UI-2025-004673

• Status of case: Unreported
• Hearing date: 19 Jan 2026
• Promulgation date: 26 Jan 2026
• Publication date: 10 Feb 2026
• Last updated on: 10 Feb 2026

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004673

First-tier Tribunal No: HU/62386/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 26th January 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE MOXON

Between

HADLA BARKAL
(ANONYMITY ORDER NOT MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Brown, Counsel
For the Respondent: Mr Diwnyzc, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Phoenix House (Bradford) on 19 January 2026

DECISION AND REASONS

Introduction

1. The Appellant appeals, with permission, a decision of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal (‘the Judge’), dated 7th August 2025, which upheld the Respondent’s decision to refuse the Appellant’s claim for entry clearance to the United Kingdom.

Background

2. The Appellant is a national of Syria. She sought entry clearance to the United Kingdom as the dependent parent of her daughter, the Sponsor. The Appellant has two other daughters within the United Kingdom. That application was refused by the Respondent on 21st August 2024 and that refusal upheld by the Judge after a hearing held on 6th August 2025.

3. The Judge found that paragraph ADR 5.1 was not satisfied as the Appellant had not shown that she requires care with every day needs and that paragraph ADR 5.2 is not satisfied as the Appellant had not shown that there was a lack of available and affordable care in Syria. She found that, whilst there is a family life between the Appellant and her UK-based daughters, refusal of entry clearance would not give rise to unjustifiably harsh consequences. She concluded:

“12. The Appellant’s case is also that there are exceptional circumstances here, and that there would be unjustifiably harsh consequences to the Appellant and the sponsors if she were not allowed to come to the UK. However, on the evidence before me, I am not satisfied that this is the case. I take account of the traumatic family history, the desire of the sponsors to have their mother with them, and her desire to be with them, but I do not find that the facts here support a finding of exceptional circumstances or unjustifiably harsh consequences, when set against the strong public interest in the maintenance of fair and effective immigration control.”

13. For the same reasons, while I accept that there is family life between the main sponsor and her mother, and that refusal of entry clearance interferes with it, since the sponsor and her sisters are all refugees, I also find that the interference caused is lawful, justified and proportionate.”

Permission to appeal

4. The Appellant submitted five grounds of appeal:
a. Misapplication of Appendix ADR 5.1
b. Misapplication of Appendix ADR 5.2
c. Failure to Evaluate Evidence Cumulatively
d. Proportionality under Article 8 ECHR – Failure to Consider Relevant Circumstances
e. Failure to Consider Material Country Evidence on Conditions in Syria

5. Permission to appeal was granted by another judge of the First-tier Tribunal on 7th October 2025:

“2. Grounds 4-5 are arguable given the sponsors status as a refugee and the Judges arguable misdirection in the law by failing to consider the 5 steps as identified in R (Razgar -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL.

3. Permission is granted on all grounds, although grounds 1-3 are less arguable.”

Hearing

6. The papers were contained within a 304-page composite bundle. They included the grounds of appeal, Rule 24 response and a reply from the Appellant to that response. The Appellant also relied upon a skeleton argument, dated 12th January 2026. I was assured there was no other documentation.

7. In oral submissions Mr Brown argued that the Judge had failed to take into account paragraph ADR 7.1 of the Immigration Rules within her determination and had not adequately assessed whether the breach of the Appellant and Sponsor’s Article 8 ECHR rights would lead to unjustifiably harsh consequences. He argued that the Judge failed to acknowledge that the Appellant had been displaced due to an earthquake in Syria. He stated that the displacement of the Appellant and the refugee status of the Sponsors had not been adequately assessed within paragraph 12 of the Judge’s determination, which was “very brief”, contained “inadequate reasoning”, and was “not sufficient”.

