Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004456

First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/53508/2024
LH/00531/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 20th of January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SHERIDAN

Between

Muritada Muyiwa Quadri-Omolayo
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Bandegani, Counsel instructed by Hackney Community Law Centre
For the Respondent: Mr Walker, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 9 January 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This appeal was conceded at the hearing by the respondent. My reasons will therefore be brief.
2. The appellant is a citizen of Nigeria who has lived continuously in the UK since June 2007. His partner (since 2012) is Ms Lawal, who is also a Nigerian citizen. He is the stepfather of QSO, a British citizen born in 2013; and the father of QQO, who was born in 2017 and is a Nigerian citizen. It is not in dispute that he has a close parental relationship with both children and a genuine relationship with Ms Lawal.
3. In March 2017 the appellant was convicted of possession of a false passport and sentenced to eighteen months’ imprisonment. In October 2018 the respondent made a deportation order against him. In 2020 the appellant’s protection and human rights claim was considered by Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Lenier, who dismissed the appeal. The appellant made further submissions, which were refused in March 2024. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal where his appeal came before Judge of the First-tier Tribunal L U Chinweze (“the judge”). In a decision dated 9 July 2025 the judge dismissed the appeal. The appellant is now appealing against this decision.
4. The central issue before the judge was whether the appellant satisfied the conditions of Exception 2 in Section 117C(5) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. This stipulates:
“(5) Exception 2 applies where C has a genuine and subsisting relationship with a qualifying partner, or a genuine and subsisting parental relationship with a qualifying child, and the effect of C’s deportation on the partner or child would be unduly harsh.”
5. The judge found that the appellant has a genuine and subsisting relationship with Ms Lawal, who is a qualifying partner; and with QSO and QQO who are qualifying children. He also found that it would be unduly harsh for Ms Lawal, QSO and QQO to accompany the appellant to Nigeria. However, the judge found that it would not be unduly harsh for them to remain in the UK without the appellant; and on that basis dismissed the appeal.
6. The most significant area of contention before the judge related to QQO, who has epilepsy and challenging behaviour (and may suffer from ADHD). The judge found that Ms Lawal would be able to cope without the appellant such that the effect of his deportation would not be unduly harsh for QQO. Amongst other things, the judge made findings about support from third parties that Ms Lawal could (or would) receive to assist with QQO. This included finding (in paragraphs 52-54) that:
(i) “Ms Lawal can get help from the school or her local authority to assist with childcare between the time when school and her work finishes”;
(ii) “If QQO is diagnosed with ADHD, appropriate support can be put in place for him by his local educational authority and his school”; and
(iii) “Even if the QQO is diagnosed with ADHD as I have said he would be likely to be given additional support and Ms Lawal could stay at home and apply for enhanced benefits to help meet the costs of looking after him”
7. At the hearing the focus of Mr Bandegani’s submissions was the three findings in paragraphs 52-54 quoted above, which were raised in the first ground of appeal. He argued that the judge erred by not putting these points to the appellant, which was necessary to do because they had not been raised by the respondent and therefore the appellant did not have an opportunity to address them through submissions or evidence.

8. Following Mr Bandegani’s submissions, Mr Walker conceded the appeal. He stated that although at first blush it appears that the judge did not err because the decision contains a thorough assessment of the effect of deportation on Ms Lawal and QQO, he accepted Mr Bandegani’s argument that the judge erred by not putting to the parties the findings in paragraphs 52-54 about support Ms Lawal will (or may) receive from the state, local authority and QQO’s school to assist with QQO. Mr Walker explained that he accepted Mr Bandegani’s argument that as the findings in paragraph 52 -54 (about the school or local authority assisting with childcare and putting into place appropriate support for QQO, and Ms Lawal being in a position to access “enhanced benefits” if she stops working) were not raised by the respondent or judge, the appellant did not have an opportunity to address them. Mr Walker agreed with Mr Bandegani that this amounts to procedural unfairness and therefore that the judge’s undue harshness finding in respect of QQO cannot stand.

9. Mr Walker argued that the case should remain in the Upper Tribunal for remaking since there is only a narrow issue to be addressed on remaking. Mr Bandegani did not dispute that only a narrow issue remained to be resolved but argued that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal as the appellant has not had the benefit of a fair hearing.
10. The general principle is that cases will be retained in the Upper Tribunal for remaking. However, there are exceptions to this, as set out in paragraphs 7.2.(a) and (b) of the Practice Statement. The exception in paragraph 7.2(a) is that:
“The effect of the error has been to deprive a party before the First-tier Tribunal of a fair hearing or other opportunity for that party’s case to be put to and considered by the First-tier Tribunal”
11. The concession by the respondent is that the decision cannot stand because of procedural unfairness. Accordingly, the case falls within the scope of the exception in paragraph 7.2(a). In these circumstances, I am persuaded by Mr Bandegani that the case should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal.
12. Mr Bandegani argued that I should preserve the judge’s finding that it would unduly harsh for Ms Lawal, QSO and QQO to relocate with the appellant to Nigeria. I am not prepared to do so. Whist this finding is unchallenged (and on the facts as they stood at the time of the hearing was plainly open to the judge) I do not consider it in the interests of justice to constrain the First-tier Tribunal judge who will remake the decision. This is because a considerable amount of time may elapse before the decision is remade and at that time of the remaking the factual matrix may be significantly different.
Notice of Decision
13. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law and is set aside.
14. The case is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be made afresh by a different judge with no findings preserved.

D. Sheridan

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

14.1.2026