Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004733

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/65700/2024
LP/14219/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 12th February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BLUNDELL
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE DURANCE

Between

FA
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

THE SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Hodson of MBM Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms Khan, Senior Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 8 December 2025

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity. No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court. Anonymity was ordered by the First-tier Tribunal and it is appropriate for that direction to continue in force in light of the fact that the appellant seeks international protection.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. The appellant appeals with the permission of Judge Kudhail against the decision of Judge Quin, who dismissed her appeal against the respondent’s refusal of her claim for international protection.
2. The appellant is a national of the Philippines who was born in 1981. She arrived in the UK as a domestic worker in 2015 and claimed asylum in June 2023. She stated that she had suffered an abusive marriage in the Philippines and had sought work abroad. Her first employer, in Lebanon, had sexually assaulted her. Her second employer, in Abu Dhabi, had mistreated her by providing her with no food or pay.
3. The respondent refused asylum on 3 May 2024. She concluded that the claim did not engage the Refugee Convention; that none of the narrative was true; that the appellant was not at risk in the Philippines; and, in the alternative, that she could seek the protection of the authorities or relocate internally. The remainder of the letter concerned non-protection matters.
The Appeal to the First-tier Tribunal
4. The appellant appealed to the FtT. By the time the appeal was heard by Judge Quinn (“the judge”) on 25 July 2025, it had been accepted by the respondent that there were reasonable grounds for concluding that the appellant was a victim of trafficking.
5. The appellant and her partner gave evidence before the judge. He found that she was an economic migrant and that “she was not claiming asylum because of genuine fears of persecution”: [19]. She was exaggerating when she said that her husband would kill her if he found her: [44]. The judge was of the view that the appellant would have reported her husband to the police if she was scared of him: [27].
6. The judge concluded in any event that there was no risk from the appellant’s husband, who had last been in contact in 2011: [25]. It was “purely speculative” to suggest that he would harm her: [46]. There was nothing to suggest that her family had been targeted by her husband: [31]. He concluded that she had a “good support network” in the Philippines and that she could relocate if necessary: [32]-[37] and [50]-[52]. There was a viable option of seeking the protection of the Philippines police: [47]-[48]. The judge rejected the psychological report because the psychologist “was not a country expert and did not provide supporting evidence for many of his assertions.”: [53]. He concluded that the appellant’s removal would not be in breach of the ECHR: [55]-[58].
The Appeal to the Upper Tribunal
7. There are four grounds of appeal: (i) failure to treat the appellant as a vulnerable witness; (ii) failure to take into account the psychological report; (ii) failure to consider the background material; and (iv) inadequate assessment of the Article 8 ECHR claim.
8. Judge Kudhail considered all of the grounds to be arguable, noting that it was particularly arguable that the judge had failed to take account of the extensive medical evidence in assessing the appellant’s credibility and the risk on return to the Philippines.
9. The Secretary of State filed a response to the grounds under rule 24 on 21 October 2025. It was not accepted that the judge had erred in any of the manners contended in the grounds of appeal, or that any of the pleaded errors had any material affect on the outcome of the appeal.
Submissions
10. We turned at the outset of the hearing to Ms Khan, and expressed some concern about the fact that the judge had failed to reflect in his decision that it had been agreed by the parties that the appellant was a vulnerable witness, or to evaluate her evidence in light of that agreement in accordance with [15] of the Joint Presidential Guidance Note No 2 of 2010 and AM (Afghanistan) v SSHD [2017] EWCA Civ 1123; [2018] 4 WLR 78.
