Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004512
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/61524/2023
LP/13091/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 11th of March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HARRIS

Between

RI
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Norman of Counsel
For the Respondent: Mrs Nolan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 27 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a citizen of the Philippines. She appeals with permission against the decision dated 3 April 2025 of First-tier Tribunal Judge N Ahmed (“the FTTJ”) to dismiss her appeal on protection and human rights grounds.
2. The basis of the appellant’s claim is that she is a transgender woman with a well-founded fear of persecution from members of her family in the Philippines and Filipino society. In addition the appellant argues that the respondent’s refusal decision is in breach of her Article 8 rights on private and family life grounds.
3. The respondent accepted that the appellant is a transgender woman and there was previous and ongoing adverse attention from her family due to sexuality but disputed that the appellant demonstrated she was at real risk on return to the Philippines. The respondent also argued that there was sufficient state protection and reasonable internal relocation available to the appellant. Under Article 8 the respondent submitted that there was no breach of Article 8 in her decision.
4. The FFTJ found that the appellant did not discharge the burden of proof in respect of having a well-founded fear of persecution from her family or from Filipino society in general. Further, the judge founder there was no breach of Article 8 in the refusal decision of the respondent.
The Grounds of Appeal
5. The appellant raises 4 grounds of appeal. In summary, these were:
(i) The FTTJ failed to give proper consideration to evidence from the appellant before the First-tier Tribunal regarding her claimed fear of her family and from Filipino society in general.
(ii) The FTTJ erred when considering issues arising under HJ (Iran) [2010] UKSC 31.
(iii) The FTTJ failed to have proper regard to evidence regarding sufficiency of protection and internal relocation for a trans woman in the Philippines.
(iv) The FTTJ erred when assessing Article 8 on family life grounds regarding the appellant and her partner.
Is there a material error of law requiring me to set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal?
6. Ms Norman for the appellant, who did not draft the grounds of appeal, at times focussed in her submissions on aspects of the grounds concerning what was said to be a failure to distinguish between the appellant’s problems in the Philippines being on the basis of sexuality and her current fear being based on her gender as a trans woman.
7. In response to this approach by Ms Norman, Mrs Nolan submitted that here Ms Norman was seeking to argue matters not actually contained in the existing grounds of appeal.
8. I have carefully considered the submission made here by Mrs Nolan. I have concluded that the submissions made before me by Ms Norman are within the scope of the grounds of appeal for which permission was granted.
9. Essentially, the appellant in the grounds, as drafted, raises various complaints about findings made by the FTTJ which do not engage with central parts of the appellant’s case. As identified in the grounds of appeal at paragraph 4 the issues before the FTTJ concerning that case flowed from the undisputed fact of the appellant being a transgender woman. See also paragraphs 1 and 14 of the appellant’s skeleton argument which was before the First-tier Tribunal.
10. I turn to consider the specific grounds. I am not persuaded that all the points raised in the somewhat diffuse grounds of appeal brought by the appellant have merit but I do note the following.
Ground 1
11. This ground complains about the FTTJ’s findings regarding both claimed actors of persecution: firstly, among her family and, secondly, among Filipino society.
The FTTJ’s consideration of whether fear of family well founded
12. Ms Norman reiterated the submission made in paragraph 5 of the grounds of appeal that the FTTJ erred when rejecting the appellant’s claim that threats from her family were “very much unresolved”. The error is said to spring from the respondent not formally challenging this piece of evidence from the appellant’s supplementary witness statement.
13. In the context of this not being a matter specifically raised as being in issue, Ms Norman argues that the FTTJ erred by failing to give the appellant the opportunity to respond or address in evidence or submissions the concerns which the judge had.
14. The respondent’s argument is as set out in the Rule 24 response. The FTTJ expressly noted the claim that threats from the family were unresolved and gave reasons open to make on the evidence about whether the threats were continuing and genuine.
15. I can see in the reasons for refusal letter that there are specific criticisms by the respondent about parts of the appellant’s evidence concerning some types of behaviour from the family as not amounting to threatening behaviour. Yet I observe that, nevertheless, the respondent expressly accepted in the reasons for refusal letter that there were threats from family that had not just occurred previously but were ongoing. Nor has the respondent suggested that she changed her position on this at the appeal hearing, whether in cross-examination or submissions.
16. The acceptance of threats being ongoing is consistent with the claim of the threats being unresolved. The FTTJ provided reasons in paragraphs 17 and 18 of the decision for finding it not being demonstrated that the threats from family were ongoing or unresolved. However, I consider that when making those findings the FTTJ did not engage with:
(i) the respondent accepting there were ongoing threats, and
