Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004546

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/60769/2023
LP/01969/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 19th December 2025

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BEACH

Between

SA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Slatter, Counsel instructed by Irvine Thanvi Natas Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr Sheikh, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 5 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and/or any member of his family is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and/or any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, promulgated on 3rd September 2025, dismissing the appellant’s appeal against a decision of the Secretary of State made on 30th October 2023, refusing his protection claim.
Background to the appeal
2. The appellant is a national of Pakistan who arrived in the UK on 4th November 2021 and claimed asylum on 10th February 2022.
3. The appellant states that he had been a member of MQM since 2010. He described himself as a senior worker. He states that he left MQM in 2016 when the Pakistan authorities began a crackdown on supporters and members. The appellant states that, in 2020, he became the victim of an extortion by a gang who made financial demands against the appellant and who threatened his family. He believed this to be partly linked to his previous involvement with MQM. He states that he made a formal complaint to the police but they did not take any credible steps to protect him and his family.
4. The appellant states that, on 29th March 2021, he attended a MQM demonstration in Karachi at which images of politicians were burned. The appellant states that he left Pakistan and travelled to Turkey and that he subsequently left Turkey when the Turkish authorities, at the request of the Pakistan authorities, started removing Pakistan nationals to Pakistan. He states that he was also informed that the Pakistan authorities had visited the family home looking for him. The appellant further states that he continued his political activities in the UK.
5. On 30th October 2023, the respondent refused the appellant’s protection claim. The appellant appealed against that decision.
6. The Tribunal dismissed the appeal. The judge accepted that the appellant was a member of MQM but found that the appellant’s claim to be a high level member of the MQM was not credible. She found that the siblings’ letters in support of the appellant were self-serving and did not add weight to the appellant’s claim. The judge further found that even if the appellant had been of interest to the authorities in Pakistan, the last visit had been 18 months before the hearing. The judge found that there was no external evidence to show that the appellant had been a member of MQM in Pakistan or to show that he had attended a demonstration in March 2021. She further found that the extortion attempt was not politically motivated and that the police had assisted the appellant when he complained about the extortion attempt. The judge did not accept that the police document was a reliable document. She found that there was no evidence of the appellant’s claimed activities in Pakistan or to show that he was or would be at risk in Pakistan.
7. The judge also considered the appellant’s sur place activities. She found that S’s evidence was vague and evasive and that he was unable to confirm whether the appellant attended rallies. She further found that the photographs did not clearly show that the events were political events. The judge also found that the appellant’s delay in claiming asylum undermined his credibility
8. The appellant sought permission to appeal. Permission to appeal was granted by Judge Lawrence of the First-tier Tribunal on 29th September 2025.
9. On 10th October 2025, the respondent lodged a Rule 24 response.
10. The appeal came before me at an error of law hearing on 5th December 2025. There were four issues:
a. Whether the judge had failed to consider the risk to the appellant as a result of his sur place activities and likely continuation of activities on return to Pakistan
b. Whether the judge had placed undue weight on the lack of corroborative evidence
c. Whether the judge had failed to take account of the crackdown in 2016 when assessing the appellant’s credibility and whether she had erred in finding that there was a distinction between low level and high level members of MQM-L
d. Whether the judge had properly applied the Section 8 factors when assessing credibility
The error of law hearing
11. At the hearing before me, the appellant was represented by Mr Slatter, Counsel instructed by Irvine Thanvi Natas Solicitors. The respondent was represented by Mr Sheikh, a Senior Home Office Presenting Officer.
12. In his submissions, Mr Slatter submitted that the judge had failed to resolve all the issues which needed to be resolved. He said that it was clear from [10(d)] that the issue of sur place activities was identified as an issue to be addressed but that the judge had failed to fully address this issue. He said that the issue of continuation of activities on return to Pakistan was identified in the appellant’s witness statement and skeleton argument but was not addressed by the judge in her decision. Mr Slatter submitted that the judge had failed to take account of the fact that there had been a widespread crackdown in Pakistan since 2016 when she made an adverse finding against the appellant that there was no corroborative evidence of his historical political activity in Pakistan. He further submitted that the judge had not considered the explanation provided in the witness statement of the appellant or consider the letter from MQM which confirmed that the appellant had joined the party in 2010 and referred to historic and present activism. Mr Slatter submitted that the judge had failed to consider the 3rd option which was that the appellant could be perceived to support MQM thus placing him at risk on return to Pakistan.
13. Mr Slatter submitted that the judge had failed to take account of relevant evidence when finding that the appellant was not a senior member of MQM. He submitted that the judge had not taken account of a report which was before her and did not take proper account of the appellant’s promotion to becoming a leader of a Unit in the UK. He further submitted that the judge did not consider the appellant’s explanation of why he delayed in claiming asylum.
14. In his submissions, Mr Sheikh submitted that the judge took account of the sur place activities and had given reasons for finding that the appellant would not be at risk on return as a result of his sur place activities. He said that there were only two hyperlinks provided for the appellant’s social media and the judge had made clear reference to the appellant’s social media. Mr Sheikh submitted that the judge had considered the evidence of the appellant holistically and had made reference to the letters provided. He said that the judge had found that it was not credible that if the appellant held the key role he stated he held that no colleagues would be able to confirm this. He submitted that the judge was entitled to take into account the lack of corroborative evidence. Mr Shiekh further submitted that the judge had given adequate reasons for finding that S was not a reliable witness and for finding that the appellant was not a prominent member of MQM. He submitted that the judge was entitled to reach the conclusions she reached with regard to the police report.
