the Appellant’s skeleton argument and the Respondent’s skeleton argument. I also had the benefit of all other documents that were before me at the error of law hearing.
9. Mr Sadeghi called the Appellant to give oral evidence. The Appellant adopted his witness statements dated 27 June 2024, 5 June 2025 and 19 June 2026 in examination-in-chief. Ms Nolan cross-examined him. I then heard detailed closing submissions from Ms Nolan and Mr Sadeghi respectively. They both agreed that the issues before me are those identified at paragraph 5 above.
10. In short, Ms Nolan submitted that the Appellant’s proposed place of return in Iraq is Baghdad. She further submitted that the Appellant was not a credible witness and that his account as to his identity documents and Facebook activities lacks credibility. She further submitted that his claim is, in any event, not objectively well-founded and that there would be no risk on return in Iraq. She invited me to dismiss the appeal. In short, Mr Sadeghi submitted that the Appellant’s account in relation to the issues before me is credible and consistent. He invited me to accept his evidence and find that he would be at risk on return in Iraq. He invited me to allow the appeal.
Burden and standard of proof
11. In protection appeals, the burden of proof generally rests on the applicant, but the standard of proof is lower than the balance of probabilities. In order to qualify under the Refugee Convention, an applicant must demonstrate a reasonable degree of likelihood that they would be persecuted in the country of return. In order to qualify for humanitarian protection, an applicant must show that there are substantial grounds for believing that they would face a real risk of suffering serious harm. The lower standard of proof also applies in relation to human rights claims under Article 3. So far as Article 8 is concerned, if it is engaged, the Secretary of State bears the burden of demonstrating that the interference with the protected right is proportionate.
Consideration of the Appellant’s evidence
12. In considering the Appellant’s evidence, I follow the guidance in Joint Presidential Guidance Note No. 2 of 2010, Child, Vulnerable Adult and Sensitive Appellant Guidance. I make my findings having carefully taken into account his background and health issues and the effect that these may have on the quality of both his written and oral evidence. In his latest witness statement, he refers to suffering chest pain, losing weight and stomach inflammation. However, no claim based on health conditions was pursued before me by Mr Sadeghi.
13. I am also mindful that genuine protection applicants may exaggerate or fabricate aspects of their evidence in an effort to reduce the risk of their appeal being wrongly dismissed. There may be many reasons why a person lies, for example, to bolster their case or to avoid embarrassment, and such behaviour is not necessarily inconsistent with their telling the truth about the central issue of fact that must be determined.
14. I recognise that corroboration is not required for a person’s evidence to be accepted. I can therefore accept that there is a real possibility that the Appellant’s account is true on the basis of his oral evidence alone.
15. Given the sensitive context of the protection and human rights claims, I am mindful of the need for the most anxious scrutiny. My findings are reached on the basis of a holistic assessment of the totality of the evidence.
Identity documents
16. The Secretary of State, as noted above, proposes to return the Appellant to Baghdad.
17. In SMO and KSP (Civil status documentation, article 15) (CG)) Iraq [2022] UKUT 110 (IAC), at, [11], the Upper Tribunal held:
“The CSID is being replaced with a new biometric Iraqi National Identity Card - the INID. As a general matter, it is necessary for an individual to have one of these two documents in order to live and travel within Iraq without encountering treatment or conditions which are contrary to Article 3 ECHR. Many of the checkpoints in the country are manned by Shia militia who are not controlled by the GOI and are unlikely to permit an individual without a CSID or an INID to pass.”
18. At [12], the Upper Tribunal added:
“In order to obtain an INID, an individual must personally attend the Civil Status Affairs ("CSA") office at which they are registered to enrol their biometrics, including fingerprints and iris scans. The CSA offices in which INID terminals have been installed are unlikely - as a result of the phased replacement of the CSID system - to issue a CSID, whether to an individual in person or to a proxy. The reducing number of CSA offices in which INID terminals have not been installed will continue to issue CSIDs to individuals and their proxies upon production of the necessary information.”
19. The current position is that the CSID and the Iraqi Nationality Certificate are no longer valid and have been replaced by the INID. Further, since October 2024, Iraqi nationals in the United Kingdom have been able to apply for and obtain an INID at the Iraqi Embassy in London.