(ii) the respondent not challenging at the hearing what was said by the appellant in her supplementary witness statement about the threats being unresolved.
It can be noted that the judge does not record the respondent as challenging this part of the appellant’s claim.
17. I am satisfied that in such circumstances fairness requires a judge to alert an appellant if that judge has concerns over a matter otherwise said not to be in dispute between the parties.
18. This did not happen in this appeal and its hearing. Consequently, I am satisfied that the FTTJ did err when assessing this part of the appellant’s claim. The findings made rejecting this part of the appellant’s case are central to the conclusion that the appellant does not have a well founded fear of persecution from family in the Philippines. Accordingly, I am satisfied that here the appellant establishes there is a material error of law.
The FTTJ’s consideration of societal persecution
19. Moving on to the FTTJ’s consideration of whether it is reasonably likely that the appellant would be persecuted by actors among Filipino society in general, this is primarily contained in paragraph 19 of the decision.
20. The respondent submits the FTTJ’s finding that the claimed persecution is not demonstrated is based on a proper analysis of the country evidence.
21. I accept that the respondent is able to point to the FTTJ making reference at the outset of the paragraph to assessing attitudes towards transgender people in the Philippines as well as the judge stating he has reviewed the “objective evidence submitted by the appellant and referred to by the respondent in the refusal letter”. However, I consider there is weight to the appellant’s submission that the FTTJ does not engage with the core part of the appellant’s claim that she is now at real risk because of her gender as a trans woman.
22. The appellant is correct to point out that the FTTJ’s conclusion, given at the start of paragraph 19, is that it is not demonstrated that that the appellant would be persecuted in the Philippines on the basis of her sexuality. This frames the consideration of the country evidence then referenced by the FTTJ. I consider this raises that the FTTJ has not considered the issue of risk of serious harm faced by a trans woman because of her gender.
23. The respondent raised in submissions that paragraph 6 of the appellant’s own skeleton argument refers to problems faced because of sexuality. I have already commented about how the skeleton argument could have been better articulated. Yet , in fairness, when one reads paragraph 6 of the skeleton argument, the reference is to what is said by the respondent about the appellant’s case in the reasons for refusal letter. Moreover, I consider the case of the appellant being centred on being a transgender woman can be seen to be expressly set out in the written submissions of paragraphs 14 and 18 of the skeleton argument.
24. Ms Norman in her submissions draws attention to there being no express assessment of country background evidence, supportive of the claim, contained in the appellant’s bundle: see, for example, the 2015 report Violence against Lesbians, Bisexual women and trans people in the Philippines which, in summary, describes LBT people in the Philippines as “extremely vulnerable to various manifestations of violence” and the Philippine government not taking sufficient action to combat; see also the 2021 Full Project report “I’m scared every damn day” regarding murders of transgender and non-binary gender individuals since 2010.
25. The respondent is correct to say that the appellant’s skeleton does not makes specific reference to this material and that there is no obligation on a judge to trawl through the papers in an appeal. However, as in this instance the FTTJ does expressly state he has reviewed all the country evidence, it follows it does fall to be assessed. I acknowledge that it may be open to a judge to prefer material relied upon by the respondent to that from an appellant but, if so, the appellant’s material needs to be referenced and express reasons given for that preference. This is particularly so where there is reliance by the FTTJ in the last sentence of paragraph 19 on there being an absence of data to support the appellant’s claim to be at real risk.
26. Such an approach was not carried out by the FTTJ. This adds to the concern that that the FTTJ has not properly engaged with the issued of risk of serious harm faced by a trans woman.
27. For the reasons given above, I am satisfied that the FTTJ decision does not show a proper engagement with a core issue of the appeal concerning the real risk said to be face by the appellant because of her gender. I am satisfied this too amounts to a material error of law.
Ground 2
28. The ground concerns the findings of the FTTJ in paragraph 21 of the decision as regards HJ Iran issues.
29. The FTTJ notes the appellant in examination in chief “not going as far as to say” she would fear persecution if dressed in female clothing. However, it is to be also noted that the appellant’s examination in chief consisted of her witness statement evidence as well as oral evidence. I consider there is weight to the submission of the appellant in the grounds that the appellant had already mentioned in her first witness statement her fear of persecution as a transgender woman on return to the Philippines (see for example paragraphs 18 and 19 of that statement). This fear is further detailed in the supplementary witness statement. As this already formed part of her evidence before the FTTJ, she was not required necessarily to repeat this in examination in chief. I am satisfied there is an error here by the FTTJ.
30. I consider the respondent is right to point out that, in addition to the FTTJ recording that the appellant did not say in oral evidence that she would conceal her identity on return to the Philippines, the appellant does not state this in her written evidence. However, applying HJ Iran principles, even if a judge finds there would not be concealment of gender, that still leaves for consideration the situation of the appellant being open about her gender on return to the Philippines. The FTTJ does not consider this.