15. Mr Sheikh submitted that the judge gave adequate reasons for finding that the appellant was not a senior member of MQM who had previously come to the attention of the authorities for political reasons. He submitted that the judge had assessed all of the evidence in the round and had given sufficient reasons for her findings. He further submitted that the judge was not necessarily required to cover every issue.
16. Mr Sheikh submitted that the judge had not placed a heavier burden of proof on the appellant than she should and had simply taken account of the paucity of the evidence from those in the MQM. He said that she had also found that the police were able to help the appellant in terms of the extortion.
17. In his response, Mr Slatter said that the reference in [26] to Twitter was a different issue and was about the appellant’s announcement of becoming joint head of the Unit and was therefore distinct from the evidence of sur place activities. He submitted that the letter referred to in [28] was different from the letter at page 48 of the composite bundle which was from an individual who had not given evidence. Mr Slatter submitted that the judge did not consider the HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v SSHD [2010] UKSC 31 point at all. He submitted that the failure to make clear reference to all of the evidence meant that the judge had not considered the letter which made reference to the appellant’s activities and to the appellant appearing on MQM social media and their website. He further submitted that the judge had erred in finding that low level members of MQM would not be at risk in Pakistan.
Error of law decision
18. I bear in mind that an appellate Tribunal should be wary of setting aside a decision by a lower Tribunal. In doing so I apply what was held in in Ullah v SSHD [2024] EWCA Civ 201 at [26]. I further bear in mind what was said in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 at [2] and what was held in HA (Iraq) [2022] UKSC 22 at [72].
19. However, I find that there is a material error of law in the judge’s decision.
20. At [22], the judge finds that the appellant has not provided any evidence of his activities in Pakistan other than letters from two of his siblings. However, there was a letter from MA, dated 9th October 2023, which made direct reference to the appellant’s activities in Pakistan stating that their internal party records showed that the appellant joined MQM in 2010, that he was a grass roots party worker and setting out the work that grass-roots party workers undertake and the problems they faced. Whilst that letter originated from the UK, it made reference to internal party records. The judge does not make reference to this in her decision. This is of particular significance given that she also finds that the appellant’s credibility is undermined because of a failure to provide corroborative evidence from Pakistan. There was therefore a need for the judge to make clear findings on the evidence which was before her with regard to the appellant’s activities in Pakistan.
21. At [26], the judge notes that there was evidence before her to show that the appellant had been appointed joint leader of a Unit. She found that there was no evidence to substantiate that the appellant was at risk in Pakistan. The judge finds that lower level members are not at risk in Pakistan [33]. She does not make any finding as to (a) whether the appellant as a joint leader of a Unit would be considered to be a high level member and (b) whether being a joint leader of a Unit would lead to a risk to the appellant. Nor is it clear on what basis she finds that low level members of MQM would not be at risk.
22. At [31], the judge finds that the appellant has not provided evidence of his sur place activities in the UK. The letter from MA, dated 9th October 2023, sets out the activities in which the appellant has been involved in the UK but the judge makes no reference to this letter and makes no findings regarding the reliability of the letter. There were also two hyperlinks at P.201 of the appellant’s bundle (referred to in [28] ASA). Whilst the judge refers to the Twitter announcement with regard to the appellant being appointed a joint leader of a Unit in the UK, there is no reference to this potentially corroborative evidence of the types of activities undertaken by the appellant in the UK.
23. There was an emphasis on the lack of corroborative evidence from Pakistan regarding the appellant’s involvement in the MQM and the problems he faced in Pakistan. However, the judge did not take account of potentially corroborative evidence in the form of the letter from MA. There is also a somewhat circular argument in the fact that the judge finds there is no corroborative evidence regarding the appellant’s activities and problems in Pakistan but then discounts the corroborative evidence which he has provided as either self-serving (the siblings’ letters) or unreliable (the police document). The letter from MA also set out background evidence regarding the problems faced by MQM members in Pakistan with hyperlinks to the news articles. That was not considered by the judge in considering the risk to MQM members.
24. The appellant has also stated that he would continue his activities on return to Pakistan [39] appellant’s witness statement] and this was a submission made in the appellant’s skeleton argument [16(5)], [38], ASA]. The judge makes no finding as to whether the appellant would continue his activities on behalf of MQM on return to Pakistan and whether this would lead to any risk to the appellant. It was incumbent on the judge to make findings on the material issues to be decided. This was an issue which had been expressly raised by and on behalf of, the appellant but about which the judge made no clear findings.
25. For the reasons given above, I conclude that the First-tier Tribunal decision did involve the making of an error of law.
26. I have considered whether it is necessary to remit the matter to the First-tier Tribunal. There is a need for findings to be made regarding the key aspects of the appellant’s claim and in respect of evidence submitted on behalf of the appellant. In those circumstances, I find that it is appropriate for the decision to be wholly set aside and for the appeal to be remitted to be reheard before the First-tier Tribunal afresh.

Notice of decision
1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error of law and I set it aside.
2. I remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to be heard by a different judge. For the avoidance of doubt, none of the findings of fact are preserved.

F Beach

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

15th December 2025