Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER
Case No: UI-2025-004748

First-tier Tribunal No: PA/68067/2023

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 26th February 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE JACKSON

Between

DG
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Ms J Lanigan of Counsel, instructed by Ata & Co Solicitors
For the Respondent: Ms S Rushforth, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 8 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the Appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the Appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the Appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS
1. This has been a remote hearing which has not been objected to by the parties. The form of remote hearing was by video, using CVP. There were no technical difficulties for the hearing itself and the papers were all available electronically.
2. The Appellant appeals with permission against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Revill promulgated on 3 September 2025 in which the Appellant’s appeal against the decision to refuse his protection and human rights claim dated 12 December 2023 was dismissed.
3. The Appellant is a national of Georgia, born on 7 January 1996, who claimed asylum in the United Kingdom on 3 August 2021. The essence of his claim was that he was at risk on return to Georgia from Chechens because of a blood feud which started in 1996 when his father, working as a police officer, was involved in an armed clash with Chechens, one of whom was killed and during which his father was also shot and killed. The Appellant relied on being a member of a particular social group for the purposes of the Refugee Convention.
4. The Respondent refused the application on the basis that the Appellant’s claim was not considered to be credible due to inconsistencies and the implausibility of being at risk now. The Respondent noted that there was no claimed attack on either the Appellant’s mother or brother who have remained in the same family home throughout and it was not accepted that the Appellant had been attacked at all in Georgia. In any event, the Respondent considered that there was a sufficiency of protection available to the Appellant from the state (the fear being from non-state actors) and that he had an option of intern relocation to a number of identified places. The Appellant was not entitled to a grant of humanitarian protection and his human rights claim failed as he did not meet the requirements of either Appendix FM for a grant of leave to remain on family life grounds (as his wife and child were not British or settled in the United Kingdom) or paragraph 276ADE of the Immigration Rules for a grant of leave to remain on private life grounds. There were no exceptional circumstances or other grounds for a grant of discretionary leave outside the Immigration Rules.
5. Judge Revill dismissed the appeal in a decision promulgated on 3 September 2025 on all grounds. The First-tier Tribunal accepted the Appellant’s claim to be subject to a blood feud in Georgia, further to which he had been attacked twice in October 2012 and October 2013; and that such blood feuds were indefinite and did not necessarily involve female members of the family. However, the First-tier Tribunal found that there would be a sufficiency of protection for the Appellant having considered the expert evidence on this point to be insufficient and not borne out by the sources relied upon. It was also found that the Appellant could internally relocate in Georgia given that he had spent seven years in Tbilisi without incident and there had only been one chance encounter with Chechens during that time which did not involve any violence and the Appellant was able to avoid contact with them. For essentially the same reasons the appeal failed on humanitarian protection grounds.
6. In relation to Article 8, the First-tier Tribunal found that there were no very significant obstacles to the Appellant’s reintegration in to Georgia and it would be in the best interests of his child to remain with the parents; the family unit returning together.
The appeal
7. The Appellant appeals on the following four grounds; that the First-tier Tribunal material erred in law in (i) its consideration of sufficiency of protection considering this first rather than starting with whether the Appellant could internally relocate given the accepted risk in his home area; (ii) applying the wrong test for sufficiency of protection set out in Horvarth v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2000] UKHL 37, in particular placing determinative weight on the Appellant’s past experience of the police rather than any broader assessment of the protection system, in the circumstances of a blood feud or generally and that there were inadequate reasons given for rejecting the expert evidence on this point; (iii) its assessment of internal relocation which failed to give adequate weight to the fact that Georgia is a small country with a strong clan network which could be used to locate individuals, with an indefinite risk period from the blood feud and with a failure to assess whether internal relocation would be unduly harsh; and (iv) its assessment of humanitarian protection and Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights for essentially the same reasons as set out in the other grounds of appeal.
8. Prior to the hearing, the Respondent made an application under Rule 15(2A) of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008 to adduce further evidence, namely copies of the source material cited in the expert report which went to the issue of whether the grounds in relation to the assessment of the expert evidence (if made out) were material to the outcome of the appeal. The Respondent highlighted in this application that the source material relied upon by the expert was repeatedly about the US State of Georgia and not Georgia, the country and was therefore wholly irrelevant to the propositions for which these sources were cited. There was no objection to the application on behalf of the Appellant and I admitted the documents as clearly relevant to the issues in the appeal and contained what was, in any event, material indirectly available before the First-tier Tribunal.
9. At the hearing, Ms Lanigan relied on the written grounds of appeal and made further oral submissions. She dealt with the first two grounds of challenge relating to sufficiency of protection together, albeit accepting that the first ground of challenge was dependent on an error of law being found on the third ground and as a standalone point, there was no material difference to the outcome whether the First-tier Tribunal considered whether there was a sufficiency of protection first or whether there was an option of internal relocation available first. Ms Lanigan was right not to pursue the first ground of challenge with any vigour, there would be absolutely no material difference to the outcome of the appeal depending on the order in which matters were considered by the First-tier Tribunal and I say no more about this ground of appeal below.
10. Ms Lanigan submitted that the First-tier Tribunal erred in law in failing to undertaking an individual assessment of whether there was sufficiency of protection for this Appellant and following a detailed analysis in paragraphs 40 to 43 needed to have gone on to consider the effectiveness of protection for a victim of a longstanding blood feud with the Appellant’s father having been specifically targeted. The expert referred to an example of a victim being killed near a police station, as well as issues of corruption and impropriety, but the First-tier Tribunal focused only on the latter. Even though only a single example was given, the First-tier Tribunal were required to undertake a careful analysis of this even if relatively rare. Ms Lanigan further referred to the findings on internal relocation and evidence of the ability of Chechens to track individuals, to look at the framework of protection, including, for example, the lack of witness protection available.
11. In relation to the source information relied upon by the expert, Ms Lanigan referred to the number of sources which did properly relate to Georgia the country and although it was accepted that there were issues with the report, it did not mean that no weight should be attached to it.
12. In relation to the third ground of appeal, Ms Lanigan referred to the First-tier Tribunal making an entirely speculative finding that the Appellant’s encounter with Chechans in Tbilisi was a chance encounter and failed to properly take into account the Appellant’s evidence on this and the overall positive credibility findings made in relation to his claim. The First-tier Tribunal focused on the passage of time the Appellant had spent in Tbilisi without incident but there had already been a long gap since the first attack and a year between the first and second attack such that the passage of time was not a material consideration to whether there was an ongoing risk.
13. On the issue of internal relocation, Ms Lanigan also submitted that the weight to be attached to the expert report on this issue was unaffected by the problem with sources relied upon given that there was sufficient information and examples of individuals being tracked to establish that the Appellant was at risk anywhere in Georgia; which is a small country. It was submitted that the First-tier Tribunal failed to grapple with the evidence on the geographical nature of Georgia which undermined and rendered unsafe the finding that it was only a chance encounter in Tbilisi.
14. As to whether the First-tier Tribunal failed to consider whether internal relocation was unduly harsh, Ms Lanigan accepted that this was not specifically raised as an issue before the First-tier Tribunal (the focus being on risk throughout Georgia) and that there was no specific evidence from the Appellant as to why internal relocation would be unduly harsh.
15. The final ground of appeal required no further expansion in oral submissions and stood or fell with the other grounds.
16. On behalf of the Respondent, Ms Rushforth relied on the detailed rule 24 response submitted and the further documentation in the Rule 15(2A) application. She submitted that the Appellant would have to succeed on both grounds two and three, that the First-tier Tribunal materially erred in its findings on sufficiency of protection and internal relocation before there could be any impact on the outcome of the appeal and overall, it was submitted that there was no error of law on either point.
17. On the first ground of appeal, Ms Rushforth submitted that it is reasonable to assume that a Judge of the First-tier Tribunal is familiar with the law on sufficiency of protection and there is nothing to suggest any misdirection on this in the present appeal; to the contrary the First-tier Tribunal demonstrated that it was aware of the test and correctly apply it. Just because a person is at risk in their home area, does not mean that there could not be a sufficiency of protection elsewhere.
18. On the second ground of appeal, Ms Rushforth submitted that the First-tier Tribunal expressly considered the Appellant’s personal circumstances and experience and that the ground of appeal was no more than disagreement with the finding. In relation to the expert report, the First-tier Tribunal appropriately engaged with the report and in any event, even though the point was not expressly identified by the First-tier Tribunal in the decision, the use of sources relating to the wrong country would inevitably have reduced the weight that could be attached to the report.
19. Ms Rushforth submitted that the third ground of appeal also amounted to no more than disagreement with the conclusions on internal relocation and again referred to the specific consideration by the First-tier Tribunal of the Appellant’s personal circumstances, including that he had internally relocated for a period of eight years without any incident of harm, and the errors in the expert report. Further, that any other relevant factors were expressly considered in the context of the Article 8 assessment and need not have been repeated elsewhere in the decision.

Findings and reasons
20. For the reasons set out already above, there is no error of law in the first ground of appeal which could not on any event amount to a material error of law. The order in which matters are considered is a complaint of form over substance.
21. The second ground of appeal relates to the First-tier Tribunal’s findings on sufficiency of protection which are contained in paragraphs 40 to 45 of the decision. The First-tier Tribunal firstly expressly considers the Appellant’s own past experience with the police in Georgia and found that he had not made out the claim that the Chechen people he fears have influence over the police such that they could attack him with impunity. There is no challenge to that finding.
22. Secondly, the First-tier Tribunal found as follows in relation to the expert report:
“43. I do not consider Mr Kharitonov’s country expert report supports the Appellant’s argument on sufficiency of protection. While he refers to a ‘political capture of the judiciary and police’ (AB/22), there is no political element to the Appellant’s claim and therefore no reason to believe this would be a difficulty. He cites a killing in Pankisi Gorge that happened a few kilometres from a police station and allegedly ‘in view of police vehicles’ where ‘only two of thirteen suspects were convicted’ and locals allege the attackers ‘may have been linked to the authorities’ (AB/23). I do not believe this is evidence of a general insufficiency of protection. The conviction of two people shows the matter was investigated and taken seriously. There are any number of reasons why other suspects may have been acquitted, and in the absence of further detail I am not prepared to find that this shows impropriety in that case, let alone that the same applies to the Appellant’s.
44. While Mr Kharitonov opines that ‘[f]or someone facing a persistent blood feud, the police lack the independence and capability to provide reliable long-term protection’, I find that this is not borne out by the sources on which he relies. I reject his conclusions in this regard.”
23. The expert report in relation to sufficiency of protection is relatively brief and as recorded by the First-tier Tribunal includes only one example with an allegation of attackers being linked to the police and otherwise only a reference to political issues which is not relevant at all to this Appellant. It was lawfully and rationally open to the First-tier Tribunal to conclude that that the evidence was insufficient, both in terms of that example and the sources cited, for the expert to reach a conclusion that there was no sufficiency of protection for the Appellant in Georgia. It was self-evidently inadequate to establish that there was no sufficiency of protection to the Horvarth standard, even without any issue with the actual sources relied upon, the conclusion contained no error of law.
24. The third ground of appeal relates to the First-tier Tribunal’s findings on internal relocation, which are contained in paragraphs 46 to 50 of the decision. The First-tier Tribunal considers first the Appellant’s experience of relocating to Tbilisi between the end of 2013 and June 2021, during which it was found that he had a single chance encounter with Chechens in 2020 which did not involve an attack nor was there anything to suggest that Chechens may be in the capital for reasons other than tracking down the Appellant. In particular, it was noted that the Appellant had remained in Tbilisi for a year after this encounter during which he had also not been tracked down by any Chechens. It was lawfully and rationally open to the First-tier Tribunal to find, on the limited evidence available, that there was only a chance encounter with Chechens in 2020 in Tbilisi against the Appellant’s claim on this incident and even with positive credibility findings on other aspects of his claim.
25. Secondly, the First-tier Tribunal expressly considered the expert report and in particular the view that the small size of Georgia meant no location is beyond a few hours’ travel, with Mr Khaironov’s view that Chechens, with deep-rooted clan and kinship networks, could pursue a person with relative ease. It was lawfully and rationally open to the First-tier Tribunal to consider that if that was correct, it weakened the Appellant’s claim because despite the ease which with a pursuer could find someone like the Appellant, they had not done so in over seven years and even after seeing him in Tbilisi.
26. For the reasons given in paragraphs 46 to 50, after express consideration of both the Appellant’s own evidence and circumstances and the exert report on the issue; it was rationally and lawfully open to the First-tier Tribunal to find that the Appellant could safely and reasonably internally relocate within Georgia. On the evidence available, the Appellant simply failed to establish his claim otherwise and the decision contained no error of law in its assessment of this.
27. The First-tier Tribunal does not expressly consider whether internal relocation would be unduly harsh for the Appellant, however, that is not at all unexpected given that (i) it was not raised as an issue by the Appellant; (ii) there was no evidence from the Appellant raising any matters that could even arguably make internal relocation unduly harsh; and (iii) the First-tier Tribunal had already set out the Appellant’s successful internal relocation for a period of over seven years, which was in any event strong evidence that it was neither unreasonable nor unduly harsh. There is no error of law by a Judge for failing to consider a matter which was simply not before it, in any form. In any event, in the absence of any evidence of internal relocation being unduly harsh, it is inevitable that even express consideration of this would not have had any material impact on the outcome of the appeal.
28. I would add a further point in relation to the second and third grounds of appeal about the sources relied upon by the expert, that in any event even if there was an error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s assessment of the evidence, it would likely not be material to the outcome of the appeal in circumstances where the weight to be attached to the report would inevitably be reduced. As highlighted by the Respondent, Mr Kharitonov relies on sources in the sections on sufficiency of protection and internal relocation that do not even relate to the correct country and could not therefore, on any view, support the conclusions that he reaches and the weight to be attached to the same, based on more limited sources relating to the correct country would inevitably be reduced. It is of significant concern that a person who has declared himself to be an appropriate expert and specifically accessed sources did not appear to recognise that material he was relying on was not about the right country and of further significant concern that a report which contained such basic errors was still submitted to the First-tier Tribunal and relied upon by the Appellant, including on onward appeal to the Upper Tribunal. I go not further than this as it is not necessary or appropriate to make any specific findings on the expert’s compliance with his duties to the Tribunal in circumstances where there is no error of law anyway and where he has not had an opportunity to respond to concerns.
29. The final ground of appeal stands or falls with the earlier two grounds. Having found no error of law in the First-tier Tribunal’s findings that the Appellant would have a sufficiency of protection available in Georgia and an option to internally relocate, there are no consequential or similar errors of law in the dismissal of the appeal on humanitarian protection or Article 3 grounds.
30. For all of these reasons, there are no errors of law in the decision of the First-tier Tribunal, which made clear and cogent findings on the evidence before it; which included limited and poor quality expert evidence.

Notice of Decision

The making of the decision of the First-tier Tribunal did not involve the making of a material error of law. As such it is not necessary to set aside the decision.

The decision to dismiss the appeal is therefore confirmed.

G Jackson

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

20th February 2026