Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004644

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/01416/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 4th of March 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BURGHER

Between

B S
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr G Hodgetts (Counsel) Rodman Pearce Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mrs Nolan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House by CVP on 12 February 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify them. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

Background
1. The Appellant was born on 20 February 1985 and is a national of Namibia. She arrived in the UK on 23 February 2023 and claimed asylum. Her asylum application was refused on 1 March 2024.
2. The Appellant appealed against the refusal decision. It was accepted that she was abused by her former boyfriend (SH). The Appellant asserts that she fell within the scope of the Refugee Convention and that there was not sufficiency of protection for her to return to Namibia.
The Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
3. First Tier Tribunal Judge Richards-Clarke (‘the Judge’) heard the Appellant’s appeal on 12 August 2025 and in a decision promulgated on 15 August 2025 dismissed the appeal. The Judge permitted the Respondent to withdraw a concession given in its reasons for refusal letter regarding a Refugee Convention reason (Decision §17) and found that women facing gender-based violence were not considered to form a particular social group (PSG) in Namibia within the meaning of the Refugee Convention (Decision §18).
4. In respect of the Appellant’s claim for humanitarian protection the Judge concluded that the Appellant did not show that there are substantial grounds for believing that she would face a real risk of suffering serious harm (Decision §26). The Judge then concluded that the Appellant had sufficient protection from the Namibian authorities (Decision §30) and that she could internally relocate (Decision §32).
5. Permission to appeal was granted by First Tier Tribunal Judge Swaney on 28 September 2025.
Anonymity Order
6. The Judge made an anonymity order. There was no request for the anonymity order to be set aside. I conclude that the Appellant’s rights to international protection outweigh the Article 10 rights of the public to know her identity as a party to these proceedings.
The Grounds of Appeal
7. The Appellant appealed to the Upper Tribunal on the basis that the Judge materially erred in law in their conclusions relating to:
(i) Serious harm;
(ii) Sufficiency of protection;
(iii) Internal relocation;
(iv) the procedural fairness of permitting the Respondent to withdraw a concession regarding Convention reason; and
(v) the Convention reason.
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
8. I had before me the composite hearing bundle of 325 pages, the 20 page skeleton argument from Mr Hodgetts dated 5 February 2026 and had the benefit of helpful oral submissions from both representatives.
Appellant’s submissions
9. In his oral submissions Mr Hodgetts advanced five principal criticisms of the Judge’s decision.
10. First, it was contended that the Judge erred in law by holding that the cumulative harms the Appellant suffered did not amount to serious harm for the purposes of Demirkaya v SSHD and Rules 339C & 339K and Article 3. He submitted that the Judge had also incorrectly introduced a requirement of serious continuous physical violence and harm and failed to assess psychological harm, contrary to Opuz v Turkey and Demirkaya v SSHD. He emphasised that the Judge had failed to consider the cumulative effect of violence to the Appellant and the arson attack by SH over the fifteen year period.
11. Second, it was submitted that the Judge failed to conduct an individualised assessment of sufficiency of protection, instead treating the CPIN as determinative and ignoring the Appellant’s case specific evidence that SH had police connections, that police action had been consistently ineffective, and that state bodies had advised her simply to move away.
12. Third, it was submitted that the Judge’s internal relocation reasoning was erroneous in that they failed to engage with the Appellant’s medical evidence regarding the need for treatment in Windhoek; had overlooked the ability of SH to trace her through family members, and failed to assess undue harshness for a single mother with limited support. In this context it was submitted that the Judge had not properly considered the evidence of the Appellant’s sister that SH attended her home on two occasions, in December 2023 and in March 2024. The evidence was that on the latter occasion in 2024, SH physically confronted her, took her by the neck, and demanded information about the Appellant’s whereabouts. SH threatened her and stated that he was not concerned about police involvement because of his connections with the police.
13. Fourth, it was submitted that the Judge erred procedurally in permitting the withdrawal of the concession on Convention reason without giving notice, contrary to Kalidas and MH (Appendix EU; withdrawal of concession) Albania [2025] UKUT 00351 (IAC)
14. Fifth, it was contended that the Judge erred in finding that women fearing gender‑based violence in Namibia do not form a PSG. It was submitted that the Judge relied solely on the CPIN without engaging properly with the Appellant’s circumstances or the authorities on PSG reasoning.
Respondent’s submissions
15. Mrs Nolan responded that many of the grounds advanced orally improperly expanded beyond the pleaded errors. She emphasised that disagreement with findings of fact did not establish an error of law.
16. Mrs Nolan accepted that the Judge’s reference to continuous physical harm was erroneous when considering serious harm contrary to Demirkaya v SSHD and Rules 339C & 339K. However, it was submitted that this error was immaterial because the Judge proceeded to decide subsequent issues expressly on the alternative assumption that serious harm was established.
17. It was contended that the Judge’s findings on sufficiency of protection were properly grounded in the Appellant’s own history of accessing police and court processes, together with the CPIN evidence and that, in any event, the Judge was not required to recite every factual allegation advanced.
18. Regarding internal relocation, it was submitted that the Judge properly considered Rundu and Walvis Bay as locations and the Judge’s findings that the Appellant did not need to reside in Windhoek to obtain treatment was open to it. Further, the evidence of the Appellant’s sister stating that SH contact, assault and statements to her did not undermine the Judge’s assessment of risk undertaken in 2025.
19. Mrs Nolan submitted that the Judge properly applied the principles in NR (Jamaica) regarding withdrawal of the Convention concession. The Respondent’s review on 3 December 2024 clearly communicated the intention to withdraw the concession and the Appellant had the opportunity to address the issue. She submitted that no procedural unfairness arose.
20. Finally on the Convention reason, it was submitted that the Judge applied the correct test, considered the Appellant’s circumstances, and was entitled to rely on the CPIN concerning whether the Appellant fell within a PSG.
The Legal Framework
21. The Upper Tribunal is confined to considering whether there are errors of law in First Tier Tribunal decisions. In R (Iran) & Ors v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 982 Brooke LJ summarises what amounts to an error of law at paragraphs 9 and 10
9. When the court gave this guidance in Subesh, it was aware that it would not be of any relevance to an appellate regime in which appeals were restricted to points of law. It may be convenient to give a brief summary of the points of law that will most frequently be encountered in practice:
i) Making perverse or irrational findings on a matter or matters that were material to the outcome ("material matters");
ii) Failing to give reasons or any adequate reasons for findings on material matters;
iii) Failing to take into account and/or resolve conflicts of fact or opinion on material matters;
iv) Giving weight to immaterial matters;
v) Making a material misdirection of law on any material matter;
vi) Committing or permitting a procedural or other irregularity capable of making a material difference to the outcome or the fairness of the proceedings;
vii) Making a mistake as to a material fact which could be established by objective and uncontentious evidence, where the appellant and/or his advisers were not responsible for the mistake, and where unfairness resulted from the fact that a mistake was made.

