Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004700
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/50303/2024
LP/02585/2025

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 11 August 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE O’BRIEN

Between

LN
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms P Solanki of Counsel, instructed by Turpin Miller
For the Respondent: Mrs R Arif, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 22 May 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. The appellant is a citizen of Albania. He appeals against the decision of the First-tier Tribunal (FtT) in his appeal against the respondent’s refusal of his protection and human rights claim. The FtT allowed his appeal on humanitarian protection and human rights grounds, having accepted the factual basis of his claim (human trafficking), but dismissed it on asylum grounds. The FtT did not accept that the appellant was a member of a particular social group (PSG) in Albania.

2. In an error of law decision dated 12 February 2026, annexed below, Upper Tribunal Judge Lodato found that the FtT had erred in law when assessing whether male victims of trafficking constituted a PSG. He found no error in the FtT’s findings rejecting the appellant’s claim to be a member of a PSG on the strength of his mental health, which he preserved, as well as the findings which went to risk of serious harm, sufficiency of protection and internal relocation.

3. Judge Lodato retained the appeal in the Upper Tribunal to remake the decision, addressing the issues of whether male victims of trafficking constitute a PSG and, if so, whether the appellant was at real risk of persecution because of his membership of that PSG. As it was, the parties agreed before me that only the first issue remained live, and that causation was not in issue.

4. Should the appellant succeed on the point, then the FtT’s decision allowing his appeal on humanitarian protection grounds will (necessarily) be set aside and substituted with a decision allowing it on asylum grounds. However, if he fails on the issue, in accordance with the FtT’s preserved findings the appeal will nevertheless be allowed (again) on humanitarian protection grounds. The task of remaking the decision within those parameters falls to me.

Treating the Appeal as Abandoned

5. Commensurate with the decision of the FtT, the respondent granted the appellant humanitarian protection leave on 10 July 2025. In accordance with s104 of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, his appeal therefore fell to be treated as abandoned pursuant to s104(4A) unless he gave notice in accordance with the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 (‘the Procedure Rules’). On 20 May 2026, the appellant’s representatives served such notice, apologising for its lateness, caused by the default of a former employee and inviting me to extend time.

6. Pursuant to rule 17A(3) of the Procedure Rules, the appellant had to send such a notice so as to arrive at the Upper Tribunal within 30 days of the grant of leave. The present notice is, therefore, significantly out of time. The explanation is far from ideal, but the default cannot be said to be that of the appellant himself. Moreover, following both parties’ failure to comply with rule 17A(1), which required each of them to inform the Upper Tribunal of the grant of leave, significant steps have been taken on an appeal which prima facie ought to have been treated as abandoned (in particular the error of law proceedings before Judge Lodato), without objection from either party. In all of the circumstances, I am satsified that it is plainly in the interests of justice to extend time, to accept the appellant’s notice, and to permit him to pursue his appeal against the respondent's refusal of his claim on Refugee Convention grounds.

The Remaking Hearing

7. The parties relied on the evidence before the FtT. In addition, the appellant applied on 22 January 2026 to rely on limited evidence (a 12-page ‘country schedule’) not before the FtT pursuant to rule 15(2A) of the Procedure Rules. The respondent did not object. Ms Solanki also sought rely again on the unreported Upper Tribunal relied on before the FtT, in which it accepted that male victims of trafficking constituted a PSG: ES v SSHD UI-2025-000360. Again, there was no objection from the respondent. To the extent that the appellant needed permission to rely on the case (permission would have been required were the matter being reheard in the FtT), I granted that permission.

8. The parties agreed that the rehearing could proceed on the basis of submissions only. Whilst I refer below only to such matters as necessary to understand my decision, I took those submissions, and the evidence to which I was referred, into account in their entirety.

Consideration.

9. It is not in issue that the appellant is a victim of trafficking. He contends that he is consequentially a member of a PSG. Sections 33(2)-(4) of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (NABA) provide:

‘(2) A group forms a particular social group for the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention only if it meets both of the following conditions.

(3) The first condition is that members of the group share—

(a) an innate characteristic,
(b) a common background that cannot be changed, or
(c) a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it.

(4) The second condition is that the group has a distinct identity in the relevant country because it is perceived as being different by the surrounding society.’

10. I need not set out the principal authorities on the meaning of PSG, Judge Lodato having given a comprehensive overview in his error of law decision.

11. The respondent in her CPIN, ‘Albania: Human trafficking’, published in March 2024 accepts that male victims of human trafficking have an immutable characteristic, the experience of being trafficked; however, she does not accept that they have a distinct identity in Albania.

12. In his error of law decision, Judge Lodato refers to the following extracts from the expert reports of human trafficking expert Dr McQuade (Judge Lodato’s emphasis):

‘[90] The 2021 UK Country Guidance on Albania relating to trafficking notes (para 13.9.1) that a report on the University of Bedfordshire/IOM shared learning event held in October 2017 stated, “Social stigma and discrimination as a direct result of human trafficking was discussed at length and considered to be a key issue in support. These discussions centred around those who had been identified as trafficked as well as those who worked with them and access to accommodation and health services. Discriminatory labels in official or media accounts were outlined as common. Stigma and discrimination was also reported to be a key issue for the children of those who had experienced trafficking. Rejection by family members was considered a common response to people who had experienced trafficking first hand.”

[91] The 2023 CPIN asserts however, that, “Single men and boys do not appear to experience the same social stigma as lone females” (para 5.1.7).

[92] However, the report of the 2022 Home Office Fact Finding Mission (FFM) to Albania, noted that, in interview, Key Adviser, a private employment agency working with UNICEF, told the FFM team that “Stigma affects both men and women, boys and girls, I would actually say boys and men feel much more stigmatised than women. When we talked to our vocational students about human trafficking they recalled an old phenomenon in the 1990s when young girls were taken on boats to Italy for sexual exploitation. So they associate trafficking with sexual exploitation and feel insulted and never admit they are VOT. They cannot cope with the fact that trafficking has evolved and now displays in other forms and doesn’t just equate with sexual exploitation. They don’t think that they meet this category. They don’t see labour exploitation as trafficking” (p 100).

[93] The FFM report also reports that NISMA ARSIS, a NGO, when asked whether men face the same levels of stigma as women, said “I have not identified a big difference” (p 32).

