Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004547

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/63479/2023
LH/07250/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 18th February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PAUL LEWIS

Between

KK
ANONYMITY ORDER MADE
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr. Ricahrdson, counsel
For the Respondent: Mr, Tuffan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 3 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and any member of his family, expert, witness or other person the Tribunal considers should not be identified is granted anonymity.
No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or other person. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court

DECISION AND REASONS

Background
1. The appellant is a citizen of Pakistan. He appeals with leave against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal Judge [the ‘Judge’] dated 24th June 2025 dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse him entry clearance as a visitor the UK to see his children.
2. The appellant entered the UK in 2003. He was removed from the UK in 2011 having been sentenced to a period of 12 months’ imprisonment for seeking entry to the UK using a false document.
3. The appellant has two children born in 2016 and 2018. They are British citizens and reside with their mother in the UK. The appellant separated from the children’s mother. He last had face to face contact with his first-born child in 2017, when the child was approximately 18 months old. He has never seen his second child in person.
4. There have been Family Court proceedings between the appellant and his child’s mother, the details of which were provided with permission of the Family Court. The Family Court proceedings found the best interests of the children included face to face contact with the appellant. The Court made provision for the mother to travel to Pakistan to facilitate contact with the appellant. She has not done so. The Court also made arrangements for the appellant’s contact with his children in the UK, if the appellant were granted entry clearance.
5. Mr. Richardson on behalf of the appellant submitted that I should make an anonymity order to protect the identify of children and the details of the orders made affecting them in the Family Court. Mr. Tuffan agreed. I made the order above.
6. The appellant applied for an entry visa to see his children. The application was refused on grounds of suitability due to the appellant’s conviction set out at [2] above. Dismissing the appeal, the Judge went on to made findings at [19] with regards to the appellant’s Article 8 right to family life, that the public interest in effective immigration control outweighed the appellant’s family life with his children.
Permission to appeal
7. Permission to appeal against the judge’s decision was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Pinder on 25th November 2025 on four grounds more conveniently placed into three headings.
(a) Grounds one and two:
The judge’s assessment of the appellant’s intention to leave the UK was flawed because it failed to take account of material factors.
(b) Ground three
The judge’s assessment as to what was in the best interests of the child was materially flawed.
(c) Ground four
The Judge erred in her proportionality assessment in failing to consider the (arguably) contradictory positions held by the Respondent, as expressed separately within the family court (Children Act) proceedings and within the proceedings before the judge.
8. The respondent opposed the appeal in a detailed Rule 24 response. I return to the parties specific submissions below.
Discussion
9. In Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ. 464, at [2], the Court of Appeal reiterated the caution with which an appellate tribunal must approach findings of fact:
i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
10. It is common ground that the appellant does not meet the requirements of the Immigration Rules on the grounds of suitability because of the sentence imposed upon him. The judge’s finding in this regard at [8] is clear and unchallenged.
11. The appellant skeleton argument before the judge in the First-tier Tribunal identified as a relevant matter be determined by the Judge, the appellant’s intention in visiting the UK. In response to that invitation, at [9] to [11], the judge goes on to make findings that the appellant is not genuinely seeking entry as a visitor. The judge describes this exercise as one done for ‘completeness’ [10]. It was an unnecessary task to determine whether the appellant met all the requirements of the Immigration Rules.
12. The appellant’s personal circumstances have changed since he was last in the UK. It is said that the appellant’s new marriage, other children and income (which is considerably above the average in Pakistan) are all factors are said to be strong factors in motivating the appellant to return to Pakistan where he is said to have strong ties. Further, the appellant is motivated to comply with the limits of the any entry conditions so that he can continue to enjoy contact with his children in the future. It is submitted that the appellant’s misconduct was some time ago (2011) and the passage of time and his co-operation with the Family Court are positive indicators of a change in intention.
