Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004634
First-tier Tribunal Nos: HU/53287/2024
LH/04244/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11 March 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR

Between

ED
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: In person
For the Respondent: Mr M Pugh, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 5 March 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant and LK are granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant and LK, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. I will not be referring to Mr ED’s full name because he is a victim of trafficking and is granted anonymity. Instead, I shall just use his initials in this decision. In addition, I will refer to ED’s wife as LK so that he cannot be identified through her.
2. This is the re-making of the decision in ED’s appeal against the Secretary of State’s decision of 6 March 2024 refusing his human rights claim. That claim had been made following the Secretary of State’s previous decision to deport ED and to sign a deportation order. This re-making decision follows on from the error of law decision made by two judges of the Upper Tribunal sitting together (Upper Tribunal Judge Norton-Taylor and Deputy Upper Tribunal Judge Richards), sent out on 19 December 2025. That decision is copied in at the end of this re-making decision. The two should be read together.

Background
3. ED is an Albanian citizen born in 1993. He came to the United Kingdom in February 2015 and has stayed here ever since without lawful permission. In September 2019 he was convicted on a guilty plea of producing Class B drugs (cannabis) and sentenced to 8 months’ imprisonment. This led to the Secretary of State starting deportation action against him.
4. ED’s human rights claim was based on two matters: first, his relationship with a British citizen, LK, to whom he is married; second, the private life said to have been established in this country since 2015.
5. When the Secretary of State’s refusal decision was made, ED appealed to the First-tier Tribunal. The judge made the following relevant findings:
(a) ED’s offence had caused “serious harm” and he was therefore a “foreign criminal”;
(b) On the evidence, ED could not satisfy the private life exception under section 117C(4) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002;
(c) ED’s relationship with LK was genuine and subsisting;
(d) It would not be unduly harsh for LK to accompany ED back to Albania;
(e) It would not be unduly harsh for LK to be separated from ED if he returned to Albania alone;
(f) There were, however, very compelling circumstances in the case and the appeal was allowed on that narrow basis.

The error of law decision
6. All of the judge’s findings set out above were justified except for the last. The Secretary of State submitted that the judge had applied the wrong approach to the question of whether there were very compelling circumstances. The error of law decision agreed with that submission and set the judge’s decision aside (overturned it) only on the limited basis that there had been a legal mistake in relation to the very compelling circumstances issue. The error of law decision clearly stated that at the next hearing (the resumed hearing with which I am now concerned) the only issue to be considered was whether there were very compelling circumstances, subject to any new evidence being provided by ED.
7. The judge’s findings at (a)-(e), above, were “preserved”.

The evidence
8. I have considered the set of materials prepared by the Secretary of State before the error of law hearing which took place in December 2025. In addition, I have considered the new evidence provided by ED: his letter dated 3 January 2026; LK’s letter dated 4 January 2026; a GP letter and patient summary relating to LK, dated 31 December 2025; and 8 letters of support provided by friends who live in the same area as ED and LK.
9. ED and LK attended the resumed hearing. There were no other witnesses. I asked ED and LK to confirm that what they had written in their new letters was true and they did so. Mr Pugh had no questions. An Albanian interpreter attended the hearing. ED’s English is good. I provided a full introduction to him and LK as to what this hearing was all about, what was meant by the “preserved findings” made by the First-tier Tribunal Judge, and how the hearing would proceed. ED confirmed that he understood everything and wanted to speak to me in English. I made it clear that if he was unsure about anything, or indeed if I was concerned that he was not understanding everything clearly, the interpreter could be used. In the event the interpreter was used on occasion in order for ED to understand properly and to convey what he wanted to say in more detail than he would have been able to do in English.

