Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case Nos: UI-2025-004606
First-tier Tribunal Nos: EA/01990/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 13th March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE KEBEDE

Between

BILAL HASSAN
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: The Sponsor
For the Respondent: Mr A Tan, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Manchester Civil Justice Centre on 13 March 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a national of Pakistan born on 21 September 1997. He appeals, with permission, against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal dismissing his appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his application for an EEA Family Permit under the Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2016.

2. The appellant applied, on 5 December 2019, for an EEA Family Permit as the extended family member of the sponsor, his uncle Tanveer Ahmad Jan, a Spanish national exercising treaty rights in the UK. His application was considered by the respondent under regulation 8 of the EEA Regulations and was refused in a decision dated 6 January 2020.

3. The respondent refused the application because she did not accept that it was sustainable, on the evidence available of the sponsor’s financial circumstances, for the sponsor to financially support the appellant whilst meeting his own needs and the needs of any family members already reliant upon him. The respondent considered there to be a risk that the appellant would become a burden on the public funds system of the UK. The respondent was, furthermore, not satisfied that the appellant was financially dependent on the sponsor. The respondent was accordingly not satisfied that the appellant was a family member in accordance with regulation 8 of the EEA Regulations.

4. The appellant appealed against the respondent’s decision. His appeal came before First-tier Tribunal Judge Wyman and was determined on the papers, at his request, and dismissed in a decision promulgated on 7 May 2025. The judge was not satisfied that the appellant met the requirements of the EEA Regulations, concluding on the evidence before her that it had not been shown that the sponsor could afford to support him while meeting his own needs and the needs of his family without relying on public funds. The judge also found that the appellant had not provided further documentary evidence regarding his own financial circumstances such as bank statements, an inventory of his weekly or monthly costs and how they were met, or his own tax records.

5. The appellant sought permission to appeal on the grounds that, whilst the judge dismissed the appeal on the basis of a lack of documentation, he had in fact provided a bundle of evidence containing the documents referred to by the judge which he had submitted within the relevant time period following the service of the respondent’s bundle. The appellant submitted that the respondent had not served her bundle within the timeframe required and he had had to contact the Tribunal to chase the bundle as a result. He stated that he had submitted his evidence on 1 May 2025 prior to the judge’s decision being promulgated, but it had not been considered by the judge, so that there had been a serious procedural irregularity and a denial of a fair opportunity to present his case, contrary to the principles of natural justice.

6. Permission to appeal was refused in the First-tier Tribunal but was subsequently granted upon a renewed application to the Upper Tribunal, as follows:

“The issue relates to one of procedural fairness in circumstances where the appellant has provided a bundle of documents relevant to the appeal (one heard on the papers) sent by email to the Tribunal on 1 May 2025 which did not appear to have been available to the FtTJ when deciding the appeal in the decision dated 29 April but promulgated on 7 May 2025.

2. The appellant stated he did not receive the respondent’s bundle (see email sent 9 April 2025 to Hatton Cross) and the bundle was sent by Hatton Cross staff on 15 April 2025. The appellant provided his bundle on 1 May 2025, and it is arguable that this was sent in the time period starting from the receipt of the respondent’s bundle and therefore the appellant had arguably complied within the time scale but the appeal was set for a decision on the papers before the expiry of the period.

3. The judicial case manager does not have any information for this appeal, and the only information is that on the CE file. The respondent or the FtT may have further information available. The FtT should be contacted for any other correspondence /directions issued to be made available to the Upper Tribunal.”

7. Directions were made in the decision granting permission for the appellant to provide a schedule of emails (in date order) of any correspondence between the Tribunal and himself and to serve that on the other party, following which the respondent was to provide a rule 24 response.

8. On 26 February 2026 the appellant filed with the Upper Tribunal a schedule of emails together with copies of the emails sent to the First-tier Tribunal in which he had requested and received the respondent’s bundle and had served his own appeal bundle on 1 May 2025. Unfortunately the appellant did not serve the bundle on the respondent and there was accordingly no rule 24 response from the respondent.

9. The matter then came before me. Mr Tan advised me that he had not seen the emails or been aware of them. He was shown a copy of the emails by the sponsor and conceded that they showed that the appellant had filed an appeal bundle in the First-tier Tribunal prior to the promulgation of the judge’s decision. He therefore accepted that the fairness point in the appellant’s grounds was made out and that the judge’s decision had to be set aside by reason of error of law.

10. With regard to the disposal of the appeal, Mr Tan advised me that there were credibility issues arising in the appellant’s application which required further evidence to be submitted by the respondent and that a further hearing was therefore required. The sponsor also advised me that he had a legal representative ready to represent the appellant at an oral hearing in the First-tier Tribunal.

11. In the circumstances it was agreed that the appropriate course, given that there was an issue of procedural unfairness, was for the matter to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for an oral hearing. It was noted that this had been a papers case originally in the First-tier Tribunal but it was agreed that the issues in the case required oral evidence to be given. The payment of fees for an oral hearing is, I believe, a matter for the appellant and the First-tier Tribunal, but it is necessary for there to be an oral hearing with attendance by the sponsor.

12. Accordingly I set aside Judge Wyman’s decision on the grounds of procedural unfairness, on the basis that the decision was made without consideration of the appellant’s evidence, albeit through no fault on the part of the judge who appears not to have been provided with that evidence. The case is to be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a de novo hearing before another judge aside from Judge Wyman.

Notice of Decision

13. The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law. The decision is set aside.

14. The appeal is remitted to the First-tier Tribunal to be dealt with afresh pursuant to section 12(2)(b)(i) of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 and Practice Statement 7.2(a), before any judge aside from Judge Wyman.

Signed: S Kebede
Upper Tribunal Judge Kebede

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

13 March 2026