Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004683

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65751/2024
LP/00588/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

On 28th January 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE SHERIDAN

Between

LS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Ahmed, Counsel instructed by Evolent Law
For the Respondent: Ms Keerthy, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 16 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant) is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Background
1. The appellant is a citizen of Albania who entered the UK and claimed asylum in December 2021. She has a daughter born in January 2022 in the UK.
2. The appellant claims that she married, and became pregnant with the child of, a different man to the man her parents wanted her to marry; and that as a consequence of this both her family and the family of the man her family wanted her to marry have threatened to kill her and her child.
3. In May 2024 the respondent refused the appellant’s claim. The respondent accepted that the appellant’s family (and the family of the man her family wanted her to marry) threatened to kill her but not that she faces a real risk on return to Albania. This is because, in the view of the respondent, those the appellant fears are non-state actors who do not have influence over the Albanian state and the appellant can either avail herself of the protection of the state or relocate within Albania.
4. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal where her appeal came before Judge of the First-tier Tribunal Richards-Clarke (“the judge”). In a decision promulgated on 23 June 2025, the judge dismissed the appeal. The appellant is now appealing against this decision.
The First-tier Tribunal decision
5. The judge stated that it was not in dispute that the appellant married a man against her family’s wishes and that she fears her family and the family of the man her parents wanted her to marry.
6. The judge then considered whether the appellant is a member of a particular social group (“PSG”). She found that she was not, on the basis of what is said in the country guidance case DM (Sufficiency of Protection, PSG, Women, Domestic Violence) Albania CG [2004] UKIAT 00059 and the respondent’s 2022 Country Policy and Information Note on domestic violence in Albania (“the CPIN”).
7. In the light of the finding that the appellant is not a member of a PSG, the judge concluded that she does not fall within the protection of the Refugee Convention as her fear is not for a Convention reason.
8. The judge considered, in the alternative, whether there is sufficient state protection in Albania and whether it is reasonable for the appellant to relocate within Albania.
9. The judge found that there is sufficient state protection from the Albanian authorities. In reaching this conclusion, judge relied on the CPIN, where it is stated that the authorities are in general willing and able to provide effective protection of experience domestic violence, as well as the country guidance case of DM, where it was not accepted that there was a lack of sufficiency of protection in Albania for a female victim of domestic violence in Albania.
10. The judge also found that the appellant could relocate internally. The judge stated that the appellant did not “bring forth plausible reasons as to how her family or the family of [the man her family wished her to marry] would have the resources or desire to locate her”. The judge also found that it was reasonable for the appellant to relocate within Albania given her experience of living in different locations (Italy, Malta and the UK) fresh and that she has previously worked in Albania.
11. The judge also considered whether removing the appellant would breach article 8 ECHR and concluded that it would not. The reasons given for this include that (a) although the appellant suffers from depression and anxiety, and would have to disrupt her daughter’s education, she would be able to reintegrate in Albania; and (b) it is in the daughter’s best interests to be with her mother and the consequences of removal would not be unjustifiably harsh.
Grounds of Appeal
12. There are six grounds of appeal. They are:
a. Ground 1: The judge failed to properly engage with the accepted factual matrix which included that the appellant was threatened.
b. Ground 2: The judge failed to engage with the argument that, on the question of whether the appellant falls within a PSG, DM should not be followed in the light of K and Fornah v SSHD [2006] UKHL 46.
c. Ground 3. The judge failed to consider the submissions made by the appellant in respect of (i) the Refugee Convention, (ii) section 8 of the 2004 Act, (iii) the Country Guidance case TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC), (iv) the appellant will be considered “Kurva”; (v) sufficiency of protection, (vi) internal relocation, and (vii) article 8 ECHR.
d. Ground 4. The judge placed undue and “slavish” reliance on the CPIN.
e. Ground 5. The judge’s reasoning in respect of paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) of the Immigration Rules was lacking and unreasoned, and “underplayed” the appellant’s mental health issues
f. Ground 6. The judge’s consideration of the best interests of the appellant’s daughter was inadequate given the shame and stigma the appellant would face.
Analysis
13. I will consider each of the grounds in turn, taking into consideration the (helpful) submissions from both Mr Ahmed and Ms Keerthy.
Ground 1: The judge failed to properly engage with the accepted factual matrix which included that the appellant was threatened
14. Ground 1 submits that because the decision does not refer to the appellant being threatened the judge erred by failing to properly engage with the accepted factual matrix.
15. In considering this ground, I have had regard to two important authorities. The first is Volpi v Volpi [2022] EWCA Civ 464 where in para. 2(iii) it is stated:
An appeal court is bound, unless there is compelling reason to the contrary, to assume that the trial judge has taken the whole of the evidence into his consideration. The mere fact that a judge does not mention a specific piece of evidence does not mean that he overlooked it.
16. The second case is TC (PS compliance - “issues-based” reasoning) Zimbabwe [2023] UKUT 00164 (IAC), which highlights that judges should be focused on the issues in dispute as identified by the parties.
17. In this case, it was not in dispute that the appellant was threatened. There was therefore no need for the judge to focus on this issue. The key point, for the purposes of making a decision, was that the respondent accepted that the appellant feared her family and the family of the man they wanted her to marry; and the judge set this out clearly. I can see no reason why, in these circumstances, the mere fact of not mentioning the threat means that it was overlooked. To make such a finding would be contrary to Volpi which makes it clear that the starting point should be the assumption that the judge took the whole of the evidence into consideration.
Ground 2: The judge failed to engage with the argument that, on the question of whether the appellant falls within a PSG, DM should not be followed in the light of K and Fornah v SSHD [2006] UKHL 46
18. It is apparent from the appellant’s supplementary skeleton argument in the FTT that the appellant advanced the argument that the issue of whether women in general (or women who are at risk of domestic violence) fall within a PSG in Albania should be considered in the light of case law post-dating DM, and in particular K and Fornah v SSHD [2006] UKHL 46.
19. In the decision, the judge followed DM without mentioning that an argument was advanced that it should not be followed; and there appears to not have been any engagement with the appellant’s submissions on this issue. I am therefore persuaded by Mr Ahmed that there has been a failure to engage with the case advanced by the appellant on the PSG issue and that this is an error of law.
20. However, I agree with Ms Keerthy that the error is immaterial. This is because the judge was entitled to find, for the reasons given, that the appellant is able to avail herself of state protection and/or it is reasonable (and safe) for the appellant to relocate internally. She therefore is not entitled to protection under the Refugee Convention even if she falls within a PSG.
Ground 3. The judge failed to consider the submissions made by the appellant in respect of (i) the Refugee Convention, (ii) section 8 of the 2004 Act, (iii) the Country Guidance case TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC), (iv) the appellant is considered “Kurva”); (v) sufficiency of protection, (vi) internal relocation, and (vii) article 8 ECHR.
21. The appellant argues that the judge failed to engage with arguments advanced by the appellant in the First-tier Tribunal on seven different issues: (i) the Refugee Convention, (ii) section 8 of the 2004 Act, (iii) the Country Guidance case TD and AD (Trafficked women) CG [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC), (iv) the appellant being perceived as “Kurva”); (v) sufficiency of protection, (vi) internal relocation, and (vii) article 8 ECHR. However, this ground does no more than make this assertion. No detail or explanation is provided. No submissions are made explaining how, or in what way, the appellant believes the arguments on these seven issues were not considered. As drafted, this ground has no merit.
22. At the hearing, Mr Ahmed effectively reformulated the ground in his oral submissions. He argued that the judge erred by not having regard to TD and AD, which gives relevant guidance on sufficiency of protection and internal relocation, as well as the extent to which the appellant would be perceived as “shamed”. He also argued that the judge did not engage with evidence about the ease with which people can be traced within Albania and the strong motivation those the appellant fears have to harm her.
23. Ms Keerthy’s response to Mr Ahmed’s submissions, with which I agree, are that (a) TD and AD is not relevant as it is guidance on trafficked women and it is not the appellant’s case that she has been trafficked; (b) the appellant had a child in wedlock and Mr Ahmed has not identified evidence that was before the First-tier Tribunal indicating that a person in her circumstances would be considered “shamed”’ and (c) the appellant did not produce any objective evidence that would justify departing from the conclusion in DM on sufficiency of protection for a woman in the appellant’s position. For these reasons, I do not accept that there is merit to ground 3, either as originally drafted or as reformulated by Mr Ahmed.
Ground 4. The judge placed undue and “slavish” reliance on the CPIN
24. The appellant submits that the judge erred by its “slavish” reliance on the CPIN “to the exclusion of the learning and other evidence”. The difficulty with this argument is that, as submitted by Ms Keerthy and acknowledged by Mr Ahmed at the hearing, no objective evidence on internal relocation and sufficiency of protection was adduced by the appellant. The only evidence on these issues before the judge was that contained within the CPIN. Based on this evidence, the conclusion reached on state protection and internal relocation was plainly open to the judge.
Ground 5. The judge’s reasoning in respect of paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi) of the Immigration Rules was lacking and unreasoned, and “underplayed” the appellant’s mental health issues
25. The judge addressed the correct question under paragraph 276ADE(1)(vi), which is whether the appellant would face very significant obstacles integrating in Albania.
26. When addressing this question, the judge had regard to (a) the appellant’s mental health difficulties (including that she is receiving treatment in the UK); (b) the circumstances of her daughter; (c) the time she has been outside of Albania; and (d) that she is a single mother. The judge also incorporated into the analysis the findings made in respect of the protection claim: in paragraph 31 the judge states that these findings are brought forth.
27. I am satisfied that these are the relevant considerations for an assessment under 276ADE(1)(vi). I am also satisfied that it was open to the judge, based on an evaluation of these considerations, to conclude that there were not very significant obstacles to the appellant’s integration Albania. I am therefore not persuaded by this ground.
Ground 6. The judge’s consideration of the best interests of the appellant’s daughter was inadequate given the shame and stigma the appellant would face
28. This ground is premised on it being the case that the appellant would face shame and stigma in Albania. However, the appellant is not a victim of trafficking and she does not have a child out of wedlock. Her evidence is that she married her child’s father in 2018 (see para. 9 of the appellant’s statement dated 20.12.2021). The grounds do not identify (and Mr Ahmed did not identify at the hearing) any evidence indicating that a person in the appellant’s circumstances would face shame and stigma. I therefore do not consider this ground to have merit.

Notice of Decision
29. The grounds do not identify a material error of law. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal therefore stands.

D. Sheridan

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

23.1.2026