Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004504
UI-2025-004505

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/61382/2024
PA/63389/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

24th July 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MERRIGAN

Between

CA
First Appellant
TA
Second Appellant
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)

and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: Mr R. Solomon, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr D. Simpson, Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 9 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellants are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellants, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellants. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The first appellant, C, born in 1974, is the father of T, born in 2000. They are both nationals of Sri Lanka; and seek to appeal on asylum grounds against the decision (“the decision”) of First-tier Tribunal Judge Row (“the judge”) dated 25 August 2025.

2. The judge records in the decision that C entered the UK on 14 June 2022 with a visitor visa, claiming asylum on 22 November 2022. C’s application was refused on 11 April 2024. Meanwhile, his son T had previously entered the UK on 16 February 2020 with a student visa. T’s leave had been extended with a Tier 2 visa which expired on 27 June 2023. On 9 June 2023 T claimed asylum, which application was refused on 24 April 2024.

3. C and T rely on the same account, which account was rejected by the respondent, as C’s reason for refusal letter dated 11 April 2024 makes clear and which I will detail below. In May 2018, R came to work for C in his business. While working for C, R had a relationship with T. In late 2020, R ceased to work for C. In March 2022, C was arrested from his home by the Criminal Investigation Department (CID) on the basis that C was a supporter of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), including involvement in the importation of weapons. The CID informed C that R was involved in the LTTE’s international work, as was C’s associate who had introduced C to R. The CID further informed C that R had implicated both C and T. C denied involvement and was beaten. He was eventually released from custody through the payment of a bribe, and with the assistance of an agent, flew to the UK in June 2022. I should say that neither C nor T are Tamils.

4. In C’s statement dated 26 September 2024, C adds that the authorities visited his wife at his home in Sri Lanka at various times between July 2022 and August 2024, looking both for himself and T. C contends he would be arrested and killed if he were to return; for the same reasons, so does T.

5. The appellants rely on a number of documents relating to the Magistrates’ Court at Negombo, all certified on 2 February 2024. They are:
a. an application for a warrant dated 26 July 2022;
b. a warrant issued for the appellants’ arrest of the same date; and
c. an order for the appellants’ arrest at the airport dated 6 January 2023.

6. In a letter dated 7 July 2025, Nishantha Pathberiya, attorney-at-law and notary public, explained that he obtained these documents (“the court documents”) from the Magistrates’ Court on behalf of the appellants. He wrote that the Court issued certified copies on 14 February 2024. He went on to state:

“…there is an arrest warrant issued against the above named clients [the appellants] on 26 July 2022 and on 06 January 2023 there is an order issued to the controller of immigration and emigration to arrest the above named clients at the airport and they will be arrested at the airport on their arrival to the country and they will not get a fair trial under the prevailing circumstances.”

7. The respondent did not accept that the court documents were genuine. At [46], the judge summarised that the respondent did not think it credible that it would have taken almost four months for the authorities to seek an arrest warrant following, on the appellants’ case, C’s escape from custody. The judge noted at [48] that the respondent did not accept Mr Pathberiya’s letter were genuine either; and expanded at [49] that the respondent was particularly concerned that the appellants’ solicitors had neither explained the origin of the letter nor attempted to verify its veracity.

8. The grounds of appeal are dated 25 September 2025. They may be summarised as follows:
a. Ground 1: the judge erred in law by failing to consider relevant case law in rejecting court documents as unreliable.
b. Ground 2: the judge erred in law by failing to apply country guidance when considering whether the first appellant was able to leave Sri Lanka.
c. Ground 3: the judge erred in law by giving undue weight to the appellants’ delay in claiming asylum.

9. Permission to appeal on all grounds was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Owens on 29 December 2025.

10. I will consider grounds 1 and 2 together: as the judge assessed both whether (a) the court documents are genuine and (b) C’s account of how he came to leave Sri Lanka is accurate in the light of the appellants’ overall credibility, the matters relevant to grounds 1 and 2 overlap.

11. The judge stated at [54] that he would decide what weight to put on the court documents in the light of all the evidence. He concluded at [68] that neither appellant was a reliable witness as to fact, at [71] that C’s arrest was fabricated and, accordingly, that neither C nor T would be at risk in Sri Lanka [71, 72]. That same lack of credibility cast doubt on the court documents. The judge found at [69]:

“I put little weight on the court documents or the lesser [sic] from the lawyer in Sri Lanka. There were straightforward steps which could have been taken to verify these documents which have not been taken. It is for the appellants to establish that these documents are what they purport to be. They have not done so.”

12. The appellants take issue with what the judge considered “straightforward steps”. The judge set out at [51] to [53] what those steps could be.