[94] The 2024 ARC/Asylos report, drawing on UK Home Office sources, on Albania confirms that stigma against men and boys persists, noting that, “Interlocutors and one source noted the difficulty that males face in disclosing their trafficking experiences or identifying themselves as having been trafficked, due to shame and fear of stigma and prejudice … particularly where this relates to sexual exploitation … A source interviewed for the UK Home Office fact-finding mission in 2022 opined that trafficked men may experience more stigma than boys. Trafficked Albanian men are reportedly reluctant to seek assistance …, blame themselves for what happened (D), and may not see themselves, or be seen by society, as having been trafficked, particularly where they have been subjected to forced labour … which is not well recognised as a form of trafficking in Albanian society. … Cultural factors reportedly contributing to stigma experienced by males include the “patriarchal” / “macho” environment within Albanian society …), the need to preserve “social honour” (F) and be seen as strong … and cultural taboos surrounding sexual exploitation (D).One interlocutor opined that stigma experienced by males is related to the loss of agency that is associated with trafficking situations (F). Another noted that stigma experienced by men and boys may be different to that experienced by women and girls, and relates to the perceived failure to be successful and provide for the family and the perceived failure arising from being in a situation of debt bondage or forced labour (C). Another interlocutor observed that trafficked men and boys experience stigma in different spheres, including when encountering professional networks, state authorities and in their communities, noting that stigma is present and needs significant effort to counter it (A).”’

and country expert, Ms Fejzulla::

‘[37] In my opinion, [LN] would face insurmountable obstacles in reintegrating into Albanian society as a trafficking victim. Identification and recognition through Albania's National Referral Mechanism (NRM) are complex and fraught with procedural inefficiencies. Although he could present his UK positive Conclusive Grounds decision as evidence, this alone does not guarantee formal recognition as a victim of trafficking. The process requires substantial disclosure during interviews, a challenging task for individuals like [LN], given the psychological trauma and stigma associated with trafficking. Reports indicate that while initial identification is somewhat straightforward, the number of individuals officially recognised as victims is alarmingly low, with only four confirmed victims from identified between 2021 and 2023.

[38] Structural deficiencies within the NRM compound these challenges. Lack of clear procedures, absence of an appeal process, and inconsistencies in victim referral mechanisms further impede access to support. Research by NGOs highlights inadequate coordination among institutions, limited shelter infrastructure, and financial constraints, all of which hinder effective victim assistance. While government and NGO-run shelters offer temporary services, they primarily cater to women and children, leaving male victims like [LN] with insufficient options. This lack of dedicated support for men exacerbates the difficulties he would face in securing safe housing and essential reintegration services.

[39] Cultural stigma, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and resource limitations further complicate [LN]’s situation. Albania's Tier 2 status in the US Department of State’s 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report underscores ongoing systemic failures in combating trafficking and supporting victims. Although new legislation is under consideration to address these gaps, immediate recourse remains unavailable. In light of these challenges, [LN]’s prospects for safe and effective reintegration into Albanian society are severely limited, with significant risks of re-victimisation and continued vulnerability.’

13. Ms Solanki emphasised that there has been no challenge to the expertise of Dr McQuaid or Ms Fejzulla. She also relied on a supplementary report by Ms Fejzulla, and emphasised the following extracts (footnotes removed):

a. From section 1.1, ‘The Patriarchal Context and the Concept of Burrëria’:

‘3. Albanian society, particularly in rural and northern regions such as Dibër—where LN originates—continues to be heavily influenced by customary laws derived from the Kanun of Lekë Dukagjini. This historical code intricately codifies social behaviour around rigid concepts of honour, shame, and hospitality. Central to this societal structure is the concept of Burrëria (manhood or masculinity). Under this paradigm, the ideal Albanian man is expected to be a strong, independent provider, a stoic leader of the household, and a fierce protector of his family's social honour.

4. Within this rigid gender binary, the concept of 'victimhood' is inherently feminised. To be a victim implies a state of powerlessness, fragility, and a total loss of agency—traits that are socially incompatible with Albanian masculinity. Consequently, male victims of trafficking find themselves in a profound state of cognitive and social dissonance. They have been stripped of their agency and subjected to exploitation by criminal elements, which directly violates the cultural mandate that men must be capable of defending themselves and their kin. When a man is trafficked, he is not merely viewed by his community as a victim of a crime; he is perceived as having failed in his fundamental gender role, resulting in an intense and enduring societal stigma. This stigma does not require the community to use the formal term “victim of trafficking”. In many Albanian communities, particularly outside Tirana, social categories are expressed through ideas of honour, strength, weakness, family reputation, failure, and shame. A trafficked man may therefore be perceived as different without being described in legal or technical language as a trafficking victim. The dominant cultural standpoint dictates that men cannot be powerless. A male victim is placed outside the normal understanding of what an Albanian man is expected to be.’

b. From section 1.2, ‘Reluctance to Self-Identify and Internalised Stigma’:

‘6. The external stigma applied by society is rapidly internalised by the victims, resulting in a pronounced reluctance among trafficked men and boys to self-identify or seek state assistance. According to evidence gathered during the 2022 UK Home Office Fact-Finding Mission to Albania, interlocutors from NGOs such as Key Adviser observed that boys and men often feel 'much more stigmatised than women' when discussing their exploitation.

7. The stigma operates as a powerful silencing mechanism. Because the term 'victim of trafficking' is inextricably linked to sexual exploitation and feminised vulnerability in the Albanian lexicon, men feel profoundly insulted by the categorisation and will resist identifying as victims of trafficking. They struggle to cope with the reality that trafficking has evolved into complex forms such as debt bondage and forced criminality, and they reject a label that they believe strips them of their remaining social dignity and honour. Different and Equal (D&E), a leading Albanian NGO, told the Home Office FFM that few men ask for help independently, and that men feel compelled to present as strong and resist counselling. This is particularly relevant to LN, whose exploitation involved forced criminality rather than sexual exploitation. A young man who has been coerced into drug cultivation or distribution is unlikely to be seen by his community as a victim of trafficking. He is more likely to be viewed as weak, compromised, criminally tainted, or as someone who failed to manage the risks of the criminal environment into which he had been drawn.’

c. From section 1.4, ‘Institutional Stigma’:

‘11. The UNICEF Albania July 2022 report found that trafficking survivors who are unemployed and possess the requisite documentation may receive approximately 9,000 Albanian Lek (circa £75) per month in economic assistance, yet few survivors access this support because the process is onerous, the amount is inadequate, and applicants encounter discrimination from frontline professionals. Survivors are reluctant to declare their status owing to stigma and discrimination, particularly in small communities where anonymity is impossible. For a person from a remote northern village such as LN, the risk of exposure is heightened by dense family, neighbourhood, and regional networks. Information about a young man’s return, failure abroad, lack of resources, mental health difficulties, or previous involvement with criminal groups is likely to circulate quickly. This would make private reintegration difficult and would increase the practical impact of stigma.’

d. From section 2.1, ‘The Stigma of Sexual Exploitation’

‘13. In Albanian society, human trafficking is historically and culturally synonymous with sexual exploitation. When a male is identified—or even suspected—as a victim of sexual exploitation, the stigma he faces is acute, visceral, and rooted in deep cultural taboos surrounding sexuality, morality, and bodily autonomy.