Submissions
10. Mr Pugh relied on the preserved findings and in summary said that the new evidence was not sufficient to undermine those preserved findings. Everything said in the letters had been considered by the judge. The GP evidence had limited value: it was not a full report. Mr Pugh reminded me that the judge had found that there was a functioning healthcare system in Albania. He also referred me to the Secretary of State’s Country Policy and Information Note on mental healthcare in Albania, dated January 2025, in particular section 4. He reminded me that the judge had found that LK would be able to receive support from ED’s family in Albania. The friends’ letters added nothing of substance to ED’s case. ED was a victim of trafficking but that did not significantly undermine the strength of the public interest. Mr Pugh reminded me that the judge had found that the offence caused “serious harm” and that finding was preserved.
11. ED then spoke to me directly. He said that he had asked the GP for a “full report” but this had not come through and it was unclear how long it might have taken (I pointed out at this stage that I had given ED quite a lot of time to get further information before the hearing). ED told me that he did not think the healthcare services in Albania were very good, particularly in relation to mental health conditions. He believed that his wife’s basic ability in Albanian would present language barriers to her getting the right treatment. In terms of his conviction, ED told me that he pleaded guilty as soon as he could.
12. I then felt it appropriate to hear from LK herself as the appeal clearly affected her. She told me that she suffered from anxiety, depression and PTSD. I pointed out that the GP evidence did not refer to the last of these. LK told me that this had been a problem she faced in the past. She told me that she had previously been on Fluoxetine but had had a bad reaction after which the medication was changed to Citalopram 10 mg which remains the prescribed medication at this time. LK told me that she relies heavily on ED for emotional support and that the couple felt integrated in their home area. She was concerned about going to live in Albania. She told me that she was on a waiting list for therapy.
13. At the end of the hearing I did not give my decision because I wanted to go away, read everything again, and then write my decision.

Reasons
14. I have carefully considered all of the materials before me and have thought very carefully about what ED and LK told me at the hearing. I appreciate that they find themselves in a difficult situation and must be anxious about what the future will bring. I hope that what follows clearly explains my decision in this appeal.
15. The preserved findings made by the judge remain in place. I am satisfied that none of the new evidence undermines those findings. Without intending any disrespect to ED and LK, what is said in their letters, the friends’ letters, and the GP evidence has essentially already been addressed by the judge. The evidence repeats ED’s argument that he is well-established in this country and would find it difficult to live again in Albania. It repeats the argument that ED and LK are a close couple who would face challenges to life in Albania. These matters were all looked at carefully by the judge and it was found that the circumstances did not fall within the two exceptions under section 117C(4) and (5) of the 2002 Act. In other words, ED had not lived for at least half of his life lawfully in the United Kingdom and there would not be very significant obstacles to him starting life again in Albania. In addition, it would not be unduly harsh for LK to go and live with ED in Albania. Alternatively, it would not be unduly harsh on LK if she stayed in the United Kingdom while ED went back to Albania alone.
16. In terms of LK’s mental health conditions, I accept that she suffers from depression and anxiety. What she has said is confirmed by the GP letter. I find that she probably did suffer from PTSD in the past but that this is not an active problem. I find that LK is currently on a low dose of a frontline medication, Citalopram, but is not at the moment receiving any additional specialist input. ED mentioned having asked for a “full report” from the doctor, but nothing has been provided and, as I have said before, he did have enough time to have got further evidence either before or after the error of law hearing in December 2025. ED did not ask me to put the case off for another date. In any event, from what was before me there were no sufficiently good grounds to have put the case off.
17. The Secretary of State’s document containing evidence on mental health treatment in Albania shows that treatment for conditions such as depression and anxiety, together with appropriate medication, are available in that country. The services may not be as good as in this country, but that is not the test for me. In light of the evidence on healthcare services and the preserved findings that both ED and his family could provide support to LK if she went to Albania, it is clear to me that her and her health conditions could be properly treated in that country. Overall, the new evidence about LK’s health does not undermine the preserved findings and, beyond that, does not disclose a very compelling circumstance in this case.
18. I turn to other considerations. ED has been in this country unlawfully throughout his time here, and that is important. ED is a “foreign criminal”. I have taken account of the circumstances surrounding the offence. I appreciate that he pleaded guilty at an early stage and was given some credit for this. The criminal judge said that ED had played a lesser role than others, but the overall enterprise was still sophisticated. The First-tier Tribunal Judge found that the offence caused “serious harm” and that is a preserved finding. The public interest in deporting ED is strong. ED is a victim of trafficking and I have taken that into account. However, that fact cannot by itself be said to significantly undermine the public interest in deportation and it does not by itself represent a very compelling circumstance. On the facts of this case I acknowledge that ED has shown genuine remorse for the offending and that he has not committed any further offences. However, the fact that he has not done so is of little value because of what judgments from the higher level courts in this country have said (in particular HA (Iraq v SSHD [2022] UKSC 22). There are no children involved in this case.
19. The test of showing very compelling circumstances is very high. The circumstances must go above and beyond the factors set out in the two exceptions which I have mentioned earlier (relating to private life in the United Kingdom and ED’s relationship with LK). The preserved findings clearly show that ED could re-establish himself in Albania with or without LK. Those findings show that LK could, with the help of ED and his family, live a reasonable life in Albania. She would be able to get appropriate medical treatment. She would be able to learn the language and, at least in time, find employment. She would have a loving husband and a supportive wider family network. The judge found that LK has family in the United Kingdom and that they would be able to provide emotional support to her while she was in Albania. Further, there would be nothing to prevent LK from coming back to the United Kingdom to visit those family members.
20. When I bring everything together there is only one proper conclusion that I can reach. Applying the high test required by the law, there are no very compelling circumstances in this case going above and beyond the matters set out in the two exceptions. This means that ED’s appeal must be dismissed.