Discussion and analysis

8. Throughout consideration of the appeal, I have had regard to the guidance provided by the Court of Appeal in Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 462 which states, at paragraph 2:

"The approach of an appeal court to that kind of appeal is a well-trodden path. It is unnecessary to refer in detail to the many cases that have discussed it; but the following principles are well-settled:
i. An appeal court should not interfere with the trial judge's conclusions on primary facts unless it is satisfied that he was plainly wrong.
ii. The adverb "plainly" does not refer to the degree of confidence felt by the appeal court that it would not have reached the same conclusion as the trial judge. It does not matter, with whatever degree of certainty, that the appeal court considers that it would have reached a different conclusion. What matters is whether the decision under appeal is one that no reasonable judge could have reached.
iii. An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
iv. The validity of the findings of fact made by a trial judge is not aptly tested by considering whether the judgment presents a balanced account of the evidence. The trial judge must of course consider all the material evidence (although it need not all be discussed in his judgment). The weight which he gives to it is however pre-eminently a matter for him.
v. An appeal court can therefore set aside a judgment on the basis that the judge failed to give the evidence a balanced consideration only if the judge's conclusion was rationally insupportable.
vi. Reasons for judgment will always be capable of having been better expressed. An appeal court should not subject a judgment to narrow textual analysis. Nor should it be picked over or construed as though it was a piece of legislation or a contract."

9. The restricted jurisdiction of the Upper Tribunal was also outlined by the Court of Appeal in Ullah v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2024] EWCA Civ 201, which at paragraph 26 summarised the settled case authorities:

“(i) the FTT is a specialist fact-finding tribunal. The UT should not rush to find an error of law simply because it might have reached a different conclusion on the facts or expressed themselves differently: see AH (Sudan) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2007] UKHL 49 [2008] 1 AC 678 at paragraph [30];

(ii) where a relevant point was not expressly mentioned by the FTT, the UT should be slow to infer that it had not been taken into account: e.g. MA (Somalia) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] UKSC 49 at paragraph [45];

(iii) when it comes to the reasons given by the FTT, the UT should exercise judicial restraint and not assume that the FTT misdirected itself just because not every step in its reasoning was fully set out: see R (Jones) v First Tier Tribunal and Criminal Injuries Compensation Authority [2013] UKSC 19 at paragraph [25];

(iv) the issues for decision and the basis upon which the FTT reaches its decision on those issues may be set out directly or by inference: see UT (Sri Lanka) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2019] EWCA Civ 1095 at paragraph [27];

(v) judges sitting in the FTT are to be taken to be aware of the relevant authorities and to be seeking to apply them. There is no need for them to be referred to specifically, unless it was clear from their language that they had failed to do so: see AA (Nigeria) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2020] EWCA Civ 1296 at paragraph [34];

(vi) it is of the nature of assessment that different tribunals, without illegality or irrationality, may reach different conclusions on the same case. The mere fact that one tribunal has reached what might appear to be an unusually generous view of the facts does not mean that it has made an error of law: see MM (Lebanon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2017] UKSC 10 at paragraph [107].”

10. In addition to the principles above, I also reminded myself of the merits of concise decision writing, as outlined within the ‘Practice Direction from the Senior President of Tribunals: Reasons for decisions’, dated 4th July 2024:

“Providing adequate reasons does not usually require the First-tier Tribunal to identify all of the evidence relied upon in reaching its findings of fact, to elaborate at length its conclusions on any issue of law, or to express every step of its reasoning. The reasons provided for any decision should be proportionate, not only to the resources of the Tribunal, but to the significance and complexity of the issues that have to be decided. Reasons need refer only to the main issues and evidence in dispute, and explain how those issues essential to the Tribunal’s conclusion have been resolved.

Stating reasons at any greater length than is necessary in the particular case is not in the interests of justice. To do so is an inefficient use of judicial time, does not assist either the parties or an appellate court or tribunal, and is therefore inconsistent with the overriding objective. Providing concise reasons is to be encouraged. Adequate reasons for a substantive decision may often be short. In some cases a few succinct paragraphs will suffice. For a procedural decision the reasons required will usually be shorter.”