20. In dismissing the Appellant, the Judge rejected the Appellant’s account that he was not in contact with his family since he left Iraq. At [47], the Judge noted:
“The appellant stated he was not in contact with his family since he left Iraq. His attempts to locate his family amounted to providing his family’s names to some acquaintances working in a restaurant in the UK. The appellant has provided evidence from the British Red Cross (BRC) that he attempted to secure their assistance in tracing his family. It is not evidence that the appellant’s father is missing. It appeared to be a cursory and belated attempt and he confirmed that there had been no contact with the BRC since August 2024.”
21. At [48], the Judge found:
“The appellant had not attempted to make contact, with anyone from his village or his area. The appellant is an enterprising individual who managed to travel from Iraq to the UK illegally. If, as the appellant states, he is the potential inheritor of significant area of land, and if, as he suggests, he has lost, or lost contact with the only family members he claims to have had, I find it implausible that the appellant would not have taken more substantive steps to locate his family or attempt to discover their fate.”
22. At [49], the Judge found:
“I did not consider it reasonably likely that appellant had ceased contact with family in Iraq and I find it reasonably likely that the appellant had claimed this in an attempt to strengthen a weak asylum claim.”
23. As noted above, these are preserved and unchallenged findings. There is no basis to depart from these findings. The findings were not challenged by Mr Sadeghi. There is simply nothing in the Appellant’s further evidence, including his latest witness statement and further correspondence with the British Red Cross, that justifies departure from the Judge’s findings of fact. I respectfully adopt these findings.
24. The Appellant has not ceased contact with his family in Iraq. In his asylum interview, in answer to question 52, the Appellant confirmed that he had been issued with the CSID and that he had left it at home in Iraq. I find this to be the case and reject his subsequent suggestion, made in his witness statement dated 27 June 2024, that the CSID had been taken by the agent who facilitated his journey to the United Kingdom. Indeed, in cross-examination before me, the Appellant accepted that he had left the CSID at home in Iraq.
25. In his latest witness statement, the Appellant stated that he attended the Iraqi Consulate in London on 16 October 2025 “to ask if they could help”. He stated that he was told that he could not apply for a passport without original identity documents. He stated that he was told that if he wanted to apply for the INID he would need to return to Iraq. He also adduced a token and a leaflet given to him during that visit. In cross-examination, he confirmed that he had not been to the Iraqi Consulate again.
26. I find that the Appellant’s family in Iraq could send him the relevant documents, including the CSID. This would enable him to obtain the INID from the Iraqi Embassy in London. His male family members in Iraq could assist him while he is in the United Kingdom. They could also assist him on return to Iraq. The Appellant’s claim that he is not in contact with his family in Iraq is not credible and, in light of the unchallenged findings made by the Judge, I reject it. He is able to obtain the INID. He will have access to the INID in Iraq in order to live and travel within Iraq without encountering treatment or conditions which are contrary to Article 3 of the ECHR.
27. In the circumstances, I conclude that the Appellant has not shown that there are substantial grounds for believing that he would face a real risk of suffering serious harm or ill-treatment on the basis of lack of identity documents in Iraq.
Sur place activities
28. The Judge, at [54], made these findings as to the Facebook activities:
“I found the appellant’s recent political activism to be opportunistic rather than representing a genuinely held political belief and was intended to strengthen a weak asylum claim.”
29. These are also preserved and unchallenged findings. There is no basis to depart from them, and they were not challenged by Mr Sadeghi.
30. The Appellant adduced a copy of a Dakok Support Centre membership card in evidence before me. It was issued on 4 August 2025. In his latest witness statement, he stated that he became an official member of the Dakok organisation on 4 September 2025 in support of the Kurdish human rights cause. He stated that he is a genuine political activist. I reject this evidence. As noted above, the Judge made detailed and unchallenged findings as to his credibility. Following that decision, he claimed to have joined the Dakok organisation as an official member. He stated that they organise demonstrations, has regular meetings and signs petitions, and he has posted photos on his Facebook account. There is no real explanation in his evidence as to why he decided to join the Dakok organisation at this point in time. I find that this is not representative of a genuinely held political belief. This is an attempt by him to get around the adverse findings made by the Judge in the hope of continuing to reside in the United Kingdom.
