Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004555

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/53080/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 3 February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DAVIES

Between

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
-and-

BCE
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr K Ojo, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer
For the Respondent: Ms F Shaw, instructed by Kreston Law Limited

Heard at Field House on 9 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Respondent is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Respondent, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Respondent. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Respondent to this appeal, who was the Appellant before the First Tier Tribunal (hereafter referred to as “BCE”) is a citizen of Turkey of Kurdish ethnicity who was born on 20 April 2001. He claimed asylum on 22 January 2023. The Respondent (“the Secretary of State”) refused that claim on 31 January 2024. An appeal against that refusal was heard on 4 August 2025 at Taylor House by First-tier tribunal Judge Hendry (“the Judge”). The appeal was allowed by decision dated 25 August 2025 on protection and Article 8 ECHR grounds.

2. The Secretary of State sought permission to appeal, which was refused on 17 September 2025 by First-tier tribunal Judge Gumsley. The application was renewed to the Upper Tribunal, which granted permission on 5 November 2025. The application comes before me to determine whether there is a material error of law in the Judge’s decision.

3. I have had regard to the contents of the composite hearing bundle, and the submissions of the representatives, to whom I am grateful for their assistance.

4. When BCE claimed asylum, in his initial contact questionnaire on 22 January 2023, he had said that he was seeking asylum because he was homosexual, and that he would be killed if he returned to Turkey. He gave his nationality as Turkish (not Kurdish), although did acknowledge having some knowledge of the Kurdish language. In his asylum interview, he said that he had left Turkey because he was a supporter of the HDP and had been detained by the police. The refusal letter and review decision took a number of points on BCE’s credibility, including that noted above.

5. The Judge acknowledged at [30] that credibility was “the significant issue”. Relevant case law on credibility is referred to at [32-35]. Para.36 states that:

The particular problems in this appeal were two-fold. First, [BCE] had provided no corroborating evidence as to his activities in Turkey, so his appeal rested on his own personal credibility. Secondly, [BCE] had been specifically untruthful in his initial interview on 22 January 2023, when he said that he was claiming asylum because he was gay.

6. It is noted at [37] that BCE had corrected his grounds for seeking asylum by way of his statement of additional grounds on 14 September 2023 after obtaining legal advice, and that he had been asked specifically during the hearing about why he had initially claimed to be gay, and had responded that he was afraid that information about his asylum claim would become known to the Turkish authorities. At [41] the Judge acknowledges that BCE’s statements contained significant detail about events in Turkey. At [42] it is recorded that BCE had been subject to “robust cross examination” and that:

…beyond clarifying some of the discrepancies in his evidence, he kept to the account he had given in his statements and in his asylum interview. I noted the inconsistencies but, apart from the claim to be gay, they were all relatively minor.

7. The conclusion on credibility is at [45]:

His overall account fitted generally with the external evidence about Alevi Kurds and HDP supporters in Turkey. I had to decide on a balance of probabilities whether the appellant has a characteristic which could cause him to fear persecution, and whether he did fear such persecution. In considering the evidence as a whole, on that basis, I conclude that he does satisfy this requirement.

8. The Secretary of State raises two grounds of appeal:
i. Error in approach to the Appellant’s lie about his basis for claiming asylum; and
ii. Inadequate reasoning in relation to other credibility factors.

9. In terms of reasons, I take into account the Practice Direction – Reasons for decisions dated 4 June 2024 issued by the Senior President of Tribunals (SPT). I note paragraphs 5 and 6 of the Practice Direction in particular.

10. The Supreme Court in HA (Iraq) v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22 reiterated the need for judicial caution and restraint when considering whether to set aside a decision of a specialist tribunal. In particular, judges of the specialist tribunal are best placed to make factual findings. Appellate courts should not rush to find misdirections simply because they might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v SSHD [2007] UKHL 49 and KM v SSHD [2021] EWCA Civ 693.

11. Where a relevant point is not expressly mentioned by the tribunal, the court should be slow to infer that it has not been taken into account: see MA (Somalia) v SSHD [2020] UKSC 49.

12. When it comes to the reasons given by the tribunal, the court should exercise judicial restraint and should not assume that the tribunal misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning is fully set out: see R (Jones) v FTT (SEC) [2013] UKSC 19.

13. I take into account that the Judge in this case had the benefit of seeing and hearing BCE’s oral evidence.

Discussion - Ground 1

14. The Secretary of State contends that the significance of a lie may be central in the context of an asylum claim, relying on Azizi (Succinct credibility findings, lies) [2024] UKUT 65 (IAC). The headnote to Azizi records that:

1. A determination in relation to an appeal must deal with the principal controversial issues presented to the judge, and it may be possible in some circumstances to provide adequate reasons in relation to those issues succinctly, provided they deal with the points raised by the party and enable the parties to understand why the decision has been reached.
2. Where an appellant accepts that he has told lies during his immigration history it will be appropriate to consider his explanation for telling those lies, and whether that explanation is accepted, as part of the fact-finding process.

