Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004608

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/64645/2023
LP/11726/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 26th February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOBBS

Between

PY
ANONYMITY ORDER MADE
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the appellant: Mr. M. Hussain, Fountain Solicitors
For the respondent: Ms. R. Abdul-Karim, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 9 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant and/or any member of his family are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant and/or any member of his family. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This is an appeal against a decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Thapar (the “Judge”), dated 6 March 2025, in which she dismissed the appellant’s appeal against the respondent’s decision to refuse his protection and human rights claim. The appellant is a national of Iraq who claimed asylum based on his imputed political opinion.
2. Permission to appeal was granted by Upper Tribunal Judge Perkins in a decision dated 7 November 2025 as follows:
“Generally, I consider the grounds to be weak but just arguable. Maybe more reasons for the conclusion should have been given.
My main concern is that the appellant might be thought to have raised a claim based on his being a Sunni Muslim as well as being Kurdish and the claim was ignored (see paragraph 13 of the appellant’s skeleton argument in the First-tier Tribunal).
I note the comments of First-tier Tribunal Judge Mills when he refused permission. It may be that any error on this point is immaterial as there was no evidence before the Tribunal that would have permitted the appeal to have been allowed.
However the appellant has an arguable case that he has raised a claim that has not been considered and it should have been. I remind him that he must show that the error is material if he is to succeed.”
3. There was no Rule 24 response.
The hearing
4. The appellant attended the hearing. I heard submissions from both parties, following which I reserved my decision.
Error of law
Ground 1
5. It was alleged that the Judge failed to consider the appellant’s claim to be at risk in his home area based on his religion and ethnicity as a Sunni Muslim Kurd. The grounds state that this had been raised in the appellant’s skeleton argument, and that he had submitted background material supporting his claim that the PMF targeted ethnic and religious minority groups.
6. Mr. Hussain submitted that the Judge should have considered whether the appellant was at risk on account of being Sunni Muslim. The PMF, who were in control of his home area, were Shia Muslim. There was no reference in the decision to the fact that he was a Sunni Muslim. This was a material error of law.
7. Ms. Abdul-Karim accepted that the Judge had not specifically dealt with the point. However, she submitted that it had not been raised at the outset of the hearing. She referred to [6] of the decision where it was not raised as a specific issue. She submitted that, when it was mentioned at [12] and [13] of the skeleton argument, it was in the context of the appellant’s previous encounters, not as a separate issue to be considered irrespective of whether or not his account was found credible. She submitted that it could have been raised at the start of the hearing when the issues had been discussed. It was not a material error in any event.
8. In response, Mr. Hussain submitted that it had been raised as an issue in the skeleton argument. There was no Presenting Officer at the hearing so there had been no cross-examination, but the Judge should have considered the witness statements.
9. I have carefully considered whether the Judge erred in failing to consider the risk to the appellant as a Sunni Muslim. I have considered the skeleton argument at [12] and [13] as referred to in the grounds.
10. At [12] under the heading “Would the Appellant be at risk by Hashd Al Shaabi and Asayish upon return to Iraq?”, it is submitted that the appellant will be at risk from both of them. It then refers to the claimed encounter with the Hashd Al Shaabi, and the claimed detention by the Asayish. The Judge did not accept the appellant’s account of these events. It continues:
“The Appellant contends he will be at risk by the Hashd Al Shaabi due to his Kurdish Ethnicity and will be at risk by the Asayish as he was arrested. The Appellant contends he will be at risk upon return to Iraq and will be in the adverse attention of both the Hashd Al Shaabi and Asayish upon return to Iraq. The Appellant contends the Hashd Al Shaabi and Asayish work alongside each other. The Appellant will be at risk upon return to Iraq.”
There is no reference in this paragraph to him being Sunni Muslim, or to his religion more generally.
11. At [13] under the heading “Would the Appellant be able to relocate to another part of Iraq?” it states:
“The appellant contends that he will not be able to relocate to any other part of Iraq. The Appellant is Sunni Kurdish Muslim, he fears that he will be at risk of persecution. The Appellant fears he will be located by the Hashd Al Shaabi if he is returned to Iraq. The Appellant fears that he will not be able to relocate in Iraq due to the Hashd Al Shaabi and the Asayish, the Appellant will be at further risk upon return to Iraq.”
12. This is the only reference to the appellant being a Sunni Muslim. However, it is in the context of whether he will be able to relocate to another part of Iraq. It is not with reference to his home area, and it is not a separate claim that he would not be able to return to his home area on account of his religion.
13. I have considered whether it is raised elsewhere in the skeleton. At [7] it states:
“We contend that the Appellant has a well-founded fear of persecution based on the UN Convention reasons of imputed political opinion.”
14. Further, at [11] it states:
“The Appellant fears that upon return to Iraq, he will be subjected to serious physical harm, unlawful detention and death based on his imputed political opinion. The Appellant fears the Hashd Al Shaabi, Asayish upon return to Iraq.”
15. Both of these are references to the appellant’s imputed political opinion. There is no reference in the skeleton to a separate claim being made on the basis that the appellant will be at risk “upon return to his home area….based on his religion and ethnicity” as is stated in the grounds. It is incorrect to state that the appellant’s fear of return on account of being a Sunni Muslim Kurd was raised as a separate claim in the skeleton argument.
