Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004586

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54146/2022
IA/10077/2022

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 23rd December 2025

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KHAN

Between

L M
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Raggi Kotak of Counsel, instructed by Duncan Lewis Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Kerr , Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 27 November 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal by which his appeal under s.72 Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 (‘NIAA 2002’), together with his protection and human rights claims were dismissed.
2. The appellant is a citizen of Albania. The precise date of when he entered the United Kingdom is unknown, but he claims to have arrived clandestinely in November 2014 and was served with a notice for illegal entry. On 8 December 2019, he was arrested on suspicion of possession with intent to supply class A drugs, driving with no insurance and immigration offences. On 09 January 2019, the appellant was convicted at Guildford Crown Court for possession with intent to supply a controlled drug class A cocaine, use of a vehicle without insurance and driving a motor vehicle otherwise than in accordance with a licence. The appellant was given 30 months imprisonment.
3. On 29 April 2019, the appellant was served with a decision to deport pursuant to the Immigration Act 1971 and the Borders Act 2007. He did not submit any reasons why he should not be deported but indicated that he wanted to be removed under the facilitated returns Scheme. On 18 June 2020, the appellant became the subject of a deportation order and on 27 August 2020 was removed to Albania.
4. On 22 November 2020, the appellant was encountered in Essex and was served with a notice of refusal to enter and detained under immigration powers. On 5 May 2021, he was notified of removal directions to Albania scheduled for 29 May 2021. The appellant stated that he wished to claim asylum and the removal directions were deferred. On 18 August 2021, the appellant completed his substantive interview and on 27 September 2021 a Positive Reasonable Grounds (‘RG’) decision was made on his possible victim of trafficking claim. On 25 October 2021, the appellant was issued with a letter pursuant to S. 72 NIAA 2002.
5. In the respondent’s s.72 NIAA 2002 letter, the appellant was informed that any claim for asylum would be refused. This was because for the purposes of Article 33(2) of the Geneva Convention, a person is presumed to have been convicted by final judgment of a particularly serious crime, and constitute a danger to the community of the UK, where he has: (a) been convicted in the UK of an offence, and (b) sentenced to a period of imprisonment of ta least two years.
6. Pursuant to s.72(6) NIAA 2002, the appellant was invited to rebut the presumption that the crime he was convicted of on 9 January 2020 was particularly serious, and his continued presence in the UK would constitute a danger to the community.
7. No response was received from the appellant to rebut the presumptions, and the respondent refused his asylum claim on 27 September 2022 (‘the refusal decision’).
8. The appellant appealed the respondent’s refusal decision to the First-tier Tribunal. By a determination dated 25 August 2025 the appeal was dismissed, following a hearing, by First-tier Tribunal Judge Abebrese.
9. Permission to appeal was granted by First-tier Tribunal Judge Iqbal on 1 October 2025. The permission grant stated:
‘… it is arguable that the Judge failed to give adequate reasons for finding the Appellant still constituted a danger to the community, particularly in light of the fact that his offence was committed in the context of him having been a victim of trafficking.’
‘It is further arguable that at [19] the Judge in reaching his conclusions on the cause of the Appellant’s PTSD, erred in fact when considering the report of Professor Katona.’
10. The matter now comes before me to determine whether the First-tier Tribunal erred in law, and if so whether any such error was material and whether the decision of the First-tier Tribunal should be set aside.
11. The appellant and respondent were ably represented by Ms Kotak and Ms Kerr, respectively. I am grateful to them for their very helpful submissions.
Grounds
12. The appellant brings 8 grounds of appeal against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (‘FtT’).
Ground 1: failed to give adequate reasons for finding the appellant still constituted a danger to the community and failed to properly apply relevant case law.
Ground 2: failed to make a clear finding about the appellant’s credibility.
Ground 3: materially erred in fact when considering the report of Professor Katona.
Ground 4: failed to give adequate reasons for placing no reliance on the report of a qualified country expert.
Ground 5: failed to apply relevant case law to the facts of this particular case.
Ground 6: failed to take account of relevant evidence or give adequate reasons for its findings in respect of sufficiency of protection.
Ground 7: failed to take account of relevant evidence when finding that the appellant could relocate within Albania and failed to make a finding on the reasonableness of relocation.
Ground 8: failed to make a finding about whether the appellant should succeed on Article 8 grounds outside the rules.
Discussion, Findings and Reasons
13. Ground 1: Ms Kotak on behalf of the appellant submitted that the judge failed to give adequate reasons for finding the appellant still constituted a danger to the community and failed to review the relevant case law. She pointed to paragraphs [15] and [16] of the First-tier Tribunal determination. At [15] Ms Kotak observed that based on the sentencing judge’s remarks the judge accepted that the offence was particularly serious.