14. The patriarchal mindset that demands male physical dominance views the sexual exploitation of a man as a form of emasculation. Within the dominant patriarchal society of Albania, male sexual exploitation is particularly difficult to disclose because it is surrounded by shame, prejudice and fear that family or community members may infer a different sexual orientation. Country evidence on trafficked boys and young men notes that sexually exploited males may avoid speaking to police because of stigma, fear that their family will learn what happened, and fear that their “different sexual orientation” may become known. In addition, this must be understood against Albania’s broader context of persistent stigma, discrimination, harassment and occasional violence against LGBT persons, particularly outside Tirana and in more conservative local settings.’

e. From section 2.2, ‘The Stigma of Forced Labour and Criminality: The 'Stigma of Failure'’:

‘16. The stigma attached to forced labour, debt bondage, and forced criminality—which is the form of exploitation that LN endured—operates on an economic and social-competency axis rather than a strictly sexual one. Victims of this type of exploitation are not viewed through the lens of sexual moral failing, but rather through the unforgiving lens of personal and economic failure. This distinction is important because it explains why forced labour victims may appear less publicly stigmatised than sexual exploitation victims, while still being socially marked and excluded. Albania-specific country evidence notes that forced labour is not always recognised socially as trafficking, and that trafficked men may be blamed, may blame themselves, or may be perceived as having failed in their expected role as successful providers. In this context, the stigma attached to forced labour is often expressed through ridicule, mistrust, assumptions of weakness or failure, and practical barriers to reintegration, rather than through the explicit moral condemnation more commonly associated with sexual exploitation.’

f. From section 2.3, ‘Comparative Synthesis’:

‘21. The Home Office CPIN draws a distinction between the social stigma associated with different trafficking profiles and forms of exploitation. In the Albanian context, sexual exploitation is treated as carrying a particularly acute moral and reputational stigma because it engages issues of sexuality, shame, family honour and social respectability. Forced labour may not attract the same explicit moral condemnation, but for male victims it may still produce a serious and socially damaging form of stigma. Men and boys who return after forced labour, debt bondage or failed migration may be perceived as weak, unsuccessful, indebted, unreliable, or unable to fulfil the expected male role of provider. Their exclusion is therefore often expressed through blame, ridicule, mistrust and practical distancing, rather than through the overt moral condemnation more commonly associated with sexual exploitation. In my view, this assessment misunderstands the Albanian social dynamics through which male victims of trafficking are marginalised. It is correct that forced labour does not carry the same sexualised taboo as sex trafficking. However, Albania-specific evidence shows that forced labour and debt bondage may carry a debilitating socio-economic stigma of their own. Male victims may be perceived as having failed abroad, failed to provide for their families, or shown weakness by allowing themselves to be exploited. This stigma is capable of damaging a man’s social standing, weakening family and community support, obstructing access to employment and housing, and increasing vulnerability to re-exploitation or re-trafficking.’

g. From section 3.1, ‘Definitions of Distinct Identity’:

‘27. The defining feature of a PSG's distinct identity is frequently the very discrimination and stigmatisation it faces. The evidence cited indicates that due to stigma male victims of trafficking fail to self-identify. The fact that a marginalised group actively hides its status out of a well-founded fear of societal retribution is, in itself, compelling proof that the society perceives that characteristic negatively and treats those who possess it differently. If male trafficking victims were not perceived as different, there would be no social reason for them to conceal their history, resist the label, avoid support services, or fear disclosure. The pattern of concealment is therefore consistent with the existence of stigma and social differentiation.’

h. From section 4.1, ‘The 'Sexual Exploitation Only' Argument’:

‘37. The argument that only sex trafficking victims have a distinct identity hinges on the premise that forced labour carries 'less' stigma. Whilst it is sociologically accurate that forced labour avoids the specific homophobic or sexualised taboos of sex trafficking, measuring the intensity of stigma is legally irrelevant to the determination of a PSG. The Refugee Convention and NABA 2022 do not require a group to face the worst or most intense stigma in a society; they merely require the group to be perceived as different.

38. As established in Section 2, a male victim of forced labour is perceived as fundamentally different from a non-trafficked Albanian male. He is marked by the 'stigma of failure', viewed as weak, and treated with derision for failing to maintain his autonomy and provide for his family. The perception of a man as a 'loser' who succumbed to debt bondage or was forced to cultivate cannabis against his will creates a clear, undeniable boundary between him and the normative, independent Albanian male. The fact that Albanian society may not describe this as “trafficking” does not remove the social difference. It merely shows that the victim is denied the protective label of victimhood while still carrying the social consequences of exploitation.’

i. From section 4.3, ‘The Criminalisation of the Victim’:

‘42. Victims of forced criminality face a specific and additional form of societal differentiation. Society perceives these young men not as innocent victims of modern slavery, but through a lens of criminality. Because they were forced to deal drugs or work in cannabis houses, society—and often corrupt local police—views them as complicit criminals. This victim-blaming isolates them from community support and from formal protection mechanisms, setting them apart from the law-abiding population. It is a particularly damaging form of stigma because it converts victimhood into perceived culpability. A male victim of forced criminality may therefore be viewed not primarily as a coerced person, but as someone tainted by the criminal activity in which he was compelled to participate. Albania-specific evidence shows that trafficking survivors may experience discrimination from family members, neighbours, employers, customers, clients and frontline professionals, and that stigma may obstruct access to employment, housing and state services. In the case of male victims, this is compounded by patriarchal expectations that men should be strong and self- reliant, making them less likely to seek help and more likely to be judged as weak, unreliable or culpable rather than recognised as victims of exploitation.
…
44. Therefore, the distinct identity of male victims of trafficking in Albania is not contingent upon the modality of their exploitation. Whether subjected to the sexualised shame of prostitution or the emasculating stigma of forced labour and debt bondage, the male victim is stripped of his Burrëria, the cultural norms mean that he is permanently alienated from the patriarchal mainstream, denied the protections afforded to normative citizens, and definitively perceived as 'different' by the surrounding society.’