16. I am mindful of the case of Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 00163 (IAC), in particular headnotes (2) and (7):
“2. Upon the parties engaging in filing and serving a focused Appeal Skeleton Argument and review, a judge sitting in the First-tier Tribunal can properly expect clarity as to the remaining issues between the parties by the date of the substantive hearing.”
“7. Unless a point was one which was Robinson obvious, a judge's decision cannot be alleged to contain an error of law on the basis that a judge failed to take account of a point that was never raised for their consideration as an issue in an appeal. Such an approach would undermine the principles clearly laid out in the Procedure Rules.”
17. I find that, although the skeleton argument states that the appellant is a Sunni Kurdish Muslim who fears persecution, it was not raised as a separate ground to be considered by the Judge. It is therefore not surprising that it is not listed in the “issues in dispute” at 6(b). This states: “whether the Appellant is at risk from the PMF and Asayish in Iraq”. There is no specific reference to his religion.
18. I find that there was no claim before the First-tier Tribunal that the appellant was at risk on return to his home area solely on account of being a Sunni Muslim Kurd. I find that ground 1 discloses no error of law. I will in any event consider the materiality of this when considering ground 2 below.
Ground 2
19. Ground 2 is on similar lines to ground 1, and relates to the Judge’s findings at [16]. It alleges that she failed to apply Country Guidance, specifically “headnotes [A] [5] [ii], [A][6], and [D] [24]” of SMO & KSP (Civil status documentation; article 15) Iraq CG [2022] UKUT 00110 (IAC) (“SMO II”), when considering whether the appellant could return to and reintegrate into his home area “given that he is a Sunni Muslim Kurd, and that his home area is controlled by the PMF”. It is alleged that she failed to assess and make findings on the current situation in the appellant’s home area, Kirkuk.
20. Ms. Abdul-Karim submitted that the Judge had gone through the factors in the Country Guidance. There was no error of law in her finding that the appellant could return to his home area. She had considered all of his personal characteristics, including the fact that he had contact with his family. She had considered that he would be returning from the United Kingdom, and that he had health issues. As she had found that the appellant would be documented, he could return to his home area of Kirkuk.
21. Mr. Hussain submitted that there was no consideration of his being a Sunni Muslim Kurd, a minority in Kirkuk. He referred to 5(ii) of the headnote. Paragraph (5) contains a list of the “personal characteristics”, the impact of which “must be carefully assessed against the situation in the area to which return is contemplated, with particular reference to the extent of ongoing ISIL activity and the behaviour of the security actors in control of that area”.
“(ii) Membership of a national, ethnic or religious group which is either in the minority in the area in question, or not in de facto control of that area;”
22. Mr. Hussain submitted that, although ISIL had moved on, the Judge should have considered the situation where the PMF, Shia Muslims, were in control. He submitted that the Judge had not considered internal relocation, but only return to his home area.
23. I find that the Judge was considering the appellant’s return to his home area of Kirkuk. She was not considering internal relocation to Kirkuk, nor internal relocation to the IKR, or any other area of Iraq. She had found that his account was not credible, and that therefore he would not be at risk in his home area. At [16] she states:
“The Appellant would be returning from the UK which would dispel any perceived association with ISIL. The Appellant does not have a political profile and there is nothing before me to suggest that he is not conforming to Islamic mores. Whilst the Appellant states he suffers from kidney problems and has an issue with his arm, he has failed to provide any medical documents detailing his health issues and he states that he is not receiving any treatment in the UK. I find it has not been shown that the Appellant would be unable to obtain any relevant treatment in Iraq if needed. The Appellant lived in Iraq for most of his life, he speaks the language, he worked in Iraq, his family reside in Iraq with whom he has maintained contact. I have found the Appellant has failed to establish that he is of any interest to the authorities in Iraq or that he would be at risk on return. I further find the Appellant has not shown that he cannot be redocumented and I find it has not been demonstrated that the Appellant cannot return to reside with his family in his home village. Consequently, I find based on the evidence before me there would be no very significant obstacles to his integration into Iraq.”
24. I find that there is no reference in this paragraph to the appellant being a Sunni Muslim, and how this would impact on his return to Kirkuk. This is one of the characteristics referred to in SMO II. However there was no evidence before me to show that this one factor would mean that return would be a breach of Article 15(c), or that return would not be reasonable on account of him being a Sunni Muslim Kurd. There is nothing in SMO II to suggest that being a Sunni Muslim Kurd in and of itself creates a risk on return to Kirkuk, or indeed to any other part of Iraq. There was no evidence before the First-tier Tribunal, or before me, to show that there was a risk on account of this alone.
25. The grounds refer to one piece of evidence where it is said that the PMF target ethnic and religious minority groups, page 171-172 of the bundle before the First-tier Tribunal. This is from the USSD Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2023. This states:
“Government forces, particularly certain PMF groups, targeted members of ethnic and religious minority groups, as did the remaining active ISIS fighters. Some government forces, including PMF units, forcibly displaced individuals due to perceived ISIS affiliation or for ethnosectarian reasons.”
