Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004533
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/53941/2024
LH/06535/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 21 July 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KHAN

Between

MB
(ANONYMITY Direction MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Heard at Field House on 5 June 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity because the case involves consideration of sensitive issues. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr A. Alam, Counsel instructed by Law Dale Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr M. Parvar, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

DECISION AND REASONS
INTRODUCTION
1. This is a decision of the Upper Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (‘the Upper Tribunal’). The Upper Tribunal is an independent decision-making body with powers given to it by an Act of Parliament. This decision is made in the context of the Upper Tribunal’s role in considering statutory appeals from decisions made by the First-tier Tribunal (Immigration and Asylum Chamber) (‘the First-tier Tribunal’).
2. The appellant (MB), a national of Bangladesh, appealed a decision of the respondent (‘SSHD’) dated 25 March 2024 to refuse her human rights claim dated 26 December 2023, made in the form of an application for leave to remain in the United Kingdom. The appellant lodged an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal under section 82 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (‘NIAA 2002’). Judge Thorne of the First-tier Tribunal (‘FTTJ’) dismissed the appellant’s human rights claim in a decision dated 29 July 2025.
3. The losing party in an appeal before the First-tier Tribunal can apply for permission to appeal to the Upper Tribunal. If permission is granted, the Upper Tribunal will consider the legal arguments put forward by both sides in the appeal. The Upper Tribunal only has power to set aside a decision of the First-tier Tribunal if it concludes that the arguments put forward by the party that applied to appeal show that the decision involved the making of an error of law: see section 12 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (‘TCEA 2007’).
4. If the Upper Tribunal finds that a decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error of law, the First-tier Tribunal decision will stand. If a decision of the First-tier Tribunal is found to involve the making of an error of law the Upper Tribunal has power to set aside the decision. The Upper Tribunal will then decide whether it will retain the case and remake the decision or whether the appeal might need to be remitted to be reheard in the First-tier Tribunal.
5. The appellant appealed the First-tier Tribunal decision to the Upper Tribunal on the basis of an error of law. In a decision sealed on 28 January 2026, the Upper Tribunal found that the First-tier Tribunal decision did involve the making of an error of law in respect of two of the five grounds of appeal advanced by the appellant.
6. In this regard, the Upper Tribunal was satisfied that the First-tier Tribunal made an error of law in failing to: (i) take into account as a factor within the assessment of very significant obstacles and proportionality that the appellant was a victim of very serious domestic abuse, and (ii) take into account the Caguitla argument (see: Caguitla Philippines [2023] UKUT 116 IAC at [197]-[199]) as a factor in the assessment of proportionality. In short, the Caguitla argument was that it weighed (or was capable of weighing) in the appellant’s favour in the assessment of proportionality that she would have been eligible for indefinite leave to remain under Appendix Victim Domestic Violence of the Immigration Rules but for the fact that she entered the UK as a student, and met her husband afterwards, rather then having entered as his spouse.
7. Having found a material error of law, the Upper Tribunal set aside the First-tier Tribunal decision and retained the appeal, preserving paragraphs [34]-[35] for a remaking hearing.
8. The chronology of this appeal and the outcomes of the previous hearings are set out in the error of law decision dated 28 January 2026 and need no repetition.
9. The remaking hearing originally commenced on 30 March 2026 but had to be adjourned in order to secure the attendance of an interpreter as it became apparent once the appellant started giving her live evidence that she did not fully understand the English language.

Anonymity
10. An anonymity direction was made previously in connection with the error of law hearing and is continued here on the same basis as previously granted.
THE REMAKING HEARING
11. The following two issues are agreed by the parties as forming the basis of the remaking hearing before the Upper Tribunal:
(i) Whether there would be very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration in Bangladesh for the purposes of section 5.1(b) of Appendix Private Life of the Immigration Rules;
(ii) Whether the Appellant’s removal would be disproportionate under Article 8 ECHR assessed outside the Immigration Rules.
Preserved findings
12. The preserved findings, as set out in the UT decision at [34]-[35] states:
At [34] “…the Judge gave the following reasons for finding that the Appellant would not be at risk of ill-treatment on return as a result of her support and activities for the JCD and the BNP: (1) there was a lack of evidence that she was ever associated with the BNP; (2) there was a lack of evidence that any such association would put her at risk now; and (3) the Appellant had failed to claim asylum (and being depressed was not a reasonable explanation for this’.
