Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004552

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/51451/2024
LH/04496/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 16th January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE STAMP

Between

FATHIMA FAZLIN IBRAHIM RASHEED
(NO ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Bendock, counsel instructed by HMA Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Newton, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 7 January 2026

DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The appellant appeals, with permission, the decision of First-tier judge McTaggart dated 11 May 2025 on the basis that it contains an error of law. The judge dismissed the appeal against the respondent’s refusal to grant long term leave to remain.
2. The appellant is a 42-year-old Sri Lankan national and has been in the UK since June 2022. She applied, on 19 December 2022, for long term leave to remain as the wife of her husband who has lived in the UK for over 25 years and has limited leave to remain. This application was refused by the respondent on 30 January 2024.
3. The appellant appealed the refusal on the Article 8 grounds that her removal would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for her and her husband.
4. The judge dismissed her appeal and found that given both the appellant and her husband were Sri Lanken nationals they could choose to reside together in their home country and rejected the submission that the appellant’s husband would be unable to find a job. Applying the balance sheet test, the judge concluded that the public interest in maintaining effective immigration controls outweighed the appellant’s private and family life consideration and that the decision of the respondent to refuse LTR was not disproportionate leading to unjustifiably harsh consequences for her or her husband.
5. Permission to appeal was initially refused by First-tier judge Gumsley on 12 September 2025.
6. Permission to appeal was subsequently granted by Upper Tribunal judge Ruddick on 5 November 2025 which I set out in full below given the fulsome consideration of the grounds of appeal by the judge:
“1. Ground 1 challenges the FTT’s finding that the country evidence of the social stigma faced by certain women in Sri Lanka did not apply to the appellant, because she was not a “widow or a single woman but merely a married woman who lives overseas.” This was considered “a common position in many countries”. The grounds state that it was not reasonably open to the FTT to find that the country evidence about social stigma did not apply to the appellant, because she and the expert had described her as facing stigma before, when she was in analogous position because her husband was working abroad in Saudi Arabia, and that the appellant would be deemed to be an “abandoned woman” and would therefore suffer the same stigma as other women described in the country evidence in question.
2. The appellant relies here on a Canadian IRB report entitled “Sri Lanka: Situation of single women, including widows, and their treatment by society and authorities, including their ability to live on their own and access housing, education, employment, health care, and support services (2021–June 2023)”, and specifically what is said at page 55 of the Appellant’s bundle below. I have read that report with care. The grounds say the following about this evidence: “The objective material relied upon relates to the plight of Women-Headed Households (WHHs) which can include war widows, never married, disabled and elderly women (AB/55). However, the definition excludes other ‘vulnerable categories of WWHs such as ...divorced and/or abandoned women’ and as a result, such women ‘often lack access to government welfare and social protection programs’ (AB/55).” The point seems to be that the appellant should have been considered to be facing the conditions faced by women in Women Headed Households. The paragraph relied on says in full:
“The DFAT report states that the definition of women-headed households (WHHs) "varies, but can include war widows, never married, disabled and elderly women, and family members of the missing or disappeared" (Australia 2021-12-23, para. 3.97). The Diplomat article indicates that there is no "consistent" definition for WHHs, which has led to the generalization of WHHs as a homogenous group and excluded certain vulnerable categories of WHHs such as women with disabilities, women with spouses who are living with disabilities, divorced and/or abandoned women, elderly women, ex-combatants, and widows of former combatants. (The Diplomat 2021- 06-04)”
3. It is not arguable that it was not rationally open to the FTT to find that the appellant did not fall into any of these categories. The grounds assert that the appellant should have been considered an “abandoned woman”, but this is simply an assertion. Although she would be separated from her husband, she would not be abandoned by him (as she had been by her first husband, who had a second family in Saudi Arabia and forced her to return to Sri Lanak without him). Nothing in the country evidence relied on suggests that women whose spouses live and work abroad are considered “abandoned women.” Most of the IRB report, moreover, considers the position of widows, which is obviously irrelevant to this appellant. The appellant would not, on return to Sri Lanka, be a widow.
