Tribunal decisions

The decision

IN THE UPPER TRIBUNAL
IMMIGRATION AND ASYLUM CHAMBER Case No: UI-2025-004767
First-tier Tribunal No: PA/03736/2024

THE IMMIGRATION ACTS

Decision & Reasons Issued:
On 21st April 2026

Before

UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE BEN KEITH

Between

SS
(ANONYMITY ORDER MADE)
Appellant
and

SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT
Respondent

Representation:
For the Appellant: Mr Rahman, instructed by International Legal Solicitors LLP
For the Respondent: Ms Keerthy, Senior Home Office Presenting Officer

Heard at Field House on 20 January 2026

Order Regarding Anonymity

Pursuant to rule 14 of the Tribunal Procedure (Upper Tribunal) Rules 2008, the appellant is granted anonymity.

No-one shall publish or reveal any information, including the name or address of the appellant, likely to lead members of the public to identify the appellant. Failure to comply with this order could amount to a contempt of court.

DECISION AND REASONS

1. This is an appeal against the decision of First-tier Tribunal Judge Buckwell. This is an appeal against the decision promulgated on 15 July 2025, by which the First-tier Tribunal refused the appellant’s appeal under the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002.

2. The appellant is a citizen of Bangladesh, born on 5 May 1987. The Secretary of State refused his application for protection on 5 March 2024, the application having been made on 29 January 2023. The appellant appealed on 18 March 2024 to the First-tier Tribunal.

3. The facts are set out in detail in the First-tier Tribunal judgment and an extensive bundle of papers. In short, the appellant is a journalist working in film journalism and other mediums. He alleges that he will be at risk on return to Bangladesh of persecution, firstly, because of his journalistic background and career, and secondly, because of his criticism both of the previous government run by the Awami League, and secondly, by the current government, as well as Jamaat-e-Islami and allied actors.

4. He appeals with permission on seven separate grounds:

Ground 1: Failure to properly consider continuing risk from new political actors.

Ground 2: Flawed approach by the First-tier Tribunal judge on documentary evidence.

Ground 3: Inadequate assessment of the sur place activities and political profile of the appellant by the First-tier Tribunal judge.

Ground 4: Failure to give adequate reasons in respect of the supporting witness.

Ground 5: Error made by the First-tier Tribunal judge in the assessment of medical and Article 3 issues.

Ground 6: Failure to apply paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules properly.

Ground 7: Inadequate reasons and misapplication of the lower standard of proof by the First-tier Tribunal judge.

Assessment of Risk on Return

5. The judge records the evidence given to them in the First tier. However, on assessment of the risks on return, the judge says at paragraph 72: “I give very considerable weight to the above change in country circumstances of relatively recent time and find that the appellant’s claim as to risk of return must be objectively evaluated in the light of these changes.”

6. Overall, I am troubled by the lack of detail in the assessment of the new Bangladeshi government by the First-tier Tribunal. It is not an easy exercise to perform, but in essence, the First-tier Tribunal judge has dismissed the appellant’s appeal, not because there is no well-founded fear of persecution, but that the changing government has effectively resolved all of the potential issues and the danger to journalists in Bangladesh.

7. In my judgment, looking at the objective evidence, in particular the CPIN, that is not borne out by the evidence. The judge has failed to analyse whether there remain any risks to journalists. Simply a change of government, which was both violent and dramatic, leading to the removal of Sheikh Hasina who fled to India and now faces prosecution for murder under the International Crimes (Tribunals) Act, is well-known public fact. In my judgment, there needed to be much more detail and assessment of the potential for risk to the appellant on return.

8. Given the background that Bangladesh is still one of the most dangerous countries for journalists to operate in – under the Awami League, disappearance, murder, torture, and politically motivated prosecutions were normal practice – the change in government, of course, means that there has been some improvement in the conditions. But there has not been any real evidence to show how much that has changed or whether it is in fact now safe to report on the activities of the current government, who also contain factions from previous administrations.

9. It is worth noting that the change of government cannot, as a matter of fact, completely remove the influence of previous members of the police force, civil service, or judiciary who were equally complicit in the persecution of journalists in previous administrations. Therefore, I find it surprising that no analysis has been put forward in relation to whether there remains a risk in Bangladesh, effectively being dismissed by a change of government. I cannot see how that can be an effective and proper analysis of the facts in the case.

Unsustainable Findings

10. In any event, the judge makes some findings which I consider to be unsustainable. At paragraph 75, the judge says the following: “In his account, the appellant portrayed himself as what I would term a ‘campaigning journalist’. He emphasised several times during his evidence that he has not supported particular political parties, but that he has campaigned against injustice generally. As to the incident where the appellant claimed to have been a court witness when a disturbance erupted, involving many people there, the appellant does not claim that he was harmed as a consequence, but that he was ‘hassled’ there. That was not occasioned by any state actor.”