“The verification of a court document by solicitors is a straightforward matter. The standard procedure would be for the solicitor, not the client nor anyone instructed on behalf of the client, to write directly to the court to seek certified copies of the documents in question. The appellants’ solicitors could have done so. They have had time to do so. They could have provided the court with copies of the documents which were in their possession and have asked the court to confirm that they were genuine.

“Presumably the court would either have confirmed that the documents were genuine and that the proceedings were in existence or it would have said that it had never heard of the appellants and that the documents bore no resemblance to anything which it held on record. Either way it would have resolved the matter.

“The appellants’ solicitors would only have done this if they had instructions from the appellants to do so. Presumably the appellants would only have instructed them to do so if they thought that any reply would support their case. For whatever reason this has not been done.”

13. Mr Simpson, for the respondent, endorses the judge’s approach. It is said that there are clear discrepancies in C’s account that inevitably raise questions as to the authenticity of the court documents. By way of example, C stated in his asylum interview dated 15 February 2024:

“Q21: I know you are saying you didn’t but the police think you did. Why didn’t they press changes against you?
A21: They didn’t do anything legally. I got released paying the bribe.
Q22: How much did you pay?
A22: 50 lak around 12,000 pounds.

[…]

“Q24: Why did they come to your house again if you had paid the bribe and they released you?
A24: Because I was not officially released. After that they wanted to speak to me again so I escaped the country. Many people who have LTTE connections in Sri Lanka will be disappeared.”

14. Meanwhile, C stated in his statement dated 26 September 2024:

“My cousin is a retired police officer. He got to know [of my arrest] through his contacts. He has contacts with the police and politicians. So, he was able to bribe for my release. My wife arranged Rs. 4 million from our savings and gave it to my cousin for my release. I was released on 25 March 2022.”

15. In her witness statement dated 5 August 2025, C’s wife explained:

“We gave Rs. 5 million for my husband’s release. My in laws and I arranged the money. My husband was released on 25 March 2022.”

16. T’s witness statement dated 28 October 2024 explains:

“On 20 March, we got to know from my father’s cousin who informed us that they are asking for a bribe for my father’s release. My mother and grandparents arranged the money and my father was released on 25 March 2022. My father told me about what had happened. My father’s cousin introduced an agent and the agent arranged for my parents to travel to the UK.”

17. The appellants’ case on this point in its most general terms that C was arrested and a bribe was paid for his release. It is said however by Mr Simpson that the evidence reveals material inconsistencies in their respective accounts. For example, who paid the money for C’s release; and how much? C answered in his first asylum interview dated 30 January 2024:

“Q61: After 15 days you said you were released what were the conditions of your release?
A61: My aunt’s son who was in the police he was retired when I was taken my wife contacted my cousin and he advised I will found out who took him - he found out the officer in the situation he paid him money 50 lakhs for me to released - no conditions just my cousin paid the 50 lakhs and I was released.”

18. C claims to have accounted for that discrepancy in the first paragraph of his supplementary witness statement dated 5 August 2025:

“…What I meant to say at Q61 of AIR was that my cousin gave me the money for my release.”

19. But this, says Mr Simpson, only leads to the issues raised in the C’s reasons for refusal letter. There is no explanation for how the cousin could have raised that amount of money so quickly; nor any explanation for why the cousin – only a retired police officer – was sufficiently influential to be able to facilitate the bribe at all. Indeed, with such a sizeable amount of money, it is unlikely that there would be any confusion at all as to its provenance. The inevitable conclusion is that the appellants’ version of events simply does not add up. The judge was right to make the adverse credibility findings that he did: indeed, it was inevitable that he would have to make them.

20. Those credibility findings being safe, says Mr Simpson, there can be no force in grounds 1 or 2. The judge was right to be on high alert as to the authenticity of the court documents given his assessment of the appellants’ account. The material in [51] to [53] is not speculative, but practical; and the thrust of those paragraphs is not to prescribe how such documents should be verified, but only such steps as may be taken. The point is that the appellants, as the judge himself put it in [69], failed to establish that these documents are what they purport to be. Equally, it is said that the judge is appraised of the relevant country guidance at [59]:

“I accept that there is background evidence that Sri Lanka is a corrupt country and that it is said that arrangements can be made for people to travel through airports without being apprehended. That is what the appellant now claims.”

21. The judge was entitled at [60] to consider that, on the appellants’ own account, they were involved in terrorist activities “of the upmost seriousness”; and thereby to conclude that, as the authorities would actively be seeking C, he could not bribe his way out of custody, and then leave the country undetected.

22. Against this, Mr Solomon, for the appellants, says grounds 1 and 2 identify errors that undermine the judge’s credibility assessment. Addressing ground 1, he submits that [51] to [53] are speculative observations which do not take adequate account of the appellants’ explanation of how Mr Pathberiya’s letter came to be obtained, nor adequately assess the letter itself as explaining the court documents.