31. In XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC), at [5]-[6], the Upper Tribunal gave the following guidance on Facebook generally:
“There are several barriers to monitoring, as opposed to ad hoc searches of someone’s Facebook material.  There is  no evidence before us that the Facebook website itself has been “hacked,” whether by the Iranian or any other government. The effectiveness of website “crawler” software, such as Google, is limited, when interacting with Facebook.  Someone’s name and some details may crop up on a Google search, if they still have a live Facebook account, or one that has only very recently been closed; and provided that their Facebook settings or those of their friends or groups with whom they have interactions, have public settings.   Without the person’s password, those seeking to monitor Facebook accounts cannot “scrape” them in the same unautomated way as other websites allow automated data extraction.    A person’s email account or computer may be compromised, but it does not necessarily follow that their Facebook password account has been accessed.
The timely closure of an account neutralises the risk consequential on having had a “critical” Facebook account, provided that someone’s Facebook account was not specifically monitored prior to closure.”
32. At [7]-[9], the Upper Tribunal gave the following guidance on social media evidence generally:
“Social media evidence is often limited to production of printed photographs, without full disclosure in electronic format.   Production of a small part of a Facebook or social media account, for example, photocopied photographs, may be of very limited evidential value in a protection claim, when such a wealth of wider information, including a person’s locations of access to Facebook and full timeline of social media activities, readily available on the “Download Your Information” function of Facebook in a matter of moments, has not been disclosed. 
It is easy for an apparent printout or electronic excerpt of an internet page to be manipulated by changing the page source data. For the same reason, where a decision maker does not have access to an actual account, purported printouts from such an account may also have very limited evidential value. 
In deciding the issue of risk on return involving a Facebook account, a decision maker may legitimately consider whether a person will close a Facebook account and not volunteer the fact of a previously closed Facebook account, prior to application for an ETD: HJ (Iran) v SSHD [2011] AC 596.  Decision makers are allowed to consider first, what a person will do to mitigate a risk of persecution, and second, the reason for their actions.    It is difficult to see circumstances in which the deletion of a Facebook account could equate to persecution, as there is no fundamental right protected by the Refugee Convention to have access to a particular social media platform, as opposed to the right to political neutrality.   Whether such an inquiry is too speculative needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis.” 
33. The Facebook evidence provided by the Appellant is quite limited. Full disclosure, as readily available on the “Download Your Information” function, has not been provided. In cross-examination, the Appellant suggested that he was not aware of the download function on Facebook. This is not credible. The Appellant is legally represented, and the Upper Tribunal’s decision in XX is referred to in his skeleton argument. I do not accept that he is not aware of the download function. I am mindful that corroboration is not required for a person’s evidence to be accepted, and I can accept that there is a real possibility that the Appellant’s account is true on the basis of his oral evidence alone. However, the fact that full Facebook download disclosure is readily available but has not been provided does not assist him. As it was put in MAH (Egypt) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] EWCA Civ 216, [2023] Imm AR 713, at [86]:
“… there is no requirement that the applicant must adduce corroborative evidence … On the other hand, the absence of corroborative evidence can, depending on the circumstances, be of some evidential value: if, for example, it could reasonably have been obtained and there is no good reason for not obtaining it, that may be a matter to which the tribunal can give appropriate weight …”
34. I note that in his skeleton argument before the First-tier Tribunal, at [45], it was stated that the Appellant could provide a full data activity report of Facebook activities “if necessary upon request”. I would therefore not reject reliance on Facebook posts on the basis that the full download has not been provided. However, in line with the findings made by the Judge, I find that the Facebook posts are not representative of a genuinely held political belief. These are intended to strengthen a weak claim. They are an opportunistic attempt to address the adverse credibility findings and rejection of his account as not being credible.
