Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004582
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/62504/2024
LP/10621/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 7th of October 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE PINDER

Between

A K Z
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr J Greer, Counsel instructed by Legal Justice Solicitors.
For the Respondent: Ms S Simbi, Senior Presenting Officer.

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 7 July 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. This is the re-making of the decision in the Appellant’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s refusal of his protection and human rights claims. This follows Upper Tribunal Judge Lodato’s and Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Richards’ (‘the panel’) earlier decision to set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the FtT’). The FtT decision had dismissed the Appellant’s appeal on all grounds and was set aside because this contained material error(s) of law. The panel’s decision (‘the error of law decision’) was promulgated on 22nd February 2026.
2. Following a transfer order, I heard the remaking appeal on 7th July 2026.
3. I have maintained the Anonymity Order in favour of the Appellant, which was made both in the FtT and in this Tribunal (see para 2 of the error of law decision for the latter). I continue to consider that, on the specific facts of this appeal, the maintenance of the integrity of the United Kingdom’s immigration system and the Appellant having raised a claim to international protection against the Iranian authorities are such that an Anonymity Order is a justified derogation from the principle of open justice. I have at the forefront of my mind the strong public interest in open justice. Nevertheless, the potential risks of persecution or serious harm to the Applicant, outweigh, in my judgment, the right of the public to know of his identity.
4. As was recorded in the ‘Notice of Decision’ at the end of the panel’s error of law decision, the focus for the re-making hearing in this Tribunal, and for my decision, is to conduct a risk assessment, taking into consideration all relevant risk factors on a cumulative basis, including the Appellant’s Kurdish ethnicity, his illegal exit from Iran, the possibility of him being identified as having engaged in sur place activities in the UK, and his background as having previously worked as a Kolbar – see paras 28, 32-37 of the error of law decision.
5. The panel also preserved some of the findings of the FtT and expressly referred to these in the ‘Notice of Decision’, namely preserving the findings at [16]-[26] and [29]-[35] of the FtT’s decision. Many of those findings relate to the Appellant’s pre-flight claim, which was not accepted by the FtT and which does not form part of the Appellant’s appeal to this Tribunal. Thus, in so far as the preserved findings are relevant to the re-making hearing and for ease of reference, I summarise those findings as follows:
(a) The Appellant gave inconsistent accounts about when he began working as a Kolbar, although this inconsistency did not undermine the core claim that he had undertaken Kolbar work at some stage. The Judge accepted that the Appellant had likely engaged in smuggling alcohol and tobacco as a Kolbar and had given a generally consistent account of those activities – [16]-[18];
(b) The Judge rejected the Appellant’s claim ‘pre-flight’ regarding his claimed difficulties with the authorities arising from purportedly assisting two alleged KDPI members and the raid on his storage facility and home in Iran – [19]-[21] and [23]-[25];
(c) The Judge was not satisfied that the Appellant had left Iran in the manner claimed, finding that his explanation of the arrangements for his departure lacked credibility and that his travel was likely pre-planned – [26]. It was accepted however that the Appellant had left Iran illegally;
(d) The Judge found that the Appellant’s sur place political activities (Facebook posts and attendance at demonstrations) were not genuinely motivated by political belief. The Judge noted that the Appellant had not been politically active in Iran, only began attending demonstrations shortly after arriving in the UK, and he had not adequately explained the development of his claimed political views. The Judge concluded that the Appellant’s attendance at demonstrations was “contrived” to support his asylum claim. Accordingly, the Judge found that he would not continue such activities on return to Iran and would not be required to suppress genuinely held political beliefs – [30]-[32];
(e) The Judge also found that the Appellant’s participation in demonstrations was limited to that of an ordinary attendee undertaking a low level role. Nor was the Appellant a member of any organisation – [33].
(f) As regards Facebook activity, the Judge found that the Appellant had failed to provide the evidence envisaged by the reported decision of XX. The Judge also considered that several aspects of the account were unclear, including for example whether the account or the various published posts were on a ‘private’ or ‘public’ setting. The Judge also noted that the Appellant was illiterate and concluded that the Appellant was not the apparent author of the posts, had not explained who assisted him in operating the account. The Judge also considered that the account appeared to be in a different name from that used by the Appellant, which meant that this would not be attributable or traceable to the Appellant, who can in any event delete the account, pursuant to the guidance in XX – [34]-[35].