23. Mr Solomon has today however concentrated his submissions on ground 2: submitting that the fundamental error in the respondent’s approach, repeated in the decision, is at paragraph 9(e) of C’s refusal letter, which reads:

“Furthermore, it is not considered reasonable that you would be released from police custody by the payment of a bribe if you were initially detained on the suspicion of assisting the LTTE a proscribed terrorist organisation.”

24. The footnote in support of this contention is a link to an article entitled: “LTTE is banned by the SL Govt: with immediate effect (archive.org)”.

25. The judge, says Mr Solomon, has failed to apply country guidance as to bribes. Relying on GJ and Others (post-civil war: returnees) Sri Lanka CG [2013] UKUT 00319 (IAC), which then replaced the existing country guidance on Sri Lanka, Mr Solomon argues that the appellants’ fundamental account of being able to secure his prison release from by means of bribery is consistent with that country guidance. He refers me to particular paragraphs in GJ:

“He [the respondent’s counsel] accepted that there were no detention facilities at the airport and that, given the prevalence of bribery and corruption in Sri Lanka, having left Sri Lanka without difficulty was not probative of a lack of adverse interest in an individual. On return, the computers at the airport hold two lists: a "stop" list, comprising names and bio data details of individuals against whom there is either a court order or an outstanding arrest warrant; and a "watch" list of those whose activities the authorities wish to monitor. Those on a "watch" list are not reasonably likely to be detained at the airport. However, those whose names are on a "stop" list will be stopped at the airport and passed to the relevant security service in accordance with the order or warrant.” [§170]

“We take particular account of his view that the seriousness of any charges against an individual are not determinative of whether a bribe can be paid, and that it is possible to leave through the airport even when a person is being actively sought.” [§275]

“Given the substantial sum paid to the agent and the evidence before us on the pervasive bribery and corruption in Sri Lanka, applying the lower standard, we accept this element of the appellant’s account. The appellant’s uncle arranged the agent and paid for his services. The appellant was entitled simply to trust his uncle.” [§394]

26. Mr Solomon continues by observing that KK and RS (sur place activities: risk) Sri Lanka CG [2021] UKUT 130 (IAC) considered GJ and did nothing to change that guidance regarding the ability of individuals to leave Sri Lanka via bribery or agents.

27. Even if there are minor discrepancies in the appellants’ accounts, there is, submits, Mr Solomon, a fundamental failure to deal with the country guidance. He says that [62] underlines the error of law:

“The escape from custody of a person wanted in connection with such offences would have caused concern. It would have been noticed almost immediately. It is difficult to see why the authorities should wait until after the appellant had left Sri Lanka in June before applying to the court for an arrest warrant and to notify the airport authorities of it.”

28. The conclusion, says Mr Solomon, must be that the judge’s findings are against country guidance and background evidence.

29. I do consider that grounds 1 and 2 each disclose a material error of law. Taking ground 2 first, the judge erred by failing to apply country guidance when considering whether the first appellant was able to leave Sri Lanka. The matters of which the appellants were accused by the Sri Lankan authorities are serious. But, firstly, GJ is clear at paragraph 170 that there is a distinction between a ‘stop’ list and a ‘watch’ list. It is the appellants’ case that there was no warrant for C’s arrest until after he left Sri Lanka. Therefore, C would only have been on the ‘watch list’ and “not reasonably likely to be detained at the airport”. Secondly, paragraph 275 of GJ is plain that a bribe would make leaving Sri Lanka possible even if there were a warrant for C’s arrest. The decision does not address either point. Moreover, in making global credibility findings against both appellants at [68], the judge finds in the preceding paragraph that “I do not find it credible that C would be able to apply for a visa and obtain one if he were actively sought by the Sri Lankan authorities for terrorist offences”. That finding is made against country guidance. Beyond being unsafe in itself, that finding undermines the adverse global credibility finding against C, and therefore the finding that C has fabricated his account.

30. This in turn undermines the global credibility made in respect of T. It is plain from [64] that the judge considered T’s credibility separately from C’s:

“T must have been aware that the Sri Lankan authorities were interested in him. His father will have told him. He did not claim asylum when his father claimed asylum. He did not claim asylum until 9 June 2023 when his Tier 2 visa was about to expire. It is a long delay.”

31. However, T’s evidence is essentially reliant on C’s account of how C came to leave Sri Lanka, the same in its assertion that he and C were both sought out by the Sri Lankan authorities in July 2022 and on several occasions since, and identical as to the provenance of the court documents. The findings at [71] and [72] capture this:

[71] “I do not find that C was arrested in Sri Lanka because of his alleged involvement in terrorist offences. I find that his account is fabricated. He is not at risk in Sri Lanka for that reason or for any reason.”