Ground 1 – Misapplication of Appendix ADR 5.1

11. The ground of appeal argues:

“3. Appendix ADR 5.1 provides that entry clearance may be granted where:

“ADR 5.1. The applicant, or if the applicant is applying as a parent or grandparent, the applicant’s partner, must as a result of age, illness or disability require long term personal care to perform everyday tasks.

4. The Tribunal accepted that the Appellant suffers from hypertension, cardiac problems, diabetes, weakness and mobility issues; that she struggles to wash herself properly; and that she cannot stand for long periods. These are objective indicators of a need for personal care.

5. Nevertheless, the Tribunal concluded that ADR 5.1 was not met because the Appellant currently dresses herself, prepares light meals, and has some neighbourly assistance. This is a misdirection. The Rule requires “long-term personal care”, which includes assistance with washing, mobility, and daily functioning, not complete incapacity.”

12. Within its Rule 24 response, the Respondent contends:

“… Ground 1 is entirely misconceived. Whilst it may be that the requirements of ADR 5.1 do not require the complete incapacity of an Appellant, they clearly envisage something more than help with shopping and lifts. The medical evidence evidently did not support a claim that the Appellant was unable to care for herself.”

13. The Appellant reiterated her arguments within a reply to the Rule 24 response and skeleton argument.

14. The Judge, at paragraph 10, adequately assessed the evidence and reached a conclusion that was reasonably open to her.

“… on the evidence before me, the Appellant has not been shown to need long-term care to perform everyday tasks, in the sense set out in the Rules. The oral evidence of the sisters is that their mother is managing to look after herself, living alone, with no personal care provided, and no help apart from shopping and lifts from a neighbour. The medical evidence shows that she is getting good medical care in Syria. Neither letter from each doctor has stated that it is their professional opinion that the Appellant needs long-term personal care to carry out everyday tasks. On the evidence before me, 5.1 of Appendix ADR is not met.

15. The Judge clearly took into account the Appellant’s medical conditions and personal circumstances. Similarly, she took into account the lack of evidence of the Appellant requiring long-term personal care with everyday tasks and identified the lack of reference to such in the medical evidence and the fact that the Appellant manages her daily needs without care and support. At paragraph 11, the Judge considered it notable, as she was permitted, that there had been no effort to locate care provision in Syria for the Appellant, which was indicative of a lack of genuine care needs. She did not express that any particular feature of the evidence was determinative and it is evident from reading her determination that she took account of all the evidence and the Appellant’s circumstances in the round.

16. The Judge was cognisant that the burden of showing satisfaction of the Rules was upon the Appellant.

17. Requiring assistance with shopping and lifts would not be sufficient to satisfy the requirement within ADR 5.1 but, even if it were, the evidence before the Judge was that the assistance with those tasks was available to the Appellant in Syria and, as such, ADR 5.2 would not be satisfied.

18. The Judge reached conclusions that were reasonably open to her upon the evidence, and having considered in full the Appellant’s personal circumstances.

19. Ground 1 of the appeal demonstrates nothing more than a disagreement with the conclusions made by the judge and is dismissed.

Ground 2 – Misapplication of Appendix ADR 5.2

20. The ground of appeal argues:

“6. Appendix ADR 5.2 requires that:

“ADR 5.2. Where the application is for entry clearance, the applicant, or if the applicant is applying as a parent or grandparent, the applicant’s partner, must be unable to obtain the required level of care in the country where they are living, even with the financial help of the sponsor because either:
(a) the care is not available and there is no person in that country who can reasonably provide it: or
(b) the care is not affordable.”

7. The FtT misdirected itself under ADR 5.2 by treating the absence of prior attempts to procure care in Syria as probative that care is “not presently needed.” ADR 5.2 requires an evidence-based assessment of whether suitable care is available or affordable, not proof of prior attempts.

