Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004637; UI-2025-005076
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01034/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

5th June 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HIRST
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE WALSH

Between

BK
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: The appellant appeared in person
For the Respondent: Ms. S McKenzie, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 28 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant or her child, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant or her child. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Anonymity Order

1. The First-tier Tribunal made an anonymity order in this appeal because the appellant has made a claim for international protection and is accepted to be a victim of domestic violence. No party asked for this to be set aside and we consider it appropriate for that order to continue because the public interest in the UK’s compliance with its international obligations and in the confidentiality of the asylum system outweigh the public interest in open justice in this case.

Background

2. The appellant appeals with permission against a decision of the First-tier Tribunal (FtT) promulgated on 16 July 2025 dismissing her appeal against the respondent’s decision dated 31 January 2024 refusing her protection claim.

3. The appellant is a national of India and a Sikh from the Punjab. The appellant arrived in the United Kingdom on 12 December 2021 on a student visa with her now estranged husband. The basis of her claim is as a victim of domestic violence from her husband fearing persecution/serious harm from her husband and his family in India.

4. The appellant asserts that following her arranged marriage, she suffered domestic violence both from her husband and his family. Her husband’s violence toward her escalated upon arriving in the UK and her becoming pregnant in 2022. He left the appellant and their child in January 2023. She last heard from him in July 2023. Around the time he left had made threats to take the child. The appellant consequently sought and obtained a non-molestation order with the assistance of a family support worker.

5. The appellant claims that if returned to India she would not be able to seek sufficient protection from the authorities, nor is there anywhere in India to which she could relocate as her husband and/or his family would find her. She also claims that she would not be able to support herself or access medical treatment for her depression.

6. The appeal came before a panel of the Upper Tribunal at an error of law hearing on 28 January 2026. Having heard submissions we reserved our decision which is given with reasons below.

First-tier Decision

7. The issues in dispute before the FtT were whether the appellant could avail herself of sufficient protection and/or whether she could internally relocate within India. It was not disputed that the appellant was a victim of domestic violence and as such was a member of a particular social group thus falling within the scope of Article 1A (2) of the 1951 Refugee Convention.

8. At [17] to [22] the FtT judge considered the issue of sufficiency of protection taking into account the appellant’s personal circumstances and the respondent’s Country Policy Information Note (CPIN) India: Women Fearing Gender-based Violence, Version 3.0 (November 2022) and Actors of Protection, Version 2.0 (June 2023). The FtT judge found that the appellant still had the support of her father and as such would not be returning as a single mother without support. He found it likely the appellant would be able to access sufficient protection in India.

9. The FtT judge considered the appellant’s ability to relocate internal internally at [23] to [27]. He found firstly that there was no evidence before him to suggest that the appellant’s husband’s family had influence outside the local area and observed that she had not had contact with them since she blocked them and cut off contact in 2023. In considering whether it was reasonable and not unduly harsh for the appellant to relocate, he took into account her undisputed medical conditions and concluded from the CPIN India: Internal Relocation, Version 2.0 (June 2023) that she was likely to be able to access treatment in India. He also considered the CPIN India: Religious Minorities, Scheduled Castes and Tribes, Version 4.0 (April 2024) observing that there are non-governmental organisations to fill any gaps in state welfare provision. The FtT judge took account of the fact that the appellant is highly educated. He found at [27] that life for the appellant and her child may be difficult in a new location in India with which she was not familiar but would not amount to undue harshness.

10. In his conclusions on international protection and human rights, the FtT judge stated at [32] “no reliance was placed on Article 8 by the appellant”.

Grounds of Appeal

11. The appellant, who was unrepresented at the First-tier, put forward 6 grounds of appeal which are understood as follows:
a. The FtT judge gave too much weight to the objective evidence and not enough weight to the appellant’s evidence
b. The FtT judge erred in his conclusion that the appellant did not seek protection from domestic violence in the UK
c. The FtT judge erred in failing to take into account the difficulties in her relocating in the India due to her poor health and the inability of her father to support her
d. The FtT judge failed to take into account Section 55 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 and the impact on her child
e. The FtT judge erred in finding there was no evidence that her husband could trace her in India and failed to take into account her depression and the impact on her mental health of having been a victim of domestic violence
f. The FtT judge failed to take into account the letter of support from the Southall Black Sisters.