6. The Respondent’s decision refusing the Appellant’s claims is dated 25th April 2024 and arises from the Appellant’s claim which he lodged on 23rd February 2023. The provisions of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 on how to assess protection claims and appeals therefore apply.
The evidence
7. I have before me a composite bundle (‘trial bundle’/’TB’) of evidence of 748 pages. This collated the parties’ respective evidence before the FtT and brought this up to date for the proceedings in the Upper Tribunal and the re-making hearing. I have given careful consideration to all of the written materials contained in this bundle.
The hearing
8. The Appellant attended the hearing and was the only witness to be called to give oral evidence. He was assisted by a Kurdish Sorani interpreter and confirmed the truth and accuracy of his witness statement dated 22nd June 2026. The Appellant was then cross-examined by Ms Simbi on behalf of the Respondent and there was no re-examination of the Appellant by Mr Greer.
9. Following the Appellant’s oral evidence, I heard legal submissions from both advocates, after which I confirmed that I would be reserving my decision. I have addressed both parties’ competing evidence and submissions below when setting out my analysis and conclusions.
Findings of Fact and Conclusions
The Appellant’s sur place activities
10. It is not in dispute and/or it has now been established that the Appellant is of Kurdish ethnicity, that he has worked as a Kolbar, that he left Iran illegally and that he has attended demonstrations protesting against the Iranian regime here in the UK. The Appellant does not seek to re-visit before me the aspects of his pre-flight claim, which were not accepted by the FtT.
11. Pursuant to the findings of the FtT which have been preserved, it has been found that the Appellant did not genuinely hold a political belief. This is premised, as recorded at [32] of the FtT’s decision, on the Appellant not having been politically active in Iran, having only started attending demonstrations shortly after his arrival and it not being clear to the FtT when the Appellant acquired his new found political beliefs.
12. The Appellant has continued to attend demonstrations here in the UK since the dismissal of his appeal in the FtT (now set aside). In total, he has attended a further five demonstrations between May 2025 and June 2026. In his statement, the Appellant explains that he was not politically active in Iran “because of the strict rules and the regime’s suppression of Kurds.” The Appellant adds that since coming to the UK, he has been politically active because he “can express himself freely here without fear” (TB [29]). Specifically with regards to the demonstrations, the Appellant relies on the fact that he appears in many of the photographs of the demonstrations posted online by others and that he was also interviewed by a broadcasting platform ‘K4’.
13. In his oral evidence before me, the Appellant stated in summary that he has attended the demonstrations to exercise his rights to freedom of expression and to protest against the treatment of Kurds in Iran. He said that, as a Kolbar and a member of the Kurdish minority, he had experienced restrictions on fundamental rights, including the ability to provide for their daily needs, to receive an education in the Kurdish language, and to express their Kurdish identity in “simple” ways such as to wear Kurdish clothes. The Appellant relied on there being “a huge injustice with regards to treatment by the Iranian regime towards the Kurdish nation.”
14. The Appellant was duly cross-examined by Ms Simbi. In response to her questions, the Appellant stated that his opposition to the Iranian regime pre-dated his arrival in the UK, but that he had been unable to express those views openly in Iran because doing so would result in conviction(s), severe punishment, including execution. He referred to the treatment of others, including a friend from his village whom he said was executed after being found in possession of certain items, including a flag that said “Woman, Life, Freedom”.
15. The Appellant confirmed in cross-examination that he remained informed about events in Iran through news and media sources, particularly AVA, and through social media. He claimed that the Iranian authorities continue to target Kurdish individuals and political opponents, including those alleged to support foreign states in the context of the current and on-going conflict.
16. When challenged about the genuineness of his political activities, the Appellant maintained that, if questioned on return to Iran, he would tell the truth about his attendance at demonstrations and anti-regime activities. He believed that the authorities would regard him as a political opponent because of his participation in demonstrations, his social media activity, his past smuggling activities (as a Kolbar), and his involvement in burning the Iranian flag and chanting anti-regime slogans.
