Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004694

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/55881/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 16th February 2026

Before

DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LAY

Between

IAA (Somalia)
(Anonymity Order made)
Appellant
v

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr B Shabbir, instructed by Maguire Solicitors
For the Respondent: Mr D Simpson, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 30 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the anonymity of the Appellant is maintained.

No one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The Appellant seeks to challenge the dismissal of his appeal by First-tier Judge (FTJ) Rea in a determination promulgated on 4 September 2025 in Glasgow. Permission was granted on all grounds by FTJ Dieu in a decision dated 8 October 2025.

2. In accordance with Directions, there was a Composite Bundle served ahead of the error of law hearing – page references in this determination are in the form [CB: XX], denoting [Composite Bundle: PDF page finder]. This included evidence advanced under Rule 15(2A) in the form of an addendum country expert report, albeit the application for the latter was late. There was a Rule 24 reply by the Respondent, a Rule 25 response in turn and a further set of written submissions from the Appellant.

3. By way of background, the Appellant is a Somali national from Galguduud whose asylum and human rights claims, submitted on 9 March 2022, were refused on 16 August 2023. He was accepted to be a member of a minority clan, the Tumaal. His past account – almost all of which was accepted by the FTJ – was that he had been targeted and captured twice by Al Shabaab militants in his home area including most recently in 2022, as had his brother, while his father had earlier been murdered by the group. The Appellant fled the country via Mogadishu and feared return to Somalia owing to the family history, as claimed.

The grounds of appeal

4. The Appellant advanced three grounds [CB: 11]: (1) that the FTJ had failed to engage rationally with the original country expert report on Somalia which had offered a range of views on both the extent of ongoing risk from Al Shabaab groups/operatives in the country, including purported risk to the Appellant in the capital itself; (2) that the FTJ erred in finding that the Appellant would have clan assistance and could gain unskilled work to sustain himself, while failing to have regard to an expert report from a psychologist on the Appellant’s mental health/vulnerability – as expressed at paragraph 16: “the combined effect of these errors was the Tribunal misapplied OA” [CB: 14]; (3) that the FTJ had conducted a flawed proportionality assessment under Article 8 ECHR, both misapplying the appropriate threshold test within the rules and again failing to engage with the country and medical evidence relevant to his prospects on return.

5. The Respondent’s Rule 24 reply argued that the FTJ had explicitly dealt with the country expert report of Omer Ahmed, had rationally concluded that the Appellant was not someone who would face “elevated risk” in Mogadishu and that, ultimately, the determination provides sufficiently adequate reasoning of the various strands of evidence to sustain the conclusions reached in line with the Country Guidance cases.

6. I note that the First-tier determination under scrutiny here did not contain adequate paragraphing, albeit there are sections, underlinings and italicised headings. I will give both the internal page number of the determination (which is 7 pages long in total) and Composite Bundle page references so that a reader can locate the sections under discussion.

Submissions

7. I heard oral submissions from Mr Shabbir on the three grounds, as pleaded, and their impact on consideration of the two applicable Country Guidance cases: OA (Somalia) (CG) [2022] UKUT 33 (IAC), read alongside MOJ & Ors (Return to Mogadishu) (Rev 1) (CG) [2014] UKUT 442 (IAC). At the heart of his submissions lay the argument that the FTJ had not had adequate or any regard to central elements of the country expert and medical evidence. If he was going to reject expert evidence, there needed to be sufficient analysis and reasoning. In particular, the psychological evaluation by Nomir Ahmed [CB: 130ff] is mentioned in the determination only once in the context of the FTJ’s (positive) assessment of the Appellant’s credibility (page 4 of determination) [CB: 6] but is not otherwise examined later when the FTJ came to evaluate the Appellant’s prospects in Mogadishu for the purposes of internal relocation and/or under Articles 3 & 8 ECHR.

8. Mr Simpson, on behalf of the Secretary of State, submitted that the credibility portion of the determination did indeed consider the expert medical evidence. It followed, therefore, that the FTJ can be deemed to have both read and had regard to it. Further, on the penultimate page of the determination (page 6 of 7) [CB: 8], the FTJ – in a section evaluating Humanitarian Protection and OA’s guidance on Article 3 ECHR destitution - states “I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that the appellant is disabled to the extent that he would be unfit to work.” Mr Simpson argued that this constituted an implied reference to all of the medical evidence, including the psychological assessment of Nomir Ahmed.