14. Ms Solanki also relied the conclusions in EF that male victims of trafficking would be perceived to have been victims of sexual exploitation and so subject to the same discrimination and stigmatisation as trafficked women [37], and thus constituted a PSG [39].

15. Mrs Arif relied on the CPIN, and in particular section 2.1.3, which she argued was more up-to-date that the material relied on by the appellant. Men were overwhelmingly subject to labour rather than sexual exploitation and were rarely identified as victims of trafficking, seen rather as economic migrants who had failed abroad. Male victims of trafficking did not have the social visibility to have a distinct identity in Albania.

16. Section 2.1.3 references in particular section 9, ‘Treatment of victims of trafficking’. Paragraph 9.1.2 is relevant to the issue of male victims of trafficking:

‘9.1.2 The official from Key Adviser told the Home Office FFT 2022 that ‘Stigma affects both men and women, boys and girls…’ However, it was the official’s opinion that men and boys feel more stigmatised than women as trafficking was generally associated with sexual exploitation. Consequently, men would never admit they were VOT148. When asked whether men faced the same level of stigma as women, the official from NISMA ARMIS stated that they had not noticed a big difference, but added that support services generally had increased in the past 10 years. The same source noted that it was more difficult to identify male VOT.’

17. I do not agree that the CPIN is more up-to-date than the material relied upon by the appellant. In particular, the source referenced in paragraph 9.1.2 is the report published in December 2022 of a fact-finding mission undertaken in October 2022. In fact, Ms Fejzulla appears to cite many sources cited in the CPIN and regularly cites the CPIN itself. The key difference in any event is the analysis applied to the information from those sources.

18. As noted above, the respondent has not challenged the expertise of either Dr McQuaid or Ms Fejzulla. Having quoted the material in paragraph 11 above, Judge Lodato remarked that it disclosed a cogent case that male victims of trafficking are seen differently in Albanian society. I agree.

19. That case is fortified by Ms Fejzulla’s supplementary report. From that report, I accept that the evidence shows that when a man is trafficked, he is either suspected of being sexually exploited or is perceived as having failed in his fundamental gender role. Whilst the latter attracts perhaps less stigma than attaches to victims of sexual exploitation, an intense and enduring societal stigma still results. Furthermore, someone coerced into drug cultivation or distribution is likely to be viewed as weak, compromised, criminally tainted, or as someone who failed to manage the risks of the criminal environment into which he had been drawn.

20. It matters not that a male victim of trafficking does not consider himself so to be, or that he would resist being identified as such. Indeed, the fact that such reluctance arises from fear of stigma and discrimination is evidence of male victims being seen by society as different from the general male population. Neither does it matter whether society formally describes such individuals as ‘victims of trafficking’. The question is whether those men identified as having gone through an experience amounting in law to trafficking are seen differently in Albanian society. I am satisfied on the evidence that they are. It follows that the appellant, as a male victim of trafficking, is a member of a PSG and so, it is agreed, is entitled to asylum.

Notice of Decision

1. The decision of the First-tier Tribunal involved the making of an error on a point of law and is set aside.
2. That decision is remade and the appeal is allowed on asylum grounds.

Sean O’Brien

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

7 August 2026

Annex

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004700
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/50303/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:

…………………………………

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE LODATO

Between

LN
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms Solanki, counsel instructed by Turpin Miller solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Abdul-Karim, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Birmingham Civil Justice Centre on 23 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
Introduction
1. I have decided to maintain the anonymity order originally made in these proceedings by the First-tier Tribunal because the underlying claim involves international protection issues in that the appellant claims to fear persecution or serious harm on return to Albania. In reaching this decision, I am mindful of the fundamental principle of open justice, but I am satisfied, taking the appellant’s case at its highest for these purposes, that the potential grave risks outweigh the rights of the public to know of his identity.
2. The appellant appeals with permission against the decision, dated 25 June 2025, of a judge of the First-tier Tribunal Judge (‘the judge’) to dismiss the appeal on Refugee Convention grounds.
Background
3. The appellant is an Albanian national. His underlying claim for international protection is founded on his characteristic of being a victim of trafficking. The Single Competent Authority found conclusive grounds that he had been trafficked for the purposes of forced labour.
Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
4. The appellant appealed to the First-tier Tribunal against the refusal of his protection claim. There was little in the way of disputed narrative facts between the parties as it was agreed that the appellant arrived in the UK as a 17-year-old victim of modern slavery and suffered ill treatment at the hands of his father. What fell to be decided was what these underlying facts meant for the purposes of international protection under the Refugee Convention or humanitarian protection principles. The first issue to be resolved in that context was whether the appellant was a member of a particular social group (‘PSG’) because he is a victim of trafficking. It is the judge’s assessment of that issue which is at the heart of these error of law proceedings. It does not overburden this decision to set out the judge’s analysis of this issue in full:
[18] The Respondent relies on the following passage from the CPIN Albania: Human Trafficking of March 2024 (“the HT CPIN”):
2.1.3 Men who are trafficked are not likely to form a PSG. Although they have an immutable characteristic – the experience of having been trafficked – they do not have a distinct identity within Albanian society.
[19] I bear in mind ss.33(2) to 33(4) of the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (“NABA”) direct that a conjunctive approach is to be taken to the definition of a PSG. The Appellant must show both that they have an immutable characteristic and a distinct identity within society. It is the second limb of the definition that is in issue in this case.
[20] The Appellant submits that the conclusion at paragraph 2.1.3 above is based on a misreading of the country evidence upon which the HT CPIN is based, in particular the Asylos and ARC Foundation Report of May 2019 (“the Asylos report”). The Appellant relies on the unreported UT case of DK (UI-2023-003379), in which the Tribunal found that a male VOT could be a member of a PSG. That conclusion was based on the Tribunal’s own interpretation of the Asylos report. The Appellant also relies on a Human Trafficking Expert Witness Report of Dr Aidan McQuade, who quotes from the Asylos report and the 2022 Home Office Fact Finding Mission (“FFM”) to argue that male VOTs are stigmatised by Albanian society.
[21] I have taken the case of DK into account, but I am not bound by it. I have also read with care section 1.6 of the Asylos report which addresses “Stigma affecting trafficked men and boys”.
[22] The material in the Asylos report indicates that males are reluctant to self-identify as VOTs because trafficking is associated with sexual exploitation. Forced labour is not generally regarded as trafficking and carries far less social stigma. Men who are trafficked abroad and then forced to return to Albania may face the stigma of failure.
[23] The same association of trafficking with sexual exploitation is identified in another passage from the Home Office FFM quoted within Dr McQuade’s report. The source states that “boys and men feel much more stigmatised than women” but goes on to explain that:
They associate trafficking with sexual exploitation and feel insulted and never admit they are a VOT. They cannot cope with the fact that trafficking has evolved and now displays in other forms and doesn’t just equate with sexual exploitation. They don’t think that they meet this category. They don’t see labour exploitation as trafficking.
[24] This is echoed by the following passage from the HT CPIN:
7.2.9 6 sources told the Home Office FFM 2022 team that most men did not accept or recognise that they were victims of trafficking, or that they were not recognised as such by society. The UNICEF Albania September 2022 report found that only 5% of 1387 survey respondents (Aged 15 to 29) recognised that men aged over 18 were at risk of trafficking.
[25] The Appellant was a victim of labour exploitation within Albania. He was not sexually exploited. He was not trafficked to the UK and will not face any stigma of failure upon return. In those circumstances, I find he does not have a distinct identity within Albanian society such as would make him a member of a PSG.
5. The judge ultimately found that the appellant’s claim did not engage the Refugee Convention, but the appeal was allowed on humanitarian protection grounds because he was at risk of suffering serious harm, specifically “re-exploitation by criminal gangs” (see [46]). In coming to this latter conclusion, the judge directed himself to the risk factors identified in TD & AD (Trafficked women) [2016] UKUT 92 (IAC) which were found to apply equally to male victims of trafficking bar the presence of an illegitimate child.
Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
6. The appellant applied for permission to appeal in reliance on a single ground of appeal, namely that the judge materially erred in finding that he was not a member of a PSG. In developing that ground of appeal, it was argued that judge had misunderstood his analytical task in assessing whether the group satisfied the social perception test which must now be established under the Nationality and Borders Act 2022 (‘NABA’). It was further suggested that the judge had not addressed his mind to important expert evidence and country background information to properly inform his consideration of this issue.
7. In a decision dated 4 August 2025, First-tier Tribunal Boyes granted permission for the grounds to be argued.
8. At the error of law hearing, I heard oral submissions from both parties. I address any submissions of significance in the discussion section below.
Legal Framework
9. Section 33 of NABA sets out the meaning of the various Refugee Convention reasons. Where relevant, it provides:
33 Article 1(A)(2): reasons for persecution
For the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention—
[…]
(2) A group forms a particular social group for the purposes of Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Convention only if it meets both of the following conditions.
(3) The first condition is that members of the group share—
(a) an innate characteristic,
(b) a common background that cannot be changed, or
(c) a characteristic or belief that is so fundamental to identity or conscience that a person should not be forced to renounce it.
(4) The second condition is that the group has a distinct identity in the relevant country because it is perceived as being different by the surrounding society.
10. JCK (s.32 NABA 2022) (Botswana) [2024] UKUT 00100 (IAC) is a reported Upper Tribunal decision which offers guidance as to the meaning of these statutory requirements. Paragraphs [13]-[14] assist in how the social perception requirement of s.33(2) falls to be judicially assessed:
The decision-maker is not required here to consider whether the characteristic, or imputed characteristic, has in fact attracted persecution, or whether it will do so in the future. The simple question is whether the claimant has a protected characteristic which could cause them to fear. In many cases this will be straightforward. Applicants fearing persecution because they have an outwardly obvious characteristic such as their gender or race will have little difficulty in discharging the burden of proving this matter on a balance of probabilities. Other, more opaque, characteristics could be more challenging to discern. Whether someone is gay, or holds a particular religious or political belief is not something that can be seen with the naked eye, or by making windows into souls. It is something that must be evaluated on the evidence in the round, but care should be taken not to automatically reject, at this first stage, a claimed characteristic by reference to the overall credibility of the claim. The focus must be on the characteristics. […]