35. As I noted in my error of law decision, at [17], Mr Sadeghi argued that the Facebook activity, although not pursuant to a genuine political belief, nonetheless objectively gave rise to a risk on return. In support of this argument, he relied on the objective evidence extracts in the composite hearing bundle. These included Country Policy and Information Notes, Opposition to the government in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq and Internal relocation, civil documents and return, and a number of other reports and articles. However, in his oral submissions, Mr Sadeghi accepted that these extracts do not relate to social media activity outside Iraq. I have nonetheless carefully considered these extracts, together with further references to objective evidence in Mr Sadeghi’s skeleton argument, but find that they do not assist the Appellant. He is not a genuine political activist. He would not continue his Facebook or other political activities in Iraq. This is not because of any fear of persecution or ill-treatment, but because the current activities are not indicative of a genuinely held political belief. I find that the Appellant will be of no interest to the authorities on return to Iraq.
36. n the circumstances, I find that the Appellant’s Facebook and other activities in the United Kingdom would not give rise to a risk of persecution, harm or ill-treatment in Iraq. There is no reasonable likelihood of persecution. He has not shown that there are substantial grounds for believing that he would face a real risk of suffering serious harm or ill-treatment on the basis of these activities.
Article 8 claim
37. The Appellant does not claim to have a family life in the United Kingdom. He advanced a claim based on his private life. The requirements for leave to remain on the grounds of private life are set out in Appendix Private Life to the Immigration Rules. In a case like this, an applicant must have been continuously residing in the United Kingdom for 20 years or, alternatively, there would be very significant obstacles to their integration into the country where they would have to live if required to leave. The Appellant has resided in the United Kingdom for around 4 years.
38. In Kamara v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] EWCA Civ 813 [2016] 4 WLR 152, at [14], the Court of Appeal noted that the idea of “integration” calls for a broad evaluative judgment to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in terms of understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and a capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individual’s private or family life. In Parveen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 932, at [9], the Court of Appeal noted that the words “very significant” connote an elevated threshold and that the test will not be met by mere inconvenience or upheaval. The test contemplates something which would prevent or seriously inhibit a person from integrating into the country of return. There must be something more than “obstacles”.
39. The Appellant has resided almost all of his life in Iraq. He is familiar with the local culture, language and way of life. He has, as noted above, family in that country. There are no serious health issues. He faces no risk of persecution, harm or ill-treatment. He will be able to rebuild his life and relationships in Iraq within a reasonable period. His family would support him. He would be able to find work and accommodation, and adjust in Iraq without any significant difficulties.
40. Accordingly, I find that there would be no very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration into Iraq. He does not qualify for leave to remain under the Immigration Rules on the grounds of his private life.
41. I consider the Appellant’s claim by reference to five questions identified in Razgar v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 27 [2004] 3 All ER 821, at [17]. First, will the proposed removal be an interference by a public authority with the exercise of the Appellant’s right to respect for his private or family life. Second, if so, will such interference have consequences of such gravity as potentially to engage the operation of Article 8. Third, if so, is such interference in accordance with the law. Fourth, if so, is such interference necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others. Fifth, if so, is such interference proportionate to the legitimate public end sought to be achieved.
42. I accept that the Appellant has a private life in the United Kingdom. I bear in mind, as emphasised in AG (Eritrea) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] EWCA Civ 801 [2008] 2 All ER 28, at [28], and VW (Uganda) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2009] EWCA Civ 5 [2009] Imm AR 436, at [22], that the threshold for engagement of Article 8 is low. It merely requires more than a technical or inconsequential interference with one of the protected rights. This threshold, in my judgment, is met in this case. The Secretary of State’s decision is an interference with the exercise of the right to have respect for private life. Its consequences are of such gravity as potentially to engage the operation of Article 8. I therefore answer the first two questions of Razgar in the affirmative. The interference caused by the Secretary of State’s decision is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of the economic well-being of the United Kingdom. I answer the next two questions of Razgar in the affirmative too and proceed to the issue raised by the last question, namely, whether the interference is proportionate.
43. Section 117A(2)(a) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 requires me to have regard to the considerations listed in section 117B in considering the public interest question. The public interest question is, in turn, defined in section 117A(3) as being the question of whether an interference with a person’s right to respect for private and family life is justified under Article 8(2). I take careful account of the considerations in section 117B. The maintenance of effective immigration control is in the public interest. The Appellant came to the United Kingdom clandestinely. His immigration status has always been precarious. The private life that he has established in this country is quite limited and, in all the circumstances, I attach little weight to it.