11. Ms Khan maintained the submissions made in the rule 24 response. She accepted that it had been agreed by the parties that the appellant was a vulnerable witness but she submitted that there was no reason to think that the hearing had been unfair. There was no suggestion that the appellant was unfit to give evidence before the FtT and she had been called to do so. Ms Khan accepted that the Consultant Clinical Psychologist who had written the report before the FtT had noted that the appellant had PTSD, depression and anxiety, and that she suffered from difficulties with recall impairment. She submitted that the judge’s main finding was that the appellant was no longer at any risk from her husband, and that that finding was untainted by anything said in the grounds. The credibility findings which had been made were “based on the appellant’s evidence”, Ms Khan submitted, and it was not necessary for the judge to consider her vulnerability before reaching his “thorough and well-reasoned” findings. Ms Khan submitted that it was not necessary for the judge to make reference to the background material before finding as he did, because the Senior President of Tribunals had underlined the benefits of concise decisions in his recent Practice Direction. The judge had been entitled to conclude that there was no threat to the appellant, and had been entitled to dismiss the appeal for the reasons that he had given.
12. We indicated that we did not need to hear from Mr Hodson and that the decision of the First-tier Tribunal would be set aside for error of law. We asked for submissions on relief and the representatives agreed that the proper course was for the appeal to be remitted. We agreed with their submissions in that regard and indicated that the appeal would be remitted de novo for hearing by a judge other than Judge Quinn. Our reasons for those conclusions are as follows.
Analysis
13. Whilst the Secretary of State is correct to submit orally and in writing that the judge’s ultimate conclusion was that there was no risk to the appellant from her husband, this is not a case in which her account was accepted in full. The judge cast doubt not only on the extent of her current fear, stating in terms that she had “exaggerated” it; he also expressed concern about the extent of the appellant’s past fear of her husband, stating that she would have reported his conduct to the police if she was as scared of him as she claimed to be.
14. In making those findings, and in concluding that the appellant was nothing more than an economic migrant, the judge gave no consideration to the appellant’s vulnerability. As Mr Hodson noted in his grounds of appeal, a First-tier Tribunal Legal Officer had made an order in the week before the hearing in which it was recognised that the appellant was a vulnerable witness. We doubt that any such conclusion was binding on the judge who ultimately came to consider the appeal, but it was at the very least an indication that the Joint Presidential Guidance (“JPG”) might be relevant. It should in any event have been clear from the case papers that the appellant was probably to be treated as a vulnerable witness. The psychological report discussed the mental health problems with which she presented and it had also been accepted that there were reasonable grounds to conclude that the appellant was a victim of trafficking. Whether by reference to her past or to her mental health, therefore, there was every reason to treat the appellant as a vulnerable witness. That was brought to the judge’s attention at the start of the hearing but we see no reference to it in the decision.
15. Ms Khan submitted that there was no reason to think that the hearing was conducted unfairly. We agree, but it is no part of Mr Hodson’s case that the hearing was conducted in a procedurally unfair manner. His complaint, instead, is that the judge failed to consider the appellant’s evidence in accordance with [15] of the JPG, which is as follows:
The decision should record whether the Tribunal has concluded the appellant (or a witness) is a child, vulnerable or sensitive, the effect the Tribunal considered the identified vulnerability had in assessing the evidence before it and this whether the Tribunal was satisfied whether the appellant had established his or her case to the relevant standard of proof. In asylum appeals, weight should be given to objective indications of risk rather than necessarily to a state of mind.
16. The importance of that guidance was made clear in JL (medical reports – credibility) [2013] UKUT 145 (IAC), with which the Court of Appeal agreed at [34] of AM (Afghanistan).
17. This was obviously not a case in which the judge thought, for example, that the appellant’s account was materially inconsistent or lacking in detail. In such a case, the JPG is obviously to the fore. But we are not able to accept Ms Khan’s submission (or that in the rule 24 response) that this was, in effect, a case in which the JPG had no part to play. According to the psychological report, the appellant suffers from mental health problems including PTSD and the judge was bound to take those conditions into account before he found that she had exaggerated her current fear and that her failure to report her problems to the police in the Philippines suggested that she was not in great fear at the time. Those conclusions were necessary ingredients in the judge’s overall finding that the appellant would not be at risk from her husband on return to Manila, and the judge’s failure to consider or to apply [15] of the JPG renders that conclusion unsafe.