The answer is not, however, always going to be that simple. There are certain classes of applicant for whom it will be necessary to consider the country context in order to answer the question at s32(2)(a). Sub-sections 33(2)-(4) NABA 2022 require a member of a particular social group to demonstrate not only the innate characteristic possessed by, for instance, an ethnic group, but they must also demonstrate that they have “an identity in the relevant country because it is perceived as being different by the surrounding society”. That ‘social visibility’ test can only be applied by looking carefully at the country background material (both expert and general), which is, at this stage, to be assessed on the balance of probabilities. Decision-makers must however be mindful that they are not here evaluating risk.
11. While NABA now requires the social perception test to be met in any asylum claim based on membership of a particular social group, the senior courts and tribunals previously considered the nature of a distinct identity within a given society because this was always one of two possible bases on which a PSG might be found to exist, because prior to NABA this could have been on a disjunctive, rather than conjunctive, footing. In EMAP (Gang violence – Convention Reason) El Salvador CG [2022] UKUT 00335 (IAC), the panel considered a wealth of authority on the point and provided the following analysis of the meaning of this concept:
[100] The first point to note is that any proposed particular social group must be assessed in the context of the society in which it is said to exist. Groups regarded as having social visibility in one country may not do so in another: in his dissenting judgment in Shah and Islam Lord Millett posits ‘westernised women’ as an example of that. We would suggest that it is this central tenet of the jurisprudence which has perhaps given rise to the fact of social visibility morphing into a requirement.
[101] The second point is that a group that makes out its claim to ‘social visibility’ by pointing to the discrimination it faces will not necessarily fall foul of the principle that the group cannot be defined by reference to the feared persecution. The two are not the same thing: see for instance the defining features of life as a Pakistani woman in Shah and Islam.
[…]
[103] The fourth point is that members of the group need not be identifiable ‘on sight’ by members of the society in which they live. When we consider some of the most vulnerable groups that have benefitted from this provision of the Convention – for instance homosexuals or former victims of trafficking – the logic of this approach becomes apparent. It is the perception of the group in general that counts. An individual gay man need not therefore establish that he has personally been perceived or identified as gay in the hostile environment from which he comes, it is enough that he can show that gay men in general are perceived as different by the surrounding society.
[104] This leads to the final, and for the purpose of such cases, perhaps the most important point about social visibility. The group does not need to be perceived as different by society as a whole. It certainly can be – eg women in Pakistan – but in practice the perception need only be held by some members of the society. It is today uncontroversial that members of a family can constitute a particular social group, and that they would (absent special notoriety or fame) only be perceived as being part of that group by the immediate community in which they live.
[…]
[106] First, their Lordships’ judgments in Fornah, although obiter, are highly persuasive. They are made in the context of an appeal which was wholly concerned with the definition of ‘particular social group’, and in which their Lordships were referred to all of the relevant international authorities. UNHCR was an intervener in the case, and as Lord Bingham notes, their opinion in favour of a disjunctive reading amounted to a “very helpful distillation” of the effect of those authorities. At [§46], for instance, Lord Hope of Craighead cites with approval the speech of McHugh J in Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2004) 217 CLR 387:
“46. In Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, paras 67-69 McHugh J was at pains to emphasise that it was a mistake to say that a particular social group does not exist unless it is always perceived as such by the society in which it exists. He said that it was not necessary that society itself must recognise the particular social group as a group that is set apart from the rest of that society, or that the persecutor or persecutors must actually perceive the group as constituting a particular social group. As he put it in para 69:
"It is enough that the persecutor or persecutors single out the asylum-seeker for being a member of a class whose members possess a 'uniting' feature or attribute, and the persons in that class are cognisable objectively as a particular social group."
In their judgment in paras 17-18 Gleeson CJ, Gummow and Kirby JJ appear to disagree with McHugh J in requiring recognition within the society subjectively that the collection of individuals is a group that is set apart from the rest of the community. My own preference, with respect, is for the more cautious approach of McHugh J that it would be a mistake to insist that such recognition is always necessary. I agree with him that it is sufficient that the asylum-seeker can be seen objectively to have been singled out by the persecutor or persecutors for reasons of his or her membership of a particular social group whose defining characteristics exist independently of the words or actions of the persecutor. That is as true in cases where the family is identified as the particular social group, as it was in that case where it was contended that the particular social group comprised young, able-bodied Afghan men”.
[…]
[110] We agree with UNHCR’s analysis [cited at §15 of Fornah] that where both tests are satisfied there certainly will be a particular social group, but that the point of the ‘social perception’ approach is as follows:
“If a claimant alleges a social group that is based on a characteristic determined to be neither unalterable or fundamental, further analysis should be undertaken to determine whether the group is nonetheless perceived as a cognizable group in that society. So, for example, if it were determined that owning a shop or participating in a certain occupation in a particular society is neither unchangeable nor a fundamental aspect of human identity, a shopkeeper or members of a particular profession might nonetheless constitute a particular social group if in the society they are recognized as a group which sets them apart.”
12. Returning to K & Fornah v SSHD [2007] 1 AC 412, it worth drawing out further observations made by their Lordships. Lord Bingham referred, at [p.431B] to the “valuable insights” of the High Court of Australia in Applicant A 190 CLR 225 before citing a passage of Brennan CJ’s leading judgment:
By the ordinary meaning of the words used, a ‘particular group’ is a group identifiable by any characteristic common to the members of the group and a ‘social group’ is a group the members of which possess some characteristic which distinguishes them from society at large. The characteristic may consist in any attribute, including attributes of non-criminal conduct or family life, which distinguish the member of the group from society at large. The persons possessing any such characteristic form a particular social group.
13. Lord Rodger referred, at [p.455D], to the “convenient summary” of Gleeson CJ et al in Applicant S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 217 CLR 387, [para 36]:
First, the group must be identifiable by a characteristic or attribute common to all members of the group. Secondly, the characteristic or attribute common to all members of the group cannot be the shared fear of persecution. Thirdly, the possession of that characteristic or attribute must distinguish the group from society at large.
14. No analysis of the meaning of PSG would be complete without considering the seminal judgment of the House of Lords in Shah & Islam v SSHD [1999] 2 W.L.R. 1015. Lord Hoffmann discussed some of the underlying features which marks out a particular group in a given society. He said this at p.1034G:
To what social group, if any, did the appellants belong? To identify a social group, one must first identify the society of which it forms a part. In this case, the society is plainly that of Pakistan. Within that society, it seems to me that women form a social group of the kind contemplated by the Convention. Discrimination against women in matters of fundamental human rights on the ground that they are women is plainly in pari materiae with discrimination on grounds of race. It offends against their H rights as human beings to equal treatment and respect. It may seem strange that sex (or gender) was not specifically enumerated in the Convention when it is mentioned in article 2 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. But the Convention was originally limited to persons who had become refugees as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951. One can only suppose that the delegates could not think of cases before that date in which women had been persecuted because they were women. But the time limit was removed by the 1967 New York Protocol and the concept of a social group is in my view perfectly adequate to accommodate women as a group in a society that discriminates on grounds of sex, that is to say, that perceives women as not being entitled to the same fundamental rights as men. As we have seen, La Forest J. in the Ward case had no difficulty in saying that persecution on grounds of gender would be persecution on account of membership of a social group. I therefore think that women in Pakistan are a social group.
[Underlining added]
