Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004479

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/50929/2023
LP/03284/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 20th of January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RASTOGI

Between

SU
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

The Secretary of State for the Home Department
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A. Slatter, Counsel instructed by Buckingham Legal Associates
For the Respondent: Ms S. Simbi, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 5 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (“FTT”) dated 17 July 2025 in which the FTT dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection claim. The respondent’s decision was taken on 31 January 2023.
2. The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan. His protection claim of 29 July 2022 was founded on his journalistic and political activities in Pakistan, and since his arrival into the United Kingdom on 27 February 2022. In summary his claim is that he is an active supporter of the Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (“PTM”). He worked as a freelance and employed journalist in Pakistan where he reported and commented on matters relating to the treatment of Pashtuns in his area. He claimed to be at risk in Pakistan on the grounds of both his activism and journalism and he said is wanted by the Pakistani army and has been threatened by the Taliban. He also claims (in a new matter but to which the respondent consented could be dealt with by the FTT) to be at risk in Pakistan as an atheist and no longer a follower of Islam.
3. The respondent accepted the appellant has an interest in politics in Pakistan, has expressed support for the PTM, and has used social media to criticise the authorities in Pakistan and the Taliban. The respondent did not accept that the appellant was a journalist there or that his political activities put him at risk of treatment amounting to persecution (see page 731 of the error of law bundle (“the bundle”)).
4. The judge did not find the appellant to be a journalist or reporter as claimed and decided this was fabricated for immigration purposes. Neither did the judge find he was a member or supporter of the PTM party in Pakistan “to the extent claimed”. The judge arrived at these decisions as the judge did not find the appellant credible [33] having considered disparate aspects of the appellant’s claim [20]-[30]. Accordingly, the FTT dismissed the appellant’s protection claim.
5. The appellant challenges the judge’s decision on 7 grounds under the umbrella ground given in the conclusion that the judge failed to apply anxious scrutiny to the appellant’s claim. The grounds are summarised as follows:

Ground 1: at [21] the judge failed to resolve material issues of fact in not making clear findings about whether or not the appellant was a journalist in light of the unchallenged evidence of his academic training as a journalist; the extent of evidence of his journalistic activities; the evidence the appellant supplied about inaccuracies in the interview record. Accordingly it is contended that the judge gave inadequate reasons for not finding the appellant to be a journalist;
Ground 2: at [22] the judge dismissed the appellant’s GNN journalist identity (“id”) card without adequate reasoning particularly as the judge did not expressly find the card to be false and attached limited weight to it and the extent it supported the appellant’s claim. In any event, the judge’s concerns about the documents were not ones raised in the refusal letter and it is not clear if they were ever raised at the hearing;
Ground 3: it is contended that the judge’s reasons for rejecting the appellant’s reasons as to why he was at risk from the army and the Taliban in 2022 [25] reveal that the judge misunderstood the nature of the appellant’s claim so failed to take that into account;
Ground 4: at [27] the judge failed to expressly make a finding about whether or not the appellant was an atheist and/or irrationally rejected the appellant’s claim to be an atheist (or would be perceived as one) by overlooking the supporting evidence about that and instead focusing just on the delay in the appellant raising this aspect of his claim;
Ground 5: at [28] the judge erred in characterising the difference in the evidence between the witness and the appellant as an inconsistency so was in error in discounting his evidence;
Ground 6: the judge failed to consider whether the appellant’s sur place activities in the UK would give rise to a real risk of persecution on return to Pakistan, particularly in light of the fact that such activities were accepted by the respondent;
Ground 7: the judge improperly discounted the weight to attach to the expert report by relying on matters about which the expert was not asked and focussing on immaterial matters such as whether or not the appellant and the expert had spoken [29].
6. Upper Tribunal Judge Lodato granted permission on all grounds.
7. I was provided with a 982 error of law bundle. At the hearing, I heard submissions from both representatives. Although the respondent had not filed a Rule 24 notice, Ms Simbi confirmed the appeal was opposed on all grounds. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision which I now give together with my reasons for the same. In arriving at my decision I have taken into consideration all of the submissions helpfully made by both representatives.
Legal Framework
8. There is considerable authority as to the restraint to be exercised by an appellate court. At [26] of Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, the following was said:
“Sections 11 and 12 TCEA 2007 Act restricts the UT's jurisdiction to errors of law. It is settled that:
(i) the FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal. The UT should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678 at paragraph [30];
(ii) where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account: e.g. MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49 at paragraph [45];
(iii) when it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out: see R (Jones) v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19 at paragraph [25];
(iv) the issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 at paragraph [27];
(v) judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they had failed to do so: see AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1296 at paragraph [34];
(vi) it is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law: see MM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 10 at paragraph [107].”