14. At [16] the judge states ‘A is of the view that there are mitigating circumstances in that the offence was committed by A in the context of trafficking and forced criminality and that the material facts are founded to a large extent on the positive conclusive findings of R. …The position of A is that R have not particularised the danger that A would be to the community. I reject this argument because as stated in my reasoning above the judge expressed when sentencing A, the reasons why this offence is serious and this was supported by the sentence of 30 months even though A was of good character.’
15. Ms Kotak submits that the appellant has never denied the seriousness of the offence or the conviction. Where the judge erred was to wrongly conflate the two limbs of the test in s.72 NIAA 2002. As a result, the judge failed to have regard to the submission that because the offence was committed in the context of forced criminality, there was no danger of it being repeated and he was no longer a danger to the community.
16. Ms Kerr for the respondent relied on the filed Rule 24 response and briefly reiterated that it was down to the appellant to rebut the presumption which he failed to do when he had the opportunity [13]. Further, when sentencing the appellant, the sentencing judge gave reasons why the offence was serious and this was supported by the 30 months sentence. It could not be said that the First-tier Tribunal Judge failed to give adequate reasons for finding that the appellant still constituted a danger, especially when he found at [17] that there was no evidence that the crime was committed under duress or coercion.
17. I have carefully considered the submissions. The stating point is EN Serbia [2009] EWCA Civ 630 at [66] where it was stated ‘Under section 72, it is for the Secretary of State to establish that the person in question has been convicted of a relevant offence. In practice, once the State has established that a person has been convicted of what is on the face of it a particularly serious crime, it will be for him to show either that it was not in fact particularly serious, because of mitigating factors associated with its commission, or that because there is no danger of its repetition he does not constitute a danger to the community.’
18. Accordingly, it is clear that there are two limbs to s.72 NIAA 2002. The first limb refers to the ‘seriousness of the crime’, and the second limb to ‘the danger to the community’. Section 72 creates a rebuttable presumption in relation to both limbs. Once the respondent establishes that the person in question has been convicted of a relevant offence which in practice is a particularly serious crime, it is for the appellant to show it was not particularly serious because of mitigating factors associated with its commission, or that because there is no danger of its repetition, he does not constitute a danger to the community.
19. Looking at paragraphs [15] and [16] of the determination, it is clear that the judge failed to engage with the second limb of the test concerning whether the appellant was ‘a danger to the community.’ In this regard, despite there being clear mitigating evidence before the judge that the offence was committed in the context of the appellant being a victim of trafficking, which was underscored by a positive conclusive grounds decision (dated 17 October 2022), the judge does not engage with the second limb. At [16] the judge simply rejects the evidence and reiterates the sentencing judge’s remarks regarding why the offence was particularly serious which properly relates to limb 1, not limb 2.
20. The fact that the judge adopted the reasoning of the sentencing judge and observed that the offence was not committed under duress or coercion did not obviate the need for him to have properly addressed his mind to the second limb of s. 72, and to consider if the appellant was still a danger to the community in light of the mitigating evidence before him. He appears to have become confused about his own role which was to assess the mitigating evidence that was before him.
21. It follows that the reasons he provided for finding that the appellant still continued to constitute a danger to the community were inadequate which amounts to an error law: MK (duty to give reasons) Pakistan [2013] UKUT 00641 (IAC).
22. Ground 2: Ms Kotak submits that there are no clear credibility findings which at best were confused. At [18] of the determination, the judge stated:
‘I also make the following findings in respect of the claim for asylum despite upholding of the certificate under s.72. I am of the view that the overall plausibility and credibility of the A claim that he was targeted by a criminal gang in Albania because of an outstanding debt is plausible but on the evidence the A appears to be very determined to reside outside of Albania even before the involvement of the alleged gang. It is plausible that he received assistance to leave Albania but there is a lack of evidence that the debt which may have been owed would have put him at risk on his return to Albania. The A was able to return to Albania and reside there for at least three weeks before returning to the UK. There is no evidence that he was tracked by a gang.’
23. Ms Kerr for the respondent submitted that paragraph [18] constituted a clear finding on credibility; the judge found trafficking plausible in part, but not altogether credible and the findings were open to the judge to make.
24. Having regard to paragraph [18] of the determination, it is clear that the judge’s credibility findings are confused, contradictory and wholly inadequate. He starts by stating that the ‘overall plausibility and credibility’ of the appellant’s account is ‘plausible.’ It is unclear what he meant by this statement. Having accepted the appellant’s account was ‘plausible’, in the remainder of the paragraph, he appears to undermine his earlier finding leaving the reader wondering what has the judge actually considered to be truthful in the appellant’s account. In this respect, he makes no reference to the appellant’s oral evidence, or the finding that the appellant was found to be a victim of modern slavery.
