Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004491

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60616/2023
LP/11665/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 8th of January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE ALIS

Between

S A
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:

For the Appellant: In person
For the Respondent: Miss Keerthy, Senior Home Officer Presenting Officer
Interpreter: Miss Elkhen

Heard at Field House on 22 December 2025

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant, an Iraqi national aged 33 years of age entered the United Kingdom on 2 November 2021 and claimed asylum the following day. His claim was refused by the Respondent on 31 October 2023, and his appeal was dismissed by the First-tier Tribunal (hereinafter referred to as the FtT) on 6 August 2025.
2. The Appellant lodged grounds of appeal and on 22 October 2025 Upper Tribunal Judge Hirst granted permission to appeal finding:
“2. The Appellant relies on the finding by the First-tier Tribunal at §43 as to the risk arising from the Taliban in Iraq, which had not formed part of the Appellant's case before the First-tier Tribunal. It is arguable that the First-tier Tribunal erred in addressing a case which was not before it and that that error was material to the decision.
3. The Appellant's grounds of appeal also assert that the judge gave inadequate reasons for finding that the Appellant was not still at risk on return. The judge's reasons were set out in detail at §§44-50; the finding that the Appellant was not at risk was materially based on the Appellant's own case that he had not received threats after 20I4 and the significant time that had elapsed since the Appellant's relationship with T. It is not arguable that the judge's reasoning was inadequate to explain his conclusion. However, it is just arguable that the judge's conclusion on risk was materially influenced by the error at §43 of the decision.”
3. The Appellant was unrepresented at today’s hearing, but an interpreter attended via CVP and translated the proceedings for the Appellant.
4. I extended the anonymity direction previously made in these proceedings.
SUBMISSIONS
5. The Appellant’s former representatives had lodged grounds of appeal, and these were relied on by the Appellant. The Appellant confirmed he did tell the FtT about his issues with the Taliban and he agreed he remained in occasional contact with his family in Basra.
6. The grounds of appeal alleged that the FtT materially erred in law by addressing a case that was not advanced, namely a fear of the Taliban in Iraq. This, it was argued, demonstrated a failure to properly and fairly consider the Appellant’s actual case, which concerned risk arising from an honour-based dispute following a relationship, supported by objective evidence of such practices in Iraq. It was further contended that the FtT gave inadequate reasons for rejecting the Appellant’s credibility and risk on return, failed to apply the benefit of the doubt in accordance with UNHCR guidance, and misapplied principles from relevant case law. Finally, the FtT erred in his approach to re-documentation.
7. Miss Keerthy opposed the appeal and relied on the Rule 24 statement filed in this case. She submitted that the grounds were misconceived. The reference to the Taliban at paragraph [43] of the FtT’s decision was not erroneous, as the Appellant disclosed in oral evidence, and confirmed today, that the Taliban had asked him to cease working for UNICEF, and the Presenting Officer in the FtT had also addressed this point in closing submissions. Miss Keerthy contended that the FtT was therefore entitled to consider the issue and that paragraph [43] was not lifted from another case as had been suggested. In any event, the FtT had engaged with the core claim namely the Appellant’s relationship with T and any finding in paragraph [43] of the decision did not affect the findings made about his relationship with T.
8. The second ground was linked to the first ground. The FtT had found the Appellant was not at risk on return (paragraph [44]) as he had been living safely for six years in Baghdad between 2014 and 2020. At paragraph [48] the FtT stated it was now twelve years since the events involving T and there would be no risk on return. The reasoning for this was well-founded.
9. The documentation ground also had no basis. The grounds of appeal did not specify what the error was. At paragraph [53] the FtT had considered in detail how he would be returned and found he could fly back to Basra directly and would have support from family with whom he was in contact. This finding was compliant with SMO and KSP (Civil status documentation, article 15) (CG) [2022] UKUT 00110.
DISCUSSION AND FINDINGS
10. Having heard submissions from both parties I reserved my decision.
11. The main argument centred around paragraph [43] of the FtT’s decision in which the FtT discussed a fear of the Taliban. The grounds of appeal suggested this was not relevant to the Appellant’s case and that it may have related to someone else’s claim. In granting permission Judge Hirst took those grounds at face value and found there was an arguable error in law.
12. In her Rule 24 response the Respondent provided context as to why the Taliban had been mentioned by the FtT. Such information was not referred to in the grounds of appeal. The Appellant’s representatives withdrew from the case on 18 December 2025 but did not dispute the content of the Rule 24 letter and I have approached this application on the basis that the Taliban had been raised at the hearing especially as the Appellant confirmed in oral evidence that he had described issues with the Taliban. At paragraph [43], the FtT addressed that issue and later went on to discuss and make findings about the Appellant’s claim about T’s family. I am satisfied that paragraph [43] did not detract from the core claim and given the Appellant had given evidence about the Taliban at the original hearing the FtT was entitled to deal with that issue.
13. The FtT thereafter considered his claim that his family had received further threats but rejected that claim for the reasons given in paragraph [48] of the decision. The rejection of his claim that his family had suffered problems along with the rejection of his claim that he would be of interest after 12 years were findings open to the FtT.
14. The grounds of appeal did not challenge those findings and the FtT went on to consider internal relocation and found internal relocation was possible then and would be in the future (see paragraph [49] of the decision).
15. The FtT had noted the Appellant had lived and worked in Baghdad without incident. The Appellant had reminded me that at the hearing he was not Kurdish but was from mainland Iraq and he used an Arabic interpreter. The FtT was entitled to find if he did not wish to live in Basra then he could live in Baghdad or any other part of Iraq other than perhaps the Kurdistan region.
16. All the FtT findings made were open to it and I consequently find there was no error of law on this ground.
17. The only other issue was whether the FtT’s approach to documentation was flawed. The grounds of appeal only contained one sentence on this issue at paragraph [23] namely “it is submitted that the Judge erred in his approach to redocumentation”. The grounds failed to identify what error may have been made and in granting permission there was no specific reference to any possible error over the FtT’s approach to documentation.
18. It had been the Appellant’s case that he had only ever had a CSID which he claimed to have lost in 2018 albeit he retained copies on his mobile phone. The Respondent had submitted before the FtT that his claimed loss of his CSID was “rather convenient” and as the FtT found him to lack credibility. The FtT accepted this argument for the reasons provided in the decision and I am satisfied it was open to the FtT to also find his claim to have lost his documents also lacked credibility.
19. The headnote of SMO(2) provides helpful information about the issue of documentation. This Appellant can be returned on a laissez passer and this will be accepted by the Iraqi authorities when he lands back in Iraq. Paragraphs [11] to [22] of the headnote of SMO(2) deals with CSIDs and INIDs. SMO(2) made it clear everyone needed either a CSID or an INID to live and travel within Iraq. The starting point is that the FtT rejected his claim about losing his documents. The FtT approached this appeal on the basis he had access to his document and given that finding I find the fact the FtT concluded he had access to his CSID relevant to the question of re-documentation. Based on the rejection of his account the FtT was entitled to find the Appellant had access to his documents.
20. The FtT was not required to carry out a more extensive fact-finding exercise given he rejected his claim he had lost his CSID. There was therefore no material error of law.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal contained no material error of law. The decision is upheld.

SP ALIS

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

29/12/2025