Discussion and Conclusions
9. I have borne the above guidance very much in mind in arriving at my decision. For reasons that I set out below, Ground 6 is clearly made out. That could be an error isolated from the remaining grounds of appeal and the appeal remade solely on the basis of risk on return based on the appellant’s sur place activity. However, the appellant challenges the judge’s conclusions about his pre-departure activity as a journalist in Pakistan and on the basis of his atheism and rejection of Islam. These arise in the main as a result of the judge’s assessment of credibility, the weight the judge attached to parts of the evidence, and the overall holistic assessment of the appellant’s claim. As Ullah reminds us, credibility and weight are generally matters for the judge and due deference should be afforded to the judge hearing the evidence. As will be seen, there is an overlap between some of the grounds and taken together, I am satisfied there are errors which impact the safety of the judge’s credibility assessment such that I find the whole decision needs to be set aside and re-made.
10. I turn now to my reasons for finding the decision infected by material errors of law.
Ground 6
11. At the beginning of the hearing, Mr Slatter asked Ms Simbi for clarification of the scope of what the respondent accepted at page 14 of the refusal letter (see [3] above). Ms Sibmi confirmed that the respondent accepted the appellant’s political activity both before and after he left Pakistan, but not that such activity put him at risk of persecution there because it did not fall into the heightened category where such a risk was reasonably likely to apply (as it may if he were found to have undertaken such activity as a journalist). Ms Simbi added that the basis of the appellant’s claim to be at risk arose from his activities as a journalist and not as a consequence, solely, of his political activity.
12. Mr Slatter’s submission was that there was no such distinction and the risk applied to activity of this sort in either capacity. He also submitted that, in this case, the appellant also claimed to have carried out some of his journalism on social media rather than through mainstream mediums and that he did so at times as an ‘employed’ journalist and at times as a ‘freelance’ journalist and care was needed to ensure that the nature of his claim was properly considered.
13. Once the judge rejected the appellant’s account to be a journalist or a member/supporter of the PTM in Pakistan “to the extent claimed” [33], the judge rejected the appellant’s asylum and humanitarian protection claim [34] without considering either what level of political activity the appellant was involved in (if any), his political or other sur place activity in the UK, or his likely conduct on return to Pakistan (in line with HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 31 as it relates to political opinion).
14. The judge made no reference to the respondent’s acceptance of the appellant’s political interest and activity as contained within the refusal letter despite, at [14], summarising (some of) the factors the respondent accepted and rejected.
15. Although the judge summarised the ‘issues’ in dispute at [5] these were on a generic basis and do not reflect the issues which the parties identified in the supplementary respondent’s review dated 9 April 2024 (which had been updated from the one dated 27 November 2023) and repeated in the amended skeleton argument (“ASA”) dated 12 March 2025. The updated issues were specific to the appellant’s case as follows:
“a. Is the Interview Record produced by the Respondent reliable and accurate?
b. Has the Appellant worked as a journalist who has he reported against the army and does the state target those who do?
c. Does the Appellant hold a political opinion against the military and does the state takes adverse action against those that hold such views?
d. Is the Appellant a supporter of Pashtun Tahafuz Movement (PTM) and are PTM supporters are targeted by the state?
e. Has the Appellant come to the adverse attention by the state because of his anti-military views and support for PTM?
f. Will there be risk on return, and can the Appellant internally relocate?”
16. It is clear that (b) and (c) separate the issue of the appellant’s journalistic activities from his personal political ones. Accordingly, contrary to Ms Simbi’s submissions, I am satisfied that part of the appellant’s fears (and therefore a basis of his claim) arose from his political views separately from his fear arising from his activity as a journalist. The ASA went on to note the respondent’s acceptance of his political activity. At paragraph 47 to 49 of the ASA, the appellant set out a summary of some objective evidence showing why the appellant claimed to be at risk of persecution from state agents as a result of his political opinion.
17. In that context I am satisfied it was incumbent on the judge to identify the scope of the appellant’s political activity in Pakistan (given that his claim to have been politically active was only rejected ‘to the extent claimed’) and to consider and make findings about his sur place activity in light of the respondent’s concession, and then consider whether or not this resulted in a real risk of persecution on return (in light of the HJ (Iran) guidance). I am satisfied that the judge’s failure to carry out this exercise is an error of law as the judge failed to make findings in relation to material matters. Ground 6 is made out.