44. In Hesham Ali v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2016] UKSC 60 [2017] 3 All ER 20, at [53], the Supreme Court emphasised that the failure to meet the requirements in the Immigration Rules is a relevant and important consideration in an Article 8 assessment because the Immigration Rules reflect the assessment of the general public interest made by the responsible minister and endorsed by Parliament. In making my assessment, I attach particular weight to this important consideration.
45. Taking into account all these considerations, in the light of my findings and the preserved findings, the interference caused by the Secretary of State’s decision as to the Appellant’s private life is justified and proportionate. The Secretary of State’s decision is compatible with Article 8. It does not result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the Appellant.
Conclusion
46. For all these reasons, I find that the Appellant’s removal from the United Kingdom would not breach the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention or in relation to persons eligible for a grant of humanitarian protection. It would not breach his Convention rights. Accordingly, I re-make the decision by dismissing the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds.
Notice of decision
47. The appeal is dismissed on all grounds.
Zane Malik KC
Deputy Judge of Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Date: 28 August 2026
Fee award
48. I make no fee award in light of my decision to dismiss the appeal.
Zane Malik KC
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Date: 28 August 2026



ANNEX: ERROR OF LAW DECISION



IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004446
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/5411/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision and Reasons Issued:

………………………………….
Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MALIK KC

Between

CA
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION made)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation

For the Appellant: Mr Nicholas Sadeghi, Counsel, instructed by Simman Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Mahdi Parvar, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 24 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to Rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify them or any member of their family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is an appeal by the Appellant against the decision of First‑tier Tribunal Judge Dowling, promulgated on 4 August 2025. By that decision, the Judge dismissed the Appellant’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision to refuse his protection and human rights claims.
Factual background
2. The Appellant is a citizen of Iraq, born in 1991.
3. The Appellant arrived in the United Kingdom in 2022 and made a protection claim. He stated that he is of Kurdish ethnicity and had been threatened and harassed by the Popular Mobilization Forces (“PMF”) regarding their land. He further claimed that the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (“ISIS”) had raided his village and caused destruction, and that his father had been kidnapped. He expressed a fear of being killed by the PMF and by ISIS on return to Iraq. The Secretary of State refused his protection claim, together with the associated human rights claim, in 2024.
4. The Judge heard the Appellant’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision on 13 June 2025. The Appellant, who was legally represented, gave oral evidence and was cross‑examined. By a decision promulgated on 4 August 2025, the Judge dismissed the appeal. The Judge, at [20]–[25], found that it was not reasonably likely that the Appellant would be at risk because of his Kurdish ethnicity. At [26]–[46], the Judge found that it was not reasonably likely that he would be at risk at the hands of the PMF, ISIS, or other militia groups. At [47]–[52], the Judge found that he was not a credible witness. At [53]–[55], the Judge found that his recent Facebook criticism of the Iraqi government was opportunistic rather than reflective of a genuinely held political belief, and that it was not reasonably likely that it would be of interest to the authorities or create a risk for him on return. At [60]–[63], the Judge found that it was not reasonably likely that he would be at risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 ECHR on the basis that he would be returning to Iraq without the Civil Status Identity Document (“CSID”). At [64]–[68], the Judge found that his removal from the United Kingdom would not be incompatible with Article 8 ECHR.
5. Permission to appeal the Judge’s decision was granted on 24 September 2025.
Grounds of appeal
6. There are two grounds of appeal. First, the Judge’s conclusion as to the Article 3 claim relating to return without the CSID is vitiated by a procedural error or a mistake of fact relating to the proposed place of return in Iraq. Second, the Judge’s conclusion as to the risk arising from his Facebook activities is irrational or inadequately reasoned.
Submissions
7. I am grateful to Mr Nicholas Sadeghi, who appeared for the Appellant, and Mr Mahdi Parvar, who appeared for the Secretary of State, for their assistance and clear submissions.
8. Mr Sadeghi made submissions developing the grounds of appeal. He invited me to find that the Judge erred in law as to the issues relating to the CSID and the Facebook activities. He invited me to set aside the Judge’s decision, though he made it clear that there was no challenge to the findings at [19]–[52] and [54].