15. Lord Hope, at p.1038H-1040A expanded on the role which may be played by societal discrimination in marking out a PSG:
Mr. Pannick said that a social group normally required cohesion between its members, and that if it lacked cohesion this was a very strong indication that it was not a group. But I think that this cannot be so in all cases. There are various ways in which a social group may be formed. It may be voluntary and self-generating. In that event it makes good sense to say, as Staughton L.J. said in the Court of Appeal, at p. 93D, that it must have some degree of cohesiveness, co-operation or interdependence among its members. But, in the context of article 1A(2) of the Convention, I do not think that it needs to be self-generating. It may have been created, quite contrary to the wishes of the persons who are comprised in it, by society. Those persons may have been set apart by the norms or customs of that society, so that all people who have their particular characteristic are recognised as being different from all others in that society. This will almost certainly be because they are being discriminated against by the society in which they live as they have that characteristic. I do not think that the fact that it is discrimination which identifies the group to which these people belong as a "particular social group" within that society offends against the rule that the group must exist independently of, and not be defined by, the persecution. As I said earlier, people can be and often are discriminated against without being persecuted.
The rule that the group must exist independently of the persecution is useful, because persecution alone cannot be used to define the group. But it must not be applied outside its proper context. This point has been well made by Goodwin-Gill, The Refugee in International Law, 2nd ed. (1996). He observes, at pp. 47-48, that the importance, and therefore the identity, of a social group may well be in direct proportion to the notice taken of it by others. Thus the notion of social group is an open-ended one, which can be expanded in favour of a variety of different classes susceptible to persecution. In a footnote at p. 361, under reference to the analysis in Attorney-General of Canada v. Ward [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, he notes that the "grouping" will often be independent of will, so that the requirement of voluntary association relationship, if adopted in all cases, would introduce an unjustified, additional evidential burden on the person who seeks protection under the Convention. At p. 362, after further discussion, he concludes that to treat persecution as the sole factor which results in the identification of the particular social group is too simple. Persecution may be but one facet of broader policies and perspectives, all of which contribute to the group and add to its pre-existing characteristics.
The unchallenged evidence in this case shows that women are discriminated against in Pakistan. I think that the nature and scale of the discrimination is such that it can properly be said the women in Pakistan are discriminated against by the society in which they live. The reason why the appellants fear persecution is not just because they are women. It is because they are women in a society which discriminates against women. In the context of that society I would regard women as a particular social group within the meaning of article 1A(2) of the Convention.
In the decision of the U.S. Board of Immigration Appeals in In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. 211, it was recognised that, on the application of the eiusdem generis principle, the shared common, immutable characteristic which would qualify to form a particular social group could include the person's sex. La Forest J. in Attorney-General of Canada v. Ward [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 739, accepted that a particular social group could include persons who feared persecution because they were being discriminated against on the basis of gender. So to hold that the appellants were members of a particular social group in Pakistan because they are women and because women are discriminated against in that country would be consistent with previous authority. I do not think that it is necessary in this case to define the social group more narrowly. As the particular social group must be identified in each case in the 'light of the evidence, the fact that women in Pakistan belong to a particular social group because of the way people of their gender are treated in their society does not mean that the same result will be reached in every other country where women are discriminated against. In other cases the evidence may show that the discrimination is based on some other characteristic as well as gender. If so, some other definition will be needed to identify the group. But that problem does not arise in this case.
[Underlining added]
16. It can be seen from the above extracts from the leading authorities that whether a group is subject to discrimination in a given society because of the characteristics which distinguish that group is an important consideration in any assessment of whether such a group is distinct as a PSG within that society.
Discussion
17. In challenging the lawfulness of the judge’s analysis of whether the appellant was a member of a PSG, it was argued that he left out of account important expert evidence and country background information which went to that very issue and did not explain why he found that this appellant would not be stigmatised as a male victim of trafficking. In particular, the suggested failure of the judge to meaningfully analyse expert opinion evidence which supported the proposition that male victims of trafficking were discriminated against and stigmatised was said to amount to an error of law. Below are extracts from the expert reports of human trafficking expert Dr McQuade and country expert, Ms Fejzulla [the part of Dr McQuade’s report which was explicitly referred to by the judge is in bold]:
Dr McQuade:
[90] The 2021 UK Country Guidance on Albania relating to trafficking notes (para 13.9.1) that a report on the University of Bedfordshire/IOM shared learning event held in October 2017 stated, “Social stigma and discrimination as a direct result of human trafficking was discussed at length and considered to be a key issue in support. These discussions centred around those who had been identified as trafficked as well as those who worked with them and access to accommodation and health services. Discriminatory labels in official or media accounts were outlined as common. Stigma and discrimination was also reported to be a key issue for the children of those who had experienced trafficking. Rejection by family members was considered a common response to people who had experienced trafficking first hand.”
[91] The 2023 CPIN asserts however, that, “Single men and boys do not appear to experience the same social stigma as lone females” (para 5.1.7).
[92] However, the report of the 2022 Home Office Fact Finding Mission (FFM) to Albania, noted that, in interview, Key Adviser, a private employment agency working with UNICEF, told the FFM team that “Stigma affects both men and women, boys and girls, I would actually say boys and men feel much more stigmatised than women. When we talked to our vocational students about human trafficking they recalled an old phenomenon in the 1990s when young girls were taken on boats to Italy for sexual exploitation. So they associate trafficking with sexual exploitation and feel insulted and never admit they are VOT. They cannot cope with the fact that trafficking has evolved and now displays in other forms and doesn’t just equate with sexual exploitation. They don’t think that they meet this category. They don’t see labour exploitation as trafficking” (p 100).
[93] The FFM report also reports that NISMA ARSIS, a NGO, when asked whether men face the same levels of stigma as women, said “I have not identified a big difference” (p 32).
[94] The 2024 ARC/Asylos report, drawing on UK Home Office sources, on Albania confirms that stigma against men and boys persists, noting that, “Interlocutors and one source noted the difficulty that males face in disclosing their trafficking experiences or identifying themselves as having been trafficked, due to shame and fear of stigma and prejudice … particularly where this relates to sexual exploitation … A source interviewed for the UK Home Office fact-finding mission in 2022 opined that trafficked men may experience more stigma than boys. Trafficked Albanian men are reportedly reluctant to seek assistance …, blame themselves for what happened (D), and may not see themselves, or be seen by society, as having been trafficked, particularly where they have been subjected to forced labour … which is not well recognised as a form of trafficking in Albanian society. … Cultural factors reportedly contributing to stigma experienced by males include the “patriarchal” / “macho” environment within Albanian society …), the need to preserve “social honour” (F) and be seen as strong … and cultural taboos surrounding sexual exploitation (D).One interlocutor opined that stigma experienced by males is related to the loss of agency that is associated with trafficking situations (F). Another noted that stigma experienced by men and boys may be different to that experienced by women and girls, and relates to the perceived failure to be successful and provide for the family and the perceived failure arising from being in a situation of debt bondage or forced labour (C). Another interlocutor observed that trafficked men and boys experience stigma in different spheres, including when encountering professional networks, state authorities and in their communities, noting that stigma is present and needs significant effort to counter it (A).”