9. As to the apparent absence of consideration of the medical evidence as part of either evaluation of internal relocation to Mogadishu and/or Article 8 ECHR, Mr Simpson submitted that either it was implied by reading the determination as a whole or, in the alternative, it was not clear from the Appeal Skeleton Argument relied upon in the FTT [CB: 42] that the FTJ had ever been asked to consider the evidence for those discrete elements of the appeal and thus the FTJ could not be criticised if he had not done so, citing Lata (FtT: principal controversial issues) India [2023] UKUT 163 (IAC).

Conclusions

10. Despite Mr Simpson’s creative and well-expressed submissions, I cannot agree that the First-tier Judge rationally integrated the expert psychology evidence into the central issues in the appeal, namely whether or not it would be unduly harsh for the Appellant to internally relocate to Mogadishu and/or whether he faces a real risk of serious harm owing to destitution in the capital and/or whether he can show “very significant obstacles to integration” and/or whether it would be disproportionate in the round.

11. Firstly, it is an essential feature of this case that the FTJ accepted the past account. Under the “Findings” and “appeal on asylum grounds”, the FTJ accepted that “considering the appellant’s answers and evidence as a whole I find that he has been generally consistent on the key elements of his account … having regard to all the evidence I find that the appellant has given a generally credible account and that he genuinely fears persecution by Al Shabaab for a Convention reason” (page 5 of the determination) [CB: 7]. The framing of the findings is unusual: I would have expected the words “I find that…” or “I accept it is reasonably likely that…” or some such formulation. (This was an asylum claim pre-dating the commencement of ss.31-36 of the Nationality Asylum and Borders Act 2022 and so the lower standard applied. In any event, Mr Simpson accepted at the hearing before me that “the fact-finding has been done” and there has been no dispute about those FTT findings.

12. The core elements of the past account, therefore, were that the Appellant’s father and brother were targeted/persecuted, as was the Appellant himself (most recently in 2022), including torture [CB: 135] [CB: 2800], all in the home area of Galguduud. In light of that, the next task for the FTJ was to assess whether there was a reasonable likelihood of risk to the Appellant in his home area (applying paragraph 339K of the immigration rules) and, then, whether it would be unduly harsh for the Appellant to internally relocate to Mogadishu. As I observed in the hearing, this is “asylum law 101”, the most basic analytical framework in which these cases fall to be decided. Albeit the Appellant also argued that it was “unsafe” for him to internally relocate, and the country expert posited risk throughout Somalia (which, logically, would include Mogadishu), the question remained whether internal relocation was either unsafe or unduly harsh. As the Appeal Skeleton Argument put it at paragraph 26: “internal relocation would not be feasible or would be unduly harsh”. [CB: 52]

13. Despite this, the determination itself moves onto “issue (ii)” [CB: 7] which is framed as “whether it is reasonably likely that the appellant would be persecuted for that Convention reason” in Mogadishu. What follows is consideration of the Country Guidance as to risk in Mogadishu and the “reach” of Al Shabaab within the city since the improvement in conditions identified by the Upper Tribunal. The FTJ can be forgiven for addressing the issue of risk in Mogadishu since the Appellant had himself advanced the case that risk would extend to the city. But that did not obviate the need to evaluate rationally, in any event, whether internal relocation would be unduly harsh in all the circumstances, ie. short of risk.

14. To the extent that the FTJ address internal relocation, we find this at the top of page 6 of the determination [CB: 8]:

“I do not find Mr Ahmed’s [country expert] report provides an adequate basis for me to depart from the clear finding in OA. I find that notwithstanding previous persecution at the hands of Al Shabaab, the appellant in Mogadishu would be at no greater risk than any other ordinary civilian. I further find that on the basis of OA that the appellant would not be at risk of persecution in Mogadishu as a result of his membership of a minority clan. I therefore find that in terms of the claim for asylum, relocation to Mogadishu is a reasonable option for the Appellant. His claim is therefore not well-founded”

15. The analytical muddle crystallises in the section quoted above. The FTJ was right to apply OA (Somalia) (CG) [2022] UKUT 33 (IAC) and there can be no issue taken with the FTJ’s reliance on OA for the conclusion that persecutory risk could not be made out in Mogadishu. What goes wrong is the FTJ’s next analytical move: eliding the question of risk with whether or not the Appellant could be expected to internally relocate. Plainly someone who is neither at risk of persecutory harm nor can show Article 3 ECHR breach in Mogadishu can still in principle succeed in establishing that internal relocation would be unduly harsh on them, dependent on their particular circumstances.