25. Ms Kotak submitted that there was an 8-month delay between the hearing and the promulgation of the determination and that on the face of it, the determination cannot be said to be safe. She relied on the decision in SS (Sri Lanka), R (on the application of ) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 1391 where it was held that the correct approach is to ask whether the delay has caused the decision to be unsafe so that it would be unjust to let it stand. In this regard, the decision states that the only significance of the fact that delay between the hearing and the decision in an asylum case has exceeded three months is that, where the decision is challenged on an appeal, the Upper Tribunal should examine the FTT Judge’s factual findings with particular care to ensure that the delay has not caused injustice to the appellant.
26. I have carefully considered the submissions made. In the present case, the permitted grounds of appeal do not identify delay as a specific ground of appeal; it has only been advanced as part of the overall context. I, therefore, do not consider it appropriate to find that the delay per se has resulted in an error of law.
27. However, I do find that the obvious omissions and contradictions contained in paragraph [18] resulting in confusion, means there is no clear credibility finding(s) regarding the appellant’s account, which was a key matter which the judge had a duty to resolve. The failure to resolve the conflict in the evidence and to provide a reasoned credibility finding(s) amounts to an error of law: Budhathoki (reasons for decisions) [2014] UKUT 00341 (IAC.
28. Ground 3: Ms Kotak submits that the judge materially erred in fact when considering the report of Professor Katona. Specifically, it is argued that the judge misread paragraph 6.6. of Professor Katona’s report and then summarised it incorrectly in the judgment. It is further contended that the judge’s summary makes no sense given it had been that the appellant was trafficked.
29. At [19] of the determination, it states ‘I was referred by both parties to the report of Professor Katona and in particular paragraph 6.6 where it is stated that there are a variety of reasons for the cause of A’s PTSD. The cause of A’s condition according to the report cannot be attributed to the fact that he might have been a victim of trafficking.’
30. Paragraph 6.6. of the report states ‘In my clinical opinion Mr [L M] PTSD has been caused by the effects of the traumatic experiences he describes. I have considered the possibility that other factors such as his separation from his country and his family, his unstable accommodation and his continuing immigration uncertainty, could have caused Mr LM’s PTSD. In my view these factors are likely to be contributing substantially to his distress and his depressive symptoms, but do not provide a clinically plausible explanation for his core PTSD symptoms such as his nightmares and his intrusive thoughts.’
31. Ms Kerr submits that even if the judge mis-summarised paragraph 6.6. (which was not accepted) the core conclusion of the report was captured. Further, Ms Kerr makes the point that the judge did not have any GP records before him although he did have sight of the HMP Maidstone clinical records.
32. I have considered the parties’ submissions, paragraph 6.6. of the report and the judge’s summary at [19]. I find the judge’s summary on its face to be inaccurate and misleading. The judge states categorically at [19] that ‘The cause of A’s condition according to the report cannot be attributed to the fact that he might have been a victim of trafficking’. This is not accurate on the basis of paragraph 6.6 which opens with the sentence ‘In my clinical opinion Mr [L M] PTSD has been caused by the effects of the traumatic experiences he describes.’ The traumatic experiences are fully set out in the report which includes being a victim of trafficking/modern slavery which was confirmed by the respondent’s positive conclusive grounds decision dated 17 October 2022 that was known to Professor Katona.
33. In the circumstances, given that one aspect of the appellant’s traumatic experiences that has contributed to the his PTSD, includes being a victim of trafficking, the judge’s summary at [19] which categorically excludes trafficking as a contributory factor of the appellant’s PTSD condition was an inaccurate and misleading summary of paragraph 6.6. of the report. The misreading of the report and the consequent failure to properly apply the report’s findings amounts to an error of law.
34. Ground 4: Ms Kotak submits that the judge erred by failing to give adequate reasons for placing no reliance/weight on the report of a qualified country expert, Dr Tahiraj.
35. At [20] of the determination, the judge stated, ‘I also find the report of Dr Tahiraj cannot be relied upon by the A because the author states that the report is not an assessment of the A’s credibility.’
36. Further, at [21] the judge states ‘…I also note that the report of Dr Tahiraj makes not [sic] reference to the A’s return to Albania. I find that the report tends to be very general overall in the assessment of the situation in Albania and does not make sufficient reference to the specific facts of this appeal.’
37. Ms Kerr submitted that the judge was entitled to prefer the CPIN over the expert report and that ground 4 is really a challenge as to weight, which was a matter for the judge.
38. I have considered the submissions and reviewed the report of Dr Tahiraj. I agree with the judge’s observations that the report is mostly generic and fails to link it to the specific circumstances of the appellant, save in a few instances given the overall length of the report.
