Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004448

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/60695/2024
LH/00601/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 17 February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RODGER

Between

RASILA VINOD THAKKAR
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

ENTRY CLEARANCE OFFICER
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Aslam, Counsel instructed through Direct Access
For the Respondent: Ms McKenzie, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 2 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

No application to anonymise these proceedings was made and no anonymity order is made as I am not satisfied that there is justification or necessity for the proceedings to be anonymised.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dated 25 May 2025 dismissing her appeal against the respondent’s decision of 01 August 2024 to refuse her human rights claim in an application for entry clearance under Appendix ADR (Adult Dependent Relative) of the Immigration Rules.
Background
2. The appellant is a citizen of India born in 1955 (now aged 70yrs). She joined her son, Mr Bhavir Thakkar, the sponsor, in Ireland in 2019 following the death of her husband in 2018. Her son is an Irish national. Her son and his wife and infant daughter relocated to the UK for the sponsor’s job in 2024 and the appellant remained in Ireland. She made the application to join the sponsor in the UK on 24 June 2024. The appellant’s application as an adult dependent relative was made on the basis that she is financially and emotionally dependent on her son and his wife and that her daughter in law provides her with daily care as she has limited mobility. The application was made under Appendix ADR and/or on grounds of her family life with the sponsor and his family in the UK.
The Respondent’s decision
3. In a decision dated 01 August 2024 the respondent refused the application under Appendix ADR and outside of the Immigration Rules.
4. The respondent considered the evidence submitted with the application and asserted that the evidence did not confirm that she required long-term personal care to perform everyday tasks due to age, illness or disability or that she required any care that was either not available or not affordable in India. The respondent found that she did not meet the requirements of paragraphs ADR 5.1 or 5.2 of Appendix ADR.
5. The respondent concluded that there were no exceptional circumstances in the appellant’s case and that the refusal would not result in any unjustifiably harsh consequences for the appellant, a relevant child or other family member. The application was dismissed outside of the Rules.
The appeal before the First-tier Tribunal
6. The appellant appealed and the appeal came before the Judge for full hearing on 20 May 2025. The appellant was represented by Ms Atas of Counsel and the respondent was represented by Ms Simpson, a Home Office Presenting Officer. The sponsor gave evidence and he was cross-examined.
7. At paragraph 12, the Judge confirmed that the Immigration Rules had been considered in full and outlined what the appellant needed to prove in order to succeed in an appeal under Appendix ADR. At paragraph 27 the Judge found that the appellant did not need long term personal care to perform everyday tasks and that even if she did, she had not provided sufficient persuasive evidence that any care that she required was not available and that there was no person in India or Ireland who can reasonably provide it or that it is not affordable.
8. At paragraph 29 the Judge accepted that the appellant was in a difficult situation and that her status in Ireland was temporary and that she was close to her son. At paragraph 31 the Judge accepted that there was family life between the appellant and the sponsor and that there would be interference. At paragraph 37 the Judge concluded that the appellant would find things difficult on return to India but that her son would continue to support her and that there was no persuasive evidence of any exceptional or compelling circumstances to justify allowing the appeal outside of the Immigration Rules.
The appeal to the Upper Tribunal
9. The appellant sought permission to appeal on five grounds, (1) error in assessing exceptional circumstances, (2) inadequate proportionality assessment, (3) neglect of consideration of the sponsor’s daughter’s best interests, (4) misapplication of Appendix ADR and (5) failing to properly consider the sponsor’s cultural and filial duties to care for her elderly mother. The grounds were drafted by the sponsor.
10. On 03 September 2025 the First-tier refused permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal.