10. Each of these grounds for detecting an error of law contain the word "material" (or "immaterial"). Errors of law of which it can be said that they would have made no difference to the outcome do not matter. This need to identify an error of law which would have made a material difference to the outcome…
22. When considering serious harm and past persecution Article 3 ECHR prohibits torture and inhuman or degrading treatment. Regulation 5(1) of the Refugee or Person in Need of International Protection (Qualification) Regulations 2006 (Qualification Regulations) requires an assessment of the nature, repetition, and accumulation of acts when determining severity.
23. A proper assessment requires consideration of the nature, gravity, repetition, psychological impact, vulnerability of the victim, and cumulative effect of harm. In Opuz v Turkey (33401/02), the ECtHR held that sustained domestic violence can amount to inhuman or degrading treatment, emphasising the need to consider both physical and psychological components, the relationship of dependency, and state response. In Demirkaya v SSHD [1999] Imm AR 498 it was held that past persecution is strongly probative of risk of future persecution and must be analysed accordingly.
24. When considering sufficiency of protection in the case of Horvath v SSHD [2000] UKHL 37, Lord Hope held:
The standard to be applied is therefore not that which would eliminate all risk and would thus amount to a guarantee of protection in the home state. Rather it is a practical standard, which takes proper account of the duty which the state owes to all its own nationals. As Ward L.J. said at p. 44G, under reference to Professor Hathaway's observation in his book at p.105, it is axiomatic that we live in an imperfect world. Certain levels of ill-treatment may still occur even if steps to prevent this are taken by the state to which we look for our protection.
25. In the case of Opuz v. Turkey (33401/02) (ECHR, 2009) at §[162] the proper consideration is whether the national authorities have taken all reasonable measures to prevent the recurrence of violent attacks against the Appellant’s physical integrity.
26. When considering internal relocation following MB (Internal Relocation - burden of proof) Albania [2019] UKUT 392 it is necessary to consider (i) whether the Appellant would be safe from persecution on return to the proposed site and (ii) whether relocation would be reasonable and not unduly harsh. Once the Respondent identifies a relocation site before the burden shifts to the Appellant to show unreasonableness.
27. When considering PSG Shah and Islam [1999] 2 AC 629 established that gender can underpin a PSG where societal attitudes place women at risk and the state is unable or unwilling to offer protection JCK (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 100 (IAC) clarified that the PSG assessment under s.33(2) NABA requires analysis of whether the characteristic is socially distinct in the country of origin.
28. When considering withdrawing concessions, Goldring LJ summarised the authorities and approach in NR (Jamaica) v SSHD [2009] EWCA Civ 856 as follows:
10. In Carcabuk guidance was offered as to the approach to be taken by tribunals to concessions. As was said [11-12]:

"It is in our judgment important to identify the precise nature of any so-called concession. If it is of fact…the adjudicator should not go behind it. Accordingly, if facts are agreed, the adjudicator should accept whatever is agreed. Equally, if a concession is clearly made by a HOPO that an appellant is telling the truth either generally or on specific matters, the adjudicator may raise with the HOPO his doubts whether the concession as appropriate but, if it is maintained, he should accept it. But there is all the difference in the world between a concession and a failure to challenge. The former will bind the adjudicator, the latter will not. Furthermore, any concession can be withdrawn so that, for example, the case before the Tribunal can be presented in a different way to that before the adjudicator. It is open to a HOPO to withdraw a concession made before an adjudicator before the hearing is concluded, but the appellant must be given a proper opportunity to deal with the new case against him and unless there is good reason for the withdrawal such as the discovery of fresh material we doubt that the adjudicator should permit any adjournment which such withdrawal would be likely to necessitate…

We can summarise the position as follows:-

…(3) If the HOPO wishes to withdraw any concession made: in a refusal letter or explanatory statement, he must inform the appellant or his advisor as soon as possible and it will be for the adjudicator to decide if an application for an adjournment to enable the new case to be met is made, whether to grant it. If he does not, the concession will stand…

(6) A concession can be withdrawn but, if a HOPO seeks to do this, the adjudicator must be satisfied that the appellant will not be prejudiced if the hearing continues and should only allow an adjournment if persuaded that there was good reason to have made and to withdraw the concession"

11. In Secretary of State for the Home Department v Akram Davoodipanah [2004] EWCA Civ 106, Kennedy LJ, with whose judgment Clarke LJ and Jacob J (as they then were) agreed, set out the principle in the following way [22]:

"It is clear from the authorities that where a concession has been made before an adjudicator by either party the Tribunal can allow the concession to be withdrawn if it considers that there is good reason in all the circumstances to take that course…Obviously if there will be prejudice to one of the parties if the withdrawal is allowed that will be relevant and matters such as the nature of the concession and the timing may also be relevant, but it is not essential to demonstrate prejudice before an application to withdraw a concession can be refused. What the Tribunal must do is to try to obtain a fair and just result. In the absence of prejudice, if a presenting officer has made a concession which appears in retrospect to be a concession which he should not have made, then justice will require that the Secretary of State be allowed to withdraw that concession before the Tribunal. But, as I have said, everything depends on the circumstances, and each case must be considered on its own merits."