39. The weight to be accorded to evidence is the quintessential matter for the tribunal. There is in my view no error in the judge’s treatment of Dr Tahiraj’s report, which is not to say that another Judge might not have treated it differently. It follows that ground 4 is not made out.
40. Ground 5: Ms Kotak submits that at [21] of the determination the judge states ‘I note the risk factors as set out in the case of TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC’ but that the First-tier Tribunal did not go on to list any of the factors or apply them to the case. The appellant argues that if the First-tier Tribunal considered them not relevant to cases involving the trafficking of males, the Tribunal should have said as much and explained its reasons.
41. Ms Kerr submits that it is unclear why the judge referred to the case of TD and AD but in any event it is immaterial.
42. I have considered the submissions and agree with Ms Kerr for the respondent. There is no indication from the face of the determination why the judge referred to the case of TD and AD. The judge did not go on to identify the factors in that case. It is evidently an error but one which is immaterial to the outcome. It follows that ground 5 is not made out.
43. Ground 6: Ms Kotak submits that the First-tier Tribunal failed to take account of relevant evidence or give adequate reasons for its findings in respect of sufficiency of protection. In this regard, at [22] the judge stated ‘I considered whether the A would be sufficiently protected if he were to return to Albania. I am of the view based on the CPIN relied on by the R the A would be protected in line with the Horvath standard. The A relies on the Asylos report which is dated 2019. I found the CPIN which is dated 2022 and more recent to be more reliable.’
44. Ms Kotak argues that apart from the difference of three years, the judge failed to provide any reasons for placing less reliance on the Asylos report compared to the CPIN.
45. Ms Kerr submits that the judge was entitled to rely on the CPIN and gave the reason for it.
46. I have considered the parties submissions and note that the appellant is not arguing that the outcome would have been different had the judge followed the Asylos report but is simply making an adequacy of reasons challenge. I agree with the respondent that it was open to judge to follow the CPIN rather than the Asylos report for the reason that it was more up to date. That was an adequate reason. It follows that ground 6 is not made out.
47. Ground 7: Ms Kotak submits that the judge failed to take account of relevant evidence when finding that the appellant could internally relocate within Albania and failed to make any finding about the reasonableness of relocation given the appellant’s vulnerability as a victim of trafficking and diagnosed with mental health issues. It is argued that the finding is irrational.
48. At [23] of the determination, it states ‘I also find that the A could relocate internally in Albania and the R suggests that Sarande is a possible area which he could relocate. I am of the view that A on the evidence has shown that he could relocate because he was able to return after the deportation order where he remained for a period of three weeks without any difficulties.’
49. Ms Kerr submits that the judge was entitled to reach the findings that he did on internal relocation. The appellant’s stay for three weeks in Sarande was relevant to the finding as the appellant had not demonstrated that he was targeted in any way, but in any event, he felt threatened, there was always sufficiency of protection. Furthermore, there is no evidence that the appellant could not live independently.
50. I have carefully considered the submissions. I find that the judge’s findings do take account of the ‘reasonableness’ of the internal relocation to Sarabande given the appellant’s vulnerability as a victim of trafficking and diagnosed with mental health issues. In respect of his vulnerability as a victim of trafficking, the judge was aware that the appellant was able to spend time in Albania without any evidence to show that his traffickers could locate him. Further, there was no evidence before the judge, despite his mental health issues, to show that the appellant was not able to live independently. It follows that ground 7 is not made out. There is no basis for the appellant to submit that the judge’s finding was irrational. The finding was clearly open to the judge on the evidence before him. It follows that ground 7 is not made out.
51. Ground 8: Ms Kotak submits that the First-tier Tribunal failed to make a finding on whether the appellant should succeed on Article 8 ECHR grounds outside the rules.
52. Ms Kerr submitted that no claim was brought outside the rules but in any event the previous findings would dispose of any Article 8 claim.
53. I agree with the submission made by Ms Kerr on this ground. It follows that ground 8 is not made out.
Conclusion
54. It follows from the foregoing, that the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Abebrese contained several material errors of law and must be set aside.
55. I canvassed the parties in respect of further steps in the event of a finding of a material error of law. The parties inclined towards remitting the case to the First-tier Tribunal for a full rehearing if there were significant material errors across the appeal grounds, including on credibility.
56. Given the nature and extent of the errors of law, including on credibility, and having considered the decision of Begum [2023] UKUT 46 IAC, I consider that it is appropriate for the matter to be remitted for a de novo hearing before a judge other than Judge Abebrese.

Notice of Decision
57. The respondent’s appeal is allowed as the making of the determination of the First-tier Tribunal involved material errors of law. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal is set aside. This matter will be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing. No findings are preserved.

K.A.Khan

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

16 December 2025