11. The appellant thereafter applied to the UT for permissions to appeal to the UT. On 14 November 2025, the Upper Tribunal granted the appellant permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. The UT Judge decision granting permission stated;
“It is right to say that the Judge’s decision does not explicitly address the best interests of the appellant’s grandchild. Although I have significant reservations about whether this failure could amount to a material error of law, in all of the circumstances I am persuaded that it is arguable.
There appear to be little merit in the other grounds which appear to be little more than disagreements with the Judge’s assessment of the evidence. However, I do not limit the grant of permission as the Tribunal identified [caselaw] it can be problematic to try to disentangle separate complaints about what is an overarching assessment considering Article 8 of the ECHR.”
The UT appeal hearing
12. At the hearing on 05 February 2026, we all had the benefit of a composite appeal bundle made up of 649 pages. I noted that the appellant had submitted a recent updated medical letter dated 26 January 2026 but it was accepted that this was not relevant for the purposes of the error of law hearing.
13. I heard submissions from Mr Aslam of Counsel for the appellant and Ms McKenzie, a senior Presenting Officer for the respondent. I have not set these out in full but have referred to them below in making my decision.
14. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision which I now give.
Discussion
15. In deciding whether the Judge’s decision involved the making of a material error of law, it is helpful to remind myself of the principles set out within the case law and in particular at paragraph 26 of Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201. I remind myself that the FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal and that where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account. Further, when it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out, as recently confirmed by the Court of Appeal in Yalcin v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 74, at [50] and [51].
16. Further, I remind myself that an appeal court should assume, unless it detects an express or implicit misdirection of law, that the specialist tribunal knows and has applied the relevant law as set out in Gadinala v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 1410, at [46] and [47].
Ground 4
17. At the outset of his submissions, Mr Aslam clarified and confirmed that the Immigration Rules are also in challenge although the grounds mainly refer to an Article 8 assessment. Mr Aslam confirmed that the primary ground was that the Judge had erred in law in making the assessment that the appellant did not require everyday care to carry out personal tasks. In considering his submissions, I note that the grounds of appeal had been written by the sponsor and no objection was raised by Ms McKenzie to the oral submissions on the application of Appendix ADR. I was satisfied that the appellant had raised misapplication of Appendix ADR in the grounds of appeal (Ground 4) and I was satisfied that it was a matter that arose for my consideration.
18. In his submissions on misapplication of Appendix ADR, Mr Aslam referred to paragraph 13 of the decision wherein the Judge noted the evidence that the sponsor and his family moved to the UK on 09 December 2024 and that they travelled back and forward from the UK, almost every week to help the appellant and that the sponsor “prepares for the whole week for her and does cooking, cleaning, taking and leaving food for her.” Mr Aslam also referred to paragraph 15 wherein the Judge notes the evidence that GP visits and physio etc was not being cared for as the appellant cannot travel to these appointments on her own. Mr Aslam submitted that the conclusion that the appellant can manage on her own was contrary to the evidence of the sponsor that he had to travel back and forwards from the UK to Ireland in order to provide care for the appellant and also with the fact that the appellant was not able to attend medical appointments and treatments.
19. I have considered with care the submissions made by Mr Aslam but I am not satisfied that the Ground relating to an error of law in applying Appendix ADR (Ground 4 in the sponsor’s initial grounds) has been made out.
20. At paragraph 24 of the decision, the Judge noted the medical letters relied upon [p336] dated 23 November 2024 and noted that this was dated before the appellant started living alone since 09 December 2024. The Judge accepted the medical issues and noted that the letter referred to the appellant being unable to manage to household tasks independently and that her son provided daily assistance with mobility, cooking and personal care. However, the Judge found that he preferred the oral evidence that this was not the case and had not been the case since December 2024 and at paragraph 26 made a finding that the appellant may find everyday tasks difficult, slow and painful but that she is largely managing her own personal care as set out earlier within the decision.
