Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004628
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/54543/2024
LP/02971/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 14th of May 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HARRIS

Between

MSK
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Malik of Counsel
For the Respondent: Ms Isherwood, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 24 April 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant is a citizen of Sierra Leone. She appeals with permission against the decision dated 27 May 2025 of First-tier Tribunal Judge Latta (“the FTTJ”) to dismiss her appeal on protection and human rights grounds.
2. The basis of the appellant’s claim is that she is of adverse interest to the Sierra Leone authorities who perceive her as supporting the opposition following her attendance as a journalist at an anti-government demonstration on 10 August 2022, where the authorities used violence; accordingly she has a well founded fear of persecution from the Sierra Leone authorities for the reason of imputed political opinion.
3. The respondent disputes that the appellant has in fact the claimed fear of persecution on the basis that she lacks credibility about attracting adverse attention from the Sierra Leone authorities.
4. The FFTJ agreed with the respondent, finding that the appellant was not credible in her account about attracting the claimed adverse interest and therefore did not demonstrate that she has a well founded fear of persecution if returned to Sierra Leone or that there was a breach of Article 3.
The Grounds of Appeal
5. The appellant has permission to argue the following 4 grounds:
(i) The FTTJ failed to consider credibility in the round
(ii) The FTTJ misapplied the standard of proof
(iii) The FTTJ failed to engage with objective evidence
(iv) The FTTJ gave inadequate reasons and failed to consider material evidence
Is there a material error of law requiring me to set aside the decision of the First-tier Tribunal?
6. The respondent accepts that the appellant is a journalist. At the hearing before me, Ms Isherwood for the respondent clarified that, given the reasoning present in the refusal letter, it was not disputed that the appellant attended the August 2022 demonstration.
7. The parties agree that the primary issue in this appeal before the FTTJ concerned whether the appellant is credible about the authorities in Sierra Leone forming an adverse interest in her.
8. In his submissions before me Mr Malik for the appellant identified that grounds 1, 3 and 4 overlapped with the central complaint being that the FTTJ failed to give proper consideration to relevant evidence before her. I turn to consider grounds 1,3 and 4.
Grounds 1, 3 and 4
9. I agree with the analysis of Mr Malik that these grounds do essentially raise a similar challenge regarding the approach taken by the FTTJ, which is that the FTTJ failed to take into account relevant evidence in the appeal. Ground 1 concerns adverse credibility findings made as regards the appellant coming to the attention of the authorities, ground 3 concerns country background evidence about the treatment of journalists in Sierra Leone and ground 4 returns to the findings rejecting the appellant’s account of being targeted by the Sierra Leone authorities.
10. The position of the respondent, as set out in Rule 24 response and the submissions of Ms Isherwood, is essentially that the FTTJ made reasonable findings which it was open to him to make on the evidence in this appeal- there is no material error made.
Ground 3
11. I can begin with ground 3. I see no error made out here in the approach taken by the FTTJ regarding country background evidence. The FTTJ expressly notes at paragraph 24 of the decision the submissions of the appellant regarding background evidence on Sierra Leone, including as regards the treatment of journalists and I see no basis to doubt that the FTTJ has this evidence in mind when making his decision, as stated at paragraph 27 of the decision. The appellant was not arguing her claim on the basis that all journalists are at real risk in Sierra Leone but that on the facts of her own case she faces persecution. It was the claim regarding those particular facts that the FTTJ considered in the decision.
The overlapping Grounds 1 and 4
12. I am not persuaded by all the points made in support of the overlapping grounds 1 and 4, which in a number of instances amount to no more than a simple disagreement with the findings made by the FTTJ rejecting the appellant’s claim. However, I do have the following concerns regarding the FTTJ’s assessment of relevant evidence in this appeal.
Failure to consider relevant evidence in witness statement
13. In paragraphs 30 to 36 of the decision, the FTTJ finds much turns on it being the account of the appellant that she did not publish a report of the demonstration she attended.
14. Taking this into account the FTTJ finds, firstly, that it is not clear why the authorities would want the appellant if she had not published a report: see paragraph 32 of the decision. This is clearly one matter the FTTJ finds damaging to the credibility of the appellant.
15. However, I accept that the appellant is able to point to her account at paragraph 7 of her witness statement that at the demonstration:
- she attended with her camera and recording equipment, and
- she interviewed both the police and ordinary people attending the protest.
In the same paragraph she adds that she took photographs of the dead and the police with guns when they started shooting.
16. I am satisfied this is evidence from the appellant capable of indicating she was openly going about her work as a journalist at the demonstration with the visible tools of her camera and recording equipment and this included making her presence known to the police present through interviewing. If accepted, it is evidence capable of establishing there did not have to be a published report from the appellant to trigger adverse interest from the authorities in her.
17. It was clearly raised in the appellant’s FTT skeleton argument at paragraph 2 that the appellant’s “problems arose after she was seen interviewing and taking photographs of police and youth at [the] demonstration”.