Ms Fejzulla:
[37] In my opinion, [LN] would face insurmountable obstacles in reintegrating into Albanian society as a trafficking victim. Identification and recognition through Albania's National Referral Mechanism (NRM) are complex and fraught with procedural inefficiencies. Although he could present his UK positive Conclusive Grounds decision as evidence, this alone does not guarantee formal recognition as a victim of trafficking. The process requires substantial disclosure during interviews, a challenging task for individuals like [LN], given the psychological trauma and stigma associated with trafficking. Reports indicate that while initial identification is somewhat straightforward, the number of individuals officially recognised as victims is alarmingly low, with only four confirmed victims from identified between 2021 and 2023.
[38] Structural deficiencies within the NRM compound these challenges. Lack of clear procedures, absence of an appeal process, and inconsistencies in victim referral mechanisms further impede access to support. Research by NGOs highlights inadequate coordination among institutions, limited shelter infrastructure, and financial constraints, all of which hinder effective victim assistance. While government and NGO-run shelters offer temporary services, they primarily cater to women and children, leaving male victims like [LN] with insufficient options. This lack of dedicated support for men exacerbates the difficulties he would face in securing safe housing and essential reintegration services.
[39] Cultural stigma, bureaucratic inefficiencies, and resource limitations further complicate [LN]’s situation. Albania's Tier 2 status in the US Department of State’s 2024 Trafficking in Persons Report underscores ongoing systemic failures in combating trafficking and supporting victims. Although new legislation is under consideration to address these gaps, immediate recourse remains unavailable. In light of these challenges, [LN]’s prospects for safe and effective reintegration into Albanian society are severely limited, with significant risks of re-victimisation and continued vulnerability.
18. In assessing the adequacy of the judge’s reasoning in support of his finding that the appellant was not a member of a PSG, it is worth recalling the way in which this conclusion was expressed at [25]:
The Appellant was a victim of labour exploitation within Albania. He was not sexually exploited. He was not trafficked to the UK and will not face any stigma of failure upon return. In those circumstances, I find he does not have a distinct identity within Albanian society such as would make him a member of a PSG.
[Underlining added]
19. This conclusion came at the end of a summary of some of the expert evidence and country background information before the judge. I must exercise caution to read the decision fairly and not assume that a strand of evidence has been disregarded merely because it was not expressly referred to. The real test is whether it can be readily understood why the decision was taken. I have two concerns with the basis on which the judge determined this issue which was decisive as regards the asylum claim on the basis of membership of a PSG.
20. Firstly, while the judge referred to various parts of the evidence which was before him, I have struggled to piece together why he concluded that male victims of trafficking were not distinct within Albanian society and therefore fell short of amounting to a PSG. The judge himself referred to opinion evidence and background information which detailed how males who have been trafficked are reluctant to self-disclose because of the danger of being confused to have been involved in sexual exploitation. Another chilling effect is the pervasive social impression formed of males who were formerly trafficked that they are weak or failures in a society which attaches value to conventional male stereotypes. On the face of this evidence and material, there was a cogent case that male victims of trafficking are seen differently in Albanian society. It arguably matters not that Albanian society might not attach the label of victims of trafficking to such males because they were not sexually exploited. It is not what they are called but how the group is seen, as being set apart from the wider society, which is of importance in this context. If a group is perceived by parts, not necessarily the whole, of society as being different, the social perception test is demonstrably satisfied. Even if male victims of trafficking would not be referred to in those terms because they tend not to have been sexually exploited, there was evidence to support the proposition that they are nonetheless marked as standing apart for not conforming to conventional standards of male behaviour. The passages of the expert evidence I have copied above also provided the foundation for the suggestion that male victims of trafficking are not treated in the same way as female victims of trafficking and are certainly not treated like males who have not been trafficked. There was a comprehensive case advanced before the judge that the appellant would be at risk of structural and societal discrimination on return to Albania because of his background as a male victim of trafficking. From the authorities I have cited at length above, this was a fundamental matter to be assessed in deciding whether such individuals form a distinct group within Albanian society. There is no hint in the judge’s reasons that this point has been grappled with in any meaningful way.
21. The second concern stems from the part of paragraph 25 which I have underlined above. Here, the judge can be seen to have asked himself entirely the wrong question. The question is manifestly not whether the appellant himself has a distinct identity within Albanian society as a member of a PSG. One only needs to ask a similar question in the context of a different PSG commonly encountered in this jurisdiction. There is no doubt that homosexual men may form a PSG in a given society. The fact that a particular homosexual man might not be inclined to disclose his sexuality could have no impact on whether the wider group of homosexual men exists within the wider society. At this juncture, the judge was deciding whether male victims of trafficking constituted a PSG distinct within Albanian society. The appellant’s personal characteristics would obviously be relevant to the later question of whether the appellant was at risk of persecution, but it could not sensibly have a bearing on whether the wider particular social group was perceived as such by Albanian society at large.
22. In my judgement, the judge has fallen into the trap of summarising the evidence going to an issue and reaching a conclusion without taking the necessary step of explaining how he got from the starting point to the end point. It cannot be understood why the evidence was rejected that male victims of trafficking are perceived differently in Albanian society and discriminated against. It was no answer to this fundamental question to observe that the appellant himself would not be identified as a member of such a group although I fully accept that this would have purchase in any assessment of the causative nexus required to show that any persecution would be for a Refugee Convention reason and reasonably likely to occur.
23. I am satisfied that the decision involved a material error of law and falls to be set aside.
Disposal
24. The parties were agreed that if an error of law were found the appropriate course would be to remake the underlying appeal in the Upper Tribunal. I agree that it is appropriate to remake the decision given the narrow scope of the issues which remain to be resolved. The judge’s factual findings going to the decision to allow the appeal on humanitarian protection principles are preserved. However, if the appeal ultimately succeeds on Refugee Convention grounds, the decision to allow the appeal on humanitarian protection grounds could not stand as this can only be a lesser alternative to refugee status. At the remaking hearing, the parties should come prepared to reargue whether male victims of trafficking are a PSG within Albanian society and whether the appellant has established the causative nexus between his membership of that cohort and any risk of persecution he might face on return. I see no reason to unpick the judge’s findings on the appellant’s membership of a PSG on the strength of his mental health ([26]-[29]) nor of the findings which went to risk of serious harm, sufficiency of protection or internal relocation ([31]-[62]). All of these findings stand as preserved.
Notice of Decision
The judge’s decision involved a material error of law and I set it aside. The underlying appeal decision will be remade following a further hearing.
I make the following directions:
i. The remaking hearing is to be listed at the Birmingham Civil Justice Centre for 3 hours on the first available date.
ii. No later than 14 days before the resumed hearing, the parties must upload to CE-File, and directly serve on the other party, any further evidence they intend to rely upon.  
iii. An Albanian interpreter is to be booked for the hearing. 

P Lodato

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

9 February 2026