At [35] “..In my view the Judge’s reasons on this matter were intelligible and adequate and enable the reader to understand why the matter was decided as it was. In short, the Judge considered that the credibility of this element of the appellant’s account was fatally undermined by the following factors: (1) her account was lacking in detail; (2) she had failed properly to explain why she would be at risk now in any event (in which context it is noted that the Awami League government had fallen by the time of the appellant’s First-tier Tribunal hearing on 17 June 2025…); (3) she had failed to raise this issue via an asylum claim……’
13. I have considered the First-tier Tribunal decision and the documentation, the grounds of appeal, the decision of Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Hoshi dated 28 January 2026, the skeleton arguments submitted for this hearing and the submissions made before coming to a decision in this appeal. It is not necessary to summarise the oral submissions because they are a matter of record, but I will refer to any relevant arguments in the decision.
14. The hearing was attended by representatives for both parties, as above. Both representatives made submissions and the conclusions below reflect those arguments and submissions, where necessary.
15. At the end of the hearing, I reserved the decision and now give my reasons below.
DECISION AND REASONS
16. As one of the grounds of appeal relates to section 5.1 (b) of Appendix Private Life (PL) of the Immigration Rules, I set this out in full below and the relevant case law.
PL .5.1 (b) states ‘where an applicant has not been continuously resident in the UK for more than 20 years, the decision maker must be satisfied there would be very significant obstacles to the applicant’s integration into the country where they would have to live if required to leave the UK’.
17. In the decision of Secretary of State v Kamara [2016] EWCA Civ 813 the Court of Appeal stated at [14] ‘The idea of ‘integration’ calls for a broad evaluative judgement to be made as to whether the individual will be enough of an insider in understanding how life in the society in that other country is carried on and the capacity to participate in it, so as to have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted there, to be able to operate on a day to day basis in that society and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to the individuals private or family life’.
18. In Parveen v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 932 Court of Appeal considered what was meant by ‘very significant obstacles’. The Court confirmed that the words ‘very significant’ connote an ‘elevated threshold’ and the test will not be met by ’mere inconvenience or upheaval’. The Court further stated, ‘The task of the Secretary of State, or the Tribunal in any given case is simply to assess the obstacles to integration relied on, whether characterised as hardship or difficulty or anything else, and to decide whether they regard them as ‘very significant’.
Whether there would be very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s integration in Bangladesh for the purposes of section 5.1(b) Appendix Private Life of the Immigration Rules
19. The first issue I turn to consider is whether there would be very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration in Bangladesh for the purposes of section 5.1(b) of Appendix Private Life of the Immigration Rules.
20. The appellant gave live evidence at the hearing. She relied in-chief on her updated witness statement dated 16 February 2026. In summary, her evidence was that she arrived in the UK as a student with entry clearance on 27 June 2022. On 21 December 2023, the appellant married a British national of Bengali heritage. The appellant subsequently applied for leave as the spouse of a settled person and on her private life. The application was refused by the respondent but since the application, the appellant said that her relationship had broken down as result of domestic violence. As of the date of the witness statement, the appellant said she left her marital home and was living between her sister’s house and her uncle in the UK. As a result of the domestic violence, she obtained a non-molestation against her husband which remains in force.
21. The appellant confirmed that no criminal proceedings had yet commenced against her ex-husband and the Crown Prosecution Service had not been in contact with her to provide a witness statement. In this context, I was referred to a letter dated 22 April 2025 from the Metropolitan Police addressed to the appellant which confirmed that a criminal investigation had been opened and was ongoing in respect of the appellant’s husband. The letter advised the appellant to extend the non-molestation order to protect herself because the outcome could take time, with ‘another several months’ if the matter progressed to the Crown Prosecution Service.
22. The appellant explained that she had issued civil proceedings for divorce on 7 May 2026 and produced a copy of the Notice of Proceedings issued by the court as evidence. She said once the civil marriage was through, she would undertake the Islamic divorce. Her evidence then changed as she stated that she considered herself already divorced under Islamic law because of the circumstances that led to her leaving her husband. In this regard, she had viewed on social media (Tik Tok) post by a well-respected Imam who said that women suffering from their husbands in circumstances like the appellant are treated under sharia law as no longer being married.