8. The Court of Appeal in Ribeli v ECO Pretoria confirmed that the Rules demand a fact sensitive inquiry grounded in independent evidence (Appendix FM-SE paras 34–35), considering accessibility, location and standard of care (Ribeli, [40], citing BritCits).

9. The tribunal must not speculate or draw sweeping inferences from evidential gaps: there must be independent evidence supporting conclusions on availability (see Ribeli, [49], [51]). The FtT’s reasoning therefore imposed an extra-statutory burden and amounted to legal error.”

21. Within its Rule 24 response, the Respondent contends:

“Ground 2 respectfully fails to consider the Judge’s findings at paragraph 11 and respectfully fails to consider where the burden of proof lies. The FTTJ makes the obvious point that the fact that there has been no attempt to find care for the Appellant in Syria clearly suggests that the Appellant is able to care for herself to the required level.”

22. The Appellant reiterated her arguments within a reply to the Rule 24 response and skeleton argument.

23. The ground of appeal cannot succeed following the dismissal of ground 1, given that Appendix ADR 5.1 must be satisfied for Appendix ADR 5.2 to become relevant.

24. In any event, the ground of appeal is without any merit. The judge correctly identified that the burden of proof laid with the Appellant. She undertook a fact-sensitive analysis of the evidence and did not make any sweeping conclusions as claimed by the Appellant.

25. The Judge, at paragraph 11, adequately assessed the evidence and reached conclusions that were reasonably open to her:

“… do not find that there is sufficient evidence before me to show on a balance of probabilities that care is not available in Syria. The sponsors have not genuinely tried to explore this option, in my judgment, because they do not want their mother looked after by other people. I also find that the absence of attempts to find care in itself tends to demonstrate that such care is not presently needed. There is no real evidence before me of any attempt to find a carer to come in, daily or overnight, and no evidence of any research into residential care homes. When these aspects were put to the witnesses, they effectively said they wanted their mother in the UK, so they could look after her themselves. On the evidence before me, 5.2 of Appendix ADR is not met.”

26. The reasoning is unimpeachable. Whilst the Appellant may have a preference to being cared for by family in the United Kingdom, she does not currently benefit from that care. If she had genuine care needs, it is reasonable to expect that there would have been some investigation in Syria as to how they could be met. The burden is upon the Appellant to show that such care is unavailable or unaffordable. The evidence before the Judge fell far short of reaching that standard as the Appellant did not provide sufficient evidence of the availability and / or affordability of care in Syria.

27. Ground 2 of the appeal again demonstrates nothing more than a disagreement with the conclusions properly made by the judge and is dismissed.

Ground 3 – Failure to Evaluate Evidence Cumulatively

28. The ground of appeal argues:

“10. The Tribunal accepted that the Appellant is an elderly widow, lives alone in Aleppo, suffers from hypertension, diabetes and cardiac problems, and relies only on limited neighbourly help. Each of these findings points to significant frailty and vulnerability.

11. Nevertheless, the Tribunal concluded that she has “no care needs” and could reasonably obtain care in Syria. This conclusion is inconsistent with the cumulative weight of the evidence.

12. In Mibanga v SSHD [2005] EWCA Civ 367, the Court of Appeal held that:
“What the fact-finder does at his peril is to reach a conclusion by reference only to the appellant’s evidence and then, if it be negative, to ask whether the conclusion should be shifted by the expert evidence.” ([24])

13. And further:
“The adjudicator’s failing was that she artificially separated the medical evidence from the rest of the evidence and reached conclusions… without reference to that medical evidence. That was a structural failing, not just an error of appreciation.” ([30])

14. Here, the Tribunal committed the same error: it compartmentalised the Appellant’s age, widowhood, chronic health conditions and reliance on neighbours, instead of assessing them “in the round.” The cumulative picture demonstrates dependency and lack of available care in Syria, which was not lawfully considered.”