17. The Appellant referred to Iranian officials monitoring demonstrations in the UK, including through embassy staff who photograph participants and relay information to the authorities in Iran. He also maintained that Iranian authorities monitor public social media profiles. However, he accepted that he had never been contacted directly by the Iranian authorities, nor had anyone approached him through his Facebook account.
18. The Appellant stated that he would not delete his Facebook account before returning to Iran, describing it as an expression of his freedom of speech and asserting that deletion would not remove, in any event, material already shared by others. The Appellant also referred to a speech he had given, which was featured on K4’s website, an international media platform. Although he accepted that he was not involved with senior Kurdish activists or organisations, he considered even low-level participation to be an important means of making Kurdish voices heard.
19. The Appellant expressed the view that Kurdish diaspora activism had increased international awareness of the treatment of Kurds in Iran. He stated that he supported international efforts to challenge the Iranian regime, including within the context of the on-going conflict, and believed such efforts were necessary to secure freedom, equality, and justice for all people in Iran.
20. Mr Greer submitted on behalf of the Appellant that I am permitted to make findings on the Appellant’s motivation for attending the five further demonstrations and for continuing to post anti-regime materials on Facebook. This is because I am assessing risk on return to the Appellant as at the time of the hearing, and those recent events remain relevant to that assessment. Ms Simbi responded that the starting point for my findings remain the adverse credibility findings reached by the FtT on the Appellant’s political beliefs, which I have summarised above at para 5.
21. For the avoidance of doubt, I do not consider that there is a basis for me to re-visit the findings reached by the FtT in relation to the evidence before it.
22. It remains the case that the Appellant has continued to attend demonstrations and has continued to express a claimed political belief in those demonstrations, on Facebook posts, on other platforms online, and before me within these proceedings. He also maintains that he would wish to continue to do so on return and would only refrain from doing so because of the ill-treatment risk.
23. I am prepared to accept that at least one of the reasons why the Appellant was not politically active in Iran was because of the risks that this would have otherwise entailed. This is consistent with the background evidence available and the country guidance – HB (Kurds) Iran (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) CG [2018] UKUT 430 (IAC), which documents at para (7) of the head-note that “(e)ven Kurds expressing peaceful dissent or who speak out about Kurdish rights also face a real risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment.” The FtT did not make a finding as to why the Appellant had not been politically active previously in Iran.
24. Having heard the Appellant give evidence, subjected to robust cross-examination, which directly tested his beliefs, I am satisfied that as at the date of the hearing, the Appellant espouses a belief against the Iranian state authorities, which is grounded in his belief that Kurds are discriminated against, are not free and equal in Iran, and which stems from the Appellant’s own experiences of being suppressed when living in Iran. At the very least, those experiences include the Appellant working as a Kolbar, and all that that entailed – see section 5.6 of the Respondent’s ‘Country Bulletin Iran: Kurds and Kurdish political groups’, May 2026.
25. I also accept that the Appellant’s belief has been expressed in the Appellant’s attendance at demonstrations, with specific reference to those he has continued to attend since his appeal was dismissed at first instance. His attendance is not disputed.
26. Even if I am wrong about the nature of his politic beliefs as at the time of this hearing, it is of particular relevance that the Appellant is pictured in numerous photographs holding posters of at least A4, and sometimes larger sizes, which depict slogans and images that are clearly highly dissident and critical of the regime, the late Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and other aspects of the Iranian state authorities. The Appellant is also photographed with materials that are clearly pro-Kurdish, Kurdish rights and/or nation (TB [34]-[36]; [38]-[41]; [44]-[56]). This is relevant to the issue of perception and imputed political opinion, which I consider further below in my decision.
27. In these photographs, the Appellant is very clearly visible and recognisable since the photographs feature the Appellant relatively close-up in the foreground. In some of the photographs, the Appellant is standing very close to what appears to be the main entrance to the embassy (with the Iranian flag above the entrance). In some of those pictures in front of the Embassy and in others, the Appellant is holding the Kurdish flag (TB [42]-[43] and [37]).
28. I detail the above because, as I have mentioned at [26], I am satisfied that even if I am wrong about the Appellant’s motivation for expressing his political beliefs since May 2025, I consider it likely that the Appellant would be perceived by the Iranian authorities as espousing beliefs that are pro-Kurdish and against the Iranian state and institutions. This is if the materials considered above come to the attention of the Iranian authorities, which I consider further below.