Anonymity
21. As I said earlier, an anonymity direction in respect of ED and LK because ED is a victim of trafficking.

Notice of Decision
The decision of the First-tier Tribunal has been set aside to the extent set out in this re-making decision.

I re-make the decision and ED’s appeal is dismissed.

H Norton-Taylor
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: March 2026

ANNEX: THE ERROR OF LAW DECISION

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004634
First-tier Tribunal No: HU/53287/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE NORTON-TAYLOR
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE RICHARDS

Between

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Appellant
and

[E D]
(ANONYMITY DIRECTION MADE)
Respondent

Representation:
For the appellant: Mr D Simpson, Senior Presenting Officer
For the respondent: In person and not legally represented

Heard at Field House on 5 December 2025

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction
1. ED is no longer legally represented and we have kept this in mind when explaining what we have decided and why.

2. In our decision we shall call the Home Office “the SSHD” (short for the Secretary of State for the Home Department).

3. ED is an Albanian citizen, born in 1993. He came to the United Kingdom in February 2015 and has stayed here ever since without lawful permission. In September 2019 he was convicted on a guilty plea of producing Class B drugs (cannabis) and sentenced to 8 months’ imprisonment (he served four months before being released). The SSHD then decided to deport him to Albania. A deportation decision was made on 23 September 2019, followed by a deportation order signed on 4 November 2019. On 25 April 2022 ED made a human rights claim (a claim that he should not be sent back to Albania because it would be against his human rights). The human rights claim had two parts to it. First, he said that he was in a genuine relationship with Ms LK, a British citizen, and that he should be allowed to stay in United Kingdom to live with her. Secondly, ED said that he had made a private life for himself in this country. ED does not have any children.

4. On 6 July 2023 conclusive grounds decision was made under the National Referral Mechanism (“the NRM”) that ED was a victim of trafficking. He was not given any permission to stay in this country as a result of that decision.

5. On 6 March 2024 the SSHD refused ED’s human rights claim. The SSHD said that ED was not in a genuine relationship with LK and that he should be deported to Albania because his offending had caused “serious harm”.

6. ED then made an appeal to the First-tier Tribunal.

The First-tier Tribunal’s decision
7. We shall refer to the First-tier Tribunal Judge as “the FTTJ”.

8. The FTTJ set out the background to ED’s case, including what was said about the claimed relationship, the offending, and his circumstances in Albania. At paragraph 23 the FTTJ stated that the issues for her to decide were: whether ED met one of the “exceptions to deportation” and/or whether his circumstances were “compelling”.