11. It seems to me that that is factually incorrect, and in fact the hassle to the appellant was in fact explicitly stated as being by a state actor, albeit that it was potentially somebody employed or connected to the Awami League party.

12. At paragraph 77, the judge says the following: “As to any claimed outstanding court case, I am not persuaded in that respect, finding myself broadly in agreement with Ms Skinner for the reasons she put forward. However, if there might be a politically motivated charge outstanding, the current and very much changed circumstances are more likely to provide for justice in Bangladesh, as compared to governance under the Awami League.”

13. I find paragraph 77 to be troubling. The judge has not found either way as to whether there is a politically motivated case against the appellant, but has said that there “might be” a politically motivated charge. If that is the case, that is enough to reach the plausibility threshold under the Refugee Convention.

14. The follow-up decision that the very much changed circumstances are more likely to provide for justice in Bangladesh does not meet the required standard of a fair trial or non-persecutory trial that might take place. If somebody is to be returned to a country for a prosecution that was politically motivated, and that is a plausible outcome, even in the circumstances where there might be a fair trial and it might be dismissed, that would be a breach of the Refugee Convention.

15. So I am troubled that paragraph 77 of the judgment does not adequately analyse the situation in this case effectively and is, in any event, wrong in law. Once a politically motivated charge is found to be a plausible factual scenario, then in my judgment that would be sufficient to show Refugee Convention grounds, absent of looking at internal relocation and sufficiency of protection.

16. I note that internal relocation and sufficiency of protection are not properly analysed in this judgment, although I am aware that, at least from the CPINs, actors of protection are poor and the country situation is extremely volatile at the current time.

Ground 1: Continuing Risk from New Political Actors

17. In relation to Ground 1, in my judgment, there is an error of law. The First-tier Tribunal judge does not adequately, or in any real way, reason the potential for risk of persecution from Jamaat-e-Islami and only focuses on the Awami League and that they are no longer in power. Given that there is no proper analysis of this element of the claim, it is my judgment that that constitutes an error of law.

18. It is a difficult assessment to make given the fast-moving pace of Bangladeshi politics and civil society. But given the severity of the human rights violations that occur in Bangladesh towards journalists prior to the change of government, in my judgment, that starting point of journalists being at serious and persistent risk of persecution means that the First-tier Tribunal judge did need to reason and examine the evidence such as it is in relation to alternative agents of persecution. I therefore find an error in relation to Ground 1.

Ground 2: Documentary Evidence

19. In relation to Ground 2, the appellant argued before me and in writing that the First-tier Tribunal judge materially erred in their assessment of the appellant’s documents. The appellant’s counsel argued that the First-tier Tribunal judge rejected the appellant’s assertion that a newspaper report described at paragraph 19 of the judgment could have been produced by 7 a.m. the following day, and that was an error of law.

20. There are a few issues with this. In my judgment, that is in fact not what the First-tier Tribunal judge was saying. The First-tier Tribunal judge was merely recording that the Home Office had put that contention to the appellant – that it was impossible for him to have been in an article at 7 a.m. the following day. As a matter of common sense and common knowledge, that is a bizarre thing to put to a witness, given that it is perfectly factually capable of producing a newspaper story the day following an incident. The suggestion made by the Home Office in the First-tier Tribunal, or otherwise, is without foundation or evidence.

21. In my judgment, the judge does not in fact make any proper findings in relation to documentary evidence, which is in fact more problematic. And given that there is no proper analysis of the risk on return from the new government, other than to say that the old government is not in place, I consider that to be a problem. However, in relation to the specific issue pleaded at Ground 2, I find there is no error of law as currently pleaded.

Ground 3: Sur Place Activities and Political Profile

22. In relation to the sur place activities and his political profile, in my judgment, the judge has in the same way not analysed the risk of the appellant on return as a result of his sur place activities, particularly in relation to the new government. This is a complex, fast-moving scenario in that there is a new government, and the appellant has criticised both the old and the new government. In my judgment, Grounds 1 and 3 rise and fall together, given that there is not a proper analysis of the risk on return in relation to the new government. In my judgment, Ground 3 is also made out and there is an error of law.

Ground 4: Supporting Witness

23. Ground 4 is a failure to give adequate reasons in respect of the supporting witness. The appellant pleads that the Tribunal failed to properly engage with the evidence of a supporting witness, who is referred to as AM, in particular, whose testimony gave corroborative evidence as to the systemic risks faced by journalists in Bangladesh. It is pleaded that the judge gave little or no weight to their evidence, essentially on the basis that the witness did not have personal dealings with the appellant.