29. With regards to the Appellant’s other activities undertaken whilst in the UK, which he says support his claim to have a well-founded fear of persecution on the ground of actual or imputed political opinion, the Appellant posts on Facebook. This has already been considered by the FtT and the Appellant has not addressed before me the issue of the name on his Facebook account. It also remains the case that the Appellant has not disclosed the full download of his data on Facebook, which does not assist with assessing the Appellant’s social media footprint, pursuant to XX (PJAK - sur place activities - Facebook) Iran CG [2022] UKUT 00023 (IAC). Nevertheless, I can see that many of the photographs depicting the Appellant at demonstrations in the UK have been published on the Facebook account, including that which shows the Appellant holding a burnt Iranian flag (TB [70]-[82]; [85]-87]; [90]-[108]; [110]-[112]; [114] and [118]-[126]). I do not rehearse my assessment of those photographs at paras 26-28 above.
30. The fact that the Appellant is not proficient in reading and writing, particularly in English, and the fact that he needs the assistance of others to effect some or many of his posts does not necessarily mean that the Appellant only posts on Facebook for reasons only related to strengthening his protection claim. Such a conclusion would otherwise mean that expressing an opinion in writing is only reserved for educated and literate persons, which is perverse and not a reality. This is not what the FtT had found either.
31. In assessing the Appellant’s evidence and its credibility, particularly with regard to his political beliefs, I have considered, as my starting point, the adverse credibility findings of the FtT. In his evidence on his sur place activities, which he has continued to undertake since the FtT’s appeal, I found the Appellant to be a compelling witness. He responded to all questions during Ms Simbi’s cross-examination with clarity and composure. Notably, the Appellant did not seek to exaggerate or embellish his involvement in real-world political activities. For instance, he candidly confirmed that he had not been one of the organisers of the demonstrations, as he had before the FtT but that the point of him attending was to support the demonstration, to stand together against the Iranian regime, and to show a position against them. The Appellant’s answer included the following (from my note) in response to Ms Simbi’s question as to whether he was involved with any senior leaders or Kurdish activists:
“Every single step, whether as a group or alone, would have a voice especially in the present life where the voice can be heard very easily, no matter where you are living.”
32. From the Appellant’s evidence when considered as a whole, I find that he has given a clear and persuasive account of his reasons for attending the five more recent demonstrations. I agree with Mr Greer that it is likely that the origin of the Appellant’s views lie in his accepted background as a Kolbar. The Appellant explained that the rights of Kolbars had been taken away and he linked that experience to the wider treatment of Kurdish people in Iran. The background information on Kolbars supports to this. I also take into consideration that the FtT’s findings are premised on the Appellant’s inability to explain what had changed since his arrival in the UK, not from a lack of knowledge or expression of a pro-Kurdish political belief.
33. This is in contrast with the Respondent’s position, which in effect amounts to describing the Appellant as Kurdish, as having engaged in smuggling activities, and accepting that he attended numerous demonstrations, whilst nevertheless maintaining that the Appellant held no genuine political beliefs at all. I agree that in the circumstances of this case, this is unrealistic and does not take into account the real-world spectrum of political belief and how these are expressed.
34. Supporting the Appellant’s position is also the guidance from Lord Kerr in RT (Zimbabwe) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2012] UKSC 38. Political motivation and expression indeed exists on a spectrum, ranging from those entirely motivated by political conviction to those with no political motivation whatsoever. The Appellant need not be at the extreme (top) end of that spectrum. If his attendance was/is motivated, even in part, by genuine opposition to the regime or by some degree of political affinity with those opposing it, that is sufficient.