9. The “exceptions” referred to relate to the part of the law called section 117C of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. This applies in cases where someone who is not British has been convicted of an offence and sentenced to imprisonment (where the imprisonment is for 12 months or more, or where the offence(s) caused “serious harm”, or where the person is a “persistent offender”). The FTTJ agreed with the SSHD that ED’s offence had caused “serious harm”. Under section 117C, there are two exceptions (in other words, reasons why a person will not be deported). The first exception is where the person has a private life in the United Kingdom, has lived here legally for more than half of their life, is socially and culturally integrated, and there are very significant obstacles to integration to the country of their nationality. The second exception is where the person has a family life with a partner and/or a child in this country and it would be “unduly harsh” (in other words, very difficult indeed) for the person and their partner/child to go and live together in another country, or where it would be “unduly harsh” to separate the person from their partner/child.

10. The FTTJ discussed the first exception at paragraphs 48-58. She found that ED had never had permission to be in United Kingdom. She found that he was socially and culturally integrated into the United Kingdom. She found that he had family ties in Albania from whom he could get support if he returned there. He spoke Albanian, was fit and well, and could find a job in Albania. ED’s brother, who lives in the United Kingdom, could help support him on return to Albania. The FTTJ found that there would not be very significant obstacles to ED going to live in Albania.

11. The FTTJ discussed the second exception at paragraph 59-69. She accepted that ED was in a genuine and subsisting relationship with LK and that LK was British. LK could speak basic Albanian and that the culture of that country was similar to the culture of Hungary (LK’s father is Hungarian). The FTTJ found that LK should have little problems in getting used to Albanian society. LK could find a job in Albania, but even if she could not, ED and his family would be able to support her. There was no evidence that LK required ongoing medical treatment, but in any event, Albania had a functioning healthcare system. The FTTJ concluded that it would not be unduly harsh for LK to go and live with ED in Albania.

12. The FTTJ found that LK had close family members in the United Kingdom who would be up to give her support if ED was sent back to Albania by himself. LK would be able to communicate with ED by telephone and other social media platforms. LK would be able to visit ED in Albania. The FTTJ concluded that it would not be unduly harsh for LK to be separated from ED.

13. Therefore, ED could not show that either of the two exceptions applied to his case.

14. This meant that the only way he could win his case is if he could show that there were “very compelling circumstances over and above” the considerations which had already been talked about under the two exceptions. That test is under section 117C(6) and is very difficult to meet.

15. The FTTJ discussed the test at paragraphs 73-80. She said that ED’s offending was “serious” and that drugs caused “significant harm in the community”. The judge reminded herself that ED had not satisfied either of the two exceptions.

16. At paragraph 75 the FTTJ said the following:

“The appellant and his partner met in 2018. The appellant’s relationship with his partner was established before his index offence, although the appellant had no lawful leave to be in the United Kingdom and little weight should be given to a relationship formed with a qualifying partner at a time when a person is in the United Kingdom unlawfully I find that I can attach some weight to their relationship because, I accept that the appellant is in a subsisting relationship with his partner and I take into account his family life and the fact he will not be able to enjoy his family life in the United Kingdom if he is deported. I also take into account the fact the appellant and his partner want to start a family which has been hindered to date due to some gynaecological health issues, [LK] has been having which may have been resolved by the recent operation she had to remove a cyst found on her ovaries. [LK] may well need on-going emotional support as she continues her medical treatment, and although her family can offer support the best emotional support in these circumstances will come from the appellant who should be around physically to provide this support.”

17. At paragraphs 76 and 77, the FTTJ said this:

“Rehabilitation and risk of re-offending:- These are factors that do not of themselves lead to a conclusion that the public interest in deportation is outweighed. They are however relevant factors in the overall assessment and balancing exercise and I give them some weight. The appellant has expressed remorse for his offending, and I accept that this is genuine. I take account that the respondent’s National Referral Mechanism (NRM), had made a conclusive grounds decision that the appellant was a victim of human trafficking, which would usually attract a grant of Discretionary leave, but the respondent has decided not to grant such leave.

