Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004514
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/55288/2024
LH/00618/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

12th June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE OWENS

Between

The Secretary of State for the Home Office
Appellant
and

Chuanying Xie
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Lawson, Senior Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Mr Soloman, Counsel, instructed by Corbin & Hassan Solicitors

Heard at Cardiff Civil Justice Centre on 12 March 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is an appeal by the Secretary of State against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Boyes “the judge” sent on 23 June 2025 allowing Mrs Xie’s appeal against the decision dated 24 April 2024 to refuse her human rights claim.
2. Permission to appeal was granted by a judge of the Upper Tribunal on 31 October 2025.
Background
3. Mrs Xie is a national of the Republic of China born on 28 March 1980. She originally entered the UK on a spouse visa on 15 December 2011. She was granted leave to remain until 26 June 2020. Her spouse is a British citizen and she has four children, three of whom are British.
4. On 23 April 2019 she was convicted of the offences of fraudulent evasion of VAT, being knowingly concerned in the fraudulent evasion of income tax and of the concealment of criminal property. On 3 May 2019 she was sentenced to a total of 33 months’ imprisonment. On 29 May 2019 Mrs Xie was notified of a decision to make a deportation order and in response she made an application for leave to remain on the basis of her family and private life. The refusal of the human rights claim was on 24 April 2024. The appeal against that decision was allowed by First-tier Tribunal Boyes on 23 June 2025. This is the decision under appeal.
5. Mrs Xie’s case was that she is a “medium” offender, Exception 2 applies to her because it would be “unduly harsh” for her children to remain in the UK without her, the respondent having accepted that it would be unduly harsh for the children to relocate to China with her.
6. The Secretary of State’s position was that it would not be “unduly harsh” for the children to remain in the UK without their mother.
The decision of the judge
7. The judge had sight of extensive evidence in relation to the family including statements from Mrs Xie, her husband, older daughter and family friend as well as school reports and social worker reports. The judge also heard evidence from the witnesses. The judge accepted the entirety of the evidence before him. The judge decided that it would be unduly harsh on the children to remain in the UK without their mother Mrs Xie.
Grounds of appeal
8. The grounds of appeal assert the following:
Ground 1 - Material misdirection of law
When considering if the effect of Mrs Xie’s deportation would be unduly harsh on the children the judge failed to properly apply the “unduly harsh” test as set out in s 117C(5) and the “considerably more elevated nature this requires as confirmed in HA (Iraq) [2020] EWCA Civ 1176. The circumstances referred to by the judge in reaching his findings even if taken completely, fail to meet the elevated threshold. In HA the formulation in MK (Sierra Leone) [2015] INLR 563 was approved. It is submitted that the factors that the judge took into account are generic and do not satisfy the threshold.
Ground 2 – Failure to give adequate reasons
The judge failed to give adequate reasons for his finding that the unduly harsh test was met. The respondent does not understand why they lost. There are no clear reasons why the children’s father cannot look after them. The conclusion that there would be a complete fracture in the family relationship is inadequately reasoned.