4. Ground 2 challenges the FTT’s finding that the appellant’s husband would not be able to support them in Sri Lanka. It is said that various factors have not been taken into account: the couple’s evidence that they would not have accommodation available to them with family if they returned to Sri Lanka, the appellant’s husband’s age (49), and his lengthy absence from Sri Lanka. It is said that it was irrational to place weight on the husband’s ability to speak English, because he is “unskilled”. The factors identified as overlooked in the grounds were clearly recorded in the FTT’s account of the couple’s evidence at [7] and [8]. The assertion that the husband is “unskilled” and that English is of no assistance to unskilled workers in Sri Lanka does not appear to be based in any evidence; none is referred to in the grounds. In any event, the husband works as a team leader at B&Q and also at Sainsburys and it is not arguable that it was irrational for the FTT to consider that he would have obtained transferrable skills in these roles. Finally, it was clearly open to the FTT to note that there had been no evidence that work would not be available to the husband in Sir Lanka because his own evidence was that he had not looked for work there. This ground appears to be simply a disagreement.
5. Ground 3 is that the FTT erred by failing to take into account the evidence of the couple’s desire to conceive a child, the likely impact on those efforts if they lived apart until the sponsor was eligible for ILR, and the impact on the appellant’s mental health if she were unable to conceive. This is arguable. Although there is a detailed consideration of the evidence concerning the appellant’s mental health (which is largely accepted), this specific issue is mentioned nowhere in the decision. It would appear to be highly relevant to the finding at [30] that the couple could “arrange their lives so they can see each other for part of the year”. It may not be material, given that there is a clear alternative finding that they could live together in Sri Lanka, but materiality can be addressed at the error of law hearing.
Given what is said above about Grounds One and Two, I have considered limiting the grounds. However, having taken into account the relevant Presidential Guidance, I have decided not to do so.”
Preliminary Issues
7. There had been an application under Rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 for permission to submit additional medical evidence that was not available at the time of hearing before the judge. Mr Bendock withdraw the application acknowledging that it was not relevant in an error of law hearing.
8. During Ms Newton’s submissions the appellant became upset and, at Mr Bendock’s request, I adjourned for a short period. Following the adjournment, the appellant resumed her seat at the hearing.
Submissions
9. Mr Bendock adopted his grounds of appeal and began with ground 3. The judge had failed to address in his Article 8 analysis the issue of the impact, if the appellant returned to Sri Lanka, on her inability to have children and the consequences for her mental health and her social status.
10. The judge had been directed to this issue in both the appellant’s and her husband’s witness statements which outlined the difficulties she had in conceiving, her previous miscarriage and the impact on her mental health. In addition, Mr Bendock referred to a letter from Epsom and St Helier University Hospitals dated 1 April 2025 in support. The judge in his decision made no mention of this issue or the impact that long term separation from her husband would have on the appellant’s ability to have children nor the stigma faced by women in Sri Lanka who are childless. Mr Bendock additionally submitted that the judge had not considered the mental health of the appellant his Article 8 analysis. The psychiatric report prepared by Dr Obuaya dated 10 February 2025 (the ‘Medical Report’), which the judge had given positive weight to, concluded she had symptoms of mixed anxiety and depressive disorder and relied on the report to submit that it was ‘highly likely’ that her mental health would deteriorate if she was required to return to Sri Lanka whether with or without her husband given the lack of medical support and that any fertility process that had been undertaken in the UK would at best be interrupted and at worse discontinued.
11. On Ground 1 Mr Bendock submitted that the judge had failed to take into account the social ostracism which the appellant had suffered in her previous marriage, outlined in her witness statement, when she similarly lived apart from her first husband, and its impact on her mental health. In terms of the Report by the Refugee Board of Canada dated June 2023 (the ‘IRB report’), Mr Bendock focused on the expressed wider discrimination faced by women in Sri Lanka and that it was “common” for women to suffer sexual harassment and employment discrimination. This was a material consideration which the judge should have taken into account in his analysis on the issue.
12. On Ground 2, Mr Bendock submitted that the judge had unfairly concluded that the appellant’s husband would be able to find employment and had failed to take into account his age, medical conditions and the state of the Sri Lankan economy in coming to his finding. The adverse conclusion that the judge had drawn on the appellant’s husband never having looked for a job in Sri Lanka was not fairly made as he was not in a position to look for a job at this stage given his current employment in the UK and the appellant’s uncertain immigration status.