13. It is submitted that the judge failed to take into consideration these matters when determining the appellant’s intention to return.
14. With reference to ground two, it is argued that at [10] the judge mistakenly conflated the children’s wishes as expressed through their mother, that they would like the appellant to be part of their daily lives, as inconsistent with the appellant’s claim to visit the UK for two weeks.
15. In oral submissions, Mr. Richardson developed the argument that the judge’s finding as to the appellant’s motive for entering the UK was ultimately relevant to the proportionality assessment under Article 8. He submits in terms that the weight to be attached to the maintenance of immigration control should be given less weight in circumstances where is found that an appellant would return at the end of his visit, than appellant who would not.
16. The respondent submits this ground of appeal is no more than a disagreement with findings of fact in which the judge expressly considered return-motive factors and was entitled to give more weight to ‘daily lives’ evidence and infer incentive to overstay.
17. Grounds one amounts to a challenge to the sufficiency of the judge’s reasons. In a concise decision the judge set out her reasons for rejecting the appellant’s claim to return. At [10] the judge expressly referred to the appellant’s business interests in Pakistan as a factor which would not ensure his return.
18. The judge did not list every factor referred to by Mr. Richardson. Applying Volpi (above), ‘The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.’ It is tolerably clear that the judge reached a reasoned conclusion as to the appellant’s intentions in entering the UK.
19. Ground two is also to a challenge to the judge’s reasons. It is important to avoid a narrow textual analysis of the sentences of which Mr. Richardson complains at [10] of the judge’s reasons. It is tolerably clear that the judge was doing no more than referring to the strong emotional pull factors (the appellant’s childrens’ wishes) which might motivate the appellant not to return to Pakistan. Whilst the judge’s reasoning may have been more clearly expressed, the error is one of expression, not law.
20. Ground 3 relates to the Judge assessment of the best interest of the child. At [18] she found:
‘..it would be in the best interest of the children to remain the stable and settled environment they are presently in but maintain contact with the appellant online and in person.’
21. It is submitted that such as assessment was flawed for the reasons set out at [21 (a) to (d)] of the grounds of appeal. Specifically, Mr. Richardson submits that the since the appellant has had no in person contact since 2017 with his first child only, such assessment was clearly in error. The judge’s reasoning at [18] needs to be set against her finding at [17] in which the judge expressly acknowledges that the appellant did not have face to face contact:
‘The children currently maintain contact with their father via online video calls. The sponsor stated that she has not facilitated any visits between the appellant and the children since 2017 shortly after the eldest child was born. I find the appellant can maintain contact in the way he currently does, in addition to the sponsor arranging visits to Pakistan.’
22. When read together, [17] and [18] of the judge’s findings simply acknowledge that the children’s best interests would be served by the sponsor complying with the Family Court order and taking the children to Pakistan. Whilst the judge’s reasons could have been more fully expressed, her findings are tolerably clear. In reaching her decision as to proportionality the judge simply gave greater weight to the appellant’s failure to meet the Immigration Rules.
Ground 4
23. It is submitted that the respondent’s assurances to the Family Court that there would be no barrier to appellant being permitted to re-enter the UK, upon which she then reneged, ought to have been viewed as diminishing the weight attached to the public interest in denying entry to the appellant and been seen as militating in favour as a grant of leave to enter outside the Rules. It is submitted that the judge’s failure to consider the impact of this assurance on proportionality was a material omission.
24. It is clear from my enquiry that this point is not raised by Mr. Richardson as creating an estoppel or legitimate expectation point, simply that the matter ought to have been considered by the judge . The Family Court order, at [6] and [7] is plain that the appellant’s contact with his children in the UK was subject to the grant of a visa, and that the respondent could not advise as to when such a decision (on a visa application) would be made. By the date of the application giving rise to the appeal, the respondent’s position had settled in opposition to the appellant’s application.
25. Again, the judge was not obliged to set out each and every matter in the course of her decision and this ground remains a reasons challenge without merit.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the judge does not contain an error of law. The appeal is dismissed.

Paul Lewis

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

11th February 2026