35. Moreover, from the same guidance in RT (Zimbabwe), I remind myself that caution is needed in a context whereby the Iranian authorities are known to act with a “hair-trigger” approach, holding heightened suspicions towards those of Kurdish ethnicity. The guidance at paras 72 and 74 of Lord Kerr’s judgment resonates, both as to the difficulties in assessing what may be differing spectrums of political opinion(s) held (if any) and the emphasis on the persecutor’s mind (my emphasis):
“72. As a matter of fundamental principle, refusal of refugee status should not be countenanced where the basis on which that otherwise undeniable status is not accorded is a requirement that the person who claims it should engage in dissimulation. This is especially so in the case of a pernicious and openly oppressive regime such as exists in Zimbabwe. But it is also entirely objectionable on purely practical grounds. The intellectual exercise (if it can be so described) of assessing whether (i) a person would - and could reasonably be expected to – lie; and (ii) whether that dissembling could be expected to succeed, is not only artificial, it is entirely unreal. To attempt to predict whether an individual on any given day, could convince a group of undisciplined and unpredictable militia of the fervour of his or her support for Zanu-PF is an impossible exercise.
73. But all of the foregoing is by way of incidental preamble. The truly critical question in this appeal is whether there is a right in Refugee Convention terms not to have a political opinion. Ultimately, Mr Swift was driven to accept that there is such a right but he suggested that this right can be attenuated according to the disposition of the person who espouses a strictly apolitical stance.
74. I consider that this central proposition is fundamentally flawed. The level of entitlement to protection cannot be calibrated according to the inclination of the individual who claims it. The essential character of the right is inherent to the nature of the right, not to the value that an individual places on it. And the need for a clear insight into that critical aspect of the right is well exemplified by the situation in Zimbabwe. If an apolitical individual fails to demonstrate plausibly that he or she is a sufficiently fervent supporter of Zanu-PF, he or she will be deemed to be a political opponent, irrespective of how greatly he or she cherishes the right not to hold a political view. The status of deemed political opponent, whether it is the product of imputation of political opposition or merely the arbitrary decision of those testing the degree of conviction or fervour with which support for Zanu-PF is expressed, is the gateway to persecution and that cannot be dependent on whether the lack of political opinion is due to a consciously held conviction or merely due to indifference. That is why the emphasis must be not on the disposition of the individual liable to be the victim of persecution but on the mind of the persecutor.”
36. I take into consideration, as the Court of Appeal noted in S v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 1482 – also relied upon by Ms Simbi - that the issues which the Supreme Court were considering in RT (Zimbabwe), arose in a different context, namely the return of a non-political Zimbabwean to an area in which it was likely that he would have to provide a convincingly false account of his allegiance to the ruling party when stopped and questioned by ill-disciplined militia at roadblocks. As noted by the Upper Tribunal in XX at [98], Lord Kerr had raised practical concerns in evaluating whether lying to a group of ill-disciplined and unpredictable militia would be successful but made clear that his comments were by way of “incidental preamble”, as the critical question was whether the appellant in that case had the right to political neutrality.
37. Nevertheless, the Iran country guidance decisions establish heightened tensions in Iran in security terms both generally and in relation to those of Kurdish ethnicity, meaning that those of Kurdish ethnicity are regarded with even greater suspicion and are reasonably likely to be subjected to heightened scrutiny - (HB (Kurds) [50] and [94].
38. A returnee to Iran will not face an unpredictable militia, as was considered in RT (Zimbabwe), but a highly organised state – XX at [99]. It is also relevant that from the background information, as reported and recorded in the Respondent’s CPIN ‘Kurds and Kurdish political groups, Iran’, October 2025, repression against the Kurds intensified in 2024 (para 14.4.9). Similarly, I also accept that the recent conflict and the recent crackdowns on the protesters in Iran by the Iranian authorities has contributed to the Appellant’s progression in political belief.
Assessment of risk on return
39. I now turn to assess whether the Appellant is at a real risk on return, as a result of his actual and/or imputed political opinion.
40. I have reminded myself and taken into full consideration all of the Country Guidance authorities relating to Iran, in particular, XX (PJAK, sur place activities, Facebook) Iran (CG) [2022] UKUT 23 (IAC), PS (Christianity - risk) Iran CG [2020] UKUT 46 (IAC), HB (Kurds) Iran (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) CG [2018] UKUT 430 (IAC), SSH and HR (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) Iran (CG) [2016] UKUT 308 (IAC) and BA (Demonstrators in Britain - risk on return) Iran CG [2011] UKUT 36 (IAC).