15. The Secretary of State further relies on MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49. In that case, it was held at para.31 - 32 that:

31. …where a claimant tells lies on a central issue, his or her case will not be saved by general evidence unless that evidence is extremely strong. It is only evidence of that kind which will be sufficient to counteract the negative pull of the lie. But much depends on the bearing that the lie has on the case…

32. Where the appellant has given a totally incredible account of the relevant facts, the tribunal must decide what weight to give to the lie, as well as to all the other evidence in the case, including the general evidence. Suppose, for example, that at the interview stage the appellant made an admission which, if true, would destroy his claim; and at the hearing before the AIT he withdraws the admission, saying that his answer at interview was wrongly recorded or that he misunderstood what he was being asked. If the AIT concludes that his evidence at the hearing on this point is dishonest, it is likely that his lies will assume great importance. They will almost certainly lead the tribunal to find that his original answers were true and dismiss his appeal. In other cases, the significance of an appellant’s dishonest testimony may be less clear-cut…

16. I conclude from review of these authorities that the circumstances of the case and the context of a lie being told are relevant to the question of the weight to be given to the lie. It is relevant to consider the explanation put forward for the lie having been told. The significance of a lie will be relevant to its weight in the assessment of credibility. The duty to give reasons may be met by way of succinct reasons, provided they deal with the points raised by the party and enable the parties to understand why the decision has been reached.

17. The thrust of the Secretary of State’s argument in this appeal is that the significance of BCE’s lie as told in his initial information (i.e. that he was homosexual) was such that there was a requirement for the Judge to address BCE’s explanation for the lie, and to provide reasons if the explanation was to be accepted. It is argued that there was no adequate analysis of BCE’s explanation, or consideration of whether that explanation could be accepted, and that this amounts to an error of law, given the centrality of the credibility issue to the appeal.

18. I accept that credibility was a central issue to BCE’s appeal and therefore if there was an error of law in the Judge’s approach to credibility, it would be material.

19. Paragraph 36 of the determination acknowledges that BCE had been “…specifically untruthful in his initial interview on 22 January 2023, when he said that he was claiming asylum because he was gay”. Paragraph 37 records BCE’s explanation for that untruthfulness. Mr Ojo referred me to the standard information provided to an applicant at the outset of an interview, which includes information regarding the confidentiality of the asylum process. I take into account that BCE provided his explanation to the Judge, and is recorded as having been robustly cross-examined. The fact that BCE’s account withstood such cross-examination is recorded at [42] where it is stated that, “I noted the inconsistencies but, apart from the claim to be gay, they were all relatively minor”. That, in my view, is an acknowledgement that the “claim to be gay” is not a minor inconsistency and is an implicit finding that it is a significant credibility issue. Insofar as the Secretary of State’s complaint is that the Judge failed to ascribe weight to the lie, I conclude that the Judge did so, in separating it from the relatively minor issues.

20. The Judge then went on to consider photographic, documentary and external evidence, and concluded at [45] that, “In considering the evidence as a whole, on that basis, I conclude that he does satisfy this requirement”. In so doing, the Judge considered whether on the whole, the lie was outweighed by the totality of the evidence in support of the claim.

21. Looking at the determination as a whole, and having regard to the authorities noted at paragraphs 9-12 above, I am satisfied that the Judge’s approach to the BCE’s lie does not amount to an error of law. The Judge implicitly recognised the lie as being more significant than a minor inconsistency. The explanation for the lie is recorded, and is noted as having been the subject of cross-examination. Other matters relevant to credibility (photographic, documentary and external evidence), are weighed against the acknowledged lie, leading to a conclusion that the core of the claim, notwithstanding the admitted lie, is accepted.

22. I consider that approach to be in line with the authorities noted above, which acknowledge that the circumstances of the case, and context in which a lie was told, are relevant to its weight in the overall assessment of credibility.

23. Insofar as it is asserted that the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for the weight given to the lie, I consider the Judge’s reasoning to be discernible (as outlined above) and adequate, having regard in particular to the Practice Direction.

Discussion - Ground 2

24. The Secretary of State’s complaint under Ground 2 is that other aspects of credibility relied upon in the refusal and review decisions and at the hearing are not expressly addressed within the determination, amounting to a failure to give reasons.

25. The Secretary of State raised, amongst other things, a lack of consistency as to where BCE was arrested on the first occasion and as to the frequency with which he was required to report to the authorities on release. The Secretary of State also questioned the plausibility of BCE being recruited as an informer given that he was not able to speak Kurdish (he had, it should be noted, reported that he could understand Kurdish, but could not speak it).

26. Mr Ojo accepted in submissions that the Judge was not required to address each and every point that had been taken in the refusal and/ or review decisions, but submitted that alleged dishonesty of BCE should have been engaged with and was not.

27. I find that the Judge was not required to address each and every credibility issue that had been relied upon. The Judge’s task was to determine the core facts and to apply those to the claims for protection and under the ECHR. BCE’s credibility was clearly identified as an issue in dispute, and the Judge made findings upon it. The Judge was entitled to regard some of the alleged inconsistences as being “relatively minor” in conducting the function of giving weight [42].

28. It is sufficiently clear that the minor inconsistencies were considered to be outweighed by the overall view that there was broad consistency between the BCE’s accounts (with the exception of the claimed homosexuality) and with external sources, in particular at 42-45.

Conclusion

29. There is no material error of law in the Judge’s decision. The Secretary of State’s appeal shall be dismissed.

Notice of Decision

1. There is no material error of law in the determination of First-tier tribunal Judge Hendry dated 25 August 2025.
2. The Secretary of State’s appeal is dismissed.

Siân Davies

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

9 January 2026