16. The headnote of OA itself makes clear how internal relocation should be addressed (my emphasis added):

12. There will need to be a careful assessment of all the circumstances of the particular individual in order to ascertain the Article 3, humanitarian protection or internal relocation implications of an individual's return.

13. If there are particular features of an individual returnee's circumstances or characteristics that mean that there are substantial grounds to conclude that there will be a real risk that, notwithstanding the availability of the Facilitated Returns Scheme and the other means available to a returnee of establishing themselves in Mogadishu, residence in an IDP camp or informal settlement will be reasonably likely, a careful consideration of all the circumstances will be required in order to determine whether their return will entail a real risk of Article 3 being breached. Such cases are likely to be rare, in light of the evidence that very few, if any, returning members of the diaspora are forced to resort to IDP camps.

14. It will only be those with no clan or family support who will not be in receipt of remittances from abroad and who have no real prospect of securing access to a livelihood on return who will face the prospect of living in circumstances falling below that which would be reasonable for internal relocation purposes.

17. Paragraph 14 is an invitation to consider clan and family support, as well as the likelihood of securing a livelihood – all potential factors in this category of case - but it is to be read with paragraph 12 which reminds FTJ’s of the need for a careful assessment of all the particular circumstances of an individual. Paragraph 14 does not impose a sui generis threshold test for internal relocation floating outside established refugee law. As made clear at paragraph 340 of OA:

340. Where an individual has established that they face a well-founded fear of being persecuted such that internal relocation is a live issue, the analysis is different. Such an assessment necessarily entails an examination of the prospective, longer term, living arrangements. In those circumstances, as was the case in MOJ as held by Said, the humanitarian conditions in the IDP camps and informal settlements acquire a greater potential relevance. It is established refugee law that the "unduly harsh" test for internal relocation entails a materially lower threshold than that necessary to establish an Article 3 ECHR claim, and to that extent it will be necessary to consider whether residence in an IDP camp or informal settlement will be unduly harsh, consistent with the guidance in MOJ at [408] which, as clarified by Said, was referring to internal relocation.

18. In this Appellant’s case, evaluation of the circumstances and evidence relevant to internal relocation included the expert medical evidence which found that the Appellant continued to suffer from Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder and Major Depression [CB: 138], at least partly caused by his past experience in Somalia; and, further, that any return to Somalia would “very likely exacerbate his PTSD symptoms as well as precipitate a full-blown depressive relapse” [CB: 142]. These conclusions are all the more striking in light of the FTJ’s acceptance of the past account and yet there is no consideration of them in the determination.

19. In my view, on the face of the determination, the expert medical evidence has neither been considered nor accepted nor rejected. That is plainly a material error. While the FTJ states (middle of page 6 of the determination) [CB: 8] that “I am not satisfied on the evidence before me that the appellant is disabled to the extent that he would be unfit for work”, this is a conclusion that is almost certainly derived from the GP records and separate medico-legal report of Dr Crawford [CB: 151] relating to physical injuries. Either way, if the FTJ wanted to deprecate or reject the psychological evaluation, there needed to be at least some minimal degree of reasoning or explanation. There is none.

20. In my view, that evidence was at least capable of leading to a different outcome as to internal relocation (and, indeed, Article 3 ECHR and Article 8 ECHR).

21. It is worth noting the Senior President’s Practice Direction, “Reasons for decisions”, dated 4 June 2024, which reminds the IAC that “adequate reasons for a substantive decision may often be short. In some cases a few succinct paragraphs will suffice… a challenge based on the adequacy of reasons should only succeed when the appellate body cannot understand the Tribunal’s thought process in making material findings.”