12. Permission to appeal was granted at the First-tier Tribunal on the single issue of whether the FtT judge made a material error of law in failing to engage with and make a determination on article 8 of the ECHR, notwithstanding this was not relied on by the appellant.

The Hearing

13. The appellant was not represented.

14. In summary, the appellant submitted that the FtT judge should have taken into consideration the impact on the quality of her child’s life as well as her own if they returned to India. In the United Kingdom, her child is safe, settled in nursery and receiving appropriate support. At the time her then husband made threats to take her child, they had support from social workers who facilitated their move to a new property. This level of support would not be available to her in India. The appellant did confirm that family court proceedings had concluded by the time her appeal was heard at the FtT. She also argued that the judge was wrong to find that she would be able to work and support herself and her child. He did not take into consideration her poor mental health and the lack of emotional support in India as she is cut off from her family.

15. Ms. McKenzie urged us to dismiss the appeal. She argued that the FtT judge was right not to consider Article 8 as it had not been raised by the appellant and therefore he had no jurisdiction to do so, referring us to Dani v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2023] UKUT 00293 (IAC). Further, she submitted that the grounds of appeal as set out did not themselves raise issues under article 8. This issue was raised for the first time by the judge granting permission to appeal. To the extent that the ground regarding the application of Section 55 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 could be thought to import consideration of article 8, Ms. McKenzie submitted that the judgment in CAO v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] UKSC 32 made clear that section 55 Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 applies to the decision maker in the Home Office and not to the First-tier Tribunal. Therefore, she argued there was no obligation under Section 55 on the FtT judge to consider the best interests of the appellant’s child as a primary consideration.

Discussion and Findings

16. Part 5 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 provides the framework for appealing against protection and human rights claims. The sections of the NIAA 2002 relevant to this appeal are as follows:
82. Right of appeal to the Tribunal
(1) A person “P” may appeal to the Tribunal where –
(a) the Secretary of State has decided to refuse a protection claim made by P,
(b) the Secretary of State has decided to refuse the human rights claim made by P, or
(c) the Secretary of State has decided to revoke P’s protection status.
84. Grounds of appeal
(1) An appeal under section 82(1)(a) (refusal of protection claim) must be bought on one or more of the following grounds –
(a) that removal of the appellant from the United Kingdom would breach the United Kingdom’s obligations under the Refugee Convention;
(b) that removal of the appellant from the United Kingdom would breach the United Kingdom’s obligations in relation to persons eligible for a grant of humanitarian protection;
(c) that removal of the appellant from the United Kingdom would be unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (public authority not to act contrary to Human Rights Convention).
(2) An appeal under section 82(1)(b) (refusal of human rights claim) must be bought on the grounds that the decision is unlawful under section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998.
85. Matters to be considered
(1) An appeal under section 82(1) against the decision shall be treated by the Tribunal as including an appeal against any decision in respect of which the appellant has a right of appeal under section 82(1).
(2) If an appellant under section 82(1) makes a statement under section 120, the Tribunal shall consider any matter raised in a statement which constitutes a ground of appeal of a kind listed in section 84 the decision appealed against.
(3) Subsection (2) applies to a statement made under section 120 whether the statement was made before or after the appeal was commenced.
(4) On an appeal under section 82(1) … against a decision the Tribunal may consider… any matter which it thinks relevant to the substance of the decision, including… a matter arising after the date of decision.
(5) But the Tribunal must not consider a new matter unless the Secretary of Status has given the Tribunal consent to do so.
(6) A matter is a “new matter” if –
(a) it constitutes a ground of appeal of a kind listed in section 84, and
(b) the Secretary of State has not previously considered the matter in the context of –
(i) the decision mentioned in section 82(1), or
(ii) a statement made by the appellant under section 120.
86. Determination of appeal
(1) This section applies on an appeal under section 82(1).
(2) The Tribunal must determine –
(a) any matter raised as a ground of appeal…, and
(b) any matter which section 85 requires it to consider.
120. Requirement to state additional grounds for application etc
(1) Subsection (2) applies to a person (“P”) if—
(a) P has made a protection claim or a human rights claim,
(b) P has made an application to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, or
(c) a decision to deport or remove P has been or may be taken.
(2) The Secretary of State or an immigration officer may serve a notice on P requiring P to provide a statement setting out—
(a) P's reasons for wishing to enter or remain in the United Kingdom,
(b) any grounds on which P should be permitted to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, and
(c) any grounds on which P should not be removed from or required to leave the United Kingdom.
(3) A statement under subsection (2) need not repeat reasons or grounds set out in—
(a) P's protection or human rights claim,
(b) the application mentioned in subsection (1)(b), or
(c) an application to which the decision mentioned in subsection (1)(c) relates.
(4) Subsection (5) applies to a person (“P”) if P has previously been served with a notice under subsection (2) and—
(a) P requires leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom but does not have it, or
(b) P has leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom only by virtue of [section 3C of the Immigration Act 1971] (continuation of leave pending decision or appeal).
(5) Where P's circumstances have changed since the Secretary of State or an immigration officer was last made aware of them (whether in the application or claim mentioned in subsection (1) or in a statement under subsection (2) or this subsection) so that P has—
(a) additional reasons for wishing to enter or remain in the United Kingdom,
(b) additional grounds on which P should be permitted to enter or remain in the United Kingdom, or
(c) additional grounds on which P should not be removed from or required to leave the United Kingdom,
P must, as soon as reasonably practicable, provide a supplementary statement to the Secretary of State or an immigration officer setting out the new circumstances and the additional reasons or grounds.
(6) In this section—
“human rights claim” and “protection claim” have the same meanings as in Part 5;
references to “grounds” are to grounds on which an appeal under Part 5 may be brought (see section 84).

