Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case Nos: UI-2025-004541
UI-2025-004540

First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/53442/2023
HU/53443/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 26th January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between

THANABALASINGAM NAVARATNASINGAM (FIRST APPELLANT)
INTHIRANI NAVARATNASINGHAM (SECOND APPELLANT)
(ANONYMITY ORDER NOT MADE)
Appellants
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellants: Ms K Renfrew, Counsel instructed by Direct Access
For the Respondent: Mr M Pugh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 19 January 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. The Appellants are citizens of Sri Lanka. The first Appellant is the husband of the second. The first Appellant was aged 81 at the time of the First-tier Tribunal hearing and the second Appellant was then aged 78. The United Kingdom-based Sponsor was (and is) the Appellants’ daughter, Ms Robin.
2. The Appellants appeal with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Nixon (the Judge), promulgated on 28 August 2025. By that decision the Judge dismissed the Appellants’ appeal against the Respondent’s decision of 1 March 2023, which had refused the Appellants’ human rights claims.
3. In summary, those claims were based on Article 8 and the assertion that the Appellants (in particular the second Appellant) required significant help with personal care and other matters as a result of their medical conditions. After coming to the United Kingdom in October 2021 as visitors, the Appellants have lived with and been assisted by the Sponsor and her husband. The Appellants claimed that requiring them to return to Sri Lanka would be precluded by the existence of very significant obstacles. Alternatively, a return would have unjustifiably harsh consequences for them.
4. The Respondent refused the claims, concluding that there would not be very significant obstacles and that removal would be proportionate. It was not accepted that there was family life between the Appellants and the Sponsor. It was concluded that Sri Lanka had a functioning health service which could provide appropriate care for the Appellants, including long term residential care if necessary. The Respondent concluded that neither paragraph 276ADE (which had in fact been replaced by Appendix Private Life by the time of the refusal decision), nor the Rules on adult dependent relatives could be satisfied and that there were no exceptional circumstances outside of the Rules to justify a grant of leave to remain.

The Judge’s decision in summary
5. The Judge set out the parties’ respective cases in some detail. Before setting out her findings, the Judge confirmed that she had “considered all of the evidence”. The findings set out at paragraph 19 of the decision can be summarised as follows:
(a) The Judge accepted that both Appellants suffered from a variety of physical health conditions;
(b) The Appellants had received appropriate medication whilst still in Sri Lanka;
(c) Whilst not without its challenges, there was a functioning healthcare system in Sri Lanka, which included both public and private provision;
(d) The evidence did not demonstrate that the second Appellant was unable to perform a number of personal care tasks for herself;
(e) The Judge nonetheless accepted that the second Appellant would on return require “some assistance”;
(f) There was no evidence before her regarding the availability of day care or residential care for either or both of the Appellants, nor was there evidence of efforts to find a potential carer who could visit the Appellants at home on a daily basis;
(g) The Appellants could find new accommodation on return to Sri Lanka;
(h) The Appellants could not meet any of the relevant Rules;
(i) The Appellants’ removal would be proportionate.
6. Accordingly, the appeals were dismissed.

The grounds of appeal and grant of permission
7. Four grounds of appeal were put forward. In summary, these were as follows:
(a) The Judge made findings without an evidential basis and/or made findings without putting matters to the Sponsor at the hearing;
(b) The Judge failed to take account of relevant evidence relating to care needs, emotional support and the availability of relevant care provision in Sri Lanka;
(c) The Judge applied the wrong legal test when considering Article 8 outside the scope of the Rules;
(d) The Judge failed to conduct a proper proportionality balancing exercise, specifically in relation to the position of the Appellants’ grandson, S, who was artificially considered in isolation from other factors.
8. Permission was granted on all grounds.

Rule 24 response
9. The Respondent provided a detailed Rule 24 response on 7 November 2025.

The hearing
10. I received helpful submissions from both representatives, all of which are a matter of record and have been fully considered by me and subsumed within my consideration of the grounds (as to which, see below).
11. In brief summary, Ms Renfrew relied on her grounds of appeal and referred me to certain aspects of the evidence before the Judge, including the social worker’s report, the occupational therapist report and the Sponsor’s witness statement. She submitted that all of the grounds were made out and that the appeals should be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a complete rehearing.
12. Mr Pugh relied on the Rule 24 response and submitted that none of the alleged errors were made out. He submitted that even if there had been errors in respect of grounds 1 and/or 2, they would not be material, given what the Judge has said about the availability of care provision in Sri Lanka. Further, the judge had as a matter of substance conducted an adequate proportionality exercise under Article 8.
13. At the end of the hearing I reserved my decision.