[72] “For the same reason I do not find that T is at risk in Sri Lanka. The account upon which his case is based is fabricated.”

32. While Mr Simpson has sought to persuade me, as I have set out above, that there are discrepancies in the appellants’ account, it is clear that the global adverse credibility finding in respect of T falls with that of C. Both are unsafe.

33. It follows that ground 1 is also made out. The appellants explained the provenance of the court documents: the judge specifically records at [50] that “C said in evidence that his cousin P had instructed the lawyer in Sri Lanka. The lawyer had obtained the documents”. The judge said at [54] he would decide what weight to put on the court documents in the light of all the evidence. At [71] the judge found C’s account to have been fabricated, and T’s at [72]. His assessment of the appellants’ credibility was, for the reasons I have set out above, flawed. C’s appeal skeleton argument dated 30 September 2024 briefly introduces the court documents, and is amplified by C’s further appeal skeleton argument dated 11 August 2025. The latter skeleton drew the judge’s attention to PJ v SSHD [2014] EWCA Civ 1011, a decision clarifying the evidential weight and verification requirements pertaining to foreign documents such as court documents. I quote part of paragraph 29 of that decision:

“The involvement of lawyers does not create the rebuttable presumption that the documents they produce in this situation are reliable. Instead, the jurisprudence referred to above does no more than indicate that the circumstances of particular cases may exceptionally necessitate an element of investigation by the national authorities, in order to provide effective protection against mistreatment under article 3 of the Convention. It is important to stress, however, that this step will frequently not be feasible or it may be unjustified or disproportionate…Furthermore, given the uncertainties that frequently remain following attempts to establish the reliability of documents, if the outcome of any inquiry is likely to be inconclusive this is a highly relevant factor…Documents should not be viewed in isolation and the evidence needs to be considered in its entirety.”

34. The court documents were central to the appellant’s case before the judge. [51] to [53] of the decision do not amount to an adequate consideration of the principles set out in PJ. I consider that the judge’s view at [51] that the appellants’ solicitors could have written directly to the court in Sri Lanka to be speculative. It is clear from [69] that the solicitors’ not having done so was pivotal to his view that they carried little weight. His assessment that neither appellant was a reliable witness, itself unsafe, tarnished his consideration of the evidence as a whole. The judge erred in law by failing to consider relevant case law in rejecting court documents as unreliable.

35. Turning finally to ground 3, both parties rely on JT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2008] EWCA Civ 878, with both the appellant’s grounds of appeal and the respondent’s Rule 24 response expressly quoting Pill LJ at paragraph 21 therein:

“Section 8 can thus be construed as not offending against constitutional principles. It is no more than a reminder to fact-finding tribunals that conduct coming within the categories stated in section 8 shall be taken into account in assessing credibility. If there was a tendency for tribunals simply to ignore these matters when assessing credibility, they were in error. It is necessary to take account of them. However, at one end of the spectrum, there may, unusually, be cases in which conduct of the kind identified in section 8 is held to carry no weight at all in the overall assessment of credibility on the particular facts. I do not consider the section prevents that finding
in an appropriate case. Subject to that, I respectfully agree with Baroness Scotland’s assessment, when introducing the Bill, of the effect of section 8. Where section 8 matters are held to be entitled to some weight, the weight to be given to them is entirely a matter for the fact-finder.”

36. [63] of the decision reads as follows:

“There was a significant delay by each appellant in claiming asylum. C says that he came to the United Kingdom to seek asylum. He fled for his safety having been detained and tortured. He travelled half-way around the world to claim asylum. It would be expected that he would have done so on arrival, that being the purpose of his journey. He did not. He did not claim asylum until his visitor visa had almost expired. It is a long delay on any view.”

37. This is reinforced at [67], where the judge states: “There are significant matters which damage the credibility of each appellant. The most significant is the delay before claiming asylum but there are other matters”.

38. While Mr Simpson has sought to persuade me that [67] on its face refers to there being several “significant matters”, [67] also makes clear that the judge placed considerable weight on what he characterised as a long delay in respect of both appellants. But in any event, although Mr Simpson is right that the weight given to the delay is a matter for the fact-finder, I have already explained why I consider the global credibility findings to be unsafe; and for those same reasons I do consider that the judge erred in giving undue weight to the delay in claiming asylum. To that extent, ground 3 is also made out; it does not, however, add substantively to the errors already discerned under grounds 1 and 2.

Notice of Decision

1. The judge’s decision involved the making of errors of law and is set aside.
2. I do not preserve any findings of the decision.
3. The matter is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard by a different judge.

D. Merrigan

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

17 July 2026