17. The appellant did not rely on article 8 as part of her initial claim nor was a notice under section 120 served on the appellant. Nevertheless, in her refusal letter, after refusing the appellant’s protection claim, the respondent considered whether removal would breach the article 8 rights of the appellant and/or her child, deciding that it would not do so.

18. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal under Section 82(1)(a) of the 2002 Act against the respondent’s decision refusing her protection claim. She did not appeal against the respondent’s decision on article 8 or attempt to do so before the FtT judge.

19. The relevant decision for the FtT judge to determine under section 86 NIAA 2002 was therefore limited to the decision on the appellant’s protection claim as there was no further matter to be taken into consideration under Section 85 (2).

20. The issue raised in the grant of permission is, in essence, whether the FtT judge nevertheless had an obligation to engage with article 8 in relation to the best interests of the appellant’s child and or the appellant’s mental health concerns and treatment thereof.

21. In the absence of clear statutory jurisdiction to consider article 8 we conclude the only basis on which we could find that the FtT judge should have made a determination on article 8 is if we found that the written and/or oral evidence before the FtT judge disclosed a Robinson obvious article 8 point with a strong prospect of success (R v Secretary of State for the Home Department ex parte Robinson [1998] QB 929).

22. For the reasons we set out below, we find that the evidence before the FtT judge did not disclose any matter which would have raised a Robinson obvious article 8 point.

23. We turn firstly to consider whether any point arises in relation to the best interests of the appellant’s child. As CAO makes clear at [54], the duties imposed under Section 55 of the 2009 Act to promote and safeguard the welfare of children apply to the Secretary of State and her officials; they do not apply to the FtT. The FtT judge must, however, comply with article 8 including by having regard to the best interests of children as a primary consideration in accordance with their obligation under Section 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 to make decisions compatible with Convention rights: ZH (Tanzania) v SSHD [2011] 2 AC 166.

24. That does not however, require the FtT judge to “cast about” or make further enquiries as to whether there may be additional evidence to support a claim that removal is contrary to a child’s best interests: CAO at [47]. A caveat to that proposition was, however identified at [48]:

48. Although this is the general position, there may nonetheless be circumstances where, even though a point has not been taken, it is obvious that it requires examination in order to reach a proper conclusion regarding the best interests of a child affected by the decision. For example, if a decision affected a child and no attempt at all had been made to consider their best interests, that would be an obvious omission and the FTT would be bound to investigate to make sure that proper consideration was given to that issue

25. That is not the case here. In her refusal letter, the respondent confirms that she has taken into account her duty under Section 55 of the 2009 Act and sets out the different contexts in which she has considered the best interests of the appellant’s child and her rationale for determining that the removal of the appellant and her child would not breach article 8.