9. Mr Parvar resisted the appeal. He submitted that the Judge made no error of law in dismissing the Appellant’s appeal and that his findings were rational and adequate. In order to assist me with the complaint concerning procedural error, he helpfully provided minutes of the hearing before the Judge, prepared by the Presenting Officer. He invited me to uphold the Judge’s decision.
Discussion
10. At [60], the Judge noted:
“The respondent states that should the appellant be removed from the UK, it would be to Kirkuk Province, Iraq.”
11. This is entirely consistent with what the Secretary of State had stated in her decision, namely:
“However, should you be removed, it will be to Kirkuk province, Iraq.”
12. The Appellant was represented by Mr Sadeghi before the Judge. In his grounds of appeal against the Judge’s decision, Mr Sadeghi stated as follows:
“The hearing was adjourned for 15 minutes for the sole purpose of enabling the Presenting Officer to verify the proposed place of return. Upon the resumption of the hearing, according to counsel’s note, the Presenting Officer informed the court that the R proposes to remove the A to Baghdad International Airport.”
13. There is no apparent record of this 15‑minute adjournment in the Presenting Officer’s minutes of the hearing. However, those minutes record the following submission made by the Presenting Officer:
“Objective evidence confirms that failed asylum seekers can be returned through any airport in federal Iraq or the IKR. The R proposes to return the A to Baghdad.”
14. This supports Mr Sadeghi’s version of events. On any view, I would place my trust in the information provided to me directly by Counsel who was also present at the hearing before the Judge. It is not clear to me why the Presenting Officer would depart from the Secretary of State’s decision and take the position before the Judge that the Appellant would be returned to Baghdad, as opposed to Kirkuk. Mr Parvar was not sure as to the reasons for the position taken by the Presenting Officer before the Judge.
15.  Mr Sadeghi submits that, in light of the position taken by the Presenting Officer before the Judge, it was effectively common ground that the Appellant would be returned to Baghdad. Accordingly, he made no submissions to the Judge as to the implications of a potential return to Kirkuk. I am persuaded that there is force in this submission. The Judge should either have determined the appeal on the basis of the position adopted by both advocates before him, or given reasons for determining the appeal on another basis. It was not sufficient for the Judge merely to note that the Secretary of State’s position was that the Appellant would be returned to Kirkuk. The Judge was obliged to engage with the changed position presented at the hearing. If the Judge was minded to proceed on the basis that the return would be to Baghdad notwithstanding the stance taken by the Presenting Officer, that should have been made clear at the hearing. There is a procedural error in the Judge’s decision.
16. Mr Sadeghi referred me to evidence which he says demonstrates the challenges associated with a return to Kirkuk. Although I have considerable reservations as to whether this evidence assists the Appellant at all, I cannot ignore the fact that the Judge did not engage with it at [60]–[63]. The Judge’s omission to address this evidence in their reasons, in the circumstances of this case, amounts to an error of law.
17. Mr Sadeghi accepted that it was open to the Judge to find, at [54], that the Appellant’s Facebook activity was not representative of a genuine political belief. This was made clear in the Appellant’s grounds of appeal at [15]. I agree. However, Mr Sadeghi submits that this finding was not determinative. He argues that the Facebook activity, although not pursuant to a genuine political belief, nonetheless objectively gave rise to a risk on return. He referred me to evidence which he says shows that even low‑level online criticism of the government places the author at risk. I am not immediately convinced that this is what the evidence in fact demonstrates. However, in finding that the Appellant would be of no interest to the Iraqi authorities, at [55], the Judge did not engage with this evidence at all and thereby erred in law.
18. This appeal, given that it involves a protection claim, calls for anxious scrutiny. As explained in YH v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 116 [2010] 4 All ER 448, at [24], there is a need in this context for decisions to show, through their reasoning, that every factor which might tell in favour of an applicant has been properly taken into account. The Judge’s decision and reasons do not reflect anxious scrutiny of the evidence. I entirely accept that I should not rush to find an error of law merely because I might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed matters differently. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned, it does not necessarily follow that it has been disregarded. Nor should it be assumed too readily that a judge has erred in law simply because not every step in the reasoning is fully articulated. Experienced judges in this specialised field are to be taken as aware of the relevant authorities and as seeking to apply them without needing to refer to them specifically. In this instance, however, I am satisfied that the Judge’s decision is materially wrong in law.