18. The FTTJ makes no reference to this part of the appellant’s evidence, which is capable of supporting her case, before making the finding made in paragraph 32 of the decision. I am satisfied this is an error by the FTTJ.
19. This might not be material if there was otherwise sufficient good reason for rejecting the credibility of the appellant.
20. It does appear that, as mentioned by the respondent in the Rule 24 response at paragraph 3(c), the appellant brought up, albeit only in re-examination, she feared that the authorities had taken her notes from her home which would mean the Sierra Leone authorities were aware of material she had about the demonstration. I am satisfied that the FTTJ was entitled to reject such a late made claim when the appellant had had the previous opportunities of her asylum interview and the FTT witness statement to refer to this. However, this was a reason given by the appellant in addition to what she had already said in her witness statement about her open activity as a journalist at the demonstration. The FTTJ does not say he rejects the account in the witness statement because of the appellant raising in re-examination the matter of the notebook. I am not persuaded the FTTJ finding on the notebook claim of the appellant addresses what was claimed in the witness statement.
21. It was central to the submissions of the respondent before the FTTJ, as well as me, that, in any event, the credibility of the appellant’s claim was significantly damaged by what was said in the three newspaper articles she produced. I turn to this matter.
Failure to consider relevant evidence in the newspaper articles
22. It can be noted that in paragraph 32 of the decision the FTTJ begins by referring to the articles which state that the appellant was wanted for her coverage of the protest. It is from there that the FTTJ makes the finding it is unclear why the appellant would be wanted if she did not publish a report.
23. It can also be seen that at paragraph 36 of the decision the FTTJ attaches little weight to the newspaper article evidence which the FTTJ describes as referring to the appellant being wanted for her coverage of the protest because the appellant “never actually reported on the event”.
24. I am satisfied that this is the FTTJ accepting the submission of the respondent that use of the words “coverage” and “report” in the newspaper articles means there must be a published report from the appellant.
25. In contrast, the case of the appellant was, in effect, that the words “coverage” and “report” can be understood as also meaning the preparatory work of a journalist prior to publication of an article or documentary.
26. In this context, I consider the FTTJ does not engage with the content of the articles in two important aspects.
27. Firstly, in the body of each of the articles, while there is mention of “coverage” and/or “report” of the demonstration by the appellant, there is no mention of the appellant actually publishing any report. This is a consistency capable of supporting the appellant’s case. However, it is not assessed by the FTTJ.
28. Secondly, there is content in the articles capable of supporting that the Sierra Leone authorities were deciding to act against the appellant before she published or “went to press”: see the final two paragraphs in the September 2022 New Storm article, the final paragraph from the October 2022 The Times article, and the penultimate paragraph of the October 2022 Salone Compass article. This is again evidence capable of supporting the appellant’s case. However it is not addressed by the FTTJ before reaching her findings.
29. I am satisfied the FTTJ failed to give proper consideration to these parts of the appellant’s evidence and this amounts to an error in law.
30. I am satisfied the errors concerning evidence in the appellant’s witness statement and in the articles produced by the appellant lead to the FTTJ erring when (a) accepting the absence of publication made it lack credibility that the Sierra Leone authorities would form an adverse interest in her and (b) finding that there was inconsistency between the appellant’s claim and the articles, which damaged the appellant’s credibility and meant little weight should be attached to the articles.
31. I agree with the submission of the respondent that on the evidence it was open to the FTTJ to find the claimed time taken by the authorities to raid the appellant’s home and the appellant’s ability to leave the country on her own passport were matters damaging the appellant’s credibility but I am satisfied that the findings reached between paragraph 32 and 36 of the decision played a significant part in the overall conclusion of the FTTJ about the appellant lacking credibility notwithstanding. In the circumstances, I am not persuaded the findings made at paragraph 37 are sufficient, despite the errors identified, to sustain the overall rejection of credibility made by the FTTJ.
Conclusion on Grounds 1 and 4
32. I am satisfied that under Grounds 1 and 4 the errors of law I have identified above are material and mean the decision should be set aside.
Ground 2
33. Having already found there are material errors, I will deal briefly with the remaining Ground 2. I consider the submissions made here amount merely to a disagreement with the findings of the FTTJ. I am not satisfied there is any material error of law under Ground 2.
Remaking
34. With the decision of the FTTJ set aside, the normal course of action is for the Upper Tribunal to remake the decision even if it requires further findings of fact to be made on the evidence. However, both parties before me, indicated that if I found a material error of law was made concerning credibility, it would be appropriate to remit this appeal to the First-tier Tribunal for remaking. Given that fresh findings will need to be made in relation to the credibility of this appellant’s claim, I agree. This appeal will be remitted to the First-Tier Tribunal to be remade afresh.
Notice of Decision
The decision dated 27 May 2025 by First-Tier Tribunal Judge Latta contains material errors of law. I set aside that decision and direct that the appeal be remitted to the First-tier Tribunal for a fresh hearing before any judge except Judge Latta.

M Harris
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6 May 2026