29. Within its Rule 24 response, the Respondent contends:

“Ground 3 is respectfully misconceived. The fact that a person suffers from medical conditions and is of advanced age (R does not accept that a person of 68 years old is categorised as elderly) should not automatically lead to a conclusion they require care.

Whilst the judge does find that family life exists, that family life is clearly between adults and just because that finding is reached does not lead to a conclusion that the appeal should be allowed. The FTTJ is then required to consider if the decision is proportionate which she clearly does at paragraph 13 and notably refers to the fact that the sponsors are refugees.”

30. The Appellant reiterated her arguments within a reply to the Rule 24 response and skeleton argument.

31. Ground 3 is effectively an amalgamated reiteration of grounds 1 and 2. It is quite clear from reading the Judge’s determination that she undertook an adequate analysis of all of the evidence before her; considered that evidence in the round as she was required t; made findings of fact that were reasonably open to her; and correctly applied those findings to the law.

32. Ground 3 of is therefore dismissed.

Ground 4 – Proportionality under Article 8 ECHR – Failure to Consider Relevant Circumstances

33. The ground of appeal argues:

“15. The Tribunal accepted that family life exists between the Appellant and her daughters, and that refusal of entry clearance interferes with it. However, the proportionality analysis was legally flawed.

16. In a proportionality assessment it is trite law that one should look to the guidance in the case of R (Razgar -v- Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] UKHL 27 and although that guidance was in respect of removal being resisted the questions are:

“(i) Will the proposed removal be an interference by a public authority with the exercise of the applicant’s right to respect for his private or (as the case may be) family life?
(ii) If so, will such interference have consequences of such gravity as potentially engage the operation of Article 8?
(iii) If so, is such interference in accordance with the law?
(iv) If so, is such interference necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic wellbeing of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedom of others?
(v) If so, is such interference proportionate to the legitimate public end sought to be achieved?”

17. In Razgar v SSHD [2004] UKHL 27, Lord Bingham confirmed that Article 8(2) requires a structured, staged analysis. The Tribunal was therefore required to identify whether refusal of entry clearance interfered with the Appellant’s family life, to assess the seriousness of that interference, and to conduct a properly reasoned proportionality assessment.

18. The Tribunal did not do so. Although it acknowledged that family life existed, it failed to engage with the obvious fact that refusal of entry clearance was an interference with that family life. Nor did it consider the severity of the consequences: the sponsor is a recognised refugee who cannot safely return to Syria or even visit.

19. In these circumstances, refusal of entry clearance does not merely inconvenience the family life; it extinguishes it altogether.

20. When addressing proportionality, the Tribunal relied on speculation about possible care being available in Syria and criticised the Appellant for not attempting to obtain such care.

21. Furthermore, the Tribunal failed to weigh the Appellant’s age, widowhood, chronic health conditions and isolation cumulatively, instead dismissing them piecemeal.

22. The Tribunal therefore misapplied the Razgar framework and erred in law by failing to recognise the full extent of the interference with Article 8 rights, and by conducting a flawed proportionality assessment.

23. Instead, the Tribunal reduced Article 8 to a formulaic conclusion that there were no “exceptional circumstances” or “unjustifiably harsh consequences”. This is inadequate reasoning and amounts to a failure to carry out the required proportionality balancing exercise.”

34. The Judge was not required to cite the case name of Razgar, provided that the principles within that authority were followed (Ullah, paragraph 26(v)). She outlined the staged considerations at paragraph 13 of her determination:

“For the same reasons, while I accept that there is family life between the main sponsor and her mother, and that refusal of entry clearance interferes with it, since the sponsor and her sisters are all refugees, I also find that the interference caused is lawful, justified and proportionate.”