Conclusions
14. I approach my consideration of the grounds bearing in mind the need for appropriate judicial restraint before interfering with the Judge’s decision. The Judge read and heard evidence from a variety of sources and was the primary fact-finder and assessor of the evidence within the relevant legal framework. I have read her decision sensibly and holistically having due regard to the importance of looking at substance over form. I remind myself that a Judge need not refer to each and every item of evidence relied on by the parties and/or considered as part of the reasoning process.

Ground 1
15. With reference to the Judge’s decision as a whole and paragraph 19(3) in particular, I conclude that the Judge was entitled to conclude that the evidence provided did not demonstrate that the first Appellant was unable to at least assist the second Appellant with movement around the house and that such assistance would be possible on return to Sri Lanka. My reasons for this are as follows.
16. First, the fact that the Sponsor may have been providing assistance to the second Appellant did not preclude the Judge from assessing the hypothetical situation of the Sponsor not being around. Indeed, it would be artificial for the Judge to have limited herself to what in fact was taking place in the United Kingdom. That is because the Judge was required to assess the consequences of a return to Sri Lanka on the Appellants, not simply what was occurring whilst in the United Kingdom. It is, with respect, unsurprising that the Sponsor and her husband would have done all they could to assist the Appellants whilst living under their roof.
17. Secondly, I am satisfied that the Judge considered the evidence as a whole: that is what she said at the very beginning of paragraph 19 and (having regard to the fact that not all the evidence need be referred to) there is no contraindication to that clear statement.
18. Thirdly, having regard to the evidence from the Sponsor and her husband, together with what was said by the occupational therapist and social worker, it was open to the Judge to conclude that there was insufficient evidence to demonstrate that the first Appellant could not assist his wife with “any movement around the house”. That is a sensible and fair reading of what the Judge said at paragraph 19(3). The same applies to the Judge’s finding as to the lack of sufficient evidence to suggest that the first Appellant could not assist with shopping and basic household tasks on return.
19. The second strand of ground 1 is that the Judge acted unfairly by apparently not specifically putting to the Sponsor at the hearing the possibility that the first Appellant might be able to assist the second Appellant. I find that contention to have no merit. The Appellants put their case forward in a particular way, relying on Article 8 and the assertion that they could not care for themselves any longer. That claim brought with it a number of elements: (a) the burden of proof always rested with the Appellants; (b) they needed to show that they were unable to care for themselves/each other; (c) they were clearly on reasonable notice as to what they needed to demonstrate by way of evidence and that included proving to the requisite standard an inability to undertake essential care needs/tasks. The Respondent had not made any material concessions on the issue, whether in writing or at the hearing and the Appellants were represented by Counsel at the hearing. They had adduced written evidence. Having regard to the foregoing, there was no unfairness in the Judge not expressly putting the point about the first Appellant’s ability to at least assist the second Appellant. There is no sensible way in which the Appellants can now say they were taken by surprise as to the Judge’s consideration of that particular issue. Ground 1 does not disclose any error of law.
20. Even if there was an error, I agree with Mr Pugh’s submission that it would not be material (applying the low threshold for materiality: see, for example, ASO v SSHD [2023] EWCA Civ 1282). This is because of what the Judge subsequently said about the availability of appropriate care provision in Sri Lanka (see below).