23. The appellant was asked if she had checked the information with a solicitor. She was unable to confirm that she had done so, and offered no explanation, save to say that she was a Muslim, and believed the Imam because he was a scholar. When it was pointed out to the appellant that she had only recently issued civil divorce proceedings since the adjourned hearing on 30 March 2026, again she gave no response, save to state that a friend had given her the money for the divorce proceedings. The appellant was also asked why her uncle, sister or friend who knew her situation well had not provided witness statements on her behalf, given their direct involvement in her situation. The appellant provided no explanation.
24. The appellant said that her sister who lived in the UK no longer spoke to her, and that she lived only with her uncle and his family. Despite her updated witness statement stating that she lived between her uncle and her sister’s homes, she had in fact not lived with her sister since 15 September 2025. When it was pointed out that her live evidence contradicted her earlier updated witness statement, she had no explanation.
25. The appellant was next asked about her life in Bangladesh. She stated that prior to coming to the UK she lived with her parents in Bangladesh. It was put to her that she must therefore have a strong and loving relationship with her parents. She responded that her parents did not want her any longer because of her divorce. At this point, the appellant referred to new evidence admitted before the Upper Tribunal pursuant to rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 that was not previously before the First-tier Tribunal comprising an Affidavit made by the appellant’s father, a complaint filed by him at the local police station, and two media articles.
26. I have reviewed the newly admitted documentary evidence (‘the new documentation’). The complaint dated 12 August 2025 (filed for inclusion in the ‘General Diary’) appears to register with the local police station threats of violence allegedly made by the appellant’s husband’s family to her parents living in Bangladesh.
27. The complaint states that the threats are the result of the appellant leaving her husband and that the husband’s family have threatened to kill the appellant if she returns to Bangladesh unless she resumes her conjugal family life with her husband. The Affidavit dated 15 September 2025 refers to damage caused to the husband’s family honour by the appellant leaving him. The Affidavit declares that the appellant is now disowned by her family in Bangladesh with all family ties severed. The last two documents are media articles. One article dated 13 August 2025, reports on the complaint filed at the local police station, and the second article dated 16 September 2025, reports on the announcement of the severance of parental and family ties with the appellant.
28. The appellant said that the new documentation was forwarded to her via her sister who received it from their father and that after her sister passed on the documentation, her sister informed her that she did not want anything more to do with her.
29. Mr Parvar on behalf of the respondent put to the appellant that the new documentation actually supported her immigration case to remain in the UK, and, if her father had really disowned her then why would he send the papers to the UK to help her case. The appellant denied that it helped her case. Her parents felt insulted in society because of her conduct and wanted her to return to her husband. The appellant was asked if your father wanted you to return to your husband, then why would he make allegations against your husband’s family in the documentation. The appellant replied that her family considered that she had brought shame on them.
30. The appellant said that if she was allowed to remain in the UK she wanted to work and help people like her. She had not done any research about working in Bangladesh but could not return because of her personal security. She confirmed that she was on prescribed medication and had undertaken ‘Talking therapies’ for a while.
31. Mr Parvar raised several points in relation to the appellant’s evidence. Firstly, he questioned whether the appellant was really a victim of domestic violence. In support of this assertion, he relied on the unexplained delay in filing for divorce which he argued was only done in consequence of the adjourned hearing when the issue of marriage had been raised. As to the Islamic marriage, he said it was not credible that the appellant would need to see out the civil marriage in order to finish the Islamic marriage under sharia law. Further, it was astonishing that the appellant believed what she heard on Tik Tok without fully checking it.
32. The respondent also relied on the absence of any witness statements from the appellant’s uncle, sister or female friend who had lent the appellant money to issue the divorce proceedings. Mr Parvar stated that all of these individuals will have known about the domestic abuse but none of them had stepped forward to provide evidence to support the appellant.
33. In relation to the appellant’s assertion that she stopped speaking to her sister since September 2025, Mr Parvar submitted that this was a ‘lie’ given that the appellant had updated her witness statement. He said it was not plausible that she could have forgotten such an important matter at the time of making her updated statement when she was now able to recall that the relationship had broken down.
34. I have carefully considered the question of whether the appellant is a victim of domestic abuse and the submissions made. I find on the balance of probabilities that the objective evidence points strongly to the appellant being a victim of domestic abuse. I have reached this conclusion for the reasons that follow.