12. As Kennedy LJ makes clear, the Tribunal may in its discretion permit a concession to be withdrawn if in its view there is good reason in all the circumstances for that course to be taken. Its discretion is wide. Its exercise will depend on the particular circumstances of the case before it. Prejudice to the applicant is a significant feature. So is its absence. Its absence does not however mean that an application to withdraw a concession will invariably be granted. Bad faith will almost certainly be fatal to an application to withdraw a concession. In the final analysis, what is important is that as a result of the exercise of its discretion the Tribunal is enabled to decide the real areas of dispute on their merits so as to reach a result which is just both to the appellant and the Secretary of State.

13. I do not accept, as was submitted by Mr. Chelvan, that before the Tribunal can permit the Secretary of State to withdraw a concession, it must satisfy itself the decision to withdraw was rationally made in public law terms; that it is required both to analyse the nature of the concession and the justification for its withdrawal as though it were an administrative decision of a public body; that it is only if something new has arisen after the concession has been made that it may be permitted to be withdrawn; that otherwise the withdrawal is unfair. Mr. Chelvan is confusing the role of the Secretary of State in taking an administrative decision (for example in respect of someone seeking asylum), and his role as a party to litigation deciding how that litigation should be conducted.

14. I reject too a submission by Mr. Chelvan that whenever an application to withdraw a concession is made by the Secretary of State without notice, he is obliged to seek an adjournment. That is a misreading of what Collins J said in paragraph 12(6) of Carcabuk.
29. Insofar as is relevant Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) [2023] UKUT 00163 (IAC), sets out the steps to take in identifying issues in preparation for appeal as follows:
Headnote
[1] The parties are under a duty to provide the First-tier Tribunal with relevant information as to the circumstances of the case, and this necessitates constructive engagement with the First-tier Tribunal to permit it to lawfully and properly exercise its role. The parties are therefore required to engage in the process of defining and narrowing the issues in dispute, being mindful of their obligations to the First-tier Tribunal.
[2] Upon the parties engaging in filing and serving a focused Appeal Skeleton Argument and review, a judge sitting in the First-tier Tribunal can properly expect clarity as to the remaining issues between the parties by the date of the substantive hearing.
[3] The reformed appeal procedures are specifically designed to ensure that the parties identify the issues, and they are comprehensively addressed before the First-tier Tribunal, not that proceedings before the IAC are some form of rolling reconsideration by either party of its position.
30. When considering appeals relating to factual conclusions in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464, Lewison LJ stated at [2]:
The appeal is therefore an appeal on a pure question of fact. The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
i) An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii) The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii) An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv) The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v) An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi) Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract.
Conclusions
Serious harm
31. The Judge stated at §25:
While I do take account of and attach weigh to the serious incidents, in particular the burns the appellant suffered in 2014 and the destruction of her property in 2021, the appellant’s account is not one of serious continuous physical violence and harm.
32. That formulation was wrong. The proper test articulated in Opuz v Turkey and in Regulation 5(1) of the Qualification Regulations 2006, which require assessment of the accumulation and effects of violence, including psychological injury. The reference by the Judge to continuous physical violence imported a requirement not found in Article 3 ECHR, the Qualification Regulations, or associated authorities. The correct approach required consideration of the cumulative nature of harm, including its duration, repetition, severity, and psychological impact.
33. The Judge also failed to address psychological harm, notwithstanding the accepted evidence of trauma and vulnerability.
34. Those omissions amount to a misdirection and misapplication of the relevant law. I therefore conclude that the Judge erred in their assessment of serious harm.
35. When considering whether this error was material I had regard to what the Judge decided at §26 where they stated:
In case I am wrong in that assessment, I have gone on to consider whether there would be insufficient protection; and that the appellant could not internally relocate.
36. I consider that the Judge proceeded on an explicit alternative footing, namely that the Appellant had suffered serious harm and that their subsequent analysis of sufficiency of protection and internal relocation was not contingent upon the erroneous formulation at §25, but was undertaken separately. In those circumstances, although the Judge erred in the articulation and application of the serious‑harm test, this error, in itself, is not material.
Sufficiency of Protection
37. When addressing sufficiency of protection, the Judge records their findings at §§28–30) expressly recorded the Appellant’s history of seeking police assistance, including reports made in 2014, 2021 and 2023, the existence of a court‑ordered protection order, and her submissions concerning corruption, lack of resources, and ineffective enforcement. Those matters were then assessed against the relevant country material. At §30 the Judge stated:
I have taken account of the appellant’s submissions. However, I do not consider that these undermine the current Country Policy and Information that the state is willing and able to provide effective protection to women subject to gender based violence in Namibia. I have also taken account of the appellant’s particular circumstance in that she has been able make reports to the Namibian Police in 2014, 2021 and 2023 and in 2014 obtain a seven year protection order against SH. In these circumstances I am satisfied that there is sufficient protection for the appellant from the Namibian authorities. For this further reason, I dismiss the appeal on humanitarian protection grounds.
38. The Appellant criticises the absence of express findings on her claim that SH had connections with the police. However, following Volpi the Judge was not required to make discrete findings on every asserted factual detail. The obligation was to consider the substance of the claim and apply the correct legal test. I consider that the Judge did so. Considering the guidance in Horvath v SSHD it was necessary to consider whether protection was reasonably effective in practice. The Judge was entitled to place weight on the existence of formal mechanisms, the Appellant’s ability to access them, and balance that evidence when determining whether those mechanisms were practically ineffective in her case.
39. This ground therefore amounts to a challenge to the weight given to the evidence and to the Judge’s evaluative judgment. Applying Volpi, appellate intervention is not justified merely because a different tribunal might have reached a different conclusion on the same material. As no legal misdirection or irrationality is disclosed and I do not conclude that there is an error of law when considering sufficiency of protection.
Internal Relocation
40. At §32 the Judge decided that:
While Namibia is a small country it has a population in excess of 2.6 million, with Windhoek, Rundu and Walvis Bay the most populated cities. The appellant does not bring forth plausible reasons as to how SH would know of her return or to would have the resources or desire to locate her. I have taken account of the appellant’s medical problems and accept that the appellant needs to attend hospital appointments for medical care for these.
41. The Appellant submits that this finding is inconsistent with her sister’s evidence of an incident in 2024, in which SH attended at the sister’s home and sought information about the Appellant’s whereabouts. That submission is dependent on the evaluation of the weight given to the sister’s evidence in the context of the Judge’s task. The Judge was required to assess future risk on return, as at the date of decision in 2025. The sister’s evidence related to past conduct in 2024, after the Appellant had already left Namibia. At §23 the Judge specifically records the evidence including the report made by the Appellant’s younger sister to the Namibian Police on 2 April 2024 and a letter from Monica Gender Equality 28 March 2024.
42. The Judge did not reject or contradict that evidence, but evaluated whether it demonstrated a continuing capacity, motivation, and likelihood of locating the Appellant upon her hypothetical return to a different part of the country at a later point in time. The conclusion that the Appellant had not established plausible reasons for future tracing was an evaluative judgment made in that temporal and factual context. Whilst it may have been helpful for the Judge to have mentioned how the sister’s evidence was balanced as part of their conclusion, following Volpi there was no requirement to expressly rehearse the sister’s evidence in order to reach this conclusion.