41. When determining whether the Appellant faces a risk, I have considered the factors set out at [64] of BA (Demonstrators in Britain - risk on return) Iran CG, and kept in mind what is said at [92] and [95] of XX (PJAK, sur place activities, Facebook) Iran (CG).
42. As per BA (para 3 of the headnote), the level of a person’s political profile and activism is the starting point for considering the likelihood of an individual coming to the attention of the authorities and the degree of interest the Iranian regime would have in identifying him.
43. The Upper Tribunal also identified in BA the relevant factors to be considered when assessing the level of a person’s political activism as follows ([4 (i]):
“Role in demonstrations and political profile – can the person be described as a leader; mobiliser (e.g. addressing the crowd), organiser (e.g. leading the chanting); or simply a member of the crowd; if the latter is he active or passive (e.g. does he carry a banner); what is his motive, and is this relevant to the profile he will have in the eyes of the regime?”
44. Pursuant to the FtT’s findings, preserved before me and my analysis above, I find that the Appellant was simply a member of the crowd in most, if not all, demonstrations that he attended. From the photographs that appear within the Facebook posts, I am satisfied that he was active in that he was carrying and displaying posters, that are in opposition to the Iranian regime and authorities and which is also in accordance with his motives, namely a genuinely held political belief that is pro-Kurdish rights.
45. As to other forms of engagement, having applied the guidance in XX at [87]-[89], I am not satisfied that the Facebook profile and activities, relied upon by the Appellant, have to date been monitored by the Iranian authorities. I am also not satisfied that the photographs depicting the Appellant as a protester, which have been published on the internet are reasonably likely to come to the attention of the Iranian authorities when re-documenting the Appellant, whether or not the Facebook account is deleted sufficiently in advance of any appointment for Emergency Travel Document (‘ETD’) purposes. This is because the photographs have been published within a Facebook account that does not bear the Appellant’s name.
46. Applying the country guidance decisions, I must now begin with a factual assessment of the Appellant’s likely behaviour at the ‘pinch-point’ of return and that enquiry must be grounded in the practical realities of enforced return to Iran. Where an individual does not hold a valid passport, removal is ordinarily effected through the issue of an ETD by the Iranian Embassy in London. The country guidance recognises that, in that process, the Iranian authorities undertake security checks concerning the individual’s background and activities outside Iran, and that information obtained may be available to officials in Iran prior to the individual’s arrival.
47. The Upper Tribunal confirmed in XX that the cases of BA (Demonstrators in Britain – risk on return) Iran CG, SSH and HR (illegal exit: failed asylum seeker) Iran CG and HB (Kurds) Iran CG continue accurately to reflect the situation for returnees to Iran.
48. It is well established in BA, SSH and HR, and XX that returnees are routinely screened and questioned on arrival, and that this questioning is not cursory but structured and potentially prolonged. The level of questioning does depend on the individual case. That questioning also takes place whether or not a returnee has already been identified as a person of interest prior to their return. The questioning is likely to cover the following areas:
a. The Appellant’s illegal exit and travel history;
b. Whether the Appellant claimed asylum in the UK and the reasons for his claim, this is likely to include the Appellant’s attendance at demonstrations as fact;
c. What the Appellant previously did in Iran, this is likely to include his work history as a Kolbar and his involvement in smuggling alcohol and tobacco since the Appellant cannot be expected to lie about or otherwise conceal this. This is likely to exacerbate any adverse interest in the Appellant;
d. Whether the Appellant supports or has supported a political party;
e. The Appellant’s family associations;
f. The Appellant’s opinions about Kurdish organisations and Kurdish rights;
g. The Appellant’s sur place activity/ies in the United Kingdom, as considered above.