13. Ms Newton, addressing ground 3, submitted that the judge had fairly concluded that there was nothing to stop the appellant’s husband returning to Sri Lanka with her. There was no evidence put before the judge to suggest that the appellant would not be able continue her fertility treatment or medication for her anxiety and depression. The reference in paragraph 20 of the Medical Report to the poor prognosis for the appellant’s mental health was expressly limited to a return without her husband.
14. On ground 1, the social stigma that the appellant suffered in her first abusive and controlling marriage was not analogous to the current situation where the appellant and her husband were in genuine and subsisting relationship but separated due to her husband’s employment. In addition, the judge was correct in placing no weight on the IRB report as it was expressly related in its title to “single women, including widows” and the appellant fell into neither category.
15. On ground 2, the judge was entitled to find that the appellant had not discharged the burden of proof to demonstrate that employment was not available to the appellant’s husband and was not required to set out each piece of evidence he had taken into account in coming to his decision.
Discussion and Decision
16. The issue which I have to determine is whether there is an error of law in the First-tier’s tribunal decision. If I conclude that there is, I then need to consider whether the error requires me to set aside that decision in whole or part. If I set aside the decision, then I must determine whether it should be remade in this Tribunal or remit the appeal to the First-tier Tribunal to do so.
17. I now turn to the grounds of appeal in the order that Mr Bendock made his submissions.
Ground 3: Failure to consider material evidence
18. This ground is that the judge failed to properly consider the appellant’s desire to start a family with her husband and the impact on a lengthy period of separation would have on her ability to do so. In particular, by the time her husband would be able to sponsor her application in 2030 as he becomes eligible for ILR she will be 47 years old. No mention is made by the judge of this factor or the consequent impact on the appellant’s mental health.
19. The judge at paragraph 28 acknowledges that Article 8 is engaged and adopts the conventional balance sheet approach in determining whether the respondent’s refusal was proportionate in all the circumstances. The judge expressly notes in the appellant’s favour the psychological trauma the appellant had suffered in her first marriage, the genuine and subsisting relationship with her husband and his importance to her in everyday life. He gave little weight to her private life in the UK as it had been established at a time when she no LTR. The judge concluded that there was no reason given that both the appellant and her husband were nationals of Sri Lanka they could choose to be together there and that, accordingly, the factors in favour of the appellant did not outweigh the public interest of effective immigration control.
20. The judge made no mention of the appellant’s difficulties in conceiving or its impact on her mental health in his balance sheet approach although these were clearly set out in the appellant’s and her husband’s witness statements. The judge in his decision takes no issue with either witness statement. The letter from the hospital provides some external validation but the second page is missing and in absence of the identification of the letter writer and their qualifications the judge would be entitled to give it little weight. I note, however, that it suggests the appellant is not currently receiving fertility treatment.
21. The issue I have to determine is whether, if the judge had directed his mind to this issue, it could have resulted in a different outcome. I find that it does not. The judge, at paragraph 30, makes a clear finding that the parties, both being nationals of Sri Lanka, could live together in their home country if they wished to do so. Accordingly, if the judge had expressly considered the issue of the appellant’s fertility, the weight he would have given to this in his balance sheet test would have not resulted in a different outcome given the opportunity for the appellant and her husband to start a family in Sri Lanka. No evidence was presented to the judge on the absence of access to fertility treatment or medical support for the appellant’s mental health in Sri Lanka which might otherwise have altered his findings.
22. In relation to Mr Bendock’s submission that the appellant’s mental health would be “highly likely” to deteriorate on return to Sri Lanka even with her husband I find no basis for this. The Medical Report at paragraph 20 on which Mr Bendock relies deals solely with the situation of returning to Sri Lanka without her husband and makes no comment on the issue if both returned.
Ground 1: Failure to take into account material evidence
23. Turning to ground 1, given that I have found no error of law on ground 3, the issue of whether the judge made an error of law in relation to the social ostracism that the appellant could face if returned to Sri Lanka alone becomes hypothetical given the judge’s legitimate finding that the appellant and her husband could live together in their home country. Mr Bendock asked that I consider this ground on its merits and I do so.
24. Mr Bendock’s submissions on this issue were based on (i) the judge failing to take account of the social stigma that the appellant suffered previously and (ii) the IRB report insofar as it demonstrated the discrimination faced by women in Sri Lankan society. In addition, although Mr Bendock did not address me on it, the ground of appeal submitted that the appellant should be treated as an “abandoned women” for the purposes of the IRB report.