35. Her rationale for those conclusions were adequately detailed in the preceding paragraph:

“The Appellant’s case is also that there are exceptional circumstances here, and that there would be unjustifiably harsh consequences to the Appellant and the sponsors if she were not allowed to come to the UK. However, on the evidence before me, I am not satisfied that this is the case. I take account of the traumatic family history, the desire of the sponsors to have their mother with them, and her desire to be with them, but I do not find that the facts here support a finding of exceptional circumstances or unjustifiably harsh consequences, when set against the strong public interest in the maintenance of fair and effective immigration control.”

36. Paragraph ADR 7.1 states:

“ADR 7.1. If the applicant does not meet all the suitability requirements (subject to ADR 7.2) or does not meet all of the eligibility requirements in ADR 3.1. to ADR 6.4., but the decision maker is satisfied that refusal of the application would breach Article 8 of the Human Rights Convention, because it would result in unjustifiably harsh consequences for the applicant or their family, the applicant will meet the Article 8 ECHR eligibility requirement.”

37. Whilst the Judge did not specifically quote that paragraph, she was not required to do so (Ullah, paragraph 26(v)) and in any event demonstrated a clear understanding of the relevant law at paragraph 12, in which she referenced the lack of unjustifiably harsh consequences.

38. In reaching that conclusion, the Judge took into account the Appellant’s personal circumstances, including the trauma in Syria and the fact that her daughters have refugee status. She was not required to list each and every aspect of the Appellant’s circumstances. She had the benefit of the witness statements from the Appellant and her daughters, together with documentary evidence and the oral evidence during the hearing. There are no compelling reasons to assume that he failed to take the whole of that evidence into consideration (Volpi v Volpi, paragraphs 2(iii) and (iv)). It is evident, from reading her determination as a whole, that she clearly had them all in mind when making her findings. Upon doing so, she reached a conclusion that was reasonably open to her.

39. The decision does not “extinguish” family life as argued on behalf of the Appellant as there are various media in which the parties can use to maintain contact. Consideration can be given to whether they can meet in a third country. The Appellant and her daughters have lived apart since the daughters came to the United Kingdom in 2015, 2016 and 2022, yet family life has persisted, as argued by the Appellant and found by the Judge.

40. The Judge adequately undertook the proportionality exercise and reached conclusions that were reasonably open to her.

41. Ground 4 is therefore dismissed.

Ground 5 - Failure to Consider Material Country Evidence on Conditions in Syria

42. The ground of appeal argues:

“24. The Tribunal was bound to consider the evidence before it regarding the overall security and humanitarian situation in Syria, particularly Aleppo, where the Appellant resides. That evidence demonstrated that the security situation remains volatile and unstable; that public infrastructure and essential services, including healthcare and social care, have been severely degraded since the conflict and collapse of state institutions; and that independent reports confirm reliable care provision is not reasonably available in practice.

25. Notwithstanding this, the Tribunal failed to engage with, or even mention, this country evidence. Instead, it speculated that the Appellant “could reasonably obtain care in Syria,” a finding that was reached without reference to the reality on the ground.

26. The failure to take account of the security context undermined both the assessment under ADR 5.2 and the proportionality exercise under Article 8 ECHR. The Appellant cannot reasonably be expected to obtain adequate care in a war-torn environment with little functioning infrastructure.”

43. Ground 5 is mostly a repetition of ground 2. It again challenges the Judge’s finding that it had not been shown that there is no care provision available in Syria for the Appellant. As outlined above, the Judge made reasonable conclusions upon the evidence available to her. Again, there are no compelling reasons to assume that she did not take into account all of the evidence that was relied upon by the Appellant.

44. The ground argues that the Judge failed to take into account objective evidence. Mr Brown confirmed that no such evidence had been placed before the her.

45. In any event, the ground of appeal cannot succeed in light of the upheld findings that the Appellant does not require care to meet her day to day living needs.

46. Ground 5 is therefore dismissed.

Conclusion

47. The Judge’s determination contains findings of fact that were open to her and conclusions upon adherence to the relevant legal tests. The determination contains no material error of law.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error on a point of law. The decision shall stand.


DUTJ Moxon
Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber


21st January 2026