18. We find that ground one is made out for the reasons above.
19. Ground two is also made out. We have reproduced verbatim what the judge said about the psychological report. He wrongly described it as a psychiatric report but perhaps not much turns on the label. He went on, however, to observe that Dr Majid – the Consultant Clinical Psychologist – is not a country expert. We do not understand why that observation was made or why it was relevant. The psychologist was obviously not a country expert; he was instructed to write a report about the appellant’s mental health, which is what he did. As Mr Hodson submitted at [12] of his grounds of appeal, it is simply irrelevant that Dr Majid is not a country expert.
20. The judge then said that Dr Majid failed to “provide supporting evidence for many of his assertions” but, as Mr Hodson also observed in his grounds of appeal, the “assertions” to which the judge was referring are wholly unclear from his decision. A judge is obviously not bound to accept expert evidence uncritically. His obligation is to take account of the expert evidence and, if he decides not to accept it, to provide good reason for that decision: SS (Sri Lanka) v SSHD [2012] EWCA Civ 155, at [21]. We consider it to be clear that the judge failed to discharge the latter aspect of that obligation. The reasons he gave for rejecting the psychological report (if indeed he did so) are inadequate and unsustainable.
21. That was, in turn, relevant to the judge’s assessment of whether the appellant could seek the protection of the police in the Philippines, and whether she could relocate internally. If, as we suspect, the judge failed to make any reference to the psychological report because he had rejected it for the reasons discussed above, that failure had a material impact on the judge’s assessment of these aspects of the appeal. The report was also relevant to the question of whether the appellant would encounter very significant obstacles to re-integration under the Private Life provisions of the Immigration Rules.
22. Ground three is also well-founded. There is no reference in the judge’s decision to any background material. The appeal was decided after the introduction of the new procedure for relying on background material. Judges are no longer confronted with voluminous bundles of country reports; they are instead given a schedule of passages which they are invited to consider. Such a schedule was provided in this case, and Mr Hodson had identified a number of sections which dealt with the availability of mental health treatment in the Philippines, but the judge made no reference to any of that in his decision. Nor do we see anything in the judge’s decision concerning the ability or willingness of the police to assist with matters of domestic violence. Ms Khan submitted that the judge was not required to rehearse the country material. That is obviously correct, and we are cognisant of the Senior President’s guidance to the FtT and the Upper Tribunal about the benefit of concise decisions. But a decision must still show by its reasoning that material matters have been considered, and this decision does not satisfy the litmus test in this respect.
23. We also consider Mr Hodson to be correct in his submission that the judge’s assessment of Article 8 ECHR was perfunctory. The judge was not required to structure his assessment of that question using a ‘balance sheet’ but the value of doing so has been highlighted by many decisions, not least of which is Hesham Ali v SSHD [2016] UKSC 60; [2016] 1 WLR 4799. In this appeal, the judge would have been well advised to set out a balance sheet because he failed, with respect, to alight on any matters which militated in favour of the appellant remaining in the UK with her Bulgarian partner. All of the considerations which he set out at [55]-[58] militated against the appellant and he undertook no assessment of basic matters which might have weighed against the public interest. He did not even make a finding, for example, on the question of whether the relationship between the appellant and her partner engaged Article 8 ECHR in its family life aspect despite her inability to meet the Immigration Rules. We think it likely that the Article 8 ECHR claim was not a strong one but the judge’s reasons for finding against the appellant in this respect were legally insufficient.
24. In the circumstances, we do not consider that any part of the FtT’s decision can stand. We therefore set it aside and, having reminded ourselves of what was said in AEB v SSHD [2022] EWCA Civ 1512; [2023] 4 WLR 12, we consider that the proper course is as urged upon us by both representatives, to remit the matter to be heard afresh by a judge other than Judge Quinn.
Notice of Decision
The decision of the FtT involved the making of errors on points of law and that decision is set aside. The appeal is remitted to the FtT to be heard afresh by a different judge.

Mark Blundell

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

5 February 2026