35. While I accept that it would have been helpful to the appellant’s case to have secured witness statements from her family and the female friend in the UK, the evidence of a non-molestation order being granted on 5 June 2024, and extended by consent on 27 January 2026 by the Family Court of East London is powerful objective evidence consistent with the Family Court being satisfied that protective measures were required on account of domestic abuse. I place strong weight on the existence of the non-molestation order and its subsequent extension.
36. In addition, to the non-molestation order, I have reviewed a GP letter dated 09 January 2026 which states that the appellant reported that her ex-husband abused her mentally and physically. The GP letter confirms that the appellant is on prescribed medication. I have also reviewed documentation from various organisations which support victims of domestic violence that have been approached by the appellant for assistance. The letter from ‘Ashiana’ dated 13 June 2024, mentions that the appellant was referred to them by the Metropolitan Police as a result of the appellant being subjected to domestic violence. There is another letter from ‘Solace’ which confirms that the appellant approached them for support.
37. I find the letters from the GP and the Metropolitan Police, taken with the correspondence from domestic abuse organisations to be wholly consistent with the non-molestation order being granted. In this regard, the absence of any criminal proceedings being initiated against the appellant’s husband does not negate the evidence that the appellant is more likely than not to be a victim of domestic abuse.
38. Further, while I note at this hearing that the respondent has questioned the veracity of the appellant’s claim to be a victim of domestic abuse, this was not the respondent’s position at the error of law hearing before Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Joshi. The decision records at [20] that Mr Ojo who represented the respondent stated, ‘that the abuse was never disputed by the respondent’. It is therefore curious that the respondent has taken a different stance at this hearing when the evidence has not changed on this issue. That said, the conclusion I have reached on the objective evidence before me, namely, that the appellant is more likely than not to be a victim of domestic abuse clearly accords with the respondent’s original position.
39. The respondent also takes issue with the new documentation disowning the appellant. As mentioned earlier, it is argued that the documentation actually supports the appellant’s immigration case to remain in the UK. In short, Mr Parvar asserts that the documentary evidence reveals the incoherence of the appellant’s case because it is very likely the appellant and her parents have a strong relationship and that the severance of family ties is a fabrication.
40. I have carefully considered the arguments made by Mr Parvar. I note the respondent does not submit that the documents themselves are fabricated but rather challenges the veracity of the narrow issue to which they pertain, namely, whether the appellant has in fact been disowned by her family, which is said to be a ‘fabrication’. For the reasons that follow, I consider that the appellant has established on the balance of probabilities that she has been disowned.
41. The objective evidence demonstrates that the appellant is recognised as a victim of abuse and this was the reason she left her husband and secured a court order. In this context, the respondent does not appear to be challenging the wider content of the complaint or the supporting affidavit that the appellant’s parents in Bangladesh have been the subject of ongoing threats from the husband’s family, that threats have been made to kill the appellant if she returns to Bangladesh, or that the appellant’s parents should force her to resume conjugal family life with her husband. The respondent’s attack appears to relate only to the part of the documents where the appellant’s parents disown her and sever all family ties.
42. I note that the two media articles are consistent in their respective content with the developments as they have unfolded. The article published in ‘The Daily Jalalabad’ dated 16 September 2025 follows on from the Affidavit dated 15 September 2025 declaring the severance of family ties. The article dated 13 August 2025 published in the ‘Sylheter Dak’ follows on from the filing of the complaint dated 12 August 2025 with the local police.
43. I recall the appellant’s evidence that her parents and sister do not wish to have anything to do with her. I note that on more than one occasion when giving live evidence about being disowned the appellant became visibly distressed and tearful. It has not been suggested by the respondent that the appellant was insincere in her distress.
44. It is also notable that the appellant said her sister severed their relationship around the 15 September 2025. This is the date the Affidavit declared the severance of all ‘family’ ties with the appellant. From the reference to ‘family’ in the documents, I infer that the appellant’s sister is included as part of the ‘family’. It is therefore not inconsistent for the appellant’s sister upon receiving and reading the documents to have adopted a similar stance as her parents towards the appellant.
45. I have considered whether the newly admitted documentation is reliable through the lens of the principles established in Tanveer Ahmed v SSHD [2002] UKIAT 00439. I am satisfied the documentation can be relied upon when considered alongside the evidence as a whole.