31. I consider the errors concern a central part of the appellant’s claim and are material.
Ground 3
32. This ground concerns findings made by the FTTJ in paragraphs 19 and 20 of the decision.
33. The respondent submits that the FTTJ makes findings based on a reasoned assessment of the country background evidence. However, I consider that, as under Ground 1, from what the FTTJ says in paragraph 19, the consideration of issues relating to whether:
(i) there is sufficiency of protection for the appellant, and
(ii) internal relocation arises as an issue because any risk does not extend throughout the Philippines
is focussed on sexuality rather than gender and does not engage with background evidence supportive of the appellant’s claim.
34. For similar reasons to those under Ground 1, I am satisfied that the FTTJ has here materially erred in law.
Ground 4
35. This concerns the Article 8 findings of the FTTJ, which are said not to be adequately reasoned. The central complaint is that identified in paragraph 14 of the grounds of appeal: the FTTJ did not give proper consideration to the appellant’s case on insurmountable obstacles to family life continuing between the appellant and her partner.
36. While the respondent submits that there is suitable reasoning provided by the judge for all the Article 8 findings made between paragraphs 30 to 38 of the decision, including in respect of the application of statutory considerations under s117B Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, this does not address that the approach of the appellant is somewhat muddled.
37. The FTTJ begins by considering general proportionality issues under s.117B of the 2002 Act in paragraphs 30 to 33 before appearing to switch in paragraph 34 to a consideration of the appellant’s case under Appendix FM. However, if an appellant satisfies the Immigration Rules, wider considerations of proportionality, such as under s.117B, are not relevant to finding a decision by the respondent is disproportionate: TZ (Pakistan) [2018] EWCA Civ 1109: meeting the Rules suffices.
38. As regards the assessment under the Rules in paragraph 34 of the decision, I consider Ms Norman is right to submit there is no distinct consideration by the FTTJ, as one might expect, of the very significant obstacles issue arising under Paragraph 276ADE(i)(vi) of the Rules: see the reasons for refusal letter. Yet this is not actually complained about in the appellant’s fourth ground of appeal which rather concerns the issue of insurmountable obstacles for family life to be pursued outside of the UK.
39. However, consideration of the case under the Rules also included determining whether the appellant satisfied the relevant requirements of Section R-LTRP of Appendix FM to the Immigration Rules for leave to remain as a partner.
40. It appears the FTTJ found no problem on the evidence in the appeal with the appellant and her partner satisfying the relevant relationship requirements. There is no error by the FTTJ in going on to find that the appellant did not satisfy the applicable immigration status, financial and language requirements under Appendix FM. However, in these circumstances, it falls to a judge to consider Paragraph EX.1 under which the issue arises of insurmountable obstacles to the pursuit of family life outside the UK. It is to be noted that this issue is not affected by the matter of whether or not it is open to an appellant to make an entry clearance from outside the UK to rejoin the partner here.
41. The FTTJ makes no refence to considering Paragraph EX.1 or the insurmountable obstacle test before finding the appellant does not satisfy the Rules. Nor is there a consideration of this issue outside of the Rules. This is in error. The error is compounded by the FTTJ failing to engage with the scenario, relied upon by the appellant, of she and her partner pursuing family life openly as a couple in the Philippines, which includes problems said to be distinctly faced by the partner as someone in an open family life relationship with a trans woman.
42. As these matters are central to the claim of the appellant, I find that the FTTJ has made material errors of law when considering Article 8.
Conclusion
43. Given the material errors of law made by the FTTJ in her Article 8 assessment, I find that the decision of the FTTJ should be set aside and remade.
Remaking
44. Normally, it is for this Tribunal to remake the decision even if further findings of fact are to be made. However, in this case I agree with the submissions from both the parties that the appeal should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing because the remaking of the decision may involve credibility findings relevant to current risk.
45. The respondent may wish to assist the First-tier Tribunal at the rehearing on one matter by clarifying what is in dispute (if at all) about the appellant’s claim that, as a transgender woman, she is currently at real risk of being targeted for serious harm by family members, given the acceptance in the reasons for refusal letter of there being “previous and ongoing (my emphasis) threats” from the appellant’s family because of her “sexuality”. If the respondent’s case is primarily that the appellant’s fear of persecution in the Philippines is not well founded because of sufficiency of state protection and/or internal relocation, it would assist to have that clarified.

Notice of Decision
The decision dated 3 April 2025 contains material errors of law. I set aside that decision and direct that the appeal be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing before any judge except for Judge N Ahmed.

M Harris

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11 March 2026