Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004503

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/02010/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

12th August 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HANSON

Between

MU
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Islam of Counsel.
For the Respondent: Ms Rushforth, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.

Heard at Cardiff Civil Justice Centre on 22 July 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The Appellant appeals with permission a decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘The Judge’), promulgated following a hearing at Newport on 30 July 2024, in which the Judge dismissed his appeal against the refusal of his application for leave to remain in the United Kingdom on protection grounds, on the basis of his sexual identity as a gay man, and/or on any other basis. The Appellant arrived in the UK in April 2022 and claimed asylum in April 2023, which was rejected in the Respondent’s decision of 9 April 2024.
2. Having considered the documentary and oral evidence the Judge sets out his findings of fact from [18] of the decision under challenge. At [28] the Judge writes:
28. Assessing the case as a whole, there is simply insufficient credible or reliable evidence upon which I can find that the appellant meets the required standard of proof. That being the case, his appeal must therefore be dismissed.
3. The Judge also does not accept the Appellant’s claim that he is estranged from his family as it was not accepted the core aspects of his claim are genuine or truthful.
4. The Appellant sought permission to appeal which was initially rejected by another judge of the First-tier Tribunal in September 2024 on the basis the grounds were nothing more than a disagreement with the findings which the Judge was entitled to make on the evidence.
5. The application was renewed to the Upper Tribunal where on 7 October 2024 it was granted, the operative part of the grant being in the following terms:
1. The appellant seeks permission to appeal, in time, against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Boyes who dismissed the appeal against a decision by the respondent to refuse his protection and human rights claim, following a hearing which took place on 30 July 2024, in a decision promulgated on 05 August 2024.
2. The grounds are poorly pleaded and unparticularised, although I make some allowance for the appellant who appears to have drafted the grounds himself as he is noted to be a litigant in person, and English appears to be a second language.
3. The grounds, when read holistically, are made out to the extent that it is arguable that the Judge failed to provide adequate reasons as to why he rejected the evidence of the appellant’s two in-person witnesses who attended the hearing to verify his claim to be a homosexual. It is also arguable that the Judge failed to consider in the round the evidence that supported the appellant’s claim to be homosexual. It is also arguable that the Judge failed to give adequate reasons on why he decided to attach more weight to the evidence he concluded was against the appellant, against the weight of evidence that was said to be in the appellant’s favour.
4. Permission is granted and is not restricted to any grounds.
6. There is no Rule 24 reply from the Respondent.
Discussion and analysis
7. The Appellant seeks to rely on the skeleton argument of Mr Mustapha, a barrister who represented him before the Judge, dated 29 July 2024 together with what is written at section 6.1 of the renewed application.
8. The Appellant asserts the Judge was not aware of is how Snapchat works as the pictures and all messages uploaded onto that platform were automatically deleted within 24 hours.
9. I accept that Snapchat messages are designed to be temporary with the default setting meaning a lot of messages will be deleted after being viewed or within a limited period, although there are ways to save or recover some messages or a copy of a person’s Snapchat data, including chat history, which could be requested through the “My Data” section in the settings. It is my understanding that Snapchat will then send an email to the person concerned with the link to download the data which may contain deleted messages.
10. However, I find no material error in relation to this aspect is no such evidence was provided by the Judge and his observations in relation to the same are therefore factually correct.
11. The Appellant states the Judge had not accepted threats that were received for the sole reason that anybody could use his pictures a profile on a WhatsApp which the Appellant claims is incorrect as he repeats his claim he received the threats and claims Judge could not give adequate reasons for why his account was not accepted appellant states this is not fair and that whilst he understands that anyone can use any picture on a WhatsApp profile the question is what the Judge believed and why he did not believe that it was not his family WhatsApp.
12. The Appellant asserts the Judge totally ignored country guidance relating to Pakistan and the acceptance by the Home Office that LGBT people are not only discriminated against in society and fundamentalists but that Pakistan would not provide them with any protection.
13. The Appellant’s appeal also referred to the Judge’s finding at [25] in which the Judge finds that the evidence of Mr Daly and Mr Harvey may have reflected their opinion and view, which the Judge did not find was sufficient, which the Appellant challenges by claiming Mr Harvey confirmed that “appellant is homosexual” and claims that the Judge’s reasoning is “not realistic”.
14. The Appellant states all the evidence provided has been treated with suspicion without reasonable justification and argues the Judge has materially erred in law to the extent the decision should be set aside.
15. First-tier Tribunal judges are encouraged to write succinct issue-based determinations. That is what this Judge did. The Judge clearly considered the evidence with the required degree of anxious scrutiny and notes the Appellant’s assertion he is a genuine and honest witness, as are his supporting witnesses, and that he will suffer harm if returned to Pakistan and will not be able to live openly as a gay man in Pakistan.
16. The Judge’s findings are set out from [18] of the decision under challenge. The Judge was not required to set out each and every aspect of the evidence. The Judge specifically confirms having taken into account everything said on the Appellant’s behalf both by his barrister and supporting witnesses. There is nothing in the determination to show that the Judge did other than that.
17. At [19] the Judge confirms that he dismisses the appeal for which he sets out the reasons at [20] – [28]. The Judge came to this conclusion having assessed the case as a whole. Having done so, he was not satisfied there was sufficient credible or reliable evidence upon which he was able to find that the Appellant met the required standard of proof.
18. The Article 3 ECHR claim was dismissed as the Appellant would be able to access treatment in Pakistan for his health needs and no very significant obstacles to integration into life in Pakistan was made out. The Judge concludes that the Appellant is not a stranger from his family as he claims, as the reasons for this were those he relied upon as forming the core aspects of his claim, which the Judge finds are not genuine or truthful.
19. An informed reader is able to understand not only what the Judge has found but the reasons why. Reasons only need to be adequate not perfect. The Appellant’s challenge to the weight the Judge gave to the evidence does not establish material legal error when weight was a matter for the Judge.
20. The Court of Appeal have made it abundantly clear that appellate judges must not interfere in decisions of judges below unless the decisions are ‘plainly wrong’. Whilst the Appellant disagrees with the Judge’s conclusions and claims he has available to him evidence that was not called before the Judge, on the basis of the evidence that was made available it is not made out the Judge’s findings are outside the range of those reasonably open to him on the evidence. In particular, it has not been established that the Judge’s findings and subsequent conclusion in dismissing the appeal are ‘plainly wrong’. Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 462 at [2], Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26] and Hamilton v Barrow and Others [2024] EWCA Civ 888 at [30] – [31], considered.
21. On that basis I dismiss the appeal.
Notice of Decision
22. This no legal error material to the decision to dismiss the appeal has been made out in the determination of the First-tier Tribunal.
23. The determination shall stand.

C J Hanson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

22 July 2025