46. I find it is entirely plausible that when faced with ongoing threats of serious harm, the appellant’s parents have felt their only option to end the ongoing rift with the husband’s family was to declare publicly that the appellant was disowned. I place weight on the fact that the severing of family ties with the appellant was done publicly and by filing an Affidavit in a court of law. What has occurred in my view cannot be described as just an internal squabble or disagreement amongst family members, but something more visceral which appears to be sincere with immediate effect.
47. It follows that I do not find the severance of family ties with the appellant to be a fabrication. It has been made in a sworn statement and published in the media. I anticipate it would be very difficult for the appellant’s parents to resile from their stated public position if the appellant returned to Bangladesh. It would indeed be an extreme step for them to have lied risking court sanction and possibly public disapprobation and censure if their stated position were a fabrication to help their daughter remain in the UK.
48. I have considered the respondent’s submissions regarding the inconsistency in the appellant’s evidence concerning her sister, the timing of the divorce proceedings, the absence of supporting witness statements from family members in the UK and aspects of the appellant’s evidence concerning her understanding of her marital status under Islamic law. Whilst I have taken all of those matters into account, I do not consider that they materially affect the central findings I have made. Those findings are supported by substantial objective evidence, including the non-molestation order, the Metropolitan Police correspondence, the GP evidence, and the documentation from organisations assisting victims of domestic violence. Viewed in the round, the matters relied upon by the respondent do not undermine the core factual conclusions reached in this appeal.
49. Having found that the appellant is a victim of domestic abuse and has been disowned by her family, I find that if she is returned to Bangladesh, it would be as single woman. I now turn to look at the country information relied upon by Mr Alam.
50. Mr Alam relies on the Country Policy and Information Note Bangladesh: Women fearing gender-based violence published in January 2024 (‘CPIN’). He submits that there are significant obstacles for single women to establish themselves in Bangladesh. In support of this assertion, he relies on CPIN paragraphs 8.2 and 8.3.
51. CPIN paragraph 8.2 provides that when poor women lose their husbands or get divorced, their vulnerability to poverty, exploitation and social isolation increases significantly.
52. CPIN paragraphs 8.3 to 8.3.11 address single women. It provides (8.3.1) that there are big problems with the social acceptance of single women, even for educated women who are working. There are financial constraints, and to live without male support is ‘almost impossible’. It is difficult for single women to rent a place to live in Dhaka or anywhere since society does not accept that and the state fails to assure security.
53. CPIN paragraph 8.3.2 states that it would not be easy for a young single woman to relocate or live alone without a good family support base. It would not be usual or seen as normal for a woman to live alone. Single women from poor backgrounds would be destitute. Marriage is seen as the main source of social acceptance.
54. CPIN paragraph 8.3.3. states that being single by choice is virtually unheard of due to the social stigma related to be being a single woman. Remarriage is often considered socially unacceptable for both widows and divorcees due to conservative societal attitudes towards marriage.
55. It is clear from the (CPIN) country information that there are significant obstacles for single women living in Bangladesh whose individual situation is further aggravated if they are poor, divorced or without a good family support base. All of these aggravating features apply to the appellant.
56. Turning to the integration test in Kamara, while I accept that the appellant is familiar with the culture and language of Bangladesh, if returned she will be doing so as a single (divorced) woman with no familial support as she has been disowned. I am not aware that she has any independent finances available to her but in any event the factors highlighted in the country information clearly pose significant difficulties and increase her vulnerability by reason of her circumstances as a single woman without familial support. In that context, I do not consider that the appellant would have a reasonable opportunity to be accepted in Bangladesh, to be able to operate on a day-to-day basis and to build up within a reasonable time a variety of human relationships to give substance to a private or family life.
57. I have also had regard to the elevated threshold required to meet the standard of ‘very significant obstacles’. It is clear from the country information and the evidence before me that the significant difficulties likely to be faced by the appellant on return to Bangladesh are more than ‘mere inconvenience or upheaval’ but are ‘very significant’.
58. In the circumstances, bringing forward my factual findings, the country information and applying the relevant case law, it is clear that the appellant would face very significant obstacles if returned to Bangladesh as a single woman without any family support base.
59. For the foregoing reasons, I allow the appellant’s appeal within the Immigration Rules and do not need to go on to consider the second ground of appeal.

NOTICE OF THE DECISION
1. The appeal is allowed.

K.A.Khan
Upper Tribunal Judge
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

07 July 2026