21. On reading paragraphs 13-26 as a whole, I do not accept that the Judge has failed to take into account the oral evidence or other evidence regarding the sponsor’s assistance to the appellant or as regards the appellant’s situation post 09 December 2024. The Judge has directly referred to the evidence and at paragraph 29 makes clear that he has taken into account all of the submissions made by Counsel for the appellant at the hearing. There is no proved error of law in the Judge’s application of Appendix ADR or in the assessment of whether the appellant had proved that she required long term personal care to perform everyday tasks. The findings made were ones that were open to the Judge on the evidence before him and the Judge was entitled to prefer the updated oral evidence on the appellant’s ability to carry out personal care and other everyday tasks and make an assessment of that evidence in deciding whether it was sufficient to meet the test as set out in Appendix ADR. The assessment carried out did not involve an error of law and is sufficiently detailed as to make it known to the parties as to why such conclusions were reached.
22. For the sake of completeness I also do not accept, as claimed within Ground 4 of the drafted grounds, that the Judge incorrectly focused on the availability of care in India. Paragraph 28 makes clear that the Judge considered both Ireland and India in his assessment of the evidence relating to availability and affordability of any necessary care required by the appellant. Further, Mr Aslam accepted in submissions that there was no evidence in the appellant’s bundle pertaining to availability and affordability of care in India, the appellant’s home country. The findings made in paragraph 28 are ones that were open to the Judge to make on the evidence before him.
Grounds 1 and 2
23. Mr Aslam’s remaining submissions were relating to the Article 8 assessment outside of the rules. Having considered his submissions and the SPO’s submissions and Mr Aslam’s reply, I am not satisfied that there is any proved material error of law within the Article 8 assessment carried out by the Judge.
24. On reading the decision as a whole, it is clear that the Judge makes a note of the evidence before him and makes a direct finding that there is family life between the appellant and the sponsor. It was said in submissions that the Judge noted the facts relating to the appellant and the sponsor and made a finding that there was family life but that the Judge did not make enough of certain factors, such as the 5 years of co-habitation with the sponsor and his wife, the extent of the bond between the appellant and sponsor given that they were living in a foreign country together, or that the appellant was not able to attend medical appointments/physiotherapy appointments.
25. I do not accept that Grounds 1 or 2 have been made out. At paragraphs 29-37 of the decision, the Judge carries out a full assessment of all of the evidence and correctly applied a balance sheet approach. I am not satisfied that it has been shown that the Judge did not make enough of certain noted facts and the challenge appears to be on the amount of weight placed on certain pieces of evidence. This was an assessment for the Judge and clear detailed reasons have been provided as to why the evidence was not accepted as demonstrating exceptional or compelling circumstances. I am satisfied that Grounds 1 and 2 are no more than a disagreement with the decision made by the Judge relating to the assessment of exceptional circumstances and the proportionality exercise. I am not able to accept that inadequate weight was placed on certain factors as set out in submissions. It is clear that the Judge assessed all of the evidence and made a positive finding that there was family life and interference with family life and it has not been shown that the Judge made such finding reluctantly as said in submissions or that inadequate weight was placed on the various circumstances of the appellant and the sponsor. The Judge made specific reference to these circumstances relied upon and made findings which were open to him. It was open to the Judge to find that their circumstances did not amount to exceptional circumstances and I find that there is no error of law in the Article 8 assessment carried out by the Judge or application of weight to any of the factors set out within his decision.