26. We have, however, gone on to consider whether any issue arose from the evidence before the FtT judge which would have required an enquiry in accordance with [48] of CAO. In doing so we had regard to the well-established factors relevant to consideration of the best interests of children in the context in removal. These include the level of the child’s integration in the UK, the length of absence from the other country, where and with whom the child is going to live; and the strength of the child’s relationships with family members which would be severed if the child is removed: ZH (Tanzania) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSC 2 AC 166 at [29]. Additionally a child’s nationality is of importance, as the removal of a child with British nationality means the loss of access to rights and advantages conveyed by their citizenship: ZH (Tanzania) at [30].

27. In this case, whilst the appellant’s child was born in the UK, they are not a British citizen and have no independent right to remain. At the time of the FtT hearing the child was three years old.

28. There was no evidence before the FtT judge demonstrating that the appellant’s child was independently integrated or had developed particularly close social or educational ties requiring additional consideration.

29. Further, the child had had no relationship with their father for over two years at the time of the hearing before the FtT judge; their father, in any event, was the subject of a non-molestation order and perpetrator of domestic abuse. There were no other relatives in the UK from whom the child would be separated were they to return to India with their mother.

30. There was no evidence that the child suffered from any medical condition or had any particular emotional, cognitive or psychological needs. In her screening interview on 26 January 2023 [UTB 97] and her asylum interview on 23 January 2024 the appellant confirms that the child is fine [UTB 114]. A letter in the bundle before the FtT judge from Hackney Children’s Services was written to support the mother’s application for an adjournment of the listed appeal hearing [UTB 36]. It confirms that at the time the letter was written the appellant’s child was subject to a Child Protection Plan due to reported domestic abuse perpetrated against the mother by the child’s father and by a subsequent partner. However, in that letter, Children’s Services did not refer to the child having any particular condition or level need.

31. We find therefore there was no evidence before the FtT judge with respect to the best interests of the appellant’s child raising any issue which would have required the FtT judge to investigate of his own accord and make a determination on article 8.

32. We turn to consider whether there was any evidence relating to the appellant’s mental health and impact thereon of the domestic abuse she suffered which raises an obvious article 8 point.

33. For an article 8 claim to succeed on the basis of health, including mental health, an applicant/appellant would need to show “something very much more extreme than relative disadvantage” between treatment available in the receiving state compared with the UK, Regina Ex Parte Razgar (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHJ 27 at [10].

34. The only independent medical evidence before the FtT judge regarding the appellant’s mental health was the GP letter dated 26 November 2024 [UTB 34], written in support of the appellant’s application to adjourn the tribunal hearing listed in December 2024. The letter confirms the appellant’s conditions registered at the surgery being polycystic ovary syndrome, mixed anxiety and depressive disorder, cobalamin deficiency, and lower back pain. The letter refers to the appellant being a victim of domestic abuse.

35. There was no expert evidence, or indeed any independent evidence before the FtT judge as to how, if at all, these conditions impacted on the appellant’s daily functioning or her parenting capacity; how the domestic abuse she experienced had impacted her physical and/or mental health; or how if at all her mental health would be impacted by her removal to India. The letter from the Southall Black Sisters [UTB 56] contains neither the requisite level of detail or expertise to evidence an article 8 claim in this respect.

36. As summarised above, the FtT judge at [25] and [26] had regard to the relevant CPINS and found that treatment for the appellant’s condition was likely to be available in India. There was no independent evidence before the Tribunal which contradicted the information in the CPINs referred to.

37. We find therefore that the evidence before the FtT judge with respect to the appellant’s mental health did not reach the threshold to engage article 8.

38. It follows that we find there was no Robinson obvious article 8 point arising from the evidence before the judge in respect of the appellant’s mental health which would have required him to engage and determine an article 8 point when no article 8 point had been advanced by the appellant.

39. Accordingly we find that the decision of the FtT judge did not involve a material error of law.

Notice of Decision

40. The appellant’s appeal is dismissed. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal stands.

Martha Walsh

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

28 May 2026