Ground 2
21. The second ground is in some ways linked to the first. Again, the Judge was not solely concerned with what the Sponsor and her husband were in fact doing for the Appellants in this country. The Judge had to go beyond that and look at what the Appellants themselves could do, either without any support or with care provided whilst in Sri Lanka. In my judgment, ground 2 fails to recognise this. It also fails to acknowledge what the Judge said at the very beginning of paragraph 19(4), namely that the Appellants would need “some assistance”. That indicates that the Judge did not simply discount what the Sponsor had said. Further, the Judge did have regard to the social worker’s report and the occupational therapist’s report, albeit details of this evidence are not set out in the decision (it was unnecessary to have done so).
22. The Appellants assert that the Judge failed to have regard to evidence of emotional support and dependency. I disagree. Whilst emotional dependence is not mentioned at paragraph 19(1) to 19(5), it is considered at paragraph 19(6) where the Judge found there to be family life based on the existence of “sufficient emotional dependence” between the Appellants and the Sponsor. That of itself demonstrates that the Judge had in mind and properly considered the issue of emotional support/dependence. Such support/dependence could never in and of itself have been sufficient for the Appellants to succeed in their appeals.
23. The third element of ground 2 relates to the provision of care in Sri Lanka. Contrary to the Appellants’ assertion, I am satisfied that the Judge did have proper regard to the general country evidence, largely contained in the December 2024 CPIN. That document is specifically referred to at a number of points in the decision and I remind myself that the judge had already said that she had considered the evidence as a whole.
24. The Judge acknowledged the difficult economic situation in Sri Lanka, but was clearly entitled to find that there was a functioning healthcare system in that country. It is true that the country evidence did not paint an especially bright picture, but that does not disclose any error on the Judge’s part. The Appellants’ challenge is really one of disagreement only. The Judge was entitled to conclude that there was in general the possibility of available treatment, even if on a privately funded basis. With that in mind, the Judge was also entitled to find that financial support from the family in the United Kingdom would continue if the Appellants returned to Sri Lanka.
25. Importantly, the Judge was not only entitled, but factually correct, to find that there was no evidence from the Appellants of enquiries having been made in respect of care provision in Sri Lanka on a specific basis relating to their circumstances. There was no evidence about carers coming to the Appellants’ own home (once they were able to rent one), there was no evidence relating to day care provision, and there was no evidence relating to the provision of longer term residential care. All of these matters were clearly relevant to the Appellants’ ability to make out their case, both within the scope of the Rules and without. They are mandatory requirements in respect of the adult dependent relative provisions in the Rules and in any event were plainly relevant to a consideration of whether there were very significant obstacles to integration. The Judge was fully entitled to take the absence of such evidence into account, as she did at paragraph 19(4) and 19(6).
26. In summary, the Appellants’ challenge is based on a generality of country evidence whereas the Judge was entitled to focus in on the specific circumstances of the Appellants’ case, albeit having due regard to the background country information.
27. Ground 2 does not disclose any errors of law.

Ground 3
28. In my judgment ground 3 is in effect seeking to put form over substance as regards what the Judge says at paragraph 19(6). There, the Judge stated that:
“I turn to the issue of whether there are exceptional reasons to go on to consider the case outside the Rules and I find that there are no such reasons”.
29. I appreciate that the precise wording used does not accurately describe the proper legal approach to an Article 8 assessment falling outside the scope of the Rules. However, in the first instance I conclude that once the entirety of paragraphs 19(6)–19(8) are considered together it is clear that what in fact the Judge was doing is undertaking an assessment of whether there were exceptional circumstances in the Appellants’ case, albeit she used clumsy terminology at the outset of that assessment.
30. In any event, any error in respect of the first sentence of paragraph 19(6) is immaterial because of what the Judge said in the second sentence, namely: “
“Out of completeness I will go on to consider this”.
31. When that “in any event” approach is seen in the context of everything said earlier in the Judge’s decision and thereafter, it is clear enough that she was, as a matter of substance, undertaking a proportionality exercise to determine whether there were exceptional circumstances in the case. It does not disclose an impermissible exceptionality test, as contended for in ground 3. The Judge was clearly not requiring a unique or otherwise particularly unusual feature of the case. Rather, she was (again) as a matter of substance applying well-established principles as set out in, for example, Agyarko v SSHD [2017] UKSC 11. In short, when read sensibly and holistically, the phrase “exceptional reasons” is commensurate with “exceptional circumstances”.
32. My conclusion on ground 3 is reinforced by a passage within paragraph 19(6) where the Judge stated that “The real question is whether the decision is proportionate to the need for effective immigration control ...”: that clearly brings the Judge’s approach within the required proportionality exercise.
33. Ground 3 is not made out.

Ground 4
34. Turning to the final ground of appeal, I conclude that the Appellants’ challenge artificially seeks to place the Judge’s consideration of the best interests of their grandchild, S, in isolation from everything else said by the Judge. Quite rightly, the Judge considered S’s best interests and gave careful consideration to that particular aspect of the case. However, it is plain that this was not the only consideration which the Judge took into account, having regard to what she said at paragraph 19(6)–19(8). The final comment in paragraph 19(7) concerning S is simply that his best interests of themselves could not permit the Appellants to succeed in their case. On a sensible reading of the proportionality exercise as a whole the best interests of S was not simply considered on a standalone basis; it followed on from consideration of other matters and preceded consideration of yet more (for example, the Appellants’ inability to meet any of the Rules, relationships other than that with S, the Appellants’ inability to speak English and reliance on NHS treatment).
35. Ground 4 does not disclose an error of law.
36. In light of the foregoing, the Appellants have failed to identify any material errors of law in the Judge’s decision.

Anonymity
37. There is clearly no basis for an anonymity direction in these appeals and I do not make one.

Postscript
38. At the hearing, the Sponsor’s husband, Mr Robin, informed me that the first Appellant had suffered a stroke only a few days before. I express my sympathy here and make it clear that my error of law decision has been based on the evidence before the Judge, not as matters currently stand.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The appeals to the Upper Tribunal are dismissed and the decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands.

H Norton-Taylor

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 20 January 2026