77. Nevertheless, I take the findings of the NRM into account, as it clearly points to the appellant’s vulnerability at the time he was found in the house where cannabis was growing, which led to his conviction. I also noted the Judge in his sentencing remarks said that he accepted that the appellant played a “lesser role” in the sophisticated drug operation.”

18. At paragraph 78 the FTTJ noted that ED had not committed any other offences since being released from prison and that he had complied with his licence. ED had shown remorse (sorrow) for his offending and his relationships with LK and his brother were something which might prevent him from offending again in the future.

19. At the end of paragraph 79 the FTTJ said that:

“… I do not consider that the public interest questions raised in this appeal give rise to a compelling need to exclude the appellant from the United Kingdom.”

20. Finally, at paragraph 80 the FTTJ stated that there were “very compelling circumstances over and above those described in exceptions 1 and 2…” She therefore allowed ED’s appeal.

The SSHD’s grounds of appeal
21. The SSHD made an application for permission to appeal because she thought that the FTTJ had made legal mistakes. The legal mistakes were written down in what are called grounds of appeal. The legal mistakes were (a) the FTTJ had got the law wrong when looking at ED’s case (what is called a misdirection in law) and (b) had not given proper reasons for why she said ‘yes’ to ED’s case.

22. We make brief observations on the SSHD’s grounds of appeal. In our experience it is relatively common to see grounds from the SSHD containing a single sub-heading entitled “Misdirection in law/failure to give adequate reasons” followed by contentions which fall outside of those two distinct potential errors of law, or otherwise appear to conflate one such error with the other. We remind the SSHD (as we would remind any appellant where the need arose) of the importance of clearly articulating alleged errors of law, using appropriate sub-headings to distinguish between one and another.

23. A different judge in the First-tier Tribunal looked at the SSHD’s application and said that the FTTJ might have made legal mistakes, but he was not sure. That meant that a hearing was set up so that all the arguments could be heard by the Upper Tribunal.

Procedural matters
24. The day before the hearing, ED’s previous solicitors told the Upper Tribunal that they were no longer representing him. ED emailed the Upper Tribunal to say that he would come to the hearing by himself. He asked for an Albanian interpreter and one was booked.

The hearing
25. At the beginning of the hearing we made sure that ED could understand the Albanian interpreter. We then explained in detail what the case was all about. This included explaining what the FTTJ had said, what the SSHD said the legal mistakes were, and what our job was. We explained that we would be looking back at what the FTTJ had written to see whether or not she had made the legal mistakes set out in the SSHD’s grounds of appeal. ED told us that he understood everything that been said.

26. We then listened to Mr Simpson, who told us why he thought the FTTJ had made the legal mistakes, and then heard from ED.

27. After that, we had a break and went to discuss the case outside of the hearing room. When we came back, we told ED and Mr Simpson that we had decided the FTTJ did make legal mistakes. We said that our written reasons for that decision would be sent out as soon as possible.

Reasons for our decision
28. These are the reasons for our decision that the FTTJ made legal mistakes.

29. We have read the FTTJ’s decision carefully. We accept that it is a detailed decision and that we should only conclude that legal mistakes were made if that is clear to us.

30. The first legal mistake is in paragraph 79. The FTTJ was clearly wrong to say that she did not “consider that the public interest questions raised in this appeal give rise to a compelling need to exclude [ED] from the United Kingdom.” That was not the correct legal test. The correct legal test was whether ED could show that there were very compelling circumstances in his case over and above the matters described in the two exceptions, not for the SSHD to show that there was a “compelling need” to deport him. In other words, in paragraph 79 the FTTJ got the legal test the wrong way round.

31. We have thought carefully about whether the legal mistake made any difference to the FTTJ’s decision to allow ED’s appeal. We have decided that it did. Not only did the FTTJ get the test wrong in paragraph 79, but at paragraphs 23 and 70: she only used the word “compelling” and not the words “very compelling”. The word “very” is important because it shows how difficult the test is to meet.