Submissions
9. Both representatives made submissions which I refer to in my discussion below.
Discussion
10. The Court of Appeal has recognised that the First-tier Tribunal is a specialist fact-finding tribunal, and the Upper Tribunal is required to exercise judicial restraint in its oversight of its reasoning: In Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201; [2024] 1 W.L.R. 4055 (‘Ullah’) Green LJ, with whom Lewison and Andrews LJJ agreed, stated at [26]:
“Sections 11 and 12 TCEA 2007 Act restricts the UT’s jurisdiction to errors of law. It is settled that:
i. the FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal. The UT should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678 at paragraph [30];
ii. where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account: e.g. MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49 at paragraph [45];
iii. when it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out: see R (Jones) v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19 at paragraph [25];
iv. the issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 at paragraph [27];
v. judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they had failed to do so: see AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1296 at paragraph [34];
vi. it is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law: see MM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 10 at paragraph [107].”
Material misdirection of law/ In adequate reasons
11. I start firstly with the principle that as an experienced judge, the judge could be expected to adhere to self-direction in accordance with the principles set out by Lady Hale at [30] in AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 and would be aware of the relevant authorities in line with Popplewell LJ in AA (Nigeria) v SSHD [202] EWCA Civ 1296.
12. In this appeal the judge manifestly directed himself appropriately and properly to the relevant authorities. At [15] the judge identified that the “principal controversial” issue is whether it would be unduly harsh for the children to remain in the UK if Mrs Xie was deported to China leaving her children in the UK.
13. At [127] to [131] the judge set out the statutory framework in respect of the deportation of foreign criminals which can be found at 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.
14. At [137] the judge stated;
“As long as the relevant tribunal recognises that the “unduly harsh “ test involves an elevated threshold, it is then for the Tribunal to make an informed assessment of the effect of deportation on the qualifying child or partner and to make a judgement as to whether that elevated standard has been met on the facts and circumstances of the case before it”.
15. The judge was clearly aware that there was an elevated threshold and directed himself appropriately. I am not satisfied that the judge misdirected himself in law in respect of the threshold.
16. Ground 1 also asserts that the judge referred to generic factors only and that these factors do not meet the threshold. Ground 2 asserts that the reasoning was inadequate. These grounds overlap.
17. At [110] the judge referred to the principles in HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 noting that
“The Supreme court provided important guidance on the key test in deportation cases. The court confirmed that when assessing if deportation would be “unduly harsh” on a child or partner there should not be a comparison to a hypothetical “typical case “instead the Tribunal should make an informed assessment based on the specific facts.”
18. I refer to the principle that an appeal court should be slow to interfere with the decision of court below who will have had sight of the “sea” of evidence before him. The grounds do not seek to challenge any of the judge’s individual factual findings in respect of Mrs Xie’s and her family’s circumstances. In this appeal there was a large amount of evidence before the judge including evidence from the children, social workers, independent social workers and head teacher all of which addressed the impact of deportation of their mother on the children. The judge accepted and gave considerable weight to the moving evidence of the oldest child which was set out at [141] to [163]. This attested to the incredibly strong bonds between Mrs Xie and her children and the level of support given by her to the children.
19. At [139] the judge accepted the expert evidence which included;
I. The social worker’s opinion about the potential impact that the absence of the children’s mother would have on her young children including the prospects of experiencing “Adverse Childhood Experiences (ACE) for instance going to prison, high risk drinking, smoking, dug taking, committing violence”.
II. The headteacher’s view that the absence of the mother would result in “irrevocable emotional distress for her children who are already struggling with the fear of losing the most important person in their lives. The children would face the traumatic loss of their mother’s presence and this could lead to long lasting effects on their mental health, academic performance and overall development” [106].
III. During their mother’s period in prison the children showed signs of suffering bereavement and loss (social worker’s email) [57].
IV. Mrs Xie provides the family with the necessary routine, stability, encouragement, and support for [the children] to thrive [62]
V. The social worker’s opinion that if the children are unable to see their mother the detrimental effect on their emotional wellbeing may start to affect other areas of their life such as education social interaction and identity development [57].
VI. The Bristol social services deputy team manger’s view that Mrs Xie’s deportation would not be in the best interests of the children [109].
20. The expert opinion was not challenged by the respondent.
21. The judge found the following facts:
(a) The three younger children are 11 year old twins and a 12 year old daughter.
(b) The Republic of China does not permit dual nationality. In order to obtain Chinese nationality the children would need to relinquish British nationality. Mrs Xie would not be able to return to the UK for at least ten years.
(c) The mother is the children’s primary caregiver. She cooks for them, washes their clothes, prepares their clothes, wakes them up and gets them ready for school. She makes sure they do their homework on time, attends parents’ meetings and ensure that they are up to date with their studies. She takes them to the GP, dentist and hospital. She monitors their computer and device usage and make sure they eat healthy food.
(d) The children have a close emotional and incredibly strong loving bond with their mother and are fully dependent on her.
(e) The children’s father works full time for long hours in a restaurant to provide financially for the family. He has one day off a week and does the shopping then. He provides the sole financial income for the family. He also has some health problems. He would not be able to meet the emotional needs of his children by himself particularly that of his daughters.
(f) The eldest child would be overwhelmed by looking after her siblings.
(g) The children felt stigmatised when their mother was in prison and they were under the supervision of social services.
(h) There would be an extremely negative effect on the children were their mother to be deported. It would be damaging on the children.
(i) If the children were separated from their mother they would suffer emotional harm. They would be impacted severely in terms of their stability and their wellbeing. The children sit on the cusp of adolescence with all the emotional difficulties that that raises.
(j) The children need hands-on care and nurturing, especially by their primary carer, their mother.
22. None of these factual findings have been challenged. The judge’s finding that the deportation of their mother to China would be unduly harsh on the children, was manifestly based on an individual assessment of the family circumstances, took into account the profound impact of the deportation on these particular children, and rationally concluded that the impact on them reached the elevated threshold. The reasons given were clear and unambiguously adequate and the finding does not reach the high threshold of perversity.
23. I cannot identify an error in the judge’s reasoning. The grounds amount to a disagreement with the decision.
24. In this respect I take into account the words of Reed LJ in Henderson v Foxworth Investments Ltd [2014] UKSC 41 at [62];
“It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appellate court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.”
Conclusion
25. It follows that none of the Secretary of State’s grounds of appeal are made out and the Secretary of State’s appeal is dismissed.
Decision
26. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal allowing the appeal is upheld.

R J Owens
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

27 May 2026