25. On the first element, the judge addressed the issue of social stigma in paragraph 25 and whilst he did not expressly address the issue of the evidence contained in the appellant’s witness statement he directs his mind to IRB report. It is clear, as set out in the Practice Direction from the Senior President of Tribunals: Reasons for decisions 4 June 2024, that a judge is not required to identify all of the evidence relied on in reaching findings of facts but it is sufficient that the judge’s thought processes were clear in coming to his conclusion and I conclude that this was the case. The judge considered the issue of whether the appellant had suffered social stigma and implicitly had concluded that the contents of the appellant’s witness statement was not sufficient to discharge the burden of proof on this issue and hence looked to the external validation which had been presented to him as evidence. In any event, I do not consider that the evidence of the social stigma in the witness statement appellant suffered is directly analogous to the situation with current husband. Her ex-husband was abusive and controlling and, at the time of her social ostracism, there was no relationship between them. This is very different from the current situation with the supportive and loving relationship she has with her husband and where the separation is out of necessity due to his working commitments in the UK and no evidence was provided as to why the appellant could, in very different circumstances, suffer social ostracism on return.
26. Turning to the second element, the IRB report sets out the plight of ‘Women-Headed Households’ in Sri Lanka the report does make general comments on the position of women in Sri Lankan society and notes that whilst they have equal rights under the civil and criminal law they face “societal discrimination” and it is common for women to face sexual harassment and employment discrimination. Having said that, the focus of the IRB report is on the situation of single women, including widows and the impact on their ability to get access to governmental services and there is nothing in the IRB report to suggest that women as a body suffer similar consequences. The judge clearly considered the IRB report at paragraph 25 and did not consider the generalised comments on societal discrimination as particularly enlightening, as he was entitled to do so, given it was focused on a different issue i.e. the position of single women.
27. In terms of the submission raised in the grounds of appeal that the appellant should be treated for these purposes as an ‘abandoned woman’, the IRB report concludes that there is no consistent definition as to who was included in the definition of ‘Women-Headed households’ but that certain categories of women were excluded, including ‘abandoned women’, who were often unable to access government welfare and social protection programmes.
28. There is no definition of abandoned women given in the IRB report and it is pure speculation that the appellant was capable of falling into this category. The appellant was, as the judge noted, a married woman whose husband worked oversees. The concept of abandonment would normally connote a unilateral decision by a partner to permanently terminate a relationship and to cease to provide continuing financial or emotional support. This is clearly not the case here as the appellant and her husband would be separated by mutual choice by reason of her husband’s work overseas and presumably, even if he does not join her in Sri Lanka, they will be in regular communication through social media or in person visits.
29. Accordingly, I find no error of law on the basis of the submission on ground 1.
Ground 2: Failure to consider material evidence
30. Mr Bendock submitted that the judge had erred in finding that the appellant’s husband could support the appellant in Sri Lanka and disregarded the evidence that her husband would be unable to get a job due to his age, lack of qualifications and his absence from the Sri Lankan job marker for many years and the state of the Sri Lankan economy. The fact he had never tried to obtain a job in Sri Lanka was not a relevant consideration given his existing employment commitment.
31. The judge at paragraph 31 held that given the appellant’s husband had learned a number of transferable skills as a team leader at B&Q and spoke English to a high level. The assertion in the appellant’s husband oral evidence that he would be unable to find a job was rejected on the basis that he had never sought to find a job in Sri Lanka. With the support of the appellant, who was also highly educated, he concluded there was nothing to prevent the appellant’s returning to Sri Lanka, finding a job and providing accommodation for their co-habitation and payment of living expenses.
32. I can find no error of law in the judge’s approach. The judge expressly considered the appellant’s husband’s witness statement which contains his employment background, his length of absence from the Sri Lankan job market and his view of the state of the Sri Lankan economy. The judge was entitled to place little weight on the evidence of the appellant’s husband that he would not be able to find a job in Sri Lanka since it was not based on any empirical evidence but merely untested assertions on whether he would be able to do so. The reference the judge made to the appellant’s husband never having looked for a job there was illustrative of his determination that this was the case.
Notice of Decision
For the reasons set out above, there were no errors of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal and I decline to set the decision aside.
The appellant’s appeal is dismissed.

Mark Stamp

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
11 January 2026