32. The first legal mistake is enough to satisfy us that the FTTJ’s decision must be overturned.

33. The second legal mistake made by the FTTJ is about her reasons for why she allowed ED’s appeal. She had said that ED and LK could go and live together in Albania without it being “unduly harsh”. She also said that ED could go and live in Albania by himself and that would not be “unduly harsh”, or present “very significant obstacles”. Once she had said this about the two exceptions, the FTTJ had to properly explain why she then concluded that there were “very compelling circumstances” above and beyond what she had already said. In other words, she could not just rely on what she had said about the two exceptions and then say that the same circumstances were enough for ED to win.

34. When we look carefully at paragraph 75 of the FTTJ’s decision we can only see circumstances relating to LK. The problem is that the FTTJ had already said that LK could go and live in Albania without it being very difficult for her. The FTTJ has not given any adequate reasons in paragraph 75 to explain why LK’s situation should then be treated as a very compelling circumstance.

35. At paragraphs 76-78 the FTTJ refers to two considerations: first, rehabilitation and the risk of re-offending; and second, the NRM decision. The problem in relation to the first consideration is that the case-law (the judgments of the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court) make it very clear that being remorseful and not committing any other offences is not an important factor because people are expected not to commit crimes. The FTTJ has not properly explained why the first consideration was so important that it could be a very compelling circumstance in ED’s case.

36. The problem in relation to the second consideration is that the FTTJ has failed to properly explain why the NRM decision (that ED was a victim of trafficking) was so important that it could show a very compelling circumstance. ED had not been given discretionary leave after the NRM decision and he had not challenged that. His circumstances might have been relevant to the length of the prison sentence, but he still received a sentence of 8 months and that he had been involved in a “sophisticated cannabis farm operation”. The FTTJ found that drugs cause significant harm in the community and accepted that ED’s offending had caused serious harm.

37. When we look at the FTTJ’s decision as a whole and even when we look at everything said in paragraph 76-78 together, we simply cannot see legally adequate reasons for why ED’s case had very compelling circumstances over and above the matters discussed under the two exceptions. The lack of adequate reasons is clearly a material legal mistake and it is another basis on which we must overturn the FTTJ’s decision.

What happens next
38. We have decided that ED’s case should be kept in the Upper Tribunal and that there should be another hearing so that a final decision can be made.

39. What follows is important and ED should read it very carefully.

40. There is nothing wrong with the FTTJ’s findings about the two exceptions. She was allowed to make those findings and they have not been challenged by ED or his previous representatives. This means that everything the FTTJ said at paragraphs 48-69 is kept for the next hearing. In addition, the FTTJ’s findings that ED is genuinely sorry for his offending, has not reoffended, and that he is a victim of trafficking are also kept for the next hearing.

41. At the next hearing the only question to be looked at by the Upper Tribunal is whether there are very compelling circumstances in ED’s case.

42. ED and the SSHD will be able to provide new evidence before the next hearing if they want to. They must remember that any new evidence must be connected to the question of whether there are very compelling circumstances. The Upper Tribunal will not be looking at everything in ED’s case all over again because a number of the FTTJ’s findings are being kept.

43. A hearing will be arranged and the date will be sent to ED and the SSHD. An Albanian interpreter will be booked for ED.

44. ED and the SSHD must carefully read the Directions which are set out at the end of our decision.

Anonymity
45. We make an anonymity direction because the appellant is a victim of trafficking.

Notice of Decision
The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did involve the making of an error on a point of law.
The First-tier Tribunal’s decision is set aside to the extent set out in this error of law decision.
This appeal is retained in the Upper Tribunal for the decision to be re-made in due course.

Directions to ED and the SSHD
1. ED can send in any new evidence (information) before the next hearing. If he does want to do this, it must happen no later than 28 days after our decision has been sent to him. He must send any new evidence by email to the Upper Tribunal using the email address [~]. He must also send the same evidence to the SSHD using the email address [~].

2. If the SSHD wants to send in any new evidence, this must be done no later than 35 days after our decision has been sent out. The new evidence must be sent to ED directly and at the same time that it is sent to the Upper Tribunal;

3. If ED gets new solicitors, he must tell the Upper Tribunal about this straightaway, using the email address referred to at direction 1.

H Norton-Taylor
Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

Dated: 8 December 2025