Ground 3
26. As to Ground 3, I indicated at the hearing that I was not able to accept Ms McKenzie’s submissions that a failure to consider the s.55 best interests of a relevant child did not amount to an error of law or that the caselaw relied upon by Ms McKenzie provided support for such contention.
27. I accept that it is correct that there is no direct reference within the decision to the best interests of the sponsor’s daughter. However, overall and having considered the issue with care, I do not accept that the best interests of the infant child was directly raised as an issue before the First Tier Judge. The appellant was represented at the time of submitting the appeal to the First Tier and on the day of the First Tier hearing. The grounds do not claim that the Judge failed to take into account submissions made by Counsel at the hearing and there is no transcript provided to evidence that such submissions were made.
28. On asking Mr Aslam as to what arguments were put before the Judge regarding the relevance of and any evidence relating to the best interests of the sponsor’s infant daughter (aged 4mths when the sponsor and his wife moved to the UK and aged 9mths at the time of the hearing), Mr Aslam was not able to assist but was able to accept my observation that the evidence within the appellant’s bundle was mainly focused on the sponsor’s own struggles on travelling back and forward to Ireland and the impact that that may have had on his own ability to be with and care for his infant daughter. I am not satisfied that it has been shown that the Judge had been directly addressed on the best interests of the sponsor’s child or that it had been argued before the Judge that the best interests of the child were relevant to the consideration of the appeal.
29. The Judge was entitled to assess the evidence before him in determining the issues raised before him and it is not an error of law for a Judge to not raise and determine alternative issues that have not been relied upon by a represented party.
30. Having considered the decision carefully, and bearing in mind that the burden was on the appellant to show that they had raised the issue and that the Judge failed to deal with it, I am not satisfied that that FtT failed to take into account or consider an issue that was raised before it. Whilst there is reference in the sponsor’s statement to his concerns about not being there for his daughter, as set out above, there is no evidence by way of a provided skeleton argument or transcript to evidence that the issue of the best interests of the infant child had been directly raised and relied upon before the Judge at the hearing. Accordingly, it has not been shown that it was an error for the Judge not to make a specific finding on the best interests of an infant child who was not living with the appellant at the time of the hearing and who was only then aged 9 months of age and was being cared for by her own parents.
31. Even if the best interests of the child had been raised before the Judge, which I do not accept has been proved, and even though the decision makes no reference to the best interests of the child, I do not accept that this would amount to a material error of law. The child was aged 4mths when she stopped living with the appellant in Ireland. The child was a young infant being brought up and cared for by her own two parents. The child was aged 9mths at the time of the hearing. It is difficult to understand how it could have been argued that the best interests of a infant child would have been adversely interfered with through separation of living with a grandparent with whom the infant had only lived with from birth until 4 months of age. Further, there is no persuasive evidence or submissions that there was any evidence before the Judge of any adverse interference with the infant’s best interests either due to separation from the appellant or through her father’s absences. The infant was being cared for by her own parents and she had only lived with the appellant from birth to age 4 months and given her very young age it does not seem likely that she would have been aware of the separation or have been adversely affected by the separation from the appellant or from her father during his weekend travels to Ireland. In all of these circumstances, even if it were to be an error of law to not carry out an explicit best interests assessment in relation to the sponsor’s daughter, of which I am not satisfied for the reasons set out above, I find that such error of law is not a material error of law as any best interests assessment is unlikely to have resulted in different conclusions or findings or to have been otherwise material to the Judge’s decision.
Ground 5
32. I do not accept that the remaining ground (Ground 5 in the sponsor’s grounds) has been made out. At paragraph 22, the Judge notes that the evidence was that it is not culturally acceptable to live with siblings who depend on their own families and that the sponsor is the appellant’s only family and that it is his duty to help her. At paragraph 36 the Judge assesses this evidence, together with all of the evidence heard and seen and makes a finding that he does not accept it as credible that her siblings will not provide her with any support. The Judge finds that ‘there is no reason they will not provide some moral and emotional support and guidance to help her re-establish herself, even if limited’ and clear detailed reasons are provided within paragraph 36 for this finding. Further, at paragraph 31, the Judge makes clear that various matters are relevant, including ‘the prevailing cultural traditions and conditions in the country of origin’ and it is clear from reading the decision and in particular paragraph 31 that the Judge has taken the evidence of cultural traditions into account in making the findings set out in the decision. I find that all of the findings made were open to the Judge to make on the evidence before him and that Ground 4 is merely a disagreement with the decision rather than there being any proved error of law.
33. Accordingly, for all of the above reasons, I consider that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and I uphold it.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law and I uphold it.

Judge Rodger

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated 09 February 2026