26. I find that this does not show that the appellant would be at risk on return from the PMF in his home area. Further, of note is that the Judge found that the appellant remained in contact with his family who live in his home village. They are also Sunni Muslim.
27. The grounds refer to two other paragraphs of the headnote to SMO II. I find that the Judge considered the appellant’s personal characteristics, in line with (6) of the headnote. As I have stated above, she was not considering relocation to Kirkuk, so (24) of the headnote is not relevant.
28. I find there is no material error of law shown by either grounds 1 or 2, as there was no evidence before the Judge to show that the appellant being a Sunni Muslim Kurd would give rise to a risk in Kirkuk. All of his other personal characteristics were considered by the Judge. Even adding in his religion, cumulatively they would not give rise to a risk. She did not materially err in her consideration of SMO II.
Ground 3
29. Ground 3 relates to paragraphs [12] to [15]. This alleges that the Judge gave inadequate reasons for not accepting the appellant’s explanations, or to have regard to his witness statement dated 16 May 2024 where he set out his responses to the respondent’s concerns. Ms. Adbul-Karim submitted that it was no more than a disagreement with the Judge’s findings, and that there was no challenge to the Judge’s findings on the basis of a mistake of fact.
30. At [11] the Judge states:
“I find that the Appellant’s account contains inconsistencies together with implausible and incoherent elements, the cumulative effect of which is to undermine the credibility of the Appellant’s account and the veracity of his claim. These are as follows:”
31. She then sets out these inconsistencies from [11(a)] to [11(d)]. At (a) and (b) she sets out two inconsistencies, with reference to page 28, which is his witness statement dated 16 May 2024. When considering the inconsistency outlined at (c), she states that she does not accept the appellant’s explanation at “pages 28-29”, the witness statement dated 16 May 2024. At (d) she sets out the inconsistent evidence and states that the appellant provided “a confused account”.
32. At [12] to [14] she concludes as follows:
“12. I find the Appellant has been unable to provide a consistent account regarding core aspects of his account. The Appellant could not consistently state when he was attacked, by how many people, whether he was detained or the duration, nor did he provide a consistent timeline of events on the day he states he was assaulted. I find this significantly undermines the Appellant’s credibility.
13. The Appellant provided a video showing him being assaulted by two men in army uniforms who he states were part of HAS and a friend of the Appellant tried to release him. The video is undated, the place the video was taken cannot be determined and I find the face of the individual assaulted in the video cannot clearly be seen. A translation of the audio is also not provided. I find taken in the round and in light of my findings above, this video holds little evidential value.
14. Drawing together all the above, I find the Appellant has failed to establish to the lower standard that he came to the adverse attention of the PMF/ HAS or the Asayish or that he is of adverse interest to the authorities anywhere in Iraq.”
33. I find that the Judge has given sufficient reasons at [12] for why she finds that the appellant’s inability to provide a consistent account damages his credibility. It is clear that she has considered the witness statement of 16 May 2024 in [11(a) to (d)], as she references it. I have considered this statement. It does not contain explanations for inconsistencies. Rather the appellant just states what he claims occurred by way of clarification. This is not an explanation which counters the respondent’s concerns.
34. In relation to the video, it has not been submitted that she erred in her consideration of it at [13]. She gives reasons for finding that it has little evidential value. At [14] she finds that the appellant has failed to establish that he came to the adverse interest of the PMF, HAS or Asayish, or that he is of adverse interest to the authorities anywhere in Iraq. I find that she has given adequate reasons for finding that she does not accept the appellant’s account.
35. It is further submitted that the Judge provided inadequate reasons for finding that the appellant is able to obtain his CSID at [15]. It is submitted that she had failed to adequately assess his evidence about the whereabouts of his CSID and his inability to obtain it. The Judge states:
“The only evidence I have before me that the Appellant does not have his identification document is his assertion. In light of my credibility findings above, I find that the Appellant’s credibility is so impugned that I place little weight upon this assertion. If the Appellant is not in possession of his CSID, he claims it is in Iraq, he remains in contact with his family members and I find based on the evidence before me it has not been established that he is unable to obtain his CSID prior to or upon his arrival in Iraq.”
36. The Judge had found the appellant not to be a credible witness. She therefore placed little weight on his assertion that he did not have his identity document. In the alternative, he claimed that it was in Iraq, and he remained in contact with his family. On this basis, her finding that he had not established that he was unable to obtain it was open to her. Mr. Hussain submitted that she had not taken into account that he had left at a time of civil war and that there was no evidence that his family was in possession of his CSID. However, her primary finding is that she placed little weight on his assertion that he was not in possession of his CSID, and so found that he had his CSID.
37. I find that the Judge gave adequate reasons for rejecting the appellant’s account. She considered the appellant’s witness statement, but did not accept the evidence set out there. She considered the evidence as a whole, and made findings. Ground 3 is no more than a disagreement with those findings, and discloses no error of law.
Notice of Decision    
38. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal does not involve the making of material errors of law and I do not set it aside.  The decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands.
  
Kate Hobbs
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber
20 February 2026