43. The Judge did not accept that the Appellant was required to live in Windhoek to obtain treatment and that finding was reached after consideration of the medical evidence and the Appellant’s history of movement within Namibia. There was no medical evidence stating that residence in Windhoek was required, as opposed to periodic attendance. The Judge was therefore entitled to conclude that internal relocation could reasonably be achieved without it being unduly harsh.
44. Therefore, this ground amount to disagreement with the Judge’s assessment of risk, plausibility and reasonableness. Applying Volpi, such disagreement does not disclose an error of law.
Withdrawal of Concession
45. The Judge recorded at §17 that the Respondent’s review dated 3 December 2024 sought to withdraw an earlier concession on Convention reason and concluded:
I am to adopt a broad approach, taking into account the imperative of considering all relevant evidence, and fairness to the parties, prejudice to the appellant and bad faith. In the respondent’s review 3 December 2024, the respondent seeks to correct an error made in the decision 1 March 2024. The appellant has been provided with notice of this, and I do not consider that there is prejudice to the appellant in my decision to permit the respondent to withdraw the concession made in the reasons for refusal that the appellant’s claim engages the Refugee Convention.
46. That conclusion accords with the principles in NR (Jamaica) and Lata. The Appellant was on notice of the Respondent’s revised position and addressed the issue in submissions. The Judge considered the fairness and prejudice and was entitled to conclude that none arose. There was therefore no procedural unfairness in this regard.
Particular Social Group
47. At §18 the Judge considered whether the Appellant fell within a PSG, applying section 33(2) of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 and the CPIN. The Judge stated that they were unable to depart from the relevant Country Policy and Information Note (“CPIN”) which indicated that women fearing gender‑based violence in Namibia are not considered to form a Particular Social Group. Read in isolation, that paragraph appears generalised. However, the decision must be read fairly and as a whole, rather than by isolating individual sentences. When §18 is read together with §30, it is clear that the Judge did not treat the PSG issue as a purely abstract or categorical question divorced from the Appellant’s circumstances. At §30, the Judge expressly stated that they had taken account of the Appellant’s submissions concerning her experiences, the alleged failures of the authorities, and the risk she faced as a woman subject to domestic violence, but nevertheless concluded that those matters did not undermine the country evidence that the Namibian state is willing and able to provide effective protection. That finding is central, not merely to sufficiency of protection, but also to the PSG analysis.
48. In Shah and Islam [1999] 2 AC 629, the House of Lords made clear that gender, and by extension gender based violence, can form the basis of a PSG where the State is unwilling or unable to provide protection, such that women are exposed to persecution because they are women. The ratio does not establish that women facing domestic violence automatically constitute a PSG in every jurisdiction. Rather, the recognition of a PSG in Shah and Islam was grounded in the systemic failure of state protection in Pakistan at the relevant time.
49. By finding at §30 that the Appellant’s evidence did not displace the conclusion that the Namibian state is willing and able to provide protection, the Judge determined that the Appellant was not in a group concerning gender-based violence which the Namibian systematically fails to protect. In so concluding the Judge did not ignore the Appellant’s personal circumstances. The decision records her history of abuse, her engagement with the police and courts, and her submissions about corruption and inefficiency. The Judge then assessed those circumstances against the country evidence.
50. The PSG inquiry is not a free‑standing exercise based on an individual’s experiences. It requires an evaluative judgment as to whether those experiences demonstrate systemic or group based persecution. The Judge was entitled to conclude that, despite the Appellant having personal history involving serious abuse, it did not establish that women fearing domestic violence in Namibia are treated by the State in such a way as to constitute a socially distinct group exposed to persecution. There is therefore not a material error of law in this regard.
51. In these circumstances the Appellant’s appeal fails and is dismissed.
Notice of Decision
I find no material error of law and the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Richards- Clarke will stand.

Benjimin Burgher

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

24 February 2026