Conclusion
19. For all these reasons, I find that the Judge erred on a point of law in dismissing the Appellant’s appeal, and that the error was material to the outcome. I therefore set aside the Judge’s decision, but preserve their unchallenged findings (as identified below).
20. I have a discretion under section 12(2)(b) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (“the 2007 Act”) either to remit the appeal to the First‑tier Tribunal for reconsideration or to re‑make the decision in the Upper Tribunal. In considering how to exercise that discretion, I have carefully had regard to paragraphs 7.1 to 7.3 of the Senior President’s Practice Statement for the Immigration and Asylum Chambers, and to the guidance in AEB v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2022] EWCA Civ 1512 [2023] 4 WLR 12, and Begum (Remaking or Remittal) Bangladesh [2023] UKUT 46 (IAC).
21. The Appellant’s grounds of appeal, at [20], submit that the decision should be re‑made under section 12(2)(b) of the 2007 Act. I agree. As noted above, there is no challenge to the findings made by the Judge at [20]–[25] (no risk arising from Kurdish ethnicity), [26]–[46] (no risk at the hands of the PMF, ISIS or other militia groups), [47]–[52] (adverse credibility), and [54] (no genuinely held political belief). The error of law on the part of the Judge had no effect on those findings. There is therefore no reason to interfere with them. Having regard to the guidance in AB (preserved FtT findings; Wisniewski principles) Iraq [2020] UKUT 268 (IAC), I preserve those findings. The re‑making of the decision will concern two discrete matters, namely the Article 3 claim based on return without identity documents and the claim based on the Appellant’s recent Facebook activities. In light of the outcome on those matters, it will also be necessary to re‑make the decision on the Article 8 claim.
22. In this case, the nature and extent of the judicial fact‑finding necessary for re‑making the decision are such that, having regard to the overriding objective, it is appropriate to retain the appeal in the Upper Tribunal. I am not satisfied that the effect of the Judge’s error has been to deprive the Appellant of a fair hearing or of an opportunity for his case to be put to and considered by the Judge. In any event, even if that conclusion were wrong, I do not consider that, in all the circumstances, it would be just, proportionate or consistent with the overriding objective to remit the appeal to the First‑tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing.
23. Accordingly, I exercise my discretion under section 12(2)(b) of the 2007 Act to retain the appeal in the Upper Tribunal in order to re‑make the decision.
Notice of decision
24. The First-tier Tribunal’s decision is set aside, and the appeal is retained at the Upper Tribunal for re-making of the decision.
Directions for the resumed hearing
25. I give the following directions as to the future conduct of this appeal:
(1) The appeal shall be listed for a resumed hearing at the Upper Tribunal with a time estimate of two hours.
(2) The Secretary of State shall file and serve a skeleton argument on the re‑making of the decision in the appeal, setting out, among other matters, her position as to the place of return, no less than 14 days before the resumed hearing.
(3) The Appellant shall file a skeleton argument as to the re-making of the decision in the appeal no less than 7 days before the resumed hearing.
(4) The Appellant shall file and serve a composite authorities bundle no less than 3 days before the resumed hearing.
26. These directions must be followed unless varied, substituted, or supplemented by further directions. The parties are reminded that failure to comply with these directions may, among other things, result in the making of an adverse order pursuant to Rule 10 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008.
Anonymity
27. I consider that an anonymity order is justified in the circumstances of this case having regard to the Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2022, Anonymity Orders and Hearing in Private, and the Overriding Objective. I make an order under Rule 14(1) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008. Accordingly, unless and until a Tribunal or court directs otherwise, the Appellant is granted anonymity. No report of these proceedings shall directly or indirectly identify them or any member of their family. This direction applies to both parties. Failure to comply with this direction could lead to contempt of court proceedings.


Zane Malik KC
Deputy Judge of Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
Date: 28 January 2026