49. Applying the above country guidance to the Appellant’s circumstances, I am satisfied that the Appellant is at real risk of suffering persecution and/or serious harm on return. This is for the following reasons:
(a) The Appellant is of Kurdish ethnicity and Kurds in Iran face discrimination – the various country guidance authorities are clear that this is, in general, not to a level that amounts to persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment but it is a relevant consideration which increases the risk(s) that the Appellant faces – see HB Kurds para (5) of head-note;
(b) The Iranian authorities have become and continue to be increasingly suspicious of, and sensitive to, Kurdish political activity. Those of Kurdish ethnicity, like the Appellant, are thus regarded with even greater suspicion and are reasonably likely to be subjected to heightened scrutiny on return to Iran – HB Kurds para (5);
(c) Other relevant factors pursuant to para (5) of the head-note in HB Kurds also apply to the Appellant;
(d) The Appellant has expressed political opinions, which are in opposition to the Iranian authorities, during demonstrations in the UK and with photographs published and shared by others on Facebook. Whilst there may be questions concerning the Appellant’s Facebook account as a result of the name, the Appellant cannot be expected to lie about his attendance at the demonstrations in 2025 and 2026 nor to conceal this;
(e) The Appellant has also expressed political opinions that are pro-Kurdish and on my findings, these are genuinely held. This places him at a risk of adverse attention by the Iranian authorities with the consequent risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment. This is because “involvement with any organised activity on behalf of or in support of Kurds can be perceived as political” and “(e)ven Kurds expressing peaceful dissent or who speak out about Kurdish rights also face” such a real risk – HB Kurds para (7)-(8);
(f) Even ‘low-level’ political activity, or activity that is perceived to be political, such as that engaged by the Appellant in supporting Kurdish rights, if discovered, involves the same risk of persecution or Article 3 ill-treatment. The Appellant cannot be expected to lie about his affinity with Kurdish rights nor to conceal this. Prolonged questioning of the Appellant on this area is reasonably likely to reveal the Appellant’s involvement in the protests in the UK. On my assessment, the materials (in the form of the photographs) published featuring the Appellant, if discovered, are likely to be viewed by the Iranian authorities as aligned with Kurdish politics and rights and in opposition to the authorities – HB Kurds para (9). These photographs remain in the Appellant’s possession.
50. In light of the above and the ‘hair-trigger’ approached, as described by the Upper Tribunal in HB Kurds at para 10, I am satisfied that the Appellant is at real risk of persecution and/or serious harm contrary to the Refugee Convention and Article 3 ECHR. This is as a result of the cumulative effect of the Appellant’s own background as a Kurd, as a Kolbar, as someone who exited illegally and as someone who has claimed asylum in the UK, where he has also been active in demonstrations in support of Kurdish rights, albeit to a low-level.
51. Iranians returning to Iran are screened on arrival. A returnee who meets the profile of a (perceived) activist may be detained while searches of documentation are made. One of the factors identified by the Upper Tribunal in BA also applies to the Appellant for triggering inquiry/action on return, namely his immigration history with his illegal exit from Iran and his residence in the UK since 2023. An additional factor is the Appellant’s work as a Kolbar, who has smuggled alcohol and tobacco. This is more likely to lead to inquiry and/or the Appellant being detained for more than a short period and ill-treated – see BA para 4(iii).
52. Ms Simbi submitted that the country guidance was silent as to how the Iranian authorities would react in such circumstances. It is clear however that the country guidance describes a two-stage screening process. Pursuant to my findings above, the Appellant’s profile, with the cumulative nature of the factors considered above, is likely to pass beyond the initial stage and cross into the threshold for further scrutiny, when subjected to questioning at the airport.
53. Whilst I have considered the fact that the Appellant was previously found to have attended the earlier set of demonstrations in order to bolster his protection claim, I agree with Mr Greer that there is nothing, in this particular case, to suggest that the authorities would disregard the attendance and/or form the view that the Appellant did not truly believe in his actions. This is because of the other risk factors that apply to the Appellant and his affinity towards the promotion of Kurdish rights – even if at a low-level. This is consistent in my judgment with the country guidance concerning the ‘hair-trigger’ approach of the Iranian authorities to those suspected of or perceived to be involved in Kurdish political activities or support for Kurdish rights.
54. I therefore conclude that the Appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution on the basis of his actual, or in the alternative, imputed political beliefs. The issues of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation do not arise since the Appellant’s fear is of the Iranian authorities.
Notice of Decision
55. The decision of the FtT dated 22nd January 2025 did involve the making of a material error of law and has been set aside, pursuant to the panel’s decision promulgated on 26th February 2026.
56. I re-make the decision by allowing AKZ’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision of 25th April 2024 on Refugee Convention and Article 3 human rights grounds

Sarah Pinder
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
01.10.2026