18. Ground 6 overlaps with Grounds 1 and 2 which challenge the judge’s specific finding about the appellant having fabricated his account that he was a journalist in Pakistan. I deal with these grounds further below. However, the preliminary discussion at the hearing (see [11]-[12] above), and the respondent’s concession, reveals several nuances in the nature of the appellant’s claimed activity in Pakistan. As part of the assessment that the judge was required to undertake and which I discuss in the preceding paragraph, I am also satisfied the judge needed to identify whether any of the appellant’s political activity was carried out in a manner which was, or could have been viewed, as political journalism.
Grounds 3 and 7
19. In support of his claim to be at risk on return to Pakistan, the appellant relied on the expert report of Dr Farhaan Wali dated 30 June 2025. Therein from paragraphs 11-12, Dr Wali provides country information about the “military operations and state repression in former FATA and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa” which is the area from where the appellant hails and is the backdrop to the emergence of the PTM which Dr Wali describes as a “non-violent civil rights campaign demanding justice and state accountability for abuses in Pashtun-majority areas” and which Dr Wali then describes in more detail at paras. 13-19. At para. 16 Dr Wali deals with the risks faced by “PTM activists and members”. At paras 20-25 Dr Wali considers the plausibility of the appellant’s claim to be at risk and concluded at para. 25 that is was plausible, considering that each discrete risk factor was plausible and a risk in its own right but, taken together, they presented a greater risk [para.26] before elaborating on that at paras. 27-33 and again at paras. 45-49.
20. The judge reduced the weight to attach to Dr Wali’s report to only attach “limited weight” to it and noting it was not decisive [30]. One of the reasons the judge gave for doing so was the “significant issue” of whether or not there was a discussion between the appellant and the expert about the preparation of his report. The judge addressed this at [29] but failed to explain why this was a significant issue going to the weight to be attached to that report. If anything it is an inconsistency between the appellant and Dr Wali but, beyond that, it is far from clear what the judge’s concern was.
21. The second reason the judge gave for reducing the weight to attach to the report was that the expert had not addressed how the appellant was able to remain in Pakistan, critical of the Pakistani army and the Taliban for an extended period (2020-2022) without consequence and despite several threats by the army and the Taliban in 2020. The appellant argues that weight should not have been reduced on that basis as Dr Wali was not asked to comment on that issue.
22. I find there to be an overlap here to Ground 3. That contends that at [25] the judge overlooked the evidence the appellant gave that the interest in him increased in 2022 despite having been politically active and having previously been targeted in 2020. Mr Slatter distilled this in oral submissions to a claim that the judge misunderstood the appellant’s case which he said was set out clearly in the letter the appellant’s representatives sent the respondent on 28 November 2022 (the representative’s letter) and also in the appellant’s witness statement at page 63-64 of the bundle. The grounds contend the judge did not meaningfully engage with this part of the appellant’s explanation.
23. The judge was clearly aware of this part of the appellant’s claim as the judge summarised it at [13] of the decision but the judge did not refer to it again. It is not clear why not. I am satisfied that there was evidence before the judge that the appellant’s case was that the risk to him increased following his 2022 activity but that risk did not become known to him until after his arrival into the UK. Notably, when first ask about his fears, the appellant said at q.4.1 of his screening interview dated 8 August 2022 that they arose on 8 July 2022 when he received a phone call from the Taliban threatening his life. There is a detailed account of how that risk came to pass in his asylum interview, his representative’s letter and his appeal witness statement. In my judgement, whilst the judge may have been entitled to reject as implausible the fact the appellant was not further targeted between 2020 and 2022 notwithstanding that his political activity continued (even on a reduced basis), I do not find it was open to the judge to have done so without considering the reasons the appellant gave as to why the more serious threats and action did not take place until 2022. In those circumstances I find ground 3 made out.
24. Returning to the expert, it was argued at para. 31 of the grounds that the Dr Wali understood the true nature of the appellant’s case (i.e. that the real risk did not arise until 2022) and that is why he did not need to address the lack of adverse attention from 2020-2022. I am surprised Dr Wali did not address the concern raised in the refusal letter (page 728/9 of the bundle)1 as to how the appellant managed to continue his activities in Pakistan without problems from 2020 to 2022 in the part of his report where he was asked to consider “the plausibility of our client’s claim”. However, given what I have said above, as the judge appeared to overlook the significance of the 2022 limb of the appellant’s claim, I am satisfied this infected how the judge dealt with the weight to attach to the expert report at [30] of the decision. When this is combined with what I have said at [20] above, I am satisfied the judge erred in her approach to the weight to be attached to Dr Wali’s report. Ground 7 is made out.
25. The expert dealt with a number of factors relating to other aspects of the appellant’s claim (such as the plausibility of his claim to have worked as a journalist, his claim he is an atheist, and his political activities and risk generally). Accordingly, I am satisfied that as the judge erred it the treatment of the expert report, that materially affected the way the judge evaluated the appellant’s credibility about other aspects of his claim and the assessment of risk on return.
Grounds 1 and 2 and the overarching ground
26. Under Ground 2, the appellant contended that, having attached ‘very limited weight’ to the GNN journalist id card, the judge failed to consider the impact of that upon him working as a journalist in Pakistan and failed to consider that evidence in the round. Mr Slatter supplemented this submission at the hearing, acknowledging that the judge dealt separately with the factors on which the appellant relied as supporting his claim and attached weight to some of that evidence, but failed to consider whether the factors to which weight attached (even if limited) were nevertheless sufficient to discharge the burden upon the appellant. I find this ground also captured by the overarching ground that the judge failed to apply anxious scrutiny to the appellant’s claim.
27. I find there to be merit in this argument. Whilst the judge had concerns about the GNN journalist id card, it was not the case that the judge rejected the card entirely through either a finding that it was not genuine or that no weight should attach. By attaching some, albeit very limited, weight to the card it was incumbent on the judge to consider that in the round with the rest of the evidence to which weight attached. That includes for example, the expert report (something short of decisive weight) [30] and the evidence of the witness (where the judge did not specify the weight to attach) [28] and the limited weight to the evidence of the appellant’s screenshots [26] including to GNN officials. As the judge did not do that, Ground 2 is made out.
28. Ground 1 comprises several component parts. I have made some reference to Ground 1 at [18] above. In light of the interplay between the appellant’s claim to be at times an employed journalist, at time a freelance journalist and at times involved in personal political commentary, I have found it necessary for the judge to have carried out a clear assessment of the nature of all of the appellant’s activities and the extent of any activity he did which might be perceived as political journalism, even if not as a paid journalist.
29. In any event, in light of the part of Ground 1 which claims the judge erred in failing to resolve the issue of the reliability of the asylum interview and that infected the way the judge assessed the appellant’s credibility at [21] and [33] of the decision. I have set out at [15] above the issues in dispute, and at (a) it is the reliability of the asylum interview. The judge did not refer to the corrections the appellant made to that interview or the impact of those, if any, to the overall assessment of the appellant’s credibility. I find this to have been a failure to resolve a material matter in dispute. Ground 1 is made out.
Ground 4
30. At [27] the judge found the appellant’s credibility severely damaged as he did not raise his fears based on religious grounds until his supplementary witness statement. The nature of the appellant’s claim is that he is an agnostic atheist and has renounced Islam. The judge did not make any express findings of fact about this anywhere in the decision. Ms Simbi submitted that it is clear from what the judge said at [27] that she rejected his account to be an atheist.
31. The appellant’s account about his journey to atheism and renunciation of the Islamic faith was set out in detail in his supplementary witness statement. At paragraph 41 therein the appellant expressed that journey as ending with a point at which he has ‘now’ renounced Islam and adopted atheism. In those circumstances, I am satisfied that delay of itself may not fully dispense with the issue of whether or not the appellant was atheist at the date of hearing. The judge’s failure to make express findings on the question of the appellant’s atheism as at that date, in light of the evidence before the FTT was an error of law. In any event, I am satisfied that the judge’s assessment of the appellant’s account on this matter was infected by the adverse credibility findings made on the other limb of the appellant’s claim.
Disposal
32. The parties agreed that if an error of law was found which impacted the assessment of the appellant’s credibility, that would require the appeal to be remitted to the FTT with no preserved findings.
33. That is indeed the position. Accordingly, the decision is set aside pursuant to section 12(2)(a) of the Tribunal, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (“the 2007 Act”) and the case remitted to the FTT to be heard de novo pursuant to section 12(2)(b) of the 2007 Act.
Notice of Decision
1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contains an error on a point of law and the decision is set aside.
2. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard by a different judge.

SJ Rastogi
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15 January 2026