24. In my judgment, this effectively wraps in with Grounds 1 and 3 in that it is not really about the failure to assess AM, but the failure to assess the risk to journalists overall. As it seems to me, at least on a prima facie reading of the facts of journalists in Bangladesh, they are at very serious risk under the Awami League of retribution involving risk of death, kidnapping, and torture. Without very careful analysis, in my judgment, that has to be the starting point for return of journalists to Bangladesh.

25. It may be that the situation has dramatically improved, and therefore journalists are now safe, reporting as they wish in Bangladesh. However, that would be a surprise given the deep-seated attacks on journalists by police, judiciary, and civil society. A change of government is not, in my judgment, without significant evidence, sufficient to radically change the position in relation to the risk against journalists.

26. Therefore, in relation to Ground 4, I make no separate finding in relation to error of law, given that I have already found that the judge has failed to reason risk on return in relation to other actors, not the Awami League. I therefore find no separate error of law in relation to Ground 4.

Ground 5: Medical and Article 3 Assessment

27. In relation to Ground 5, the error in medical and Article 3 assessment: it is pleaded that the First-tier Tribunal judge dismissed the appellant’s serious medical health conditions on the essential basis that there was medication available in Bangladesh. It is submitted that the judge failed to apply the correct threshold test set under AM (Zimbabwe) [2020] UKSC 17 and misdirected themselves by treating the availability of medication alone as sufficient.

28. In my judgment, the judge has not made any error in relation to Article 3 or the application of AM (Zimbabwe), and I find no error of law in relation to Ground 5. The judge properly reasoned the decision.

Ground 6: Paragraph 339K

29. Ground 6: failure to apply paragraph 339K of the Immigration Rules properly. The appellant pleads the judge failed to apply the mandatory presumption arising from past persecution. In my judgment, the judge has failed to properly apply 339K, essentially in relation to the same error that is present in Grounds 1 and 3.

30. But in this case, more problematically, because the judge, having accepted that the appellant suffered some persecution – in particular, the judge has failed to make a full finding on whether he was the subject of an attempted kidnapping or not – has then treated the risk on return as being nugatory given the changing government.

31. However, in my judgment, the starting point in this case is, and always has been, that there is a serious risk on return for this appellant, absent significant new evidence that the change of government has significantly improved the position of journalists – not just that it has significantly improved, but such that they are safe on return. The judge has not examined that question or examined the evidence in relation to that either way, and in my judgment, Ground 6 is also made out and is also an error of law.

Ground 7: Standard of Proof

32. Ground 7 pleads that there were inadequate reasons and a misapplication of the lower standard of proof. However, in submissions Mr Rahaman was unable to point me to any paragraph in which the judge has applied the wrong standard of proof.

33. There are, as I have explained, a number of problematic passages which I do not consider to be adequately reasoned, such that it is not clear what the judge found in relation to, for instance, the alleged kidnapping or the politically motivated trial. In those circumstances, I do find that there are inadequate reasons and find there is an error of law in that respect. I do not find that there was any misapplication of the standard of proof.

Overall Conclusion and Disposal

34. Therefore, overall, when examining the case, I find there are a number of errors of law. The key issue is the judge has failed to conduct a rigorous examination of the risk on return under the new government, simply finding that the removal of the old government is sufficient to alleviate all of the previous problems from the previous government which journalists face. That is against the background of Bangladesh being one of the most dangerous places in the world for journalists to operate.

35. In those circumstances, it was a requirement that significantly more reasoning was given to the risk on return to Bangladesh under the new government for journalists in general, but also this particular appellant, who had both suffered persecution, was potentially subject to a politically motivated prosecution, and a misapplication of 339K, without proper consideration of the impact his criticism of the current government might have on his journalistic career and his risk on return to Bangladesh.

36. For all those reasons, I find that I set aside the judgment of the First-tier Tribunal. Both parties have submitted to me that the case should be returned to the First-tier Tribunal, and I agree. This case needs full proper assessment of the factual matrix and the risk on return to Bangladesh for this particular individual, given his journalistic background and profession.

37. The only finding of fact preserved in this case is that there is no error of law in relation to Article 3 ECHR and health concerns. However, I accept that that may require assessment by a new First-tier Tribunal panel or judge if matters develop. I therefore preserve those findings only insofar as they are effective at the time of the hearing.

38. Both parties submitted that if I found an error of law the case should be remitted to the First-Tier Tribunal for a rehearing.

Notice of Decision

1. There is an error of law.
2. The case is remitted to the First Tier tribunal for a rehearing.

Ben Keith

Judge of the Upper Tribunal
Immigration and Asylum Chamber

21 January 2026