22. I conclude that I cannot glean from the First-tier determination how the FTJ approached the mental health evidence put forward on behalf of the Appellant. I reject the submission by Mr Simpson that it can be construed by implication, particularly when there is an absence of any or adequate reasoning. Further, it cannot be said that this was an issue and item of evidence which was not plainly “in play” in the appeal. The Appellant clearly advanced the evidence and argued that he could not internally relocate and/or that he would face destitution in Mogadishu. The ASA is clear enough. This was not a secondary issue buried in the bundles such that Lata would rescue the FTT determination. If I am wrong about that, then I find that the issue of internal relocation and an expert medical report relevant to it is a Robinson-obvious point for an FTJ to handle, however abstruse the pleadings.

23. It follows from my reasoning that the failure to have regard to the psychology report and/or give any reasons for rejecting it also tainted evaluation of the Article 8 ECHR claim (Ground 3).

24. I find that Grounds 2 and 3 are made out.

25. As to Ground 1, in my view the FTJ was entitled to follow the Country Guidance in OA on the degree of residual risk from Al Shabaab within Mogadishu itself. The FTJ had regard to the country expert report and gave reasons for finding it unpersuasive on that discrete issue of ongoing targeted risk in the capital, as well as the very limited analysis in the report on the Appellant’s particular minority clan (Tumaal) and where it sits in the hierarchy/networks of power.

26. Moreover, the argument over whether the Appellant would be an “ordinary civilian” in Mogadishu, by definition, rather misses the point that he in fact experienced persecution in his home area which is the place where he plainly faces elevated risk. I dismiss Ground 1. But it does not salvage the FTJ’s ultimate findings under “issue (ii)” [CB: 7-8] because in that section the FTJ failed to rationally evaluate internal relocation and/or Article 3 ECHR for the reasons given above.

27. In light of my conclusions, I set aside FTJ Rea’s determination, while preserving the factual findings to be found in the entire section under “Findings: Appeal on Asylum Grounds: Issue (i)”, pages 4-5 of the determination [CB: 6-7].

28. I invited, on a provisional basis, submissions from the representatives on whether the appeal should be retained in the Upper Tribunal or remitted to the First-tier Tribunal. Both advocates agreed that it would be appropriate to keep the appeal in the Upper Tribunal, bearing in mind that there were no outstanding disputes of fact over the past account or the subjective evidence. Mr Shabbir did not envisage there being oral evidence given that the live issues pertained to the country material and analytical framework. The issue on re-making will be internal relocation to Mogadishu and/or Article 3 ECHR risk (Humanitarian Protection) and/or Article 8 ECHR.

29. One final matter of procedure: the Appellant sought to rely, via Rule 15(2A), on an addendum country expert report. The Appellant accepts that the report itself was submitted late – it is not dated and therefore it is not clear how late and my enquiry to Counsel during the hearing did not lead to an answer – but provided the explanation that there was delay in the expert considering documents. Since I did not proceed to re-making on the day of the error of law hearing, the issue of this addendum report naturally moved to the sidelines of discussion. Mr Simpson did not formally object to the report entering into evidence at the point of re-making. Since I am making Directions for a new hearing in the Upper Tribunal, my view is that it is admissible at that stage in any event, if the Appellant wishes to rely upon it, consistent with the Directions and timetable set out below.

Notice of Decision

The decision of the First-tier Tribunal, which dismissed the appeal, is set aside, subject to the preserved findings identified above at paragraph 27 of this UT determination. The appeal is retained by the Upper Tribunal for re-making. I make the following Directions:

i. The appeal be listed for re-making with a time estimate of 3 hours, the date to be set in accordance with the availability of Mr Shabbir;

ii. The live issues are internal relocation, Article 3 ECHR and Article 8 ECHR;

iii. No later than 28 days before the listed hearing, the Appellant to confirm with the Upper Tribunal whether any further country or expert evidence is to be relied upon and, if so, that further evidence to be served on the Tribunal and Respondent in an indexed Supplementary Bundle;

iv. No later than 21 days before the listed hearing, the Appellant to file and serve a skeleton argument;

v. No later than 7 days before the listed hearing, the Respondent to file and serve a response. The Respondent has leave to rely upon any relevant Country Policy Information Notes.

vi. The Appellant to inform the Upper Tribunal if a Somali interpreter is required for the hearing, notwithstanding the Appellant will not be giving oral evidence